



















GENERAL HISTORY  
OF THE  
CHRISTIAN RELIGION AND CHURCH:

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF  
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“ My kingdom is not of this world.” “ The kingdom of heaven is like unto  
heaven.”—*Words of our Lord.*

“ The Lord is that Spirit: and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is  
liberty.”—*Words of the Apostle Paul.*

“ En Jésus Christ toutes les contradictions sont accordées.”—*Pascal.*

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# CHURCH HISTORY.

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## SECTION FOURTH—*continued.*

### HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY APPREHENDED AND DEVELOPED AS A SYSTEM OF DOCTRINES—*continued.*

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#### *Heretical Tendencies—continued.*

*Sects which originated in the blending of Christianity with ancient Oriental Views.*

THE list of these sects commences with the great family of the Gnostics, in which this intermingling of the old oriental spirit with Christianity first made its way. We shall therefore speak first of all of them.

#### *Gnostic Sects.*

*General Remarks on the Origin and Character of these Sects, on their Common Characteristics, and the Specific Differences constituting the Grounds of their Subdivision.*

Rightly to understand the historical significance of this great phenomenon we must contemplate it from several different points of view. We perceive in it, in the first place, the aristocratic spirit which had reigned supreme in the social structure and had influenced the religion and philosophy of the old world reacting against the Christian principle which was to overthrow it, and resisting the adoption of a single religious faith whereby all the distinctions previously subsisting among men in relation to the higher life were to be abolished, and all were to be united together in one and the same exalted fellowship. As the aristocracy of knowledge and enlightenment had at first spurned this faith with contempt, and set itself in hostility to it, so, when Christianity had found its way among educated men and the searchers

after wisdom, the same principle, attracted in many ways by Christianity, sought to gain admission into it. The very name, Gnosis, by which this phenomenon was designated, refers to such a tendency, since it denotes the religion of knowledge and of one who knows, as contrasted with the belief of the multitude (*πίστις τῶν πολλῶν*). We have already seen\* how, even among the Alexandrian Jews, under the influence of Platonism, such a philosophical system of religion had been formed, as exalted itself above, or set itself up in opposition to, the popular religious faith. Such a tendency had found its way into Christianity. But now Orientalism was added to Hellenism—Oriental *Theosophy* to Platonic *philosophy*. As, on the practical side, the old distinction between priesthood and laity had established itself in the development of Christianity, so here, on the theoretic side, a similar reaction of the ante-christian principle manifested itself. As there we find the antithesis between priesthood and laity, so here we find that between knowers and believers—a hierarchy of another kind. Alongside of that practical distinction between the spiritual and the secular class, the other distinction established itself in the theoretical domain—the distinction between the privileged natures, the men of intellect, whose vocation it was to know, the *πνευματικοί*, and the rude mass of the *ψυχικοί*, who could not rise above blind and implicit faith.

We invariably observe that all reactions against the Christian principle are first called forth by some defective or discoloured view of it, and that it is against such that they are primarily directed. And such we perceive was the case in the present instance. If greater prominence had been given in the church to the genuine Pauline conception of faith, this reaction, originating in an over-estimate of knowledge—that which St. Paul himself designated by the phrase *σοφίαν ζητεῖν*—might indeed have arisen; yet the elevation of mind which is grounded in the essence of faith thus understood would not have been so easily overlooked. But generally this conception had been greatly obscured; and instead of it there was to be found no higher notion of faith than a sense of trust on outward authority, which by itself alone could not obtain the reward of eternal

\* See the account of the Alexandrian theology in the general Introduction.



life, but must besides have added to it good works done from love. Such a faith might with good reason be characterized as a subordinate position of the Christian life, something which was more Jewish than Christian; and this furnished Gnosticism with a plausible reason for its depreciation of faith.\* Again, it cannot be denied that faith, in this outward view of it, did often place itself in direct opposition to the pursuit of knowledge, maintaining every dogma as a something *positive*, and as given from *without*, as an aggregate of so many individual positive doctrines and precepts. But in Christianity based upon faith, as the principle of perfection for all that is purely human, the desire of knowledge in religious matters was, without overstepping the limits of nature, also to find its satisfaction. It could not fail but that, as soon as Christianity entered man's intellectual life, a longing should arise to attain to a clear insight into the connection between revealed truths and the intellectual treasures previously in possession of mankind, and also into the harmony existing within the sphere of Christian truth itself as an organic whole. But when such a craving, instead of being met and satisfied, was sure to be violently suppressed, the one-sided tendency of the Gnosis

\* The late Dr. Möhler made Gnosticism a precursor of Protestantism, and in support of his position made use of much that was only partially true. Among these half truths is his assertion—that Gnosticism, so far as its polemical attitude to the dominant church is concerned, did undoubtedly agree with Protestantism. But there was this difference—the opposition in the two cases sprang out of very different positive principles. In Gnosticism it originated in a purely theoretical principle, a conception of Gnosis altogether alien to the foundation of Christianity;—in Protestantism, on the other hand, it sprang out of the Pauline conception of faith, once more restored and reinstated to its full significance. Marcion alone constitutes an exception, and he may with *more propriety* be styled a precursor of Protestantism. So, too, at the basis of Möhler's whole theory lies the truth, that Gnosticism, in so far as it was a reaction against the Jewish element that had been blended with Christianity, was a precursor of Protestantism; to which, however, it must be added that, as the reaction of the former proceeded from a different principle from the latter, so it was carried to an extreme which led to error of another kind. Marcion constitutes an exception in the first respect, not in the last. But as a Jewish element mixed in with Christianity is perceived in Romanism, when considered from the Protestant point of view, so, on the other hand, Gnostic elements might be naturally expected to manifest themselves in Protestantism, as viewed from the Romanist position.

found therein its justification. An exclusively 'theoretical tendency opposed itself to an exclusively practical one, and the latter fault tended to introduce the former.\*

The nature of Gnosticism, as a reaction of the old principle in religion against the Christian, is closely connected with another point. The opposition both between an esoteric sacerdotal doctrine and an exoteric religion of the people, and between a philosophical religion and a mythical popular belief, has its necessary ground in the fact that antiquity was destitute of any independent means, adapted alike to all stages of human enlightenment for satisfying man's religious needs. Such a means, however, was supplied by a faith in great historical facts, on which the religious convictions of all men alike were to depend. Thereby was secured the emancipation of religion, as well from all dependence on the elements of the world (of which emancipation we have spoken in the section on worship) as from dependence on the wisdom of the world, which *in its wisdom* knew not God. Now, as in that section we observed a reaction of the earlier principle which sought to bring religion once more under the yoke of the elements of the world, so in the Gnosis we observe a similar reaction tending to make religion forfeit the freedom gained for it by Christ, and to make it again dependent on human speculation. Christianity had furnished a simple universally intelligible solution of every enigma that had occupied thinking minds;—a practical answer to all the questions which speculation had busied itself in vain to answer. It established a temper of mind by which doubts which could not be resolved by the efforts of speculative reason were to be practically vanquished. But Gnosticism wished to make religion once more dependent on a speculative solution of these questions; in this manner it wished to lay a firm foundation for it, and to provide for its correct understanding, so that in this way men were first to learn to comprehend Christianity and to attain to that true firmness of conviction which should be no longer dependent on any external fact.

Now, with regard to the speculative element in these sys-

\* Thus Origen told his friend Ambrosius he had been conducted to a false Gnosis: Ἀπορία τῶν πρεσβυόντων τὰ χρίσταινα, μὴ φέρον τὴν ἀλογον καὶ ἰδιωτικὴν πίστιν. Orig. T. V. in Joann. s. 4. T. I. p. 172, ed. Lommatzsch.

tems, we may remark that it is not the product of reason divorced from facts, and resolved to draw the whole out of its own depths. As we observed in the General Introduction, men had revolted against the rationalistic principle which marked the close of the best times of ancient history, and into which Greek and Roman civilisation finally resolved itself: they had begun to search *in history* for vestiges of the revelation of divine things. The void into which a merely negative philosophy invariably sinks had taught the human mind, which by an inherent impulse is ever craving after reality, to seek for a more positive doctrine. We have already noticed in this direction the rising efforts of a revived Platonism to search for and to compare the theologumena, or opinions concerning the deity which had been held by the most ancient nations. The example of Plutarch has shown us this tendency proceeding out of Platonism and passing to the fountains of the ancient East. Platonism, it is true, aimed at *incorporating* everything else into *itself*—a result, indeed, of the peculiar character of the Grecian mind. But by this means it procured an admission for Oriental ideas, which thereupon revolted against the dominion of the Grecian intellect. Seeking to bring the Grecian element under subjection to itself, in its lofty flights it soared far beyond the limits with which the Platonic philosophy had caused the mere abstract reason to remain contented. The profound Plotinus was forced at a later date to attempt to restore the original Platonism (as *he* believed it should be systematically understood) to its purity and independence. He must seek to emancipate the Grecian mind from the thralldom of the Oriental; must stand forth as the defender of the old Hellenic philosophy against the haughtiness and pride of the Oriental spirit, as he saw it exhibited by the Gnostics.\*

Accordingly, in all the Gnostic systems we may trace, diversely blended together, elements of the Platonic philosophy, of the Jewish theology, and of the old Oriental theosophy. It is not improbable that a more enlarged acquaintance with the various religions of the interior of Asia might furnish many new particulars likely to throw light on the history of Gnosticism; but at the same time we must always be cautious lest, from an

\* See Ennead. II. 1. IX.

agreement which might spring from a common ground in the inmost and essential tendencies of human nature, which under like circumstances lead to like results, we directly infer the existence of some external communication. This Gnosis arrayed itself against Judaism, as a religion too material, too earthly, too confined, too little theosophic. For to men of this intellectual bent, how far from spiritual, how bald, how mean and empty must Judaism have appeared in comparison with the old colossal religions of Asia; although, to him who understands the great end to which religion is to lead man, the very comparison which moved *them* to despise Judaism first discloses its full value in the religious development of humanity. But to them these ancient religions, with their enigmatical shapes (in which man is ever more inclined to look for lofty wisdom than in what is simple), seemed to promise far greater insight than Judaism into *the questions* which excited their inquiries.

Among the old Oriental systems of religion, Parsism, or the doctrine of Zoroaster, acquired great credit and influence, through the intercourse which for many ages numerous nations had maintained with its seat, and through the influence of the Dualistic element, which in the prevailing tone of mind in this period had found many a point of sympathy. Of this the Gnostic systems are themselves an evidence. The latter, however, do not seem to have apprehended this doctrine quite consistently with the original spirit of Parsism; for this was a practical spirit. According to Parsism, the creation by the good principle comes first; powers of the kingdom of light are at work everywhere in the world;—Ahriman is but the disturbing and destructive principle. While the follower of this system exercises an active and formative influence on nature, governing and directing its wild energies and setting limits to destruction, he acts as a warrior in the service of Ormuzd for the overthrow of Ahriman. But in the Gnostic systems, though not equally in all, this practical element, this love of nature, is driven into the background. Another spirit has here prevailed, totally recasting this mode of view. The power of the ungodly principle in the world appears predominant; and hence arises the tendency to represent the mind in affinity with God as abstaining from an alien nature rather than as acting on and improving it. Considered on this side we see in



Gnosticism the spirit rather of Brahmanism, and especially of Buddhism,—that longing of the soul for release from the bonds of matter (the world of Sansara), of nature—for reunion with the primal spirit, from whom all life has flowed; that desire to emancipate itself from all human and earthly things, which strove to pass beyond the limits of finite existence. Though, in order to account for a direction which men's minds might easily take from inward grounds, without any external impulse, there is no need to look for causes in the shape of external influences,—for, in fact, the operation of such external influences could not well be understood in the absence of all attractive affinity in the inner development of the spiritual world,—still we have reason, in the present case, to ascribe such an influence to tendencies and ideas originating from the remote countries of the East. Modern investigations and discoveries have traced the way by which Buddhism might have spread its influence, even to the heart of the Roman empire.

Although the Gnostic systems contain elements of various ancient systems of religion, still they by no means admit of being explained simply by the mixture or composition of such elements; there is a *peculiar living principle* which animates most of these combinations. In the first place, the age in which they were produced stamped them with a perfectly peculiar character. For in times of great excitement we may often observe certain general tendencies imparted to their whole series of intellectual phenomena, even though the latter have no outward contact or connection with one another. There are certain tendencies and ideas which exercise a wonderful power over everything contemporary with them. Such, in the present case, was the Dualistic principle, which harmonized with the prevailing temper of the age, and in which the latter saw itself reflected.\* The prevailing tone in almost all the more serious minds of the period in question was a consciousness of the power of evil, a feeling of discord and dissatisfaction with the existing state of things, an aspiration for something beyond the limits of this earth, a longing after some new and higher order of things. This fundamental tone also pervades

\* Just as the progressive movement in our own day enables us to explain the power which the Pantheistic principle has acquired, so the progressive movement in the period of which we are speaking explains the power of the Dualistic principle.



the Gnostic systems. But upon this feeling Christianity exerted quite a peculiar influence, without which most of the Gnostic systems would have taken a very different form. It was the idea that constituted the characteristic essence of Christianity, the idea of *redemption*, which modified this fundamental tone in those systems; although it is true they only apprehended this idea in a single aspect, and not in its whole compass and with all its consequences. When the Gnostic systems describe the amazement which was produced in the kingdom of the Demiurge by the appearance of Christ, as the manifestation of a new and mighty principle which had entered the precincts of this lower world, they give us to understand how powerful was the impression which the contemplation of the life of Christ, and of his influence on humanity, had left on the minds of the founders of these systems, making all earlier institutions seem to them as nothing in comparison with Christianity. It appeared to them as the commencement of a *great* revolution in the life of mankind. The ideas of the adjustment of the disturbed harmony of the universe; of the restoration of a fallen creation to its original source; of the reunion of earth with heaven; of a revelation to man of an ineffable god-like life transcending the limits of mere human nature; of a new process of development having entered into the whole system of the terrestrial world—such were the ideas which henceforward formed the centre of these systems. The distinctive aim of the Gnostics was to apprehend the appearance of Christ, and the new creation proceeding from him, in their connection with the evolution of the whole universe. In a *theogonical* and *cosmogonical* process, remounting to the original ground of all existence, everything is referred backwards and forwards to the fact of Christ's appearance. What the Apostle St. Paul says respecting the connection of redemption with creation, they made the central point of a speculative system, and endeavoured to understand it speculatively.

As regards the particular nature of their speculations, these Gnostics are *Oriental Theosophists*. With them, on the whole, an Oriental element, radically different from the Western style of thought, greatly preponderated over the Hellenistic. They moved amidst *intuitions* and *symbols* rather than *notions*. Where the Western thinker would have framed to himself an abstract conception, there stood before the soul

of the Gnostic a *living appearance, a living personality in vivid intuition*. The notion seemed to him a thing without life. In the eye of the Gnostic everything became hypostatised, while to the Western thinker there existed nothing but a notion. The image, and what the image represented, were, in the Gnostic mind, often confounded together, so that it could not divide the one from the other. Hurried along involuntarily from intuition to intuition, from image to image, by the ideas floating before or filling his mind, he was unable to develop these ideas into clear convictions. When, however, we take pains to sift the fundamental thoughts lying undeveloped in their images, and to unfold them clearly to our consciousness, we catch a glimpse of many an idea which, though not understood by their contemporaries, were destined in far later ages to be seized once more, and to be more fully carried out by a science regenerated by faith.\* Intuition, anticipating the lapse of centuries, here grasped, in an immediate way, what the process of logical analysis was to master only after long and various aberrations.

The questions about which they principally busied themselves were these: how the transition from the infinite to the finite, and the beginning of creation, are to be explained?—how it is possible to conceive of God as the author of a material world so alien to his own nature?—whence, if God is perfect, are the imperfections of this world?—whence the destructive powers in nature?—whence is moral evil if a holy God is man's creator?—whence the great diversity of characters among men themselves, from the truly godlike to those which appear to be utterly abandoned to blind passions, without a vestige of a rational and moral nature?

On these points Christianity had separated what belongs to the province of religion from what belongs to speculation and to a merely speculative interest. And by so doing Christianity preserved religion from confounding the things divine with the earthly, and from the transference of mere natural views to God. It directed the eye of the mind beyond the series

\* We mean, *e. g.*, the ideas which lie at the root of the systems of the Judaistic Gnostics respecting the connection of the Old with the New Testament; the relation of the prophetic element in the Old Testament to Christianity; inspiration, and the organic connection of universal history.

of the phenomenal world, where, in the connection of cause and effect, one thing ever evolves itself out of another, to that omnipotent creative Word of God by which the worlds were framed, so that things which are seen were *not* made of things which do appear. Heb. xi. 3. The creation was here apprehended as an incomprehensible fact by the upward gaze of faith, which rose above the position of the understanding, which would derive all things from one another, which would explain everything, and hence denies all immediate existence, and all that enforces wonder and reverence. This one practically important truth the church teachers ever held fast, and maintained the doctrine of the creation from nothing. Here she took her stand in opposition to the *ancient view*, which would condition God's act of creation by a previously existing matter, and which, after the analogy of human operations, conceived of Him, not as a free, self-sufficient Creator, but as a mere fashioner of a material already extant. But Gnosticism would not acknowledge any such limits to speculation; it wanted to explain—to clear up everything to the mental vision. It was therefore obliged to suppose in the essence of God himself a process of development, by means of which He became the ground and source of all existence. Overlooking the *negative* signification of the doctrine of creation out of nothing, it opposed to it the old principle, “Nothing can come of nothing.” In place of this it sensuously substituted the idea of an efflux of all existence out of the supreme essence of Deity. This idea of an emanation admits of being presented under a great variety of images; under the symbol of an evolution of numbers out of an original unity; of a radiation from a primal light; of a development of spiritual powers or ideas acquiring self-subsistence; of an enunciation in a descending series of syllables and tones down to an echo.

The idea of such an emanation answers to a vague inkling in the depths of the human soul, of the *positive* element which lay at the root of the *negative* principle of creation out of nothing; and in this inkling it found a stay and support, but at the same time it gave rise to a host of speculations, by which men were easily led further astray from the practically important ends of religious faith, so as, in fact, to lose sight of them altogether.

According to the Gnostic view God was represented as the immanent, incomprehensible, and original source of all perfection.\* From this incomprehensible essence of God an immediate transition to finite things is inconceivable. *Self-limitation* is the first beginning of a communication of life on the part of God — the first passing of the hidden Deity into manifestation; and from this proceeds all further self-developing manifestation of the divine essence.† Now, from this primal link in the chain of life there are evolved, in the first place, the manifold powers or attributes inherent in the divine essence, which, until that first self-comprehension, were all hidden in the abyss of his essence. Each of these attributes presents the whole divine essence under one particular aspect, and to each therefore, in this respect, the appropriate title of God may be applied.‡ These divine powers, evolving themselves to self-subsistence, become thereupon the germs and principles of all further developments of life. The life contained in them unfolds and individualises itself more and more, but in such a way that the successive grades of this evolution of life continually sink lower and lower — the spirits become feebler the further they are removed from the first link in the series. In thus attempting to explain the incomprehensible, and consequently falling into anthropopathism, Gnosticism, as we have seen, has, without being aware of it, transferred to the eternal the relations of time.

The origin of a pure spiritual world akin to God might admit of being thus explained, and the evolution of different grades of perfection in the spiritual world might thus be rendered conceivable. But how is it possible to explain, by an emanation from God, the existence of the *sensible world* and

\* The Unfathomable Abyss (βύθος), according to Valentinus, exalted above all possibility of designation,—of whom, properly speaking, nothing can be predicated; the ἀκατονόμαστος of Basilides, the ἄν of Philo.

† Α πρώτη κατάληψις ἑαυτοῦ, the πρῶτον καταληπτὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, hypotactically represented in a νοῦς or λόγος.

‡ Hence the different meanings given by the Gnostics to the word αἰών, which, besides its primitive signification, *eternity*, is used by them to denote sometimes the *Eternal*, as a distinguishing attribute of the Supreme Essence, sometimes the primary divine powers above described, sometimes the whole emanation-world = πλήρωμα, as contradistinguished from the *temporal* world. In the last-mentioned sense it is employed by Heracleon. Orig. T. XIII. in Joann. c. 11.



the origin of evil? Even on this last problem—the rock on which speculation has so often split, to the detriment of man's faith in the holiness of God and in the freedom of rational, accountable beings—Gnosticism was unwilling to put any limits to human inquiry. If God has bestowed on man a free will, and if this free will is the cause of evil, then, said the Gnostics, the cause ultimately reverts *to God himself*. They would not allow of any distinction between permission and causation on the part of God.\* We see, in fact, that whenever speculation is not content with acknowledging evil as a fact, as an act of the creature's will—which is only to be accounted for by its having forsaken its natural dependence on God—if it will seek to *explain* evil or its origin, then it must be driven to one of two errors: either it will be forced to derogate from God's holiness, and to deprive the opposition between good and evil of its objective significance, undermining thereby the ideas of moral good and evil in their essence, by tracing the cause of the latter to God,—and this is the doctrine which lies involved in Pantheism;—or else, as is done by Dualism, it will limit God's almighty power by supposing an absolute evil, an independent ground of it beyond the divine control. And thus Dualism is driven, notwithstanding, to the very thing which it chiefly labours to avoid. The very idea of evil, which it would firmly maintain, it must really overthrow, inasmuch as it imputes it to an outward cause, which it thus makes a self-subsistent nature working with necessity; and thus, at the same time, it involves itself in the contradiction of supposing an independent existence out of God; which, since absolute independence can be predicated only of God, must be a God who, however, is not *God*, since he is not *good*. In avoiding the first of these rocks the Gnostics foundered on the last.

They thought themselves compelled to combine with the doctrine of emanation that of Dualism, in order, by the commixture of two hostile realms, by the products of two opposite principles, to explain the origin of a world not answering to the divine idea, with all the defects cleaving to it, all the evils it contains. And this explanation opened a wide field for their speculations and fanciful images. And here presented

\* Τὸ μὴ καλῶν, αἰτίον ἐστίν, was their usual motto in opposing the teaching of the church.



themselves two different modes of contemplation, which, however, in these times of religious and philosophical eclecticism, were not always directly opposed, but often came in contact and commingled at various intermediate points; as indeed they will, in the end, be found to be based on the same fundamental idea, though conceived on the one side under a more speculative, on the other under a more mythical form. In one of these general schemes the element of Grecian speculation, in the other that of Oriental intuition, chiefly predominates. Accordingly these different modes of view have given rise to the distinction of an *Alexandrian* Gnosis and of a *Syrian* (in which the influence of Parsism prevails), in so far as these two forms of Gnosis may, in abstracto, be opposed to each other, if we overlook cases where they are found to intermingle in the varied phenomena of these times. *In the former the Platonic notion of the ὕλη predominates.* This is the dead, the unsubstantial—the boundary that limits from without the evolution of life in its gradually advancing progression, whereby the perfect is ever evolving itself into the less perfect. This ὕλη, again, is represented under various images;—at one time as the darkness that exists alongside of the light; at another as the void (κένωμα, κενόν) in opposition to the fulness of the divine life; or as the shadow that accompanies the light; or as the chaos, or the sluggish, stagnant, dark water. This matter, dead in itself, possesses by its own nature no inherent tendency; as life of every sort is foreign to it, itself makes no encroachment on the divine. As, however, the evolutions of the divine life (the essences developing themselves out of the progressive emanation) become feebler the further they are removed from the first link in the series; and as their connection with the first becomes looser at each successive step, there arises at the last step of the evolution an imperfect, defective product, which, unable to retain its connection with the chain of divine life, sinks from the world of Æons into the material chaos; or, according to the same notion somewhat differently expressed, a drop from the fulness of the divine life bubbles over into the bordering void.\* Hereupon the dead matter, by commixture with the living principle, which it wanted, first of all receives animation. But at the same time, also, the divine, the living, becomes corrupted by

\* According to the Ophites and Bardesanes.

mingling with the chaotic mass. Existence now multiplies itself; there arises a subordinate, defective life; there is ground for a new world; a creation starts into being beyond the confines of the world of emanation. But, on the other hand, since the chaotic principle of matter has acquired vitality, there now arises a purer and more active opposition to the godlike—a barely negative, blind, ungodly nature-power, which obstinately resists all influence of the divine: hence, as products of the spirit of the *ὕλη* (of the *πνεῦμα ὑλικόν*), are Satan, malignant spirits, wicked men, in none of whom is there any reasonable or moral principle, or any principle of a rational will, but blind passions alone have the ascendancy. In them there is the same conflict as the scheme of Platonism supposes between the soul under the guidance of divine reason, the *νοῦς*, and the soul blindly resisting reason\*—between the *προνοία* and the *ἀνάγκη*, the divine principle and the natural.

As *Monism* contradicts what ought to be immediately certain to every man—the laws and facts of his moral consciousness; so *Dualism* contradicts the essence of reason, which demands unity. *Monism*, shrinking from its own inferences, leads to *Dualism*; and *Dualism*, springing from the desire to comprehend everything, is forced by this very desire through the constraint of reason, which everywhere requires unity, to refer the duality back to a prior unity, and resolve it into the latter. Thus was the Gnosis forced out of its *Dualism*, and obliged to affirm the same as the Cabbala and Neo-Platonism had taught; namely, *that matter is nothing else than the necessary limit† between being and not-being*, which only by abstraction‡ can be conceived as self-subsistent—as the opposite to existence, which, in every evolution of life out of God, must arise as its necessary limitation.§ In some such way, this

\* See Plato, leg. lib. X. p. 87–91, v. IX.; ed Bipont. Plutarch. Quæst. Platonicae, qu. IV.

† The outer shell, as it were, of existence, קִלְפָּה.

‡ By a *λόγος νόθος*, according to the Neo-Platonists.

§ Thus the Gnostics in Irenæus, lib. II. c. 4, are careful to defend themselves against the charge of Dualism: *Continere omnia patrem omnium, et extra Pleroma esse nihil*; et id, quod extra et quod intus dicere eos secundum agnitionem et ignorantiam, sed non secundum localem distantiam. The lower creation was comprehended in the Pleroma, velut in *tunica* maculam.

Dualism could resolve itself into an absolute Monism, and, consequently, also into Pantheism.

The other scheme accommodated itself more to the Parsic doctrine concerning Ahriman and his kingdom—a doctrine which would naturally be adopted by those Gnostic sects especially which originated in Syria. This theory assumed the existence of an *active, turbulent* kingdom of evil, or of darkness, which, by its encroachments on the kingdom of light, brought about a commixture of the light with the darkness, of the godlike with the ungodlike. Different as these two modes of contemplation may appear in description, yet we may recognise in both the same fundamental idea. In all cases where the latter theory becomes more speculative, it passes into the former; as will be seen in the instance of Manicheism, which more than any other Gnostic system wears the stamp of the Parsic religion. On the other hand, whenever the former conception, assuming a more poetic dress, strives to present itself more vividly to the imagination, it passes imperceptibly into the latter;\* and this it might do even with a distinct consciousness that the whole was but a symbolical dress, whereby abstract conceptions were to be rendered more vivid to the imagination. We have an example of this kind in the profound thinker Plotinus, who was very far from being inclined to substitute a conflict of principles beginning at a certain point, in the place of a development going on by an immanent necessity, from first to last, even to the extreme bounds of all existence.

Even among the Platonists there were those who thought that, along with an organized, inert matter, the substratum of the *corporeal world*, there existed from the beginning a *blind, lawless motive power*, an ungodlike soul, as its original motive and active principle. As the inorganic matter was organized into a corporeal world by the plastic power of the Deity, so by the same power law and reason were communicated to that turbulent, irrational soul. Thus the chaos of the *ύλη* was transformed into an *organized world*, and that

\* As, for example, when Plotinus represents matter as seized with a longing for light or the soul, and describes how it darkens the light in attempting to embrace it. Plotin. in Enneas. I. lib. VIII. c. 14: "τλη παραῦσα προσαιτεῖ, καὶ οἶον ἰνοχλεῖ, καὶ εἰς τὸ εἶσω παρελθεῖν ἐθέλει, τὴν δὲ ἄλλαν καὶ τὴν ἑαυτὴν ὥς ἐσκότωσε τῇ μίξει.

blind soul into a rational principle—a mundane soul, animating the universe. As from the latter proceeds all rational, spiritual life in humanity; so from the former proceeds all that is irrational, all that is under the blind sway of passion and appetite—all malignant spirits are its progeny. It is easy to see how the idea of this  $\psi\chi\eta\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ , brooding over chaos, would coincide with the idea of a Satan originally presiding over the kingdom of darkness.\*

In the system of the Sabæans, or disciples of John,† which in origin was allied, beyond doubt, to the Syrian Gnosis, there does appear, indeed, to have been an independent kingdom of darkness, with powers of its own; it exercises, however, no sort of influence on the higher realm of light. The idea which seized one of the genii belonging to the world of light, to detach himself from the great primal Fountain whom all ought to glorify, and to establish a separate and independent world in chaos, was the original cause of the intermingling of the two kingdoms—the beginning of the visible world, founded on territory won from the kingdom of darkness, from chaos; which therefore the powers of darkness, impatient of any foreign authority within their proper province, seek either to conquer again and bring into their own possession, or else to destroy. Whilst *Abatur*, the genius who shapes the third grade in the evolution of life, mirrors himself on the dark water of chaos, there springs up from his image an imperfect genius, formed out of the mixture of this nature of light with the substance

\* See Plutarch. de animæ Procreat. e Timæo, particularly c. 9. Opera ed. Hutten. T. XIII. page 296.

† This sect of the Sabæans ( $\beta\alpha\pi\tau\iota\sigma\tau\alpha\acute{\iota}$ , from  $\beta\alpha\pi\tau\iota\varsigma$ ), Nazareans, Mandeans (according to Norberg, from  $\nu\epsilon\tau$ ,  $\mu\alpha\delta\eta\tau\alpha\acute{\iota}$  or  $\gamma\gamma\omega\sigma\tau\iota\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$ ), evidently took its origin from those disciples of John the Baptist who, contrary to the spirit and intention of their master, adopted, after his martyrdom, a course hostile to Christianity. We find traces of them, mixed up with fabulous matter, in the Clementines and in the Recognitiones Clementis, perhaps also in the  $\acute{\eta}\mu\epsilon\rho\omicron\beta\alpha\pi\tau\iota\sigma\tau\alpha\acute{\iota}\varsigma$  and  $\gamma\alpha\lambda\iota\lambda\alpha\acute{\iota}\nu\iota\varsigma$  of Hegisippus; see F. Walch. de Sabeis comment. Soc. Reg. Gott. T. IV. Part. philol. From this there afterwards sprang up a sect, whose system, formed out of the elements of an older eastern theosophy, has an important connection with the history of Gnosis. A critical examination of their most important religious book, published by Norberg, the Liber Adami, may furnish much additional information on this subject. See a review of this work by Gesenius, in the Jenaischen Literatur-Zeitung, J. 1817, No. 48–51, and (Kleuker's?) review of it in the Göttingschen Anzeigen.



of darkness, and destined to a gradual advance in glory. This is *Fetahil*, the Demiurge or artificer of the world, from whose awkwardness result all the imperfections of this world.\* In the system of the Syrian Bardesanes, also, matter is represented as the progenitor of Satan.

Thus it must be evident enough how the modes of conception peculiar to the Syrian and to the Alexandrian Gnosis might, on this side, pass over from one to the other. It might perhaps admit of a question whether we can properly speak of a Gnosis *originally Alexandrian*; whether *Syria* is not the common home of *everything* Gnostic, whence it was merely transplanted to Alexandria, to receive there a peculiar stamp from the Hellenic, Platonizing tendency which there prevailed. At Alexandria such a Gnosis could easily find many points on which to attach itself in a certain Jewish ideal philosophy of religion already existing there; while, on the other hand, the Platonic and Western element, which adhered strictly to the pure ideal position, and did not forthwith hypostatize the idea into intuitions, too strongly predominated for the peculiar character of the Gnosis to form itself there without any influence of the pure Orientalism from Syria.

It might be thought that this two-fold theory would have led to a corresponding difference in the *practical spirit*. As the *Syrian* theory supposed an active kingdom of evil, which was one and the same with the kingdom of matter, we might conclude from this that it would make the leading points in its system of morals to be the renunciation of this hated matter and its hostile productions, and the strictest asceticism. And, on the other hand, since the *Alexandrian Gnosis* considered matter in the light of an unorganized substance, and the *divine* as its formative *principle*, we might suppose that it would adopt no such *negative* theory of morals, but be inclined rather to make the active melioration of the world, by the power of the divine element, the principle of its moral system. This conjecture will be rendered still more probable by comparing several of the *Alexandrian* with the Syrian systems.

\* The idea here may be compared throughout with the Ophitic idea of the Ophiomorphus (see below), although in the Ophitic system the latter appears possessed of a malignant nature; and yet the Ophitic system, so far as it concerns its speculative ideas, is in very many respects nearly related to the Alexandrian system of Valentinus.



But we shall see, as we go more deeply into the subject, that the difference of practical tendencies is not so much grounded in the difference of principles, as that a different shape and application is given to the principles themselves, by virtue of the diversity of intellectual bents. And in truth all borrowed principles, from whatever quarter they may have been taken, receive through the general intellectual bias which adopts them, and from the peculiar mental temperament of the period, an application which would not necessarily have flowed from them in and by themselves. We have seen,\* for instance, how Dualism, in its primitive form among the Persians, by no means involved a tendency to an ascetic, indolent renunciation of the world; but that on the contrary it led to an active life, and the exercise of a regulative influence on the outward world, in the conflict for the kingdom of light. And yet the same principle received another application through the influence of the mental tone prevailing in this period. But in Platonism two points of view were presented, and its practical influence was conditioned by the prominence of the one or the other. On the one hand, Platonism represented the soul as the plastic power in the world;—it made the ideas actualize themselves in becoming, and stamp themselves in the  $\psi\lambda\eta$ . The self-manifestation of these ideas, striving to mould and to master the  $\psi\lambda\eta$ , should meet the kindred spirit in its contemplation of the world in all its aspects,—in all the phenomema of the beautiful and good. Through the symbols—however inadequate to the original type—of the ideal harmony of the sensible world, the recollection of its original author himself was to be called up in the mind that belongs to the higher world, and the longing after him awakened within it;—by means of this contemplation the soul was to become gradually winged. But, on the other side, Platonism taught that there was a resistance of the  $\psi\lambda\eta$  against these ideas, which would never entirely be vanquished; it insisted on an opposition between the idea and the manifestation which could never be overcome. According to this view, evil is, in this world, a necessary antithesis to good. It is inseparable from the relation of the idea to the  $\psi\lambda\eta$ ; and therefore it is only by a contemplation, rising to the spiritual world of ideas, that one can soar above this opposition, which

\* See above, p. 14.

will always of necessity continue to exist in this lower region. At all events, it was from this position that the aristocratic principle of the ancient world, of which we have before spoken, took that direction, by virtue of which the contemplative life was exalted far above the practical; as, in like manner, this defect—though more or less tempered according to the greater or less reaction of the Christian principle—cleaves to the Gnostic systems generally. Now in proportion as the one or the other of these elements of its theory predominated, Platonism came to be united with either a more practical, æsthetic-artistic tendency, or an ascetical and contemplative one. Considered in the former element, Platonism contains within it the genuine principle for the construction of the system of ethics; but in order to be able to realize what lies within it, it was requisite that the other element should be driven into the background. This Dualism must be practically annulled; the means must be given to it to reconcile the opposition between the idea and the manifestation; and this could be furnished only by the fact of a redemption of mankind. Thus Platonism points to Christianity, through which alone the ethical problems contained in the Platonic ideas could be actually realized.

Now the mental tone of this period, which lies at the root of all those Gnostic systems, and out of which sprang hatred and contempt of the world—the predominant Oriental principle of total alienation from the world and from all human affections—tended to give prominence to one of those elements and to repress the other; as is manifest in the peculiar ethical systems of the later Platonists generally, if we except Plotinus. In fact, one of these Gnostics (Marcion) combined, as we shall see, with the doctrine of the *ἰλν*, a direction of thought in other respects altogether foreign to Platonism.

The most essential distinction of the several Gnostic systems, and the one moreover which is best suited to serve the basis of their classification, arises from the different degree of that which constitutes the characteristic peculiarity of the Gnostic view of the universe, relatively to the pure Christian view. It is the pervading Dualistic element, by virtue of which those oppositions which Christianity exhibits as conflicting with the primal unity of creation, and having first arisen in the fall of the creature and to be removed ultimately by redemption, are

regarded as original and grounded in the very principles of existence, and, therefore, such also that they cannot be removed by redemption itself—the opposition, viz., between a temporal, earthly, and a higher, invisible order of things; between the natural, the purely human, and the divine. Wherever this opposition was apprehended generally, and in its extreme sense, nothing less than an absolute contrariety could be supposed between Christianity and the creation, between nature and history. In such cases Christianity must appear as altogether a sudden phenomenon, as a fragment disconnected from all else, as an incident wholly unexpected and unprepared. According to this view, no gradual development of the Theocracy, as an organically connected whole, could be admitted. The connection, also, between Christianity and Judaism must be broken. And all this seems concentrated in the way in which the relation of the Demiurge was conceived to stand to the Supreme, perfect God, and the world of Æons. Everything depends, then, on the circumstance whether an absolute opposition was here assumed, or room was still left for some sort of mediation. It is manifest how deeply this difference must affect every religious and moral consideration.

In one respect *all* the Gnostics agree: they *all* held (as we remarked above) a world purely emanating out of the vital development of God, a creation evolved directly out of the divine essence,\* to be far exalted above any outward creation produced by God's plastic power, and conditioned by a pre-existing matter. They agree, moreover, in holding that the immediate framer of *this lower* world was not the Father of *that higher* world of emanation, but the Demiurge, (δημιουργός,) a being of kindred nature with the universe framed and governed by him, and far inferior to that higher system and to the Father of it. But here arose a difference; for while they all maintained the fact of such a subordination, they did not agree in their conceptions of it. Some, setting out from ideas which had long prevailed among certain Jews of Alexandria, (as appears from consulting the Alexandrian version of the Old Testament, and from Philo's works,) supposed that the Supreme God created and governed the world by His ministering spirits, by the angels. At the head of these angels

\* עולם אצילות.

stood one who had the direction and control of all; therefore called the artificer and governor of the world. This Demiurge they compared with the plastic, animating, mundane spirit of Plato and the Platonists,\* who, moreover, according to the Timæus of Plato, strives to represent the idea of the Divine Reason in that which is *becoming* and temporal. This angel is a representative of the Supreme God on this lower stage of existence: he does not act independently, but merely according to the ideas inspired in him by the Supreme God; just as the plastic, mundane soul of the Platonists creates all things after the pattern of the ideas communicated by the Supreme Reason (νοῦς).† But these ideas transcend his limited essence; he cannot understand them; he is merely their unconscious organ; and therefore is unable himself to comprehend the whole scope and meaning of the work which he performs. As an organ under the guidance of a higher inspiration, he reveals higher truths than he himself can comprehend. And here also the Gnostics adopted the current ideas of the Jews in supposing that the Supreme God had revealed Himself to their Fathers through the angels, who served Him as the ministers of His will. From them came the law by Moses. Moreover, they considered the Demiurge to be a representative of the Supreme God in this respect also;—as the other nations of the earth are portioned out to the guidance of other angels, so the Jewish people, considered as the peculiar people of God, are committed to the especial care of the Demiurge as His representative.‡ He revealed also in the religious polity of the Jews, no less than in the creation of the world, those higher ideas which, in their true significance, he himself was unable to understand. The *Old Testament*, like the whole creation, *was the veiled symbol of a higher mundane system, the veiled type of Christianity.*

Among the Jews themselves the Gnostics, however, after the example of the Alexandrians, carefully distinguished between the great mass, who are merely a representative type of the

\* The δεύτερος Θεός, the Θεὸς γενητός.

† The δ᾽ ἑστῆς, ζῶν, —an antithesis to the γενητόν, the Θεὸς γενητός of Plato,—the παράδειγμα of the Divine Reason hypostatized.

‡ According to the Alexandrian version of Deuteron. xxxii. 8, 9: "Ὅτε διμήριζεν ὁ ὕψιστος ἡ θύνη, ἵστησεν ὄρια ἐν ἡνῶν κατὰ ἄρρηθ μὲν ἀγγέλων θεῶν, καὶ ἐγενήθη μίσις κυρίου λαὸς αὐτοῦ Ἰακώβ.



people of God, (the Israelites according to the flesh, the Ἰσραὴλ αἰσθητός, κατὰ σάρκα,) and the small number of those who were really conscious of their destination as the people of God (the soul of the mass, the spiritual men of Philo; the Ἰσραὴλ πνευματικός, νοητός; the true priestly race, living in the contemplation of God; the ἀνὴρ ὁρῶν τὸν θεόν; the πνευματικοί, γνωστικοί, as contradistinguished from the ψυχικοί, πιστικοί). The latter, with their carnal minds, adhered to the outward form, perceived not that *this* was merely a symbol, and therefore could not enter into the meaning of the symbol itself.\* Thus those carnal Jews recognised not the angel by whom in all the *Theophanies* of the Old Testament God *revealed* Himself; they knew not the Demiurge in his true relation to the hidden Supreme God, who never *reveals himself* in the sensible world. Here, likewise, they confounded the type and the archetype, the symbol and the idea. They rose not higher than this *Demiurge*; they took him to be the *Supreme God himself*. Those spiritual men, on the contrary, clearly perceived, or at least divined, the ideas veiled under Judaism; they rose beyond the *Demiurge* to a *knowledge* of the Supreme God; they, therefore, are properly his *true worshippers* (θεραπεύται). The religion of the former was grounded simply on a mere faith of authority; the latter lived in the *contemplation of divine things*. The former needed to be schooled and disciplined by the Demiurge—by rewards, punishments, and threats; the latter needed no such means of discipline; they rose by the lofty aspirations of their own minds to the Supreme God, who is only a fountain of blessedness to those that are fitted for communion with him—who love him for his own sake.†

When now these Jewish theosophists of Alexandria had embraced Christianity, and with this new religion had combined their old opinions, they saw the spirit of the Old Testament completely unveiled by Christianity, and the highest idea

\* Thus in the *epistle ascribed to Barnabas*, a moderate Gnostic, who was far from having attained to that higher Gnosis which resulted from the mixture of the Alexandrian idealism with Syrian theosophy, asserts that the Jews had altogether misunderstood the ceremonial law, in observing it outwardly, instead of seeing in it an allegorical representation of universal religion and moral truths. Gnosis furnished the key which first unlocked this its true meaning.

† See above, Part I. p. 79, &c., as to the twofold religious position according to Philo.



of the whole creation brought clearly to light. The scope and end of the whole creation, and of all human development, was now for the first time manifest. As far as the Supreme *Æon*,\* who appeared in the person of Christ, is exalted above the angels and the Demiurge, so far does Christianity transcend Judaism and the whole earthly creation. The Demiurge himself now understands the revelation of a higher system of things entering within his realm, and serves henceforward as its conscious organ.

If by Jewish theologians the law was called a law dispensed by angels, in order to mark its divine, as opposed to a merely human origin, so also in the apostolical epistles this designation is made use of for the purpose of clearly setting forth the inferiority of Judaism to Christianity, as the absolute religion, for which all the earlier partial revelations of the divine were only preparatory. The all-perfect revelation of God in the Son, through whom God himself enters immediately into fellowship with the creature, is opposed to the revelation mediated by the instrumentality of different angels—different godlike powers. By the manifestation of the comprehensive whole, everything partial is rendered superfluous.† This profound idea is the centre of the fanciful speculations of the Gnostics, spinning out as they do everything into a mythical form.

What the Gnostics who adopted this view said of the relation of the Demiurge, of his creation, of his previous dominion, to the appearance of Christ and of Christianity, affords glimpses of profound ideas. They endeavour to express how the whole was implanted in the original creation, only in idea, and in the germ, which was actually realized and fulfilled by Christianity; and also as to the way in which reason, first attaining through Christianity to a full and clear consciousness of the ideas incorporated in and stamped upon creation, was to express these in an actual manifestation—a great and fruitful idea, which, but vaguely divined by the Gnosis, awaited its clear and discreet exposition by a future science, deeply rooted in Christianity. Gnosticism bore within it the germ (first presented in the form of poetic intuition) of a true philosophy of history.

The *other party* of the Gnostics consisted mainly of such as,

\* *Noûs* or *λόγος*.

† See Heb. ii., Ephes. iii. 10, and the words of Christ to Nathanael.

before their accession to Christianity, had not been followers of the *Mosaic* religion, but who had, at an earlier period, framed to themselves an *Oriental* Gnosis, opposed to *Judaism* as well as to all *popular religions*, and similar to that of which we find traces in the books of the Sabæans, and of which examples may still be found in the East, among the Persians and the Hindoos. They did not, like the former class, regard the Demiurge with his angels as a subordinate, finite being, but as one absolutely hostile to the Supreme God. The Demiurge and his angels, notwithstanding their finite nature, were to establish their independence; they will tolerate no foreign rule within their realm. Whatever of a higher nature descends into their kingdom they seek to hold imprisoned there, lest it should raise itself above their narrow precincts. Probably, in this system, the kingdom of the Demiurgic angels coincided, for the most part, with the kingdom of the deceitful star-spirits, who seek to rob man of his freedom, to beguile him by various arts of deception, and who exercise a tyrannical sway over the things of this world.\* The Demiurge is a limited and limiting being; proud, jealous, revengeful; and this his character betrays itself in the Old Testament, which came from him.

Believing that they found in the Old Testament much that is anthropopathic ascribed to God—so much which was at variance with the Christian idea of the Deity and with moral perfection—it might indeed have occurred to these Gnostics, had they lived in a different spiritual atmosphere, to consider all this as human error, whereby the true idea of God had been vitiated. But to refer it to a subjective origin, and to explain it psychologically, was altogether remote from their habit of thought. Judaism no less than paganism appeared in its contrasts to Christianity something too positively *real* to admit of being satisfactorily explained in this way. They fancied they could trace in the life of nations the influence of self-subsistent spiritual potentates, who controlled the general consciousness. What St. Paul says of the principalities and powers put down by Christ (*ἀρχαὶς* and *ἐξουσίαις*) they referred to these

\* Accordingly, in the system of these Sabæans, the seven planet-spirits and the twelve star-spirits of the zodiac, who sprang from an irregular connection between the cheated Fetahil and the spirit of darkness, play an important part in everything that is bad. To their deceptive arts the Sabæans traced the origin of those detestable religions, Judaism and Christianity.

agents. As in paganism they saw the kingdom of the demons, so in Judaism they saw the kingdom of the Demiurge. And so, while they acknowledged the history of the Old Testament to be true, they transferred to the Demiurge himself whatever in the idea of God, as presented by the Old Testament, appeared to them defective. They saw the image of this being reflected in the character and in the conceptions of the people devoted to his service. Even in nature, where they recognised the rule of an iron necessity, governing by invariable and inexorable laws, they believed that the God of holy love, revealed through Christ, was not to be found. They saw there a plastic power, manifesting itself indeed, but unable to master its material, to subdue the destructive agencies which resisted its own efforts. They beheld here the old chaos breaking loose again in manifold ways; the wild energy of the  $\nu\lambda\eta$ , revolting without control against the dominion which the fashioner would exercise over it, casting off the yoke imposed on it, and destroying the work he had begun. They recognised here, indeed, a powerful but not an all-powerful Demiurge, against whose rule the  $\nu\lambda\eta$ , which he sought to subject to his will, was continually rebelling. The same jealous being, limited in his power, ruling with despotic sway, they imagined they saw in nature no less than in the Old Testament. Their peculiar views involved however the truth that, even at the stage of illumination which was set forth in the Old Testament, religion was not wholly emancipated from the principle which ruled in the ancient world; even though it was designed to reveal a higher, theistic element in opposition to that principle. This could be effected by nothing less than the redeeming power of the gospel. These Gnostics thus judged:—the supreme God, the God of holiness and love, who has no connection whatever with the sensible world, has revealed himself in this earthly creation only by certain divine seeds of life which He has scattered among men, but the germination of which the Demiurge strives to check and suppress. The perfect God was at most known and worshipped in mysteries by a few spiritual men. But now this God has through his highest  $\text{\AA}$ eon, at once, and without any foregoing preparation, come down to this inferior world, for the purpose of drawing upward to himself those higher and kindred spiritual natures which were here held in bondage. Christianity found nowhere

in the whole creation a sympathetic welcome, except in those theosophical schools where a higher wisdom in the form of secret doctrines had been handed down from age to age.

This difference between the Gnostic systems was one of great importance, both theoretically and practically. The Gnostics of the first class, who looked upon the Demiurge as an organ and representative of the supreme God, who fashioned nature according to his ideas, and guided the development of God's kingdom in history, might, consistently with their principles, recognise the manifestation of the divine both in nature and in history. They were not necessarily driven to an unchristian hatred of the world. They could admit that the divine element might be revealed even in earthly relations; that everything of the earth was capable of being refined and ennobled by its influence. In their ascetic views they might therefore be very moderate, as we find actually to have been the case with many of this class; but still their notion of the *ἄλγ* would lead to the mischievous practical result of tracing evil exclusively to the world of sense; and their over valuation of a contemplative Gnosis might prove unfavourable to the spirit of active charity. On the contrary, the other form of Gnosis, which represented the Creator of the world as a being directly opposed to the supreme God and His higher system, would necessarily lead to a wildly fanatical and morose hatred of the world, wholly at war with the spirit of Christianity. This expressed itself in two ways; among the nobler and more sensible class it took the form of an extreme and rigid asceticism, of an anxious abhorrence of all contact with the world—though to mould and fashion that world constitutes a part of the Christian vocation. In this case morality could at best be only negative, a mere preparatory purification to contemplation. But the same eccentric hatred of the world, when coupled with pride and arrogance, might also lead to wild fanaticism and a bold contempt of all moral obligations. When the Gnostics had once started upon the principle that the whole of this world is the work of a finite, ungodlike spirit, and is not susceptible of any revelation of the divine—that the loftier natures who belong to a far higher world are held in bondage by it—they easily came to the conclusion that everything external is a matter of perfect indifference to the inner man; nothing of a loftier nature can there be expressed;



the outward man may indulge in every lust, provided only that the tranquillity of the inner man is not thereby disturbed in its meditation. The best way to show contempt of, and to bid defiance to, this wretched alien world was, not to allow the mind to be affected by it in any situation. Men should mortify sense by indulging in every lust, and still preserving their tranquillity of mind unruffled. "We must conquer lust by the enjoyment of lust," said these strong men (*esprits forts*), "for it is no great thing for a man to abstain from lust who has never tried it; but true greatness consists in not being overcome by it when surrounded by it."\* Although the statements of adversaries ought not to be received without great caution and distrust, and we ought never to forget that such witnesses were liable, either by unfriendly inferences or the misconstruction of terms, to impute to such sects much that was false, nevertheless the characteristic maxims quoted from their own lips, and the concurrent testimony of such men as Irenæus and Epiphanius, and of those still more unprejudiced and careful inquirers the Alexandrian fathers, places it beyond all reasonable doubt that they not merely taught such principles, but also put them in practice. Besides, that enemy of Christianity, the Neo-Platonist Porphyry, corroborates this statement by quoting from the mouths of these persons maxims of a similar import.† "A little standing pool," they said, "may be defiled, when any impure substance is poured into it; not so the *ocean*, which receives everything, because it knows its own immensity. So little men are overcome by eating; but he who is an ocean of *strength* (*ἐξουσία*, probably a peculiar term of theirs, and a misinterpretation of St. Paul's language, 1 Corinth. viii. 9, vi. 19) takes everything and is not defiled." Not only in the history of Christian sects of earlier and more recent times, but also among the sects of the Hindoos, and even among the rude islanders of Australia, instances may be found of such tendencies to defy all moral obligations, arising either from speculative or mystical elements, or it may be from some subjective caprice opposing itself to all positive law. In the general temperament of the present period, the false yearning of the subjective after total emancipation, and the breaking loose from all the

\* Clemens, *Stromat.* lib. II. f. 411.

† De abstinentia carn. lib. I. s. 40 et seq.



bonds, holy or unholy, by which society had been previously kept together, is quite apparent. And this tendency might seem to find a point of sympathy in that unshackling of the spirit, radically different, however, in its character, which Christianity brought along with it.

This difference in the Gnostic theories shows itself again in their several views of *particular moral relations*. The Gnostics of the last class either enjoined celibacy, and abhorred marriage as impure and profane, or else—on the principle that whatever pertained to sense is indifferent, and that men ought in this respect to defy the Demiurge by despising his stringent laws—they justified the gratification of every lust. Those of the first class, on the contrary, honoured marriage as a holy estate; and in this respect also saw in Christianity the complete fulfilment of a relation introduced into the world of the Demiurge, as a type of a higher order of things. Indeed the Valentinian Gnosis, which invariably regarded the lower world as a symbol and mirror of the higher, which sought everywhere to trace the manifestation of the same supreme law in various gradations of different stages of existence, went so far as to see in the relation of marriage the fulfilment of a higher law which pervades every stage and degree of existence, from the highest link of the chain downwards. We here recognise in the Valentinian Gnosis the first attempt, originating in the influence of Christianity, scientifically to determine the true significance of marriage, in its connection with the laws of the universe—a point which the mind of Plato was striving to reach in the *Symposium*; but which could not be reached and adequately presented until Christianity had led men to recognise the oneness of God's image in both the sexes, and their consequent relation to each other and to the common type of humanity.

*The difference between these two tendencies of Gnosticism* strongly manifested itself again in their several ways of contemplating Christ's person. All Gnostics agreed, it is true, in this respect—that, as they distinguished the God of heaven from the God of nature, and consequently made an undue separation between the invisible and the visible world, the divine and the human, they could not acknowledge the unity of the human and divine natures in *the person of Christ*. Yet as in the principle we remarked an important difference between the two chief branches of Gnosticism, so we shall

observe the same difference, too, in the consequence to which it led. We shall find an essential divergence in the views entertained of the relation between the divine and human natures in Christ. One class regarded the humanity of Christ as real, and even as possessed of a certain dignity of its own; yet, as they made two Gods of the one God of heaven and of nature, and represented the creator of the latter to be nothing more than the instrument of the former, so they divided the one Christ into two Christs—a higher and a lower, a heavenly and an earthly Christ—the latter serving merely as the organ of the former; and this, not by an original and inseparable union, but in such sense that the former first united himself with the latter at his baptism in the Jordan. But the *other form* of Gnosis, denying, as it did, all connection of Christianity with Judaism, and all progressive development of the kingdom of God among men, making of the God of Christ and the gospel a different being from the God of nature and of history, must necessarily do away the connection of Christ's manifestation with nature and with history. The favourite notion of oriental fancy,\* and which had long gained currency among the Jews, that a higher spirit has the faculty of presenting himself to the outward eye in various delusive though sensible forms, but possessing no reality of substance, was applied to Christ. One entire and important part of his earthly existence and of his personal being was criticized away; his whole *humanity* was denied, and made to be a mere deceptive show, *a mere vision*.† Yet we can in nowise agree with those who hold that *Docetism* was only one form, modified by the spirit of the age, in which a decided tendency to idealism and rationalism manifested itself; so that, had the *Docetæ* lived at some other period, they would have substituted in place of the historical Christ a mere ideal one. We must, however, carefully distinguish the proper essence of the heretical tendency from the symptoms through which it expressed itself. Docetism may be the result of very different tendencies of mind—of a supranaturalist as well as of a ration-

\* We have only to think of the Hindoo Maia, and the host of Indian myths.

† Just as Philo's idea of the Old Testament theophanies led to the views entertained by one Jewish sect respecting the angelophanies noticed in Justin M., Dial. c. Tryph. See vol. I. p. 58.

alist. It might have been founded on a strong interest to give all possible prominence to this supernatural and real element in Christ's appearance. Docetism in this case might suppose a real, though not sensuous Christ; and a real impartation of Christ to humanity. Christ gave himself, according to this view, to humanity, as a source of divine life; only he did not present himself to man's eye of sense in his true, divine nature, but, in order to be perceived by them, without, however, coming himself into any contact with matter, in an unreal sensible veil. His appearance was something objectively true; but the sensible form in which this was apparent to men was merely subjective; for this was the only way in which men, under the dominion of sense, could hold any intercourse with a nature so divine. A highly and exclusively supranaturalist mode of view might lead in this case to a total denial of the reality of the natural element in Christ. But even under this form of Docetism there might also lurk a tendency to subtilize Christianity, and to make the life of Christ a mere symbol of a spiritual communication from God, to substitute the idea of God's redeeming power for the historical Redeemer. In short, there might eventually spring out of such a tendency an opposition to historical Christianity, of which, indeed, we shall afterwards find instances.

When these Gnostics, with their system ready made, looked into the New Testament, they could easily find it all there, since they only sought for points to which they might attach it. Trusting to the inner light of their higher spiritual nature, which was to make all things clear to them, they gave themselves but little concern about the *letter* of the religious records. In all cases they were for explaining outward things from within—that is, from their own intuitions, which were above all doubt; they disdained the helps necessary to unfold the spirit contained under the cover of the word; they despised the laws of thought and of language.\* Consequently in interpreting the records of religion they were liable to all manner of delusion; while also, without any intention of fraud, they had power to charm others, as ignorant of those laws as they were themselves, within the circle of their intuitions and

\* Origen, in Philocal. c. 14, shows how the Gnostics were confirmed in their errors in biblical interpretation by the ἀγνοία τῶν λογικῶν.

symbolical representations. Taking, for instance, the term "world," wherever it occurs in the New Testament, in one and the same sense, neither distinguishing nor separating the objective from the subjective world, they could easily enough find proofs for the position that the whole earthly creation is faulty and defective, so that it could not have proceeded from the Supreme and perfect God. The parables, to whose simplicity and profound practical meaning they were quite blind, were specially welcome to them, because in them, when the point of comparison which first suggested them was once dropped, an arbitrary interpretation had the fullest scope. The controversy excited, however, by this arbitrary mode of exposition among the Gnostics, had the good effect of turning the attention of their opponents to the necessity of a sober, grammatical method of scriptural interpretation, and leading them to establish the first hermeneutical canons; as may be seen from numerous examples in Irenæus, Tertullian, Clement, and Origen.

As the opinion that falsehood is allowable and even necessary for guiding the multitude was a deeply-rooted principle of the aristocratism of the old world; and as it was Christianity that first cut off all justification of falsehood, and first awakened a general conviction of the absolute obligation of truthfulness, founded on the fact that all are alike rational, all created alike in the image of God; so it was an inseparable consequence of that reaction of the old aristocratic spirit with which Gnosticism was connected, that the principle of the conditional legitimacy of Falsehood once more slipped in. By means of the opposition which the Gnostics set up between psychical and spiritual men, they could call it good to descend from the higher position to the lower, and to say to the latter stage what is false, because they are incapable of receiving the pure truth. This principle influenced their interpretation of the New Testament; and led them to invent the theory of exegetical accommodation. Many among them asserted that Christ and the apostles expressed themselves differently according to the different standing of those whom they addressed—that they accommodated themselves to these different positions; to the natural men (the *ψυχικοί*), those who stood on the ground of blind, unconscious faith—faith on outward authority and on miracles (those who were tied down to Jewish



prejudices)—they spoke only of a Demiurge, for in truth the limited capacities of these men were unfitted for anything higher. The higher truths from the world of Æons, and relating to that world, they had communicated to none but a small circle of the initiated, who, by virtue of their higher, spiritual nature (the *πνευματικοί*), were capable of understanding such truths. But in all other cases they had simply hinted at these truths in isolated figures and symbols, intelligible to such natures alone. That higher wisdom they had, as St. Paul declared, 1 Corinth. ii. 6, spoken by word of mouth only to such as were perfect; and it was only by oral transmission within the circle of the initiated that it was to be continually handed down. The knowledge of this secret tradition, therefore, first furnishes the true key to the more profound exposition of scripture. Though other church teachers, on whom the spirit of Platonism had too great an influence, were not wholly exempt from this aristocratic element, yet the clear and earnest Christian spirit expressly opposed it in the person of Irenæus. "The apostles," he said,\* "who were sent forth to reclaim the erring, to restore sight to the blind, to heal the sick, assuredly did not speak to them according to their existing opinions, but according to the revelation of truth. What physician who desires to heal the sick will treat his patient just as he would have him, and not rather so as will effect his cure? The apostles, who were disciples of the truth, are strangers to all falsehood, because falsehood has nothing in common with truth, any more than darkness has with light. Our Lord, who is the truth, could not therefore deceive."

Others, on the principles of their Gnosis, ventured to submit the whole New Testament to the boldest criticism, affirming it to be impossible from the instructions of the apostles alone to get at the pure doctrines of Christ; for the apostles themselves were still in some degree fettered by *psychical* or Jewish opinions. The spiritual man (the Pneumaticus) must sift the "natural" from the "spiritual" in their writings. And they even went so far as to distinguish, in Christ's discourses, what had been spoken by the natural Christ under the inspiration of the Demiurge; what had been expressed through him by the divine "Wisdom," which had not yet reached its full development, but still fluctuated between the

\* Lib. III. c. 5.



province of the Demiurge and the "Pleroma;"\* and what had been spoken through him by the supreme νοῦς out of the Pleroma.†

It is easy to see that under this theosophical mode of view and expression is veiled a completely rationalistic mode of thinking, which strives to soar above the Christ and the Christianity of history. It evidently proceeds on the hypothesis of a contrariety between the idea and its manifestation in the original Christianity—of a perfectibility of Christianity, by means of which it was to purify itself from that which, in its first form of manifestation, checked and vitiated the pure evolution of the idea. In the person of Christ himself a distinction was also made between what belongs to the idea, and what belongs to the disturbing element of the temporal manifestation—between the truth which he uttered in the immediateness of inspiration from an intuition soaring beyond all temporal considerations, and what he spoke from the inferior position of reflection disturbed by the ideas of time.

These Gnostics for the most part had no intention of separating from the rest of the church, and establishing distinct communities of their own. They were convinced that the psychical natures were unable, from their lower station, to understand Christianity otherwise than in the form the church gave it; that they could not reach beyond a blind faith on authority; that they were utterly destitute of a faculty for the higher spiritual intuition;—they did not wish therefore to disturb these common followers of the church in their peace of faith; ‡ they were for uniting with the ordinary congregations, and establishing in connection with them a kind of theosophic school of *Christian mysteries*, to which all should be admitted in whom they could discern that higher faculty which was not bestowed on all. They complained that they were called heretics, though they fully concurred in the teaching of the church.§

But what would have become of the church, had they suc-

\* The Sophia, Achamoth. See below. † Vid. Iren. lib. III. c. 2.

‡ Τοὺς κοινὺς ἐκκλησιαστικούς.

§ Queruntur de nobis, quod, cum similia nobiscum sentiant, sine causa abstineamus nos a communicatione eorum, et, cum eadem dicant et eandem habeant doctrinam, vocemus illos hæreticos. Iren. lib. III. c. 15.

ceeded in their design of propagating their sect within it by means of such a distinction of two different positions in religion? The very essence of the church, which admits of no such distinction, which rests on the fact of a common faith uniting all hearts in the same fellowship of a higher life—in short, the peculiar character of Christianity itself—would have been thereby destroyed. Christianity could, as we have seen, let itself down again to a more Jewish position of the mind; it could wrap itself in a Jewish dress, and could be thus propagated in the consciousness of men, who required to be trained to Christian freedom by a gradual process. Still the essentials of the church remained, though in a very inadequate form, resulting from the reaction of an earlier stage of religious development. But had the church allowed room for such a distinction within its bosom, it must have forfeited its very essence and existence. Accordingly the spirit, which throws off whatever it cannot digest and assimilate to its own nature, united men of the most opposite theological tendencies in a common resistance to this reaction, which directly threatened the very life of the church itself.

Gnosticism had a twofold conflict to sustain—a conflict with the Christian principle which laboured to maintain its essential independence, and another with Platonism. Plotinus, who in his works nowhere openly attacks Christianity, felt himself compelled to come forward as an opponent of the Gnostics, because in their speculations they pretended to soar high above Plato and the old Greek philosophy.\* He evidently does them injustice when he asserts that what they taught consisted partly of ideas, borrowed from Plato, and partly in novelties, devoid, however, of truth, which they had devised in order to form a system of their own.† Their divergence from Platonism was by no means an arbitrary elaborate device, worked out with a view to outdo antiquity; but it was necessarily grounded in their religious and philosophical principles,—as indeed Plotinus

\* He accuses them of perverting Plato's doctrines, and of seeking to place them in an unfavourable light: 'Ὡς αὐτοὶ μὲν τὴν νοητὴν φύσιν κατα-  
νενοηκότις, ἐκείνου δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν μακαρίων ἀνδρῶν μὴ. They should  
not ἐν τῷ τοὺς Ἑλληνας διασύρειν καὶ ὑβρίζειν τὰ αὐτῶν ἐν συστάσει παρὰ τοῖ-  
ἀκούουσιν ποιεῖν. Ennead. II. l. IX. See also Porphyry's life of Plotinus,  
c. 16.

† Ὅλως γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὰ μὲν παρὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος εἰληπται, τὰ δὲ ὅσα καινοτο-  
μοῦσιν, ἵνα ἰδίαν φιλοσοφίαν θῶνται, ταῦτα ἐξω τῆς ἀληθείας εὐρεται.

himself evinces by his mode of combating them. On those principles, both as regards their Christian and their Oriental theosophic element, the Gnostics must have believed that they found in Plato intimations of the truth indeed, but that they still missed the true light which was to illuminate the history of the universe. To Plotinus, no doubt, regarding this new tendency from his peculiar position as a Greek philosopher, it must have seemed, in respect both to what was true and what was false in it, a declension from the old healthy enlightenment of the Greeks, and wholly repugnant to Hellenic sobriety. He saw in it a contagious, fanatical turn of thinking, which had taken possession of men's minds and rendered them incapable of appreciating arguments from reason.\* In Plotinus the opposition of the Platonic principle to the Gnosis on one hand is directed against Christianity itself, against the *Christian* element admitted by the Gnostics; on the other hand it coincides with the resistance which the Christian principle itself would make to the Gnosis; and it is interesting to compare what Plotinus says in this respect with the similar strictures made by Christian antagonists of the Gnostic heresy.

In respect to the former line of controversy, it is necessary to notice, first of all, his opposition to the *teleological argument*. Though it may have found a place in the original Platonism, which was not rigidly carried out to all its consequences, yet it is wholly excluded by the more severe and systematic deduction of the Neo-Platonic Monadism.\* No-

\* The statement of Plotinus, that the ancients have advanced many better things on spiritual matters, as will be readily seen by such as have not been carried away by the delusion now spreading among men (τοῖς μὴ ἐξαπαταμένοις τὴν ἐπιθίουσαν εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἀπάτην), suggests the question whether by this ἀπάτη is to be understood the spreading Gnosis, or the still more widely spreading Christianity. If the latter, then, as this would be the only passage in which he has attacked Christianity, it would be singular that he should have done so but once, and then in so vague and indefinite a manner. We must then ascribe it to his indulgence to a religion which may have had its followers among his immediate friends. Other polemical allusions, bearing against Christianity generally, have indeed been found by Creuzer in his review of the edition of Heigl, in the *Studien und Kritiken*, 1834, II., and by Baur, in his investigations of this book of Plotinus, in his *History of Gnosticism*, p. 418, &c. Yet I cannot agree with the latter in seeing such allusions in all the passages he quotes for this end.

† So I think I may call the system of Plotinus, notwithstanding his

thing is here admitted but the immanent necessity of the notion, in its evolution from the Absolute to the extreme limit of all being. The teleological motive in the operation of spiritual powers, which the Gnosis recognised, as well as the substitution of this transitive action in place of the immanent necessity of a process of development, must have appeared to Plotinus an anthropopathic falsification of the νοητά, by transferring the notion of the end and of the thereby determined beginning of an action, taken from human and temporal relations, to an order of things placed above and beyond these categories.\* Accordingly it seemed to him ridiculous that they should transfer to the Demiurge the relation of the human artist to his work, and say he created the world for his own glory.† The Gnostics, however, whom we described as belonging to the first class, would by no means spurn such a comparison and analogy; but knew how to make a very good use of them on their own principles, by which they sought to show how the highest stage of Being copied itself in all the succeeding steps.

Again, Plotinus, agreeably to his hypothesis of the immanent necessity of the mundane process of development, in which everything occupied the precise place which belonged to it as a part, regarded the great question on which the Gnostics bestowed so much labour—whence are imperfection and evil—as not less absurd than the answers which they gave to that question. The Christian doctrine of the fall must have appeared to him in the same light on the principles of his own *monadistic* scheme of the universe.

He says of the Gnostics, that, striving to rise above reason, they had fallen below it;‡ a proposition, however, which, understood according to the principles of Plotinus, tells not only against the fanciful speculations of the Gnostics, but also against the Christian notion of revelation, and against the Christian idea of divine grace.

In the following case, too, Plotinus' objection to the Gnostic scheme would also bear against the Christian doctrine. He

doctrine of the ὕλη, for he regards it as having no positive existence, but only forms the boundary of all being.

\* Τὸ δὲ διὰ τί ἐποίησε κόσμον, ταῦτόν τῳ διὰ τί ἐστὶ ψυχὴ; Καὶ διὰ τί ὁ δημιουργὸς ἐποίησεν, ὁ πρῶτον μὲν ἀρχὴν λαμβανόντων ἐστὶ τοῦ αἰεί.

† Γελοῖον τὸ ἵνα τιμῶτο, καὶ μεταφερόντων ἀπὸ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν τῶν ἐνταῦθα.

‡ Τὸ δὲ ὑπὲρ νοῦν ἤδη ἐστὶν ἔξω νοῦ πρᾶξι.



represents it as very absurd in the Gnostics to presume to exalt themselves above the great heavenly bodies, calling *their own* souls and those of the worst men immortal and divine; while in the stars, whose regular courses manifested the presence of a soul acting without disturbance in obedience to invariable laws, they could see nothing but perishable matter.\* To Plotinus the soul of *man* appeared vastly inferior to that which resided in those great heavenly bodies, always remaining like itself, and exempt from all change and all passion.

Though the charge of pride, which Plotinus brought against the Gnostics, was, in one view of it, the same which was urged on the side of paganism generally against the whole Christian scheme, yet in another view, where he complained of the arrogance and superciliousness of the Gnostics, and found in them nothing like humility, he might perhaps be arguing in agreement with the Christian principle itself. "Men without understanding," says he, "are taken by such discourses, in which they are told all at once, 'You shall be not only better than all men, but even than all gods;' for pride is great in man; and he who before thought meanly of himself, and classed himself with ordinary mortals, † begins to be puffed up when he hears it said, 'Thou art a son of God, but the others, whom you admire, are not such; for what they have received from the fathers, what they reverence, is not the right doctrine; but thou art higher than the very heavens, even without labouring for it.' ‡ In this charge of arrogance against the Gnostics, as boasting of their loftier *pneumatic* origin and nature, Irenæus also agreed, when he says of them, § "Whoever joins them is at once puffed up; thinks himself neither in heaven nor on earth, but to belong already to the Pleroma, and struts about full of pride." Here we see the unspeculative church-father and the pagan philosopher perfectly agreeing in attacking the spiritual pride of the Gnostics. And yet it may be asked whether Plotinus must not on his principles have judged pre-

\* Οὐδὲ τὴν μὲν αὐτῶν ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον καὶ θεῖαν λέγειν καὶ τὴν τῶν φαυλοτάτων ἀνθρώπων, τὸν δὲ οὐρανὸν πάντα καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ ἄστρα μὴ τῆς ἀθανάτου κοινοῦναι.

† Ὁ πρότερον ταπεινὸς καὶ μέτριος καὶ ἰδιώτης ἀνὴρ. From this combination of homogeneous predicates, it seems to me that the *ταπεινός* refers here to meanness of condition, and that this passage cannot be reckoned with those in which a blow is aimed against the Christian notion of humility.

‡ Κρείττων καὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, οὐδὲν πονήσας.

§ Lib. III. c. 15.

cisely in the same way of the Christians, who gloried in having become, through grace, the children of God, and despised the religion and civilization handed down to them from the fathers ;—whether, in writing that passage, he was not, at the same time, thinking of the Christians as a body.

Plotinus (who does not distinguish the several parties among the Gnostics)\* referring to those who maintained an absolute opposition between the Demiurge and the Supreme God, as well as between the two orders of world, says that their doctrine led to the same practical result as the principles of the Epicurean school, which denied everything divine, and made pleasure the supreme good. For were it true that this world is so utterly alienated from all that is godlike, that the latter cannot reveal or realize itself in it, it would follow that nothing remained for a man but to serve interest and pleasure,† if his own moral nature did not teach him better than such a system.‡ Justly also does he ascribe to their fundamental principles the absence in all their systems of a theory of morals,§ and he sums up with these remarks :—“ To say, ‘ Look to God,’ is nothing to the purpose, unless we are taught how we may be able to look away to him ; for what hinders

\* Baur has acknowledged this. See his work, just mentioned, p. 446. In respect to the theoretical part—the speculative view of the universe—the majority of the allusions in Plotinus are doubtless to the great Valentinian branch of the Gnostic system. In this I agree with Baur. In respect to the practical part, the attack seems to be directed for the most part against the purely *Dualistic* and antinomian views. In fact, Porphyry, the disciple of Plotinus, combats this tendency in his work on “ Abstinence from animal food.” I can find nothing in the book which may not be sufficiently explained on this hypothesis,—nothing which, as Baur supposes, could refer directly to the sect of Marcion. In reference to the latter, Plotinus would not have passed over without notice the strictly moral spirit which pervaded his sect. The preëminently practical tendency of Marcion was in no sense calculated to bring on a collision between his school and the New Platonists. It is deserving of remark, however, that Porphyry names none of the Gnostics who are known to us, but others who are wholly unknown. With the works, too, which are said to have been the fruit of immense labour on the part of the Gnostics mentioned by him, we are totally unacquainted. Perhaps we might obtain more accurate information of an ante-Christian Gnosis if these works were in our hands.

† Ἦνα μηδὲν καλὸν ἐνταῦθα δὴ ὀφθαλμῶν ὑπάρχον.

‡ Εἰ μή τις τῇ φύσει τῇ αὐτοῦ κρείττων εἴη τῶν λόγων τούτων.

§ Μηδένα λόγον περὶ ἀρετῆς περιποιῆσαι.

one, it might be said, from looking to God, though he should neither abstain from pleasure nor moderate his anger; since, surely, men may remember the name of God at the very time that they abandon themselves to their passions. Virtue, which goes right forward to its end and dwells in the soul with wisdom for its companion, enables me to meditate on God. But when, without true virtue, God is named, it is only an empty name."

The most convenient basis for a classification of the Gnostic sects is furnished by our remarks on the more important differences among them. They will best be referred to different classes according as they adopted a sterner or a milder form of Dualism; according as they represented the Demiurge as a being altogether alien from and opposed to the Supreme God, or only as subordinate to him and acting even in the ante-Christian period as his unconscious organ; according as they acknowledged the connection subsisting between the visible and invisible worlds, between God's revelation in nature, in history, and Christianity—the identity of the Old and New Testaments as belonging to the same unity of the theocratic development—or denied all this, and asserted an absolute contrariety in these several respects. In short, we may divide the Gnostic sects into two classes—one attached, the other opposed, to Judaism. If, however, we do not always find the antithesis so sharply defined in the facts as it is presented in the conception, but, on the contrary, observe many shades of transition from the stiff and rigid form of contrast down to the more flowing and evanescent shapes, this is precisely what might be expected in such a time of ferment and confusion—the same thing, in fact, which occurs in other more decided instances of contrariety. It furnishes, therefore, no objection to the correctness of our division.

As the first contrasts in the mode of apprehending Christianity came from its birthplace in Judaism, this is also true of the Gnosis, even though the latter subsequently developed itself into a direct opposition to Judaism. We have, in fact, already observed, among the Judaizing sects themselves, Gnostic elements attributable to the mystical, theosophical, or speculative tendencies existing among the Jews. Accordingly many phenomena may present themselves, of which we shall be at a loss whether to ascribe them to Judaizing or to

Gnostic sects. And as these phenomena belong to the common element of both, and constitute transition points between them, we may be in one sense right, whether we close with them the development of the Judaizing sects, or make them the opening of the development of the Gnostic sects. When, however, a phenomenon presents itself which in spirit and character belongs to a fundamentally Jewish cast of thought, though it may seem to contain individual elements of Gnosticism, we shall notwithstanding be obliged to refer it to the former system. Wherever certain tendencies or ideas predominate in the intellectual atmosphere of a period, they inevitably become mixed up with all that in any way offers a rallying point for them, even though in other respects it constitutes quite an opposite tendency. This holds good of the religious direction which shows itself in the Clementines.\* Although it must be conceded that individual ideas, closely akin to Gnosticism, are to be found in this work, yet the desire to simplify the doctrine of faith—the dogma of a primitive religion, simply restored by Moses and Christ; the purely Jewish conception of πίστις; the prominence given to outward works, the assertion of their meritoriousness, and the predominant tendency to the outward and practical life,—points which the Gnostic himself would ascribe to the psychical temperament, incapable of receiving the Gnosis;—all this is too characteristically distinctive of the Jewish position, as opposed to the Gnosis, to leave a doubt under which category we ought to place this phenomenon. And at the same time the work itself assumes a polemical attitude against Gnosticism, of which this work makes Simon Magus the representative. We must therefore view the Clementines not merely as not belonging to Gnosticism, but as representing the extreme of the Jewish position, the direct contrast to the system of Marcion. The extreme point of Judaism in the Clementines, and the one most directly opposed to the Marcionitic heresy, we consider to

\* I must explain myself where I differ on this point from Dr. Baur. The way in which we differ in our division of the Gnostic sects is connected, indeed, with our different modes of apprehending the entire system of Gnosticism; and this difference again, with the fundamental one of our theological principles. I have not thought it proper to enter any farther into the polemics of the question, inasmuch as the grounds for my own development of the subject lie in that development itself.



be this :—they recognise in Christianity *nothing that is new* ; Christianity, according to them, is only a restoration of the pure religion of Moses. So far as the main question in the Clementines relates to the restoration of a simple, monotheistic, primitive religion,—and Judaism is entirely stripped by them of its prophetic element,—we see in this work a precursor of Mohammedanism rather than a form of the manifestation of Gnosticism.

But while we must adopt this division of the Gnostics into two main classes, we may at the same time adopt a twofold modification of the second anti-Judaistic tendency. Either Christianity was presented by it in direct opposition to Judaism, but, on the other hand, placed in closer connection with paganism, though not with its mythology, but simply with the speculative element of Hellenism ; or, secondly, Christianity was severed from all connection with earlier systems, so as to appear in its complete elevation above all that went before it, and in majesty throwing all its predecessors in eclipse, and so as to be free from all liability to corruption by retaining any elements of a preceding stage of culture. The first shape of anti-Judaistic Gnosticism, inasmuch as it brings Christianity into union with paganism much more than with Judaism, must have tended to endanger the theistic principle itself as opposed to that of natural religion, and consequently to prove most injurious to the character of its Christian element. The second, on the other hand, must have come into collision with the spirit of Gnosticism itself, by which it is on one side attracted to a purely Christian interest, which, however misapprehended, still animated it.\*

After these general remarks we may now proceed to consider the several Gnostic sects in detail ; and following the classification which has appeared the most appropriate, we shall speak first of those *Gnostic sects which, attaching themselves to Judaism, insisted on a gradual development of the Theocracy from an original foundation of it in the human race.*

\* I readily acknowledge with many thanks that I should, perhaps, not have adopted this new modification of the division offered in my genetic development, and in the first edition of my Church History, but for Dr. Baur's strictures on my original classification.

*Particular Sects.*1. *Gnostic Sects attaching themselves to Judaism.*

## CERINTHUS.

Cerinthus is best entitled to be considered as the intermediate link between the Judaizing and the Gnostic sects. To him the remark formerly made applies in all its force, and in his case it may well be disputed whether he ought to be placed in the former or latter class of these sects; for in him, as has been already shown, elements alike of Ebionism and of Gnosticism are found united. Accordingly, even among the ancients opposite reports respecting his doctrine have been given from opposite points of view, according as the Gnostic or the Judaizing element was exclusively insisted upon.\* And the dispute on this point has been kept up even to modern times. In point of chronology, too, Cerinthus may be regarded as representing the principle in its transition from Judaism to Gnosticism; for he made his appearance in Asia Minor nearly at the close of the apostolic age, when, after the Pharisaic Judaism had first mixed itself up with Christianity, the tendencies allied to Essenism quickly followed. Since even as early as in the epistles which St. Paul wrote during his first imprisonment we find indications of the appearance of such a phenomenon, we have no reason to call in question the tradition (which can be traced back to disciples of St. John himself) on the credit of which Irenæus asserts that Cerinthus was a contemporary of this apostle, and was opposed by him. There is nothing improbable in what Theodoret reports,† that Cerinthus began to teach in Alexandria, and, having received his first impulse from the theology of the Alexandrian Jews, and drawn from them the germs of his doctrine, made his appearance in Asia Minor at a somewhat later time.

We detect the Jewish principle in Cerinthus when he sup-

\* To the Gnostic, by Irenæus, in whose account, however, the Judaizing element occasionally shines through;—to the Judaizing element, by the presbyter Caius at Rome, and Dionysius bishop of Alexandria, in their several statements which are preserved by Eusebius.

† Hæret. fab. II. 3.

poses an infinite gulf between God and the world ; and here comes in the hypothesis of numberless intermediate beings or angels, of lower and higher orders of spirits, to fill up this chasm. In truth, the doctrine of the different ranks of angels assumed a very prominent place in the later Jewish theology. By the instrumentality of such angels, Cerinthus taught, God had created this world ; for it seemed to him beneath the dignity of the Supreme God that He should come into immediate contact with a world so alien from His own essence.\* At the head of these angels he placed *one* who, in his whole activity at this stage of existence, and in his relation to this lower world, was to represent the Supreme God, and without knowing him to serve as an instrument of his will.† Cerinthus adhered to the doctrine that the Mosaic law was given by the ministration of angels ; and this doctrine he employed in the way already noticed, to designate, together with the divine origin of Judaism, its subordinate character. The angel, who stood at the head of the angelic host, he may perhaps have regarded as preëminently the ruler of the Jewish people, and as the being through whom the Supreme God revealed himself to them. Beyond him the Jewish people,

\* Philo, too, thought it necessary to distinguish, in the nature of man, the higher element, proceeding immediately from God, and the lower, which was formed by inferior spirits,—vid. *De mundi opificio*, s. 24 : and this notion finds something to fix itself on in Plato (*Timæus*, T. IX. p. 326, ed. Bipont.), where he says the eternal, the godlike in man proceeds from the Supreme God himself, the mortal from the subordinate gods,—to them was to be ascribed the *ἀθανάτων θνητὸν προσυφαίνειν*. The doctrine, too, subsequently, as we shall see, worked out and completed by the Gnostics, respecting the different elements in human nature, which sprang in part from the Supreme God, and partly from the Demiurge, may have rested on the same basis.

† Thus we understand the doctrine of Cerinthus, as exhibited by Irenæus, lib. I. c. 26 : “Non a primo Deo factum esse mundum docuit, sed a virtute quadam valde separata et distante ab ea principalitate quæ est super universa, et ignorante eum, qui est super omnia, Deum.” It is possible, indeed, that Irenæus transferred to the doctrines of Cerinthus the character of the later Gnosis, with which he was more familiar, and thus attributed to Cerinthus what really did not belong to him. But it is at least in perfect keeping with the whole context of his system, and is confirmed when we compare it with other Gnostic systems, to suppose that he conceived one of the angels to be ruler over this stage of existence, and therefore designated him particularly as the fashioner of the world.

as a body, were never able to rise ; although a small number of enlightened individuals, the spiritual nucleus of the Israelitish people, formed an exception. The multitude believed that in him they possessed and worshipped the Supreme God Himself. In like manner, from the great mass of the Jews—who were designed objectively to represent the type of God's people, but who possessed only an indirect knowledge of God according as He had presented himself in outward revelation and in his works generally, or in his Logos ; or else considered the Logos to be the Supreme God himself, and whose God *was* the Logos—Philo had distinguished those who had soared beyond all that is mediate and positive to an immediate contact of the Spirit with the Absolute, the *ὦν*, or the *ὅν* itself, whose God is the Supreme God himself.\* In those passages of the Old Testament where, after an angel had spoken, God is introduced as speaking himself, Gen. xxxi. 13, Philo found presented that subordinate position of religious development, at which the angel, through whom God reveals himself, is considered to be God himself ; or at which, rather, in condescension to its weakness, God reveals himself in the form of an angel ; just as, becoming all things to all men, He becomes a man to men, and condescends to exhibit himself in the likeness of man. Such are those who confound God as he manifests himself in his works with God as He is in Himself, in his essence ; like persons who imagine that, in the reflected image of the sun, they have its essence itself.† From such representations the Gnostic theories may have originated ; although, by holding fast to the side of fact and reality, they differ from the common Alexandrian theology, in which the Platonic and ideal elements predominated in a far greater degree.

The Christology of Cerinthus is based on the common Ebionite way of thinking. His notions as to what Jesus was up to the time of his inauguration to the office of Messiah, appear to have been similar to what we found among that

\* Οὗτος (ὁ λόγος) ἡμῶν τῶν ἀτελῶν ἂν εἴη θεός, τῶν δὲ σοφῶν καὶ τελείων ὁ πρῶτος. Legis allegor. l. III. s. 73. See above, vol. I. p. 79.

† Gen. xxxi. 13. "Ὅτι τὸν ἀγγέλου τόπον ἐπέσχε, ὅσα τῶ δοκεῖν, οὐ μεταβαλὼν, πρὸς τὴν τοῦ μήπω δυναμένου τὸν ἀληθῆ θεὸν ἰδεῖν ὀφείλειαν. Καθάρπερ γὰρ τὴν ἀνθρώπιον αὐχὴν ὡς ἥλιον οἱ μὴ δυνάμενοι τὸν ἥλιον αὐτὸν ἰδεῖν ὁρῶσι, οὕτως καὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ εἰκόνα τὸν ἄγγελον αὐτοῦ λόγον ὡς αὐτὸν κατανοοῦσιν. De somniis, l. I. s. 41.



class of Ebionites who denied the supernatural conception of Christ. In common with these he referred all the divine attributes in Christ to that descent of the Holy Ghost upon him which accompanied his baptism. The Holy Spirit he regarded as the Spirit of the Messiah (the πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ), as the true heavenly Christ himself (ὁ ἄνω Χριστός). By this Spirit it was that Christ was first brought to the knowledge of the Supreme God, who was before unknown to him. He it was too that through Christ revealed this unknown God, and also bestowed on Christ the supernatural power of working miracles. The lower, earthly Messiah (ὁ κάτω Χριστός), the man Jesus, was only the vehicle and organ of that heavenly Christ who wrought in him. If Christ the crucified proved a stone of stumbling to the common political spirit of the Jewish idea of the Messiah, this same Jewish spirit presents itself in Cerinthus, only under another form, corresponding to the theosophical, Magian turn of his mind. Cerinthus could form no conception of the divinity appearing in the form of a servant and in the extreme of self-humiliation; he would acknowledge no other Messiah than one who should manifest himself in splendour—none but a glorified Christ. The heavenly Christ, according to the doctrine of Cerinthus, was raised above all suffering: he withdrew from the man Jesus when he was given up to the pains of death. The very passion of Jesus proves that He had been forsaken by that higher Spirit superior to all pain; for had he remained united with that Spirit he could not have been overcome by any force, nor subject to suffering or death. Accordingly it is probable that Cerinthus attached no influence to his passion in the work of redemption, however he may have regarded it as an incontestable proof of that piety and devotion to God by which Jesus merited the highest reward. Consistently with his whole theory he must have supposed that the higher Christ now united himself again with Jesus, who had proved his perfect obedience to the Supreme God under all sufferings, and that by Him he was awakened from death and exalted to heaven. But we are without information as to the further development of his ideas. According to a statement of Epiphanius he denied the resurrection; and in this case we must suppose some such conclusion of his theory as this: The higher Christ was not again to unite himself with the man Jesus until he should establish him a victorious

sovereign in the Messiah's kingdom, and with him quicken all the faithful to share in his triumph. The statement, however, of Epiphanius, is not to be trusted; for as he went on the hypothesis that the Apostle Paul had everywhere to encounter the followers of Cerinthus, it is possible he may have been led by 1 Cor. xv. to impute to the latter an opinion which in fact he never held.

Cerinthus *agreed with the Ebionites*, again, in maintaining, in a certain sense, the continual obligation of the Mosaic law even on Christians. He may, perhaps, have held that Judaism, in its highest sense, which was not clear even to the angels who gave the law, the Ἰουδαϊσμός πνευματικός (heavenly things typified by the earthly), had been first revealed by the heavenly Christ; but that nevertheless the earthly shadow was still to continue, until the triumphant advent of the Messiah's kingdom, or the beginning of the new and heavenly order of things. But since Epiphanius says of him that he adhered *in part* to Judaism, and as this is a matter which it is not probable that Epiphanius would have invented,\* we may conclude that Cerinthus did not look upon everything in Judaism as equally divine; but that, perhaps, like the author of the Clementines, and many of the Jewish mystic sects, he distinguished an original Judaism from its later corruptions, and that he insisted on the continued obligation of only that part of the ceremonial law which he acknowledged as belonging to the former.

As an intermediate link and point of transition between the earthly and the new, heavenly, and eternal order of the world, Cerinthus, in common with many of the Jewish theologians, taught that there would be a happy period of a thousand years, when Jesus, having, through the power of the heavenly Christ united with him, triumphed over every enemy, would reign in the glorified Jerusalem, the central point of the glorified earth. It was inferred from Ps. xc. 4, literally understood, that, as a thousand years is with God as one day,

\* Προσέχειν τῷ Ἰουδαϊσμῷ ἀπὸ μέρους. Undoubtedly it may be affirmed that Epiphanius meant to denote in this way a partial observance of the Mosaic rites. As it was his object in these words to distinguish Cerinthus from Carpocrates, who rejected Judaism, the phrase might be understood of a partial recognition of Judaism as a divine institution,—partial, so far at least as he made angels only its authors.

the world would continue in its existing condition for six thousand years, and at the end of this earthly period of the world would follow, on the earth, a thousand years of sabbaths of uninterrupted blessedness for the righteous, now delivered from all their conflicts. It may be a question, indeed, whether he entertained such gross and sensual notions of this millennial sabbath as Caius and Dionysius imputed to him; for such views would hardly be in keeping with his system as a whole. He spoke indeed of a wedding-feast—an image then commonly employed to signify the blessed union of the Messiah with His saints;\* but on such an image any one who was both unfamiliar with the figurative language of the East, and interpreted his language under the bias of unfriendly feelings, might easily put a wrong construction. Dionysius indeed says that, in speaking of festivals and sacrifices, he was only seeking to veil his own gross and sensual notions.† But what warrant had he for such an assertion? If Cerinthus had really taught such a grossly sensual Chiliasm, there would be in this something so repugnant to the whole spirit of Gnosticism, and so strongly tending to the Jewish point of view, as to make it necessary for us to rank him with the Judaists rather than with the Gnostics.

### BASILIDES.

From Cerinthus we pass to Basilides, who lived in the first half of the second century. In all probability Alexandria was the principal seat of his labours—the stamp of the Jewish-Alexandrian training is too strongly marked to be mistaken, both in him and in his son Isidore,‡ whose very name denotes his Egyptian origin. The statement of Epiphanius, however, that Syria, the common birthplace of the Gnostic systems, was also the native land of Basilides, is not

\* The Gnostics also described the blessedness of the *πνευματικοί*, when received into the Pleroma, under the image of a *wedding-feast*, of a marriage between the *σωτήρ* and the *σοφία*, the spiritual natures and the angels (see below). Thus in Heracleon, “*ἀνάπαντες ἡ ἐν γάμῳ*,” cited by Orig. in Joann. T. X. s. 14.

† Euseb. hist. eccles. lib. III. c. 28.

‡ The name, however, is a singular one for the son of a person of Jewish descent.

in itself improbable, though not absolutely certain. The dogmas of emanation and of dualism formed the groundwork of his system. At the head of the world of emanations he placed that unrevealed God who is exalted above all conception or designation.\* The transition between this incomprehensible first principle and all the following evolutions of life was the unfolding of the former into its several self-individualizing powers, into so many names of the Ineffable. Man can conceive of God only after the analogy of *his own mind*; and this analogy is based on an objective truth, since the mind of man is God's image. On this rests the truth which lies at the root of the intellectual process by which we arrive at the formation of our conceptions of the divine attributes, and which also lies at the bottom of these several conceptions themselves. But the Gnostic, incapable of distinguishing the objective and subjective, transferred this to the development of objective existence out of the divine, primal essence. In order to the production of life he conceived it was necessary that the being who includes all perfection in himself should evolve out of himself the several attributes which express the idea of absolute perfection; but, in place of abstract, notional attributes, unsuited to the Oriental views, he substituted *living, self-subsistent, ever active, hypostatized powers*: first, the intellectual powers, the mind (*νοῦς*), the reason (*λόγος*), the thinking power (*φρόνησις*), wisdom (*σοφία*); next, might (*δύναμις*), whereby God accomplishes the purposes of his wisdom; and lastly the *moral attributes*, without which God's almighty power is never exerted, namely, *holiness or moral perfection* (*δικαιοσύνη*), where the term is to be understood according to its Hellenistic and Hebrew meaning, and not in the more restricted sense of our word *righteousness*.† Next to moral perfection follows inward tranquillity, *peace* (*εἰρήνη*), which, as Basilides rightly judged, can exist only in connection with holiness: and this peace,

\* Ὁ ἀκατονόμαστος, ἄρρητος.

† It is remarkable that Basilides employed the word *δικαιοσύνη*, according to the Hellenistic and Hebrew usage, to denote moral perfection; while the other Gnostics, especially those of the second class, used this word to denote a moral quality only in which there was more or less of defect,—the notion of justice or righteousness in its more restricted sense. (See below.)



which is the characteristic of the divine life, concludes the evolution of life within God himself.\* The number seven was to Basilides, as also to many other theosophists of this period, a sacred number; and accordingly those seven powers (*δυνάμεις*), together with the primal ground out of which they were evolved, constituted in his scheme the *πρώτη ὄγδοας*, the first octave, or root of all existence. From this point the spiritual life proceeded to evolve out of itself continually numberless gradations of existence, each lower one being still the impression, the antitype (*ἀντίτυπος*) of the immediate higher one.

We here recognise, for the first time, that grand idea of Gnosticism, that, in different degrees and under various forms of application, *one* law pervades all stages and kinds of existence, so that everything from highest to lowest is governed by a single law. After such general laws of the universe the profounder investigations of science are ever searching, although the attainment of the end, the complete resolution of the problem, must be reserved for the intuition of a higher state of existence. There is and ever will be a desire to find the unity amidst the endless multiplicity; to recognise the *πολυποίκιλος σοφία* in its *ἀπλότης*, in the mirror of its self-manifestation.

If, from the opinions of later Basilideans, as reported by Irenæus, and from the Basilidean gems and amulets, it were allowable to judge of the doctrines of the original school, it would appear that Basilides, as after the analogy of the days of the week he taught that there are seven homogeneous natures in each gradation of the spiritual world, supposed also that there were three hundred and sixty-five such regions or gradations of the spiritual world, answering to the days of the year. This was expressed by the mystical watchword *ἄβράξας*, formed after the Greek mode of reckoning numbers by the alphabet.†

Within this *emanation-world* each was what it ought to be at its own proper stage; but from the mixture of the godlike

\* Iren. lib. I. c. 24; lib. II. c. 16. Clem. Strom. lib. IV. f. 539.

† It may be that this term, which denotes the whole emanation-world, as an evolution of the Supreme Essence, had some other meaning besides; but every attempt to explain it would be arbitrary, since no certain data exist on which to proceed.

and the ungodlike arose disharmony, which required to be again reduced to harmony.

At this point unfortunately a great hiatus exists in our information of the system of Basilides. It is doubtful whether he followed *the theory* which attributed this mixture to a fall of a divine germ of life into the bordering chaos, or the one which supposed a self-active kingdom of evil, and therefore traced the origin of this mixed world to the attacks of the latter on the realm of light.

However, as we have seen in our introductory remarks, no very great importance can be ascribed to this possible difference of his original principles, as likely to affect the particular shaping of the system. In an ancient writing of the fourth century,\* words are quoted from a work of Basilides,† in which the subject of discourse relates to a poor and a rich principle; the nature of the poor being represented as one which, without root and without place, has supervened and obtruded itself upon things.‡ These very obscure and enigmatical words are indeed only a fragment. But when we consider that throughout this work of Basilides, or at least in the portion to which these words form the introduction, the

\* The disputation of Archelaus and Mani, preserved in the Latin translation, c. 55. In Fabricius' edition of the works of Hippolytus, f. 193.

† Gieseler, it is true, in a review of his (*Studien und Kritiken*, J. 1830, S. 397), has denied that Basilides *the Gnostic* is here intended. But I agree with Baur, who, in his work on the religious system of the Manicheans, p. 85, pronounces Gieseler's arguments unsatisfactory. The qualification, "Basilides antiquior," can hardly imply that a different person was intended from that Basilides who had been mentioned (c. 38. f. 175) some time previously in connection with Marcion and Valentine; for such a comparison with a person who had been named so far back is too vague; it would necessarily have been more strongly marked. The "*antiquior*" may be far better understood as referring to the date of Basilides as compared with that of Mani; and the "*quidam*," used with regard to a person who had been already named with others, does not strike me as very singular, especially considering the general style of the writer. But when every other allusion agrees perfectly with the Basilides known to us, can such slight reasons in any case warrant us to suppose another living at the same period and teaching the same dualistic doctrine? The treatise of Basilides here cited is probably the same work with the *ἐξηγητικά*, to which Clement of Alexandria refers.

‡ Per parvulam (here there is probably a false translation or a false reading) divitis et pauperis naturam, sine radice et sine loco rebus supervenientem, unde pullulaverit indicat.

subject relates to the antagonism of a good and evil principle, and that afterwards the manifestly Zoroastrian doctrine of the kingdoms of Ormuzd and of Ahriman is alluded to,\* it appears probable that those obscure introductory words contain only a symbolical designation of these two principles. The good principle is the rich, the evil principle the poor, one. The being "without root and place" designates the absoluteness of the principle, that springs up all at once, and mixes itself up with the development of existence. Probably the poor, in its own meagreness, was attracted by a longing for the riches which were presented to its view, and of which it felt an irresistible desire to abstract something for itself. Basilides perhaps may have quoted the Persian doctrine as corroborative of his own dualistic theory. It would agree with this view of the matter if, as stated by Clement of Alexandria, he deduced from a mixture of these principles the foreign element which united itself with the godlike nature of man.† If the

\* *Quæ de bonis et malis etiam barbari inquisiverunt.* Here the barbari are the Persians, for the doctrine immediately cited is evidently the pure Parsic doctrine. The same form of presentation may perhaps be recognised also in the manner in which Isidorus, the son of Basilides, refers certain enigmatical expressions of Pherecides Syrius to a cope stretched out in the starry heavens over the realm of light, a bulwark opposed to the kingdom of darkness. Vid. Clemens, Strom. l. VI. f. 621; Orig. C. Cels. l. VI. c. 42; Pherecydis fragmenta, p. 46, ed. Sturz.

† *Τάραχος καὶ σύγχυσις ἀρχική.* Clemens, Strom. l. II. f. 408. Gieseler, p. 397 of the review mentioned in a former note, has preferred the signification of the word *ἀρχικός*, "original" (which signification, indeed, etymologically, it unquestionably admits of), and referred what is here said to the fall and its consequences. He supposes that "Basilides, according to his rigid theory of God's justice, could not permit the human souls to be thrown into these bonds of matter without previous guilt." But neither indeed would it agree with such a notion of the strict rigour of justice to derive from the fall this disturbance of the divine in individuals; on the contrary, each must atone for his own sin. And even if Basilides taught, as Gieseler assumes, that there was a mixture of the divine germ of life with a dead matter (*ἄλν*), nothing would be gained thereby to the advantage of the rigid theory of justice. The souls would still continue to suffer in consequence of an inevitable mischance, unless we suppose that the first mixture of spirit with matter was a consequence of guilt, and refer this mixture itself to a primitive fall in the world of spirits. But even in that case, what was at first the fruit of guilt would, in its consequences, be only an inherited misfortune to the souls afterwards produced. A theory of justice so rigid and narrow must generally, if it supposes a cosmical and historically

charge which Clement of Alexandria brings against Basilides, of having deified the devil, might be referred to his Dualism, this would furnish a certain proof that he adopted the doctrine about Ahriman;\* but this accusation is not to be so understood. It must be considered as merely hypothetical; it contains nothing more than a deduction from an assertion of Basilides, which does not belong to our present subject, but of which we shall have occasion to speak hereafter.†

But whatever might have been the origin of this mixture of light and darkness, of the godlike and the ungodlike, it must, according to the system of Basilides, minister to the glory of the godlike, accomplish the ideas of the divine wisdom,—the law of the whole evolution of life. For the kingdom of evil is in itself nought—the godlike is the real, and by its very nature victorious.

*Light, life, soul, goodness*, on the one hand—*darkness, death, matter, evil*, on the other,—these were the correlative

cohering process of evolution, become involved in many difficulties and contradictions. It is very possible that Basilides supposed, in the first place, an original mixture of principles as the cause of all other disturbances, and afterwards nevertheless insisted on the principle that all suffering is in some way or other a correlative of subjective sin.

Now though the word *ἀρχικός* may undoubtedly signify the “original,” yet the manner in which the words *ἀρχή, λόγος ἀρχικός, μοναρχία* are employed in the Alexandrian style is more favourable to my own view, and the context seems to me to confirm it likewise; for *σύγχυσις* signifies a confused mixture, and this requires some more precise designation. Now *what* it is that is mixed together the word *ἀρχική* shows—it is a mixing together of principles. It is true, I admit, that the words do not necessarily designate a confusion or intermingling of the potencies of light with a self-active kingdom of Ahriman, but may also denote the mixture of the fallen divine germ of life with a dead *ἕλη*. Still we cannot allow there is any force in the argument of Gieseler, that, if Basilides had entertained a theory so closely related to the Zoroastrian Dualism, Docetism would have been the necessary result. We have already asserted, and must again repeat, that by such reasonings greater importance is ascribed to this difference than really belongs to it. As in the original Parsism such a mixture of the kingdom of Ahriman with the kingdom of light might be supposed, and *this* world derived therefrom, without the evil principle in the world of sense being made so radical a one as it is presupposed to be by Docetism; so, on the other hand, it would be possible to start from the notion of the *ἕλη*, and yet be led to Docetism, as the example of Marcion teaches.

\* Clem. Strom. l. IV. f. 507, *Θειάζων τὸν διάβολον*.

† Here I allow Gieseler to be right, and retract my former view of the matter.



members of the antithesis which, in the system of Basilides, runs through the whole progressive course of the world. Everywhere, as rust deposits itself on the surface of iron, *darkness* and *death* cleave to the fallen *seeds of light and life*; the *evil* to the *good*; the *ungodlike* to the *godlike*;—without however the original essence being thereby destroyed. Only it must purify itself by degrees from the foreign dross, in order to gain once more its original splendour—just as the iron needs to be cleansed from the rust, before it can recover its higher lustre.\* It was in the light of such a process of purification that he considered the whole course of the present world as being formed for such an end as that the godlike may be cleansed from all foreign mixture, and restored to its kindred element and to a reunion with its original source.

In the system of Basilides we find contradictory elements. On the one hand, there prevails, by virtue of its Dualism and the mixture of the two principles, the idea of a natural necessity determining the fate of souls. On the other hand, he takes great pains to give distinct prominence to the notion of justice as accurately weighing merits and demerits, and to the notion of free will, which determines the whole development and destiny of man. As, in man's life on earth, each moment is connected with the one which preceded it, and is modified by it according to the different application he may give to it by his free will, so, according to Basilides, the life of each individual on earth is connected, in the grand purifying process of the universe, with the anterior terms in the series of existence. Each one brings evil with him out of some earlier state of existence, and has to atone for it and purify himself from it in the present life. Upon his moral conduct, again, in this earthly life, depends his condition in a subsequent state of existence. To this he applied the words of Moses, as to visiting sin unto the third and fourth generation.† Thus, the

\* Basilides says this generally of all suffering of the fallen light-nature. "Pain and anxiety deposit themselves outwardly on things, like the rust on iron" (ὁ πόνος καὶ ὁ φόβος ἐπισυμβαίνει τοῖς πράγμασιν αἷς ὡς τῷ σιδήρῳ). Strom. I. IV. f. 509, a. In all this we see the spirit of the original Zoroastrian doctrine far more clearly expressed than in the gloomy Dualism of other Gnostics, where the Zoroastrian doctrines appear modified by a tone of mind which did not belong to the system.

† The proof of this is to be found in the words of the Didascal. Anatol. in Clement of Alexandria, ed. Paris, 1641, f. 794: Τὸ θανάσιμον

transmigration of souls, within the sphere of humanity at least, occupies an important place in the system of Basilides.

But here the question arises, whether his doctrine of transmigration did not extend still further, and allow the soul to migrate also in the brutes. This does seem, indeed, to jar with his *Theodicée*, which was founded on the strict notion of justice; the words, however, of Basilides himself\* express such a doctrine, when, in explaining Rom. vii. 9, he says, "I lived once without the law; that is, before I came into this human body, I lived in a bodily shape which is not subject to the law, in a brute body." These words evidently suppose a transposition of the soul out of a brute body, which by its organization holds as yet the rational consciousness enthralled, into the organism of the human body, in which it attains to free development, and consequently to the consciousness of the moral law. Such a doctrine is closely connected, moreover, with the fundamental ideas of Basilides. From the kingdom of evil, of darkness, nothing positive can proceed—it is only like the rust which deposits itself on iron. All that issues from the realm of light is life and soul. From the kingdom of darkness, which has mixed itself up with the productions of the kingdom of light, nothing springs but what holds enthralled the light and the germs of life,—the souls scattered everywhere—which does not suffer them to come to themselves. And this is the bond of matter. Thus was he obliged to recognise even in the brute kingdom a soul oppressed and confined by elements belonging to the kingdom of darkness. And this we might reconcile with his principle, already stated, regarding justice and divine retribution, in the following manner: as long as the soul is confined in the lower realm of nature it lies prostrate, in obedience to the destiny of that commixture, under the power of the nature which fetters it; but when it once attains to a free development of the rational

ἀποδιδόνς ἐπὶ τρίτην καὶ τετάρτην γενεὰν τοῖς ἀπειθοῦσι, φασὶν οἱ ἀπὸ Βασιλίδου κατὰ τὰς ἐνσωματώσεις. It is true the writer is here speaking only of followers of Basilides, of whom some departed far from the spirit and principles of their master. But the connection in which this doctrine stands with his principles proves that it is rightly considered as having actually originated with him.

\* Preserved by Origen in the fifth book of his Commentary on Romans, T. IV. opp. f. 549.

principle, or of its light-nature—in other words, when it has once passed into the human organization—the law of rigid justice begins to have its application in the destiny of the free rational beings.

According to Basilides, then, there is no such thing as a *dead* nature. The *dead* has no existence in and by itself; it is merely that which oppresses actual life, until the reaction of the latter becomes strong enough to burst the compact rind. In all nature, therefore, from the mineral kingdom up to man, through all the different stages of being, he sees a life struggling for release from the bonds of matter, in a progressive movement towards freedom. Accordingly the ethics of Basilides was based on his cosmogonic doctrine. For, proceeding on this principle of the identity of life and soul in all things,\* he announced the law, “Love must embrace all, because all things stand in a certain relation to all,—all things are closely akin to all.”† And, according to this, in the purifying process and development of the universe, there prevails a twofold law—the law of natural necessity in the evolution from below upwards to man; and the progressive education, which is determined by the laws of the moral order of the universe, and commences with man: from this point progress and regress, happiness and misery, are dependent on the free self-determination.

What we remarked concerning the place which the Demiurge occupied in the systems of the first class of Gnostic sects applies to *that angel* who, in the system of Basilides, was set over the entire course of the terrestrial world, and the whole purifying process of nature and history, and whom he designates by the name of the ruler (ὁ ἄρχων). According to this doctrine, this Archon, in his government of the world, does not act independently and plenipotentially; but the whole proceeds ultimately from the overruling providence of the Supreme God.

Three agents are joined together in the remarkable doctrine of Basilides concerning providence; but the one from whom everything eventually springs, and on whom everything depends (though through numberless intermediate instruments), is the Supreme God himself. From him comes the law implanted in the nature of all beings, according to which they develop them-

\* As in Buddhism.

† The words of Basilides, as they are found in Clement, Strom. I. VI. f. 508: Τὸ ἡγαπηκῆναι ἅπαντα, ὅτι λόγον ἀποσώζουσι πρὸς τὸ πᾶν ἅπαντα.

selves, and which modifies all the influences by which they are affected, and in which is contained the whole process of the development of the universe. The Archon does nothing more than give the impulse to the execution of that which, so far as the inherent law and the implanted power are concerned, is already grounded in the individual beings themselves. He works on all obediently to this law of nature derived from the Supreme God, and calls into action the preparatory capacities of these laws of nature; and in these his regulative operations he merely acts, though unconsciously, as an instrument of the Supreme God. "Although that which we call providence," says Basilides, "is first put in motion by the Archon, yet it had been implanted in the essence of things coincidentally with their origin by the God of the universe."\*

We thus see how Basilides endeavoured to take a middle course between two opposite views of the divine government of the world — between the one which represented God as operating only transiently and externally upon things; and another, the Neo-Platonic, which used the word providence merely as a designation of an eternal, immanent necessity in the universe, which develops itself according to invariable laws. Although, in his language, he approximates to the Neo-Platonic view,† still he adopts nothing of it but what is quite reconcilable with the theistic view of the world; and we find in his instance fresh confirmation of our previous remark on the relation of Gnosticism to Neo-Platonism. The recognition of a personal and active God, actively entering into the evolution of the universe, and the teleological argument so closely connected therewith, distinguish his fundamental position from the Neo-Platonic. Hence the communication of a some-

\* Clemens. Strom. l. IV. f. 509: 'Η πρόνοια δὲ, εἰ καὶ ἀπὸ (not ὑπὸ, because this impulse proceeds, indeed, from him, but is to be derived from another as the first cause), τοῦ ἀρχοντος, ὡς φάναι, κινεῖσθαι ἀρχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐγκατεσπάρη ταῖς οὐσίαις σὺν καὶ τῇ τῶν οὐσιῶν γενέσει πρὸς τοῦ τῶν ὅλων Θεοῦ. It is true, Clement does not quote these words expressly as those of Basilides. But as he is treating of him throughout this passage, and as the term ἀρχων is peculiar to Basilides, it scarcely admits of doubt that Clement, who is bent on refuting Basilides on his own principles, has here made use of his own words.

† Vid. Plotin. Ennead. III. l. II. at the beginning: 'Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ οὐποτε μὴ τῷ κόσμῳ τῷδε φαινὲν παρεῖναι, τὴν πρόνοιαν ἰερῶς ἂν καὶ ἀκολουθῶς λέγοιμεν τῷ παντὶ εἶναι, τὸ κατὰ νοῦν αὐτὸ εἶναι.



thing higher, of something above nature and above reason, could find a place in his system; while to Plotinus, on the other hand, that which is above reason must appear contrary to reason:

Closely agreeing with Basilides' doctrine of the angels, the different grades of the spiritual world, and of the process of purification, and of the training of embodied souls, is that of his son Isidore,—which, perhaps, we may properly refer to the father,—that every soul, on its incorporation, is attended by an angel, possessing some affinity with its peculiar nature, to whom is committed the guidance of its special process of purification, and of its particular education; who, in all probability, after its separation from that body, was supposed to accompany it to the place of its destination determined by its conduct on earth—in this sense, a guardian spirit, which everywhere accompanies its kindred soul. Such, according to Isidore, was the demon of Socrates.\*

From what has been said, it appears how far Basilides was from adopting an absolute Dualism, and from an unchristian contempt or morose hatred of the world. His system may perhaps have led to a recognition of the revelation of one God in the creation, and of the connection between divine things and natural, between grace and nature. His aim was, to make men conscious of the identity of God's revelation in nature and in history,—to lead them “*to consider the whole universe as one temple of God.*” *Theodicée*, or the justification of God's ways with man, was with him a point of the greatest importance. Faith in the goodness, holiness, and justice of Providence stood more firmly fixed in his mind than all things else. Whenever, in contemplating the course of the world, difficulties presented themselves which involved his mind in perplexity, his last word ever was, “I will say anything sooner than doubt the goodness of Providence.”†

\* Isidore, in the first book of his exposition of the so-called prophet Parchor, cites a doctrine of this sort taught by the ancients as one of the loftier truths received by them: Φασὶ δὲ οἱ Ἀττικοὶ μεμνηνύσθαι τινὰ Σωκράτει παρπομίνου δαίμονος αὐτῶ. Καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης δαίμοσι κεχρησθῆναι πάντας ἀνθρώπους λέγει συνομαρτοῦσιν αὐτοῖς παρὰ τὸν χρόνον τῆς ἐσωματώσεως. Without doubt from some writing falsely attributed to Aristotle. Strom. l. VI. f. 641.

† Πᾶν ἐρῶ, μᾶλλον ἢ κακὸν τὸ προνοῦν ἐρῶ. Strom. l. IV. f. 506.

From Basilides' theory as to the relation of the Archon to the Supreme God, we may easily infer what his opinion was of Judaism, and of its relation to Christianity. The Jews are, it is true, in idea, and in the ideal significance of their religion and of their national destination, that consecrated people of the Supreme God from whom the true knowledge and worship of the Most High was one day to proceed; but in actual manifestation they appear only as a people devoted and consecrated to the Archon, who for a while constitutes the highest power in mundane events. The great mass of this people regarded *him* as the Supreme and only God. The spiritual men among the Jews—they who constituted the *spiritual* Israel, who were really conscious of that ideal significance, and in whom it attained to its realization—these alone had soared beyond the Archon himself to a presentiment of the Supreme God, who revealed Himself through the other as His unconscious instrument. They alone could rise to the intuition of the ideas which the Supreme God had inspired into the Archon, and which the latter revealed under the cover of Judaism, without comprehending them himself. These ideas, not fathomed by the Archon himself, to whom they were exhibited under a sensuous covering answering to the inferior grade of his limited nature, form the connecting link betwixt this mediate and veiled revelation of the Supreme God in the Old Testament and his immediate and unveiled manifestation in Christianity. Accordingly Basilides says, "Moses erected one temple of God, and thus proclaimed one universe of God."\* By this was hinted (and something similar is found in Philo) the universalistic tendency which lay at the very foundation of Judaism. Basilides, however, did not confine himself to the canonical writings of the Old Testament. He made use of apocryphal scriptures besides, which are unknown to us—predictions of a certain prophet Parchor, and revelations passing under the name of

\* Ἐνα δ' οὖν νέων ἰδρυσάμενος τοῦ Θεοῦ, μονογενῆ τε κόσμον κατήγγειλε. Strom. I. V. f. 583, D. We perceive here, both in the thought and the expression, the elements of an Alexandrian-Jewish education. Philo and Josephus, also, both consider the temple as a symbol of the world, and carry the image into further details. Philo περὶ μοναρχίας I. II.: Τὸ μὲν ἀνωτάτω καὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἱερὸν Θεοῦ νομίζειν τὸν σύμπαντα χρῆν κοσμὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ χειρότερον.

the Patriarch Ham. We can hardly suppose such writings were forged by him or his school. Probably they came down to him from more ancient times, and were used by him in perfect good faith—monuments, from the times before Christ, of some older source of the ideas which lie at the root of the Gnosis. Perhaps he may have thought that in these documents he had found a still clearer exposition of a lofty truth transmitted in the form of secret doctrines than was contained in the canonical scriptures of the Old Testament. He might easily explain the rejection of these books by supposing that a people who had no taste for such ideas would have nothing to do with the books containing this higher wisdom.

As we see here an element of universalism, so it agrees with such a view that he did not confine the tradition of the higher truth in the ante-Christian period exclusively to the Jews, but believed that he saw indications thereof even *beyond the limits* of that nation. We have seen, for instance, how he cites the doctrine of Zoroaster as a testimony of the truth. The fact that he derived a tradition of higher wisdom from Ham, and not from Shem, seems a proof that he acknowledged a tradition which was not Hebrew. It is not improbable that he valued the wisdom of those who by the Greeks were called barbarians above the Greek philosophy itself.\* And yet, as is clear from a remark of Isidore's already quoted, it is certain that he also sought vestiges of that higher wisdom in the Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle, either in their genuine works or in supposititious writings. According, however, to the passage of Isidore's exposition of the prophet Parchor which has come down to us, these vestiges of truth in the Greek philosophers were not derived from a common inward source, a reaction in the more eminent men of the spiritual principle against paganism, but from a source without themselves, a borrowed tradition. Still the moderate spirit of this school, and its more favourable judgment of the Greek philosophy, are evinced by the fact that Isidore does not in this case adopt the Jewish fables of the fallen spirits who had intercourse with the daughters of men, and thereupon diffused the higher kinds of knowledge in the pagan world, but he follows the less fantastic, though not more historical

\* Giving this turn to Plato's expression, "Ἕλληνες ἀπὸ παίδες.

hypothesis of the Alexandrian Jews, according to which the Greeks had borrowed such doctrines from the scriptures of the Old Testament, through the medium of Egypt. "And let no one believe," says Isidore, "that what we consider the peculiar property of the elect had been declared before by certain philosophers; for it is no discovery of theirs, but they have adopted it from the prophets and combined it with their own pretended wisdom."\* This alone shows how low was the estimate which this school took of the Hellenic philosophy as compared with the Old Testament, and even with the ancient wisdom of the East. Isidore describes the Greek philosophers merely as men who give themselves the appearance of philosophizing.† He could see in Greek philosophy no original, but only a derivative truth, and that corrupted by foreign admixtures.

But the doctrine of a guardian angel attending on every soul may perhaps be considered as a proof that he by no means considered heathen nations to be destitute of all divine influences and providential care. As he gave to individual souls a guardian angel, he probably, following the analogy of this theory, placed angels over the several nations as their ruling spirits. In this doctrine the Basilideans of the West, with whom Irenæus was acquainted, may have rightly apprehended the opinions of their master; though they superadded something else, which did not come from him. These angels, the Elohim of other nations, he probably considered as national gods, just as he supposed the Archon, who was at their head, to be the particular god of the Jewish people. It is evident that, in holding such a theory of the Elohim, he might find support in several passages in the Alexandrian version of the Bible, and that therefore he only appropriated an idea that had long been extant.‡

\* Καὶ μή τις οἶσθω, ὃ φαρμέν ἴδιον εἶναι τῶν ἐκλεκτῶν, τοῦτο προσημαίνον ὑπάρχειν ὑπὸ τινων φιλοσόφων, οὐ γάρ ἐστιν αὐτῶν εἶρημα· τῶν δὲ προφητῶν σφτερισάμενοι προσέθηκαν τῷ μὴ ὑπάρχοντι κατ' αὐτοὺς σοφῶ. Strom. I. VI. f. 641. I now believe the latter expression should be understood as neuter, "the wisdom which does not exist with them," i.e. their pretended wisdom. The verb προστιθέναι seems to me best suited to this rendering of σοφῶ.

† Τοὺς προσποιουμένους φιλοσοφεῖν. Strom. I. VI. f. 641.

‡ Besides the passage already cited on p. 21, the words in the same song of Moses, Deut. xxxii. 43, not found in the Hebrew, but



Over mankind therefore there ruled those subordinate powers to whom men's consciousness was subject; no one could release himself wholly from their spell, from the spell of the cosmic principle. There existed, for the most part, only an unconscious union with the Supreme God and with the order of world in affinity with him. The natures which bore within them the germ of a life akin to Him remained fettered in the narrow limits of the Archon.

Without doubt Basilides possessed a profound knowledge of the spiritual condition of mankind in the times before Christ, and especially in those immediately preceding His nativity. He had unquestionably a profound sense of the weight which lay on the minds of men, and especially on the noblest natures, as well as of their unconscious craving after an emancipation of the spirit; and from this mental state he might have come to understand the nature of the redemption and to perceive its necessity. If he apprehended it imperfectly, still it held a necessary place in his system. Without it, the divorce betwixt the world of the Archon and the proper divine order of things must continue for ever. The spirits destined for the highest stage of being must have ever remained in their oppressive thralldom. They might, indeed, in the progress of the metempsychosis, rise from one higher step to another in the kingdom of the Archon; but they could not, in satisfaction of the longing implanted within them, have risen beyond this kingdom and the Archon himself, and attained to communion with the highest stage of existence, and to the clear consciousness as well as to the full and free exercise of their exalted nature, had not the Supreme God himself brought his divine life near to their kindred germ of life, and thereby first set the latter into action. And whilst, by the act of redemption, the spiritual natures are exalted to the highest position,

which the translator has added on the ground of some such theory: καὶ προσκυνησάτωσαν αὐτῷ πάντες ἄγγελοι θεοῦ, compared with v. 8. All the Elohim that presided over the other nations are called upon to do homage to God's people. What the nations were to do, and what the powers ruling over them do, is, according to this scheme, one and the same thing. The former is derived from the latter. Comp. Ps. xcvi. 7, where the Alexandrians translate עֲלֵהֶם by ἄγγελοι, and beyond question had in mind such powers as the national gods were supposed to be.

its influence extends also to the subordinate stages of existence; harmony is everywhere restored; each order of being attains to the state most agreeable to its nature.

But if, on the one hand, Basilides, in his view of the doctrine of redemption, departed essentially from the Jewish position, yet, on the other, he, like Cerinthus, held Ebionitic notions, and supposed a sudden entrance of the divine nature into the life of Jesus, and rejected the church doctrine of the God-man, in whom from the first the divine and the human elements were inseparably united. His whole theory was based, it is true, on the recognition of a redeeming God, but not of a redeeming God-man. The man Jesus was not in his view the Redeemer; he differed from other men only in degree. Basilides does not even seem to have ascribed to him *absolute* impeccability. Jesus, in his view, was merely the instrument whom the redeeming God selected for the purpose of revealing himself in humanity and of actively influencing it. The Redeemer, in the proper and highest sense of the term, was, he taught, the highest Æon,\* sent down by the Supreme God to execute the work of redemption, and who united himself with the man Jesus at his baptism in the Jordan.

Now, although Basilides did not acknowledge Jesus of Nazareth to be the Redeemer, but held that he himself stood like the rest in need of redemption, yet he cannot be accused of holding that the redemption was simply an ideal thing, and of denying it as a great historical fact. Far indeed from him, as may be gathered from what has been said, was the opinion that any being enthralled within the kingdom of the Archon could redeem himself. For this an objective fact was requisite, the actual entrance of that might from a higher world, the νοῦς, into the terrestrial and phenomenal, and this was accomplished through the medium of the man Jesus. According to Basilides, this was the greatest fact in the history of the created universe, from which must proceed everything that follows up to the final consummation of the perfect restoration of harmony to the universe. The way in which he speaks of the baptism of Jesus is a testimony to the

\* Or νοῦς, who, inasmuch as he ministers for the salvation of mankind, is called διάκονος.

great impression which this fact, and the public ministry of Christ following thereupon, had through tradition left on the minds of Christians. Clement cites on this point the following words from the Basilidean school :\*—"When the Archon himself heard the word of the communicated Spirit† (the Spirit sent from above), he was amazed at what he heard and at what he saw,‡ the joyful annunciation,§ having been wholly unexpected by him ; and his amazement was called fear,|| the beginning of wisdom,—of a wisdom which discriminated the different classes of men, which perfected all, and which restored the original harmony ; for he distinguished and separated from one another not only the natures belonging to the world (to his own kingdom), but also the elect (the pneumatic natures superior to the Archon's kingdom) from *them*, and released them from his bann (or conducted them) to the God who is over all."¶

\* Clemens, Stromat. lib. II. f. 375.

† Probably the word meant is that which, according to the Nazarene gospel (see above, vol. i. p. 484), the Holy Ghost is said to have spoken to Christ at the moment of his descent upon him.

‡ The glorified appearance in which Christ, when united with this exalted being, presented himself to the Archon ; or the sight of the miraculous dove, which was a symbol of the Spirit, which had come down from on high ; or the miraculous appearances which, according to the gospel of the Ebionites, accompanied the baptism of Christ.

§ The annunciation of the Spirit being called a *εὐαγγέλιον* for the *ἄρχων*, it is evident that he did not yield to the higher power merely from constraint ; but his first amazement was converted into reverential joy. The prospect of being one day released from the embarrassing government of the world, when the elect natures should have attained to their destined glory, and of entering into rest with his own,—to which expectation of the Demiurge the Gnostics referred such passages as Rom. viii. 20, 21,—Vid. Orig. T. I. in Joann. s. 24,—could be no otherwise than joyful to him. Comp. Didascal. Anatol. opp. Clem. f. 796, D, where the blessing which the Demiurge pronounces on the Sabbath is adduced to show how difficult the work was for him.

|| Thus, Ps. cxi. 10, "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom," was interpreted.

¶ *Αὐτὸν τὸν ἄρχοντα ἐπακούσαντα τὴν φάσιν τοῦ διακονουμένου πνεύματος, ἐκπλαγῆναι τῷ θεάματι παρ' ἐλπίδας εὐαγγελισμένον, καὶ τὴν ἐκπλήξιν αὐτοῦ φόβον κληθῆναι, ἀρχὴν γενόμενον σοφίας φυλοχερηντικῆς τε καὶ διακριτικῆς καὶ τελειωτικῆς καὶ ἀποκαταστατικῆς, οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἐκλογὴν διακρίνας, ὃ ἐπὶ πᾶσι προπέμψει* (this then would be the *ἄρχων*). Assuming τῷ to be the correct reading, I have rendered as in the text : in this case the Supreme God must be understood to be denoted.

Thus a new light dawns on the Archon himself. He comes to the knowledge of a higher God and a higher world above himself. He is redeemed from his own limited state. He attains to the consciousness of a superior power, which rules over all, and which he himself, without being aware of it, has hitherto been serving. He sees himself released from the heavy burden of governing the world, which until now he had supposed that he supported alone, and for which his own powers were inadequate. Though it had cost him so much pains, and still he had not succeeded as yet in reducing to order the conflicting elements in the mundane development, he now beholds a power able to overcome every obstacle and reduce all opposites to unity. Basilides, partly from a profound insight into the essential character of Christianity and of history, partly judging from those effects of Christianity which were before his eyes and which contained the germ of the future, foresees what a mighty movement and sifting process it would introduce into humanity. He perceives how all sensitive minds among every people, freed from the power which had held their consciousness in fetters, redeemed from all dependence on the creature, and raised to communion with their original source, would become united with one another in a higher unity. All these effects are set forth by him as the impression made on the Archon at the baptism of Christ.

The whole work of redemption, then, Basilides, like Cerinthus, attributed to the redeeming heavenly Genius. In all probability he also agreed with the latter in supposing that this Genius, at the time of the passion, left the man to himself, whom He had before used as his instrument. The sufferings of Christ could not, according to Basilides, have the least connection with the work of redemption; for, according to his rigid conception of justice, the divine justice does not allow one to suffer innocently for another, it requires that every sin should be expiated by suffering. He regarded not only suffering in general, but also every particular suffering, as a punishment for sin. He embraced the theory which Christ (John ix. 3, Luke xiii. 2) condemned. "Every one," he taught, "suffers either for actual sins or for that evil in his nature which he brought with him from an earlier state of existence, and which may not as yet have come into actual



operation.”\* It was by the latter that he vindicated Providence in respect to the sufferings of little children. When pressed with an objection drawn from the suffering of *men* of *acknowledged goodness*, he might with good reason appeal to the general fact of the sinfulness of human nature, and reply, “Whatever man you may name to me, he is still a man: God alone is holy. Who will find a voice among those who have no voice?” Job xiv. 4.

But the case was somewhat different when this proposition came to be applied to the Redeemer, who, as certainly as he *is* the Redeemer, must be pure from sin. Clement of Alexandria directly accuses Basilides of carrying his proposition even to this extent. In the words, however, which Clement quotes, this surely is not *necessarily* implied; they merely say, “If, however, passing by this whole argument, you endeavour to bring me into difficulty by adducing the case of *certain persons*; if you say, Then *He* has sinned, for *He* suffered,” &c. It might be held that Basilides is here speaking simply of certain men who were regarded with peculiar veneration, who stood in high repute for holiness, and that Clement allowed himself the liberty of drawing his own conclusion. But, *in the first place*, the objection which Basilides supposes to be taken to his position would lose all its force and meaning if it were not made precisely in the above sense; and, *secondly*, this wide extension of the proposition is quite consistent with his theory concerning the relation of suffering to sin, and with his theory of the divine justice and of the process of purification to which every nature belonging to the kingdom of the Archon is subject. The Jesus who belonged to this kingdom needed redemption himself, and could only be made partaker of it by his union with that heavenly redeeming spirit. To render him worthy of being redeemed before all others, and of being employed as the instrument for diffusing to others the influences of the redeeming Genius, it was sufficient if, as the most excellent and the purest of men, and as the furthest advanced in the work of purification, he possessed the *minimum* of sinfulness. No doubt in this case the objection might be brought against the Basilidean system, which certainly

\* Sufferings,—expiatory and purgative of sin (ἁμαρτία or the ἁμαρτημάτων). Strom. I. IV. f. 506.

must have established some proportion between the degree of sin and the degree of punishment—How, then, is such great suffering reconcilable with the smallest degree of sinfulness? But to this, as we may infer from his remarks on martyrdom, he would probably be at no loss for an answer: “The consciousness of serving as an instrument for the highest and holiest cause of humanity, and of *suffering* in this vocation (perhaps, too, the prospect of the glory into which he was to enter through suffering), so sweetened the pain that to him it was even as though he did not suffer.”

In accordance with the same principle he denied the doctrine of justification in the Pauline sense. He could not consistently admit any such thing as objective justification in the sight of God, as forgiveness of sin, in the sense of deliverance from the guilt and punishment of sin. Every sin, whether committed before or after faith in the Redeemer, or baptism, must, according to his scheme, be equally expiated by suffering. This is a necessary law of the government of the universe, which can in no wise be overruled. The only exception he makes is in the case of sins of ignorance, or unintentional sins; \* but unfortunately his explanation of this vague and indefinite expression has not come down to us. Probably he only meant sins of pardonable ignorance; such, for instance, as had been committed when consciousness was under some involuntary constraint, analogous to the state of the rational principle when restrained by the bodies of brutes. But if, on the other hand, we understand by justification (*δικαίωσις, δικαιοσύνη*) an inward, subjective condition of being made *just*—sanctification by the communicating of a divine life—such a doctrine had a very important and necessary place in the system of Basilides.

Among the religious and moral ideas of the *Basilidean school*, there are several other remarkable points which deserve to be particularly noticed.

What distinguishes Basilides from other Gnostics is this, that he did not oppose the Gnosis, as the highest stage in religion, to the *πίστις*, to faith; but with him faith itself is the highest quality of man. In the latter, however, he distinguished a series of higher and lower degrees, corresponding

\* *Μόνας τὰς ἀκουσίους καὶ κατ' ἀγνοίαν ἀφίσθαι.* Strom. l. IV. f. 536.

to the different grades of perfection which different souls are destined to occupy in that higher spiritual world from whence they sprang. He supposed, in fact, as we formerly remarked, a series of terms in the higher world of spirits, of which one was continually a copy of the other. Germs of divine life from all these grades had become mixed with the kingdom of darkness: Christianity is the sifting principle, whereby the spiritual natures belonging to the different grades of the spiritual world are separated from one another, are brought to the consciousness of their own proper essence, and acquire the power of setting it in action, and of rising to that region of the spiritual world to which they belong by virtue of this their proper and essential being before it had been developed. By means of Christianity men arrive, in this manner, at the different positions for which they are fitted by their peculiar natures, each reaching the stage of perfection of which he is capable. Even the Archon, upon the entrance of the redeeming spirit into the world, received the σοφία φυλοκρηνητική. Now that by which, in the different natures, this process of separation actually takes place, and by which each individual is enabled to reach that grade of the higher world which corresponds to his spiritual essence, is faith. In this way we must understand the Basilidean school when they taught that "faith and election alike answer to the several grades of the spiritual world, and, correspondently to the supramundane election, faith accompanies every nature in this world." \*

Such being the scheme of Basilides, we may perhaps conclude that the ordinary standard of Christian truth, as he found it existing among the majority in the church, met with more favour and experienced greater justice at his hands than it usually did from other Gnostics. Such believers he recognised as Christians, members of one Christian community; and in this regard he merely made a distinction between different stages of Christian knowledge. Faith was with him the common foundation of Christian fellowship; only alongside of this basis there were different degrees of Christian consciousness. It is evident, then, that he was far from ascribing the πίστις,

\* Πίστιν ἅμα καὶ ἐκλογὴν οἰκίαν εἶναι καὶ ἕκαστον διάστημα, κατ' ἐπακο-  
λούθημα δ' αὐτῆς ἐκλογῆς τῆς ὑπερκοσμίου τὴν κοσμικὴν ἀπάσης φύσεως  
συνέπισθαι πίστιν. Strom. I. II. f. 363.

as being simply a faith resting on authority, and therefore still cleaving to the sensible, exclusively to the psychical class. He understood faith to be in its essence a profound inward principle. Faith, according to his apprehension, is a conviction that springs from the contact of the spirit with the godlike, from the attractive power which the higher world exercised over its kindred spirits. There has been revealed to it that higher region of existence whence it came and to which it belongs, and it feels itself attracted by its kindred element. Faith is an immediate fact, which renders all evidence superfluous. In it the spirit grasps the truths corresponding to its own essence by an immediate intuition.\* The soul assents to that which does not come to it through the senses, which is not presented to it under any sensuous form.† Although as strangers in the world, the elect still live, yet, through the buoyancy of faith, they perceive the reality of the things of that higher world which beam on them from afar. But to the peculiar nature of faith must correspond also that of hope. Such must be his conviction that man shall actually enter into that higher world to which he had been already united by faith; he shall attain to the full possession of those blessings which faith has laid hold on.‡

Now, although we perceive something of the Pauline spirit in the peculiar prominence which Basilides gives to the idea of faith, yet we see him again departing widely from the apostle, and placing the essence of faith in an intuitive rather than in a practical and ethical element; making it proceed rather from an intuition of the spirit than from a determination of the will which gives its direction to the heart; and it is easy to see how this difference is grounded in the very essence of his fundamental principle.

The objection which Plotinus brought against the Gnostics generally, that they neglected *ethics*, cannot be justly applied to the school of Basilides; for *Isidore* composed a system of

\* Τὰ μαθήματα ἀναποδείκτως εὐρίσκουσα καταλήψει νοητικῇ. Strom. I. II. §. 363.

† Faith is a ψυχῆς συγκατάθεσις πρὸς τι τῶν μὴ κινούντων αἰσθησιν διὰ τὸ μὴ παρῖναι. L. c. f. 371.

‡ Κατάλληλον εἶναι τῇ ἐκάστου ἐλπίδι καὶ τῇ πίστει τὴν δωρεάν. L. c. f. 363. There is a remarkable coincidence between the definitions of faith by Basilides and Hugo a St. Victore.



ethics, from which unfortunately but a very few words have been preserved to us by Clement of Alexandria.

The *moral system* of Basilides is to be gathered from his *Cosmogony*. As he assumed a mixture of opposite principles, and considered the development of the human race as a process of purification, which was to be perfected by Christianity, the fundamental principle of his moral system must necessarily have been this—namely, that man's godlike nature should be purified from the foreign elements adhering to it, and approach continually nearer to its free development and activity. Man, according to this system, is a microcosm,—containing within himself opposite elements from two opposite kingdoms. In the elements foreign to his higher nature\* are reflected the different properties of the animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms;—hence the temperaments, desires, and passions which correspond to these different properties (for example, the mimic, sportive nature of the ape, the murderous disposition of the wolf, the hardness of the diamond, &c.);—the sum of all these effluxes from the animal, vegetable, and mineral worlds forms the blind, irrational soul,† which constantly checks and disturbs the activity of that which in man's nature is akin to the divine. Isidore thought it essential to secure this doctrine against the objection or the misapprehension that it was destructive of moral freedom, and furnished an excuse for all wickedness, as resulting from the irresistible influence of these foreign mixtures. He appeals to the supremacy of the godlike element. “Having, by the rational principle within us, such great advantages, we ought to appear as conquerors over the lower creation within us.”‡ “Only let a man have the *will*,” says he, “to do nothing but what is right, and he will have the *power*.”§ But this earnest will, this true love of goodness, is too often wanting. “We say indeed with the mouth we will not sin; but our soul has the inclination to sin. A person in this condition is restrained only by the fear of punishment; he is wanting in love.”

\* Appendages of matter, προσαρτήματα.

† The ψυχὴ προσφυῆς ἄλογος.

‡ Διὶ δὲ τῷ λογιστικῷ κρείττονας γινομένους, τῆς ἐλάττονος ἐν ἡμῖν κτίσεως φανῆναι κρατούντας.

§ Strom. l. III. f. 427 : Θελησάτω μόνον ἀπαρτῆσαι τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἐπιτεύξεται.

It follows from the whole context of the Basilidean system that, while he assigns so high a place to the will, Isidore by no means ascribed to it an independent self-sufficiency, nor denied the necessity of a higher assistance of grace. By his theory of redemption he acknowledged, in effect, that the godlike in human nature must first receive its true freedom and power of right action by an union with the higher source of divine life. How earnest he was in reminding men of their need of help, is shown by the advice which he gives to a person beset by severe temptations,—counsel which proves at the same time how far he was from cherishing a speculative pride that despised the ordinary means of grace enjoyed by the Christian community. He exhorts such a person not to retire into solitude, but to ask the Christian brethren for their intercessions, and in *society with them* to seek strength for his divine life, in order that, so strengthened, he might find confidence in communion with the invisible saints. He says of one in this condition, “Let him not separate himself from his brother. Let him say, I have entered into the sanctuary; I can suffer no evil.”\* If such an one felt himself overmuch borne down by the power of temptation, he should say to his Christian brother, “Lay thy hand on my head (give me thy blessing), and he will receive spiritual and sensible assistance” (feel himself relieved in spirit and body).† What importance he ascribed to prayer is shown by the fact that he distinguishes the different moral states of the soul by the different character which prayer must assume according to those states—or according as one should feel himself constrained to thank God for the victory achieved, or to pray for new assistance for the impending conflict.‡

The Basilideans were far from being given to an extravagant asceticism. We have already observed how this mode of apprehending the dualistic element, which came so very near to the pure doctrine of Zoroaster, would by no means lead necessarily to a decided and morose asceticism. They recognised celibacy, it is true, as a means which, undisturbed by

\* Οὗτος τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ μὴ χωρίζεσθω, λεγίτω, ὅτι εἰσελήλυθα ἐγὼ εἰς τὰ ἅγια· οὐδ' ὃ δύναμαι παθεῖν. Strom. l. III. f. 427.

† Καὶ λήψεται βοήθειαν καὶ νοστήν καὶ αἰσθητήν.

‡ This is clear from Isidore's words: “Ὅταν δὲ ἡ εὐχαριστία σου εἰς αἵτησιν ὑποσέζη.

earthly cares, would allow those who adopted it to occupy themselves solely with the things of the kingdom of God. But they regarded this as a state which all were not capable of, and which, therefore, was not advisable for all. They recommended marriage as a means of moderating the sensuous desires to those who would otherwise have to suffer many temptations. This view of marriage is based, it is true, on a very low, a merely negative and sensuous notion of its institution, and one which gave rise to an exaggerated estimate of celibacy. We miss here the more profound and positive view of the marriage estate, as a realisation of the moral idea, or of the kingdom of God in the welfare of humanity: a loftier conception, which, as we have already observed, becomes faintly visible in the *Valentinian* Gnosis.

We must notice finally another remarkable phenomenon. In the Basilidean system there are, as we have seen, marks of a relationship with certain Ebionite elements: as, for instance, in the preference which, with the Christians of that party, it evinced for the Apostle Peter. And yet,\* inconsistent as it may seem, Basilides acknowledges the apostolical authority also of St. Paul, as is evident from the weight he ascribes to the words of this apostle in his epistle to the Romans;† as well as from the influence of the Pauline ideas, so apparent in his doctrine of the essence of faith and also of marriage. We see, therefore, from this, that these opposite elements stood by no means in such a relation to each other as never to admit of being united in the phenomena of these times.

### VALENTINE AND HIS SCHOOL.

After Basilides we place Valentine, who, though somewhat later, was nearly his contemporary. To judge from his Hellenistic style and the Aramæan names that occur in his system, he was of Jewish descent. By birth he was said to be an Egyptian;‡ and it may likewise be safely presumed that he received his education at Alexandria. From this city he travelled to Rome, where he seems to have spent the

\* The Basilideans traced back their Gnosis to Glaucias, a pretended interpreter in the service of Peter. Strom. I. VII. f. 764.

† See above, p. 54.

‡ According to the report of Epiphanius.

last years of his life; which gave him opportunity to make known and to promulgate his doctrines in these parts. In his fundamental ideas he agrees with Basilides. Where he differs from him it is chiefly in his mode of carrying them out, and in the figurative dress in which he clothes them. But as the doctrines of the founders of Gnostic schools were never carefully distinguished from those of their later followers, from whom, however, they received peculiar modifications; and as moreover many cognate doctrines, which sprang from a common source, were ascribed to the Valentinian system; it is scarcely possible, in the accounts which have come down to us, to separate with certainty from such additions the doctrines which belong properly to Valentine himself, the author of the school.

Like Basilides, Valentine placed at the summit of the chain of being the primal Essence, which he denominated the Bythos (βύθος, the abyss, where the spirit is lost in contemplation). This term, of itself, clearly proves that he understood by it something different from the Absolute of the Neo-Platonic philosophy, the absolutely simple. The word implies, without doubt, an infinite fulness of life; and this same infinite, transcendent exuberance of being necessitates, in the first place, a self-conceiving (a καταλαμβάνειν ἑαυτόν), a self-limitation, before anything could come into existence. The Neo-Platonic ὄν, on account of its absolutely simple unity, eludes all possibility of comprehension; but the primal Essence of Valentine does so by reason of its transcendent fulness of life. The Bythos is, in a certain sense, something directly opposed to the Absolute of the Neo-Platonic philosophy. It may doubtless have happened that with many the former idea passed into the latter; and indeed Valentinians are quoted who made out of the Bythos something exalted above all contrarieties, of which even existence could not be predicated; the Absolute, identical with Nothing.\*

\* Irenæus, who gives the different opinions of the Valentinians on the Bythos, observes, Οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἄζυγον λέγουσιν, μήτε ἄρρενα, μήτε θήλειαν, μήτε ὅλως ὄντα τι. Iren. I. 1, at the end. The disciples of such Gnostics wished to soar in their speculations above their master—to ascend to a primal ground still more simple. Irenæus cites one of this description, whom he not unaptly describes as ὑψηλότερον καὶ γνωστικώτερον ἐπεκτεινόμενος, who knew how to distinguish between the μονότης, the ἐνότης, and the εἶν, and was in the habit of saying of every principle, "So I name it."



What Basilides denominates the *δυνάμεις* (powers) are in the system of Valentine the *Æons*.\* It is an idea peculiar to him, that, as in the primal source of all existence the fulness of all life is still undeveloped, so, with the development of life from him, members were formed standing as complements one to the other, *preëminently creative* and *preëminently passive* *Æons*,† masculine and feminine, by whose reciprocal action the chain of vital development is carried on. The feminine is the complement of the masculine, and both constitute the Pleroma (τὸ πλήρωμα); ‡ and so the complete series of *Æons*, as one whole, as the fulness of the divine life flowing out of the Bythos,—which whole again, as constantly requiring fructification, so to express it, from the same primal source, stands to the Bythos in the feminine relation,—was called the Pleroma. The *hidden* essence of God no being can comprehend; it is the absolute *ἀγνωστόν*: it can only be known so far as He has revealed himself in the development of his powers or *Æons*. The several *Æons* are so many forms of manifestation, phases, names of him who in his hidden being is incomprehensible, ineffable, and transcends all conceptions and images,§ even as that first self-manifestation of the Hidden, the Monogenes, is called preëminently the *invisible name of the Bythos* (that wherein the Bythos has conceived himself, the *πρῶτον κατάληπτον*, the *κατάληψις τοῦ ἀγενήτου*). It is a profound idea of the Valentinian system, that, as all existence has its ground in the self-limitation of the Bythos, so the existence of all created beings depends on *limitation*. So long as each remains within the limits of its own individuality, and is that which it should be at its own proper position in the evolution of life, all things are fitly adjusted to each other, and the true harmony is preserved in the series of vital

This Irenæus ridicules: ἀμολόγηκε ὅτι αὐτὸς ὀνόματα τίθει τῷ πλάσματι, ὑπὸ μηδενὸς πρότερον ἄλλου τιθεμένα.

\* For the explanation of this word, see above.

† As in all the rest of creation, which presents a symbol of that highest order of the universe, this twofold series of factors may be traced.

‡ Which word these Theosophers, who assuredly never thought of adhering strictly to the grammatical signification of their terms, understood perhaps at one and the same time in an active and passive sense: τὸ πληροῦν and τὸ πληρούμενον.

§ The *Æons* are μορφαὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὀνόματα τοῦ ἀνώνυμου.

development. But as soon as any one oversteps these limits, as soon as any being, instead of striving to know God in that manifestation of himself which God makes to him at his own proper position, presumptuously attempts to penetrate into his hidden essence, he incurs the risk of sinking into nothing. Instead of apprehending the Real, he loses himself in the Unsubstantial. Horus (*ὄρος*), the genius of limitation, of the finite, the power that fixes and guards the bounds of individual existence, who is always on the watch to restore them whenever they are disturbed, occupies accordingly an important place in the system of Valentine; and the Gnosis here bears witness against itself. The ideas of *Horus* and of the *Redeemer* must of necessity be closely related in the Valentinian system; since the forming and redeeming of existence are kindred conceptions, and the principle of limitation in both respects occupies an important place in this system. In fact, Horus was also called by many *λυτρώτης* and *σωτήρ*, Redeemer and Saviour. There are occasional traces of a mode of view which would regard the Horus only as a particular operation of the one redeeming spirit; as indeed the Valentinian system gave different names to this power, according to the different places and the different modes of his operation, which extends through all the grades of existence. Others, indeed, transformed these different modes of operation into so many different hypostases.

The Valentinian doctrine of the Horus is based upon profound ideas as to the process of development of the divine life in general and in detail, which are most important in their bearing on Christian ethics, and on our view of human history. The Valentinian school held that, in the process of developing the divine life, two momenta must concur, a negative and a positive, both standing in necessary connection with each other, —the purification of the spiritual individuality from the foreign elements by which it had been vitiated and into which it threatened to lapse; and the establishment of the purified individuality in itself, its firm and steadfast shaping, its assumption of its own nature. Two operations, therefore, were ascribed to the Horus; the *negative*, by virtue of which he defines the limits of every existence, separates and keeps away from it every foreign element; \* and the *positive*, by virtue of

\* The *ἰνεργία μεριστική καὶ διοριστική*.

which he fixes, moulds, and establishes in their own peculiar essence those that are purified from the foreign elements by which that essence had been disturbed.\* The first operation was designated preëminently by the name of ὄρος, the second by the term σταυρός. In this latter appellation the Valentinians no doubt played upon the several significations of cross, stake, palisade. Those two appellations, however, were not perhaps always so sharply discriminated; since σταυρός, with the signification *cross*, was also made a symbol of the separating, destroying energy of the Horus.† In the words of Christ “I am not come to bring peace on the earth, but the sword,” they found a description of that negative operation of the Horus, by which he separates the godlike from the ungodlike. And in the Baptist’s annunciation of Christ as coming with the fan, and with the fire by which the chaff should be consumed, the Valentinians saw a description of this activity of the Horus with regard to the whole world, by which he would destroy all the ὕλη, and purify the redeemed. In the passage where Christ says, “No man can be my disciple, unless he takes up his cross and follows me,” they saw a description of that divine power, symbolized by the cross, whereby each individual, becoming purified from all that is foreign to his nature, and attaining to a self-subsistent shaping of the higher life in his own individuality and to a well-defined impression of this individuality refined by a godlike life, first becomes a true disciple of Christ.‡

While Basilides ascribed the mixture of the divine element with matter to an encroachment of the kingdom of Darkness on the kingdom of Light, Valentine, on the other hand, attributed it to a disturbing cause within the Pleroma—the falling of a divine germ of life from the Pleroma into matter. Like Basilides, he acknowledged the manifestation of a divine wisdom in the world; but here also the lower is only a *symbol* of the higher. It is not the divine wisdom itself which animates this world; not the Æon σοφία, but an immature birth of

\* The ἐνεργία ἰδραστική καὶ σθηριστική.

† Clement of Alexandria also employs the cross as a symbol of the divine power, whereby the soul is made free from the elements of the world, from sensuous lusts. Ἀπολῦσαι καὶ ἀποστῆσαι καὶ ἀφορίσαι ὁ σταυρὸς σημαίνει, and on this is founded the ἀνάπαυσις. Strom. lib. II. f. 407.

‡ Iren. lib. I. c. 3, s. 5.

it, which only gradually attains to maturity. The idea which lies at bottom of this view is, that in the world we may recognise a revelation of divine wisdom still in the process of unfolding itself. By the appearance of Christ and the redemption it first attained to its end; and it is only when contemplated in this connection that the world presents the image of the divine wisdom in its process of development. Accordingly the Æon, who is the Heavenly Wisdom, rejoices—when everything has been made clear by the appearance of Christ—to recover his lost idea (*ἐνθύμησις*); since now the manifestation corresponds to the idea, and the latter presents itself in the former to immediate intuition. According to Valentine a symbol of this was given in the woman who lights a candle to seek after the lost piece of silver, and finally, after the house has been swept, rejoices to find it. Luke xv. 8.

Accordingly he distinguishes an ἄνω and a κάτω σοφία, the Achamoth.\* The latter is the mundane soul, from whose mixture with the ὕλη springs all living existence with its manifold gradations, which stand the higher the freer they are from contact with the ὕλη, and the lower the more they are drawn downward and affected by matter. Hence arise the *three* orders of existence:—1. The divine germs of life, exalted by their nature above matter, and akin to the σοφία, to the mundane soul, and to the Pleroma,—the spiritual natures, φύσεις πνευματικαί; 2. The natures originating in the life, divided from the former by the mixture of the ὕλη, the psychical natures, φύσεις ψυχικαί, with which begins a perfectly new order of existence, an image of that higher mundane system in a subordinate grade; and finally, 3. The ungodlike nature, which resists all amelioration, and whose tendency is only to destroy—the nature of blind lust and passion. Between the several natures which sprang from the evolution of the divine life (which flows out from the Bythos through the mediation of the Æons)—from the Pleroma down to the germs of life which have fallen into humanity (the scattered seed that is to attain to maturity in this earthly world)—there are only differences of *degree*. But between the three several orders of existence an *essential* difference of *kind* subsists. Each of these orders, therefore, must have its own independent, governing principle; though every process of education and development ultimately leads



back to the Bythos, who, by means of manifold organs, corresponding to the numberless grades of existence, influences all, for his law is alone supreme. He himself, however, can never come into immediate contact with what is alien from his essence. Accordingly, at that subordinate stage of existence which intervenes between the perfect, the godlike, and the ungodlike, and the material, there must arise a being\*—as the type of the highest—who, while he believes that he is acting independently, must yet, in compliance with that general law from which nothing can exempt itself, be subservient in realizing the highest ideas even to the very utmost bounds of matter. This being is in the physical world what the Bythos is in the higher—with this difference only, that he involuntarily acts as the instrument only of the latter. Such is the *Demiurge* of Valentine. Moreover, the *Hyle* has its representative principle, through whom its activity is exerted; one, however, which, by its nature, is not formative and creative, but only *destructive*; namely, *Satan*.† 1. The nature of the πνευματικόν, the spiritual, is essential relationship with God (the ὁμοούσιον τῷ θεῷ); hence the life of unity, the undivided, the absolutely simple (οὐσία ἐνική, μονοειδής). 2. The essence of the ψυχικοί is disruption into multiplicity, manifoldness; which however is subordinate to a higher unity, by which it allows itself to be guided, first unconsciously, then consciously. 3. The essence of Satan and of his whole kingdom is the direct opposite to all unity; disruption and disunion in itself without the least sympathy, without any point of coalescence whatever for unity; together with an effort to destroy all unity, to extend its own inherent disunion to everything, and to rend everything asunder.‡ This principle has no power to posit anything, but only to negative; it is unable to create, to produce, to form, but only to destroy, to decompose. § The first of these grades constitutes the life, which by its nature is imperishable, the essential ἀφθαρσία; the ψυχικόν, on the other hand, stands mid-

\* The μεσότης.

† As Heracleon defines him: μέρος ἐν ὅλης τῆς ὕλης. Vid. Orig. in Joann. T. XIII. s. 16.

‡ The οὐσία πολυσχιδής, that seeks to assimilate everything to itself.

§ Thus defined by Heracleon, who says, Οὐ γινῶ τοιαῦτά τινα τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει, φθοροποιῶ γὰρ καὶ ἀναλίσκοντα τοὺς ἐμβληθέντας εἰς αὐτά. Orig. in Joann. T. XX. s. 20.

way betwixt the imperishable and the perishable; the soul being by nature mortal, and capable only of being made immortal by a higher informing power. The *ψυχικοί* attain to immortality, or fall a natural prey to death, according as they yield themselves by the bent of their will to the godlike or to the ungodlike. The essence of Satan, as of the *ὑλη*, is death itself, the negation of all existence,—which in the end, when all existence, rent and dissevered by it, shall have developed itself to a mature individuality and become sufficiently established in itself, will be vanquished by the force of the Positive as soon as, having attracted within its sphere all kindred ungodlike natures, it shall have resolved itself into its own nothingness. 1. The essence of the first is the evolution of pure life from within outward; an activity not directed outwardly, and such that it has no obstacles to overcome; a life and action exalted above the antithesis of rest and motion. 2. The essence of the *ὑλη* is, in itself considered, the rest of death; but a spark of life having fallen into it, and communicated to it a certain *analogon* of life, it became a wild self-contradictory impulse, as it is exhibited in Satan, its representative, to whom, as well as to all men akin to him by nature, they ascribed no rational consciousness, no self-determining will, but only a blind, wild, impulsive nature, only desire and passion.\* When he looked at the crimes committed by men, which filled him with abhorrence, this was the only explanation which could occur to the mind of a man like Valentine.† 3. Peculiar to the *Demiurge*, and his subjects the *Psychici*, is a propensity to create, to produce without themselves—a busy activity. They would always be doing, as usually happens with such busy natures, even without really understanding what they are about,‡ without being really conscious to themselves of the ideas that govern them.§

The doctrine of redemption occupied a place no less im-

\* Heracleon says, *Τὸν διάβολον μὴ ἔχειν θείλημα, ἀλλ' ἐπιθυμίαν*. Orig. in Joann. T. XX. s. 20.

† Notice the remarkable manner in which a Valentinian expresses himself on this point in the dialogue on Free Will ascribed to Methodius. Galland. Bibl. patr. T. III. f. 762. Consult, however, on this tract, the investigations in my "Genetic development of the Gnostic systems," p. 205.

‡ *Φύσις πολυέργος, πολυπράγμων*.

§ For evidence see Heracleon, Orig. in Joann. T. XIII. c. 16, 25, 30, 51, 59; T. XX. c. 20.

portant in the Valentinian than in the Basilidean system, forming properly its central point; as may be gathered from our previous remarks on the relation of the notions of creation and of redemption in this scheme. It was in a greater degree the aim and effort of the latter system than the former to comprehend the doctrine of redemption in its connection with the universal process of development; as, while it went back to the first germ of discord in the universe, so also it sought to point out the necessity of a redemption in its primal ground. No doubt it did this in such a manner that the speculative interest continually overshot the practical. As a process of vital development pervades every region of existence, and as the *disharmony*, which in the germ had its beginning in the Pleroma itself, extended itself from thence still more widely; so the *whole mundane course can only then attain to its end* when harmony has been restored both in the Pleroma and in all grades of existence. What takes place in the Pleroma must be imaged forth in all the other grades of existence. Inasmuch, then, as the work of redemption is carried on in different gradations of existence, and the same law is here fulfilled in different forms at different positions, so accordingly it is the same agent of the revelation of the hidden God, the same agent through whom the life that emanated from God is again united with Him, who, working continually until the consummation of all things, presents himself under different hypostases, according as he accomplishes his work at different stages of existence. Thus it is the same idea which is represented in a Monogenes, a Logos, a Christ, a Soter. The Soter is the Redeemer of the whole world without the Pleroma; and hence also the framer of it (in considering this position we must bear in mind what has been said already respecting the twofold activity of the Horus). By the process of framing, the higher element is in the first place freed from its adherent matter, evolved from an unorganised, formless existence to a determinate one, with its proper organic form. By the redemption, the higher individuality first attains to a full and perfect development, and to clear self-consciousness. Redemption completes the process of formation. All the divine life of the Pleroma concentrates and reflects itself in the Soter, and through him works onward in giving individual shapes, until the spiritual natures akin to the Pleroma are sowed in the

world and are matured to perfected existence. The Christ of the Pleroma is the operative principle; the Soter, without the Pleroma, the recipient, framing, and perfecting principle.\*

The Soter first proves his redeeming, formative power on the *mundane soul*, which is as yet immature, and had its origin in the Pleroma;—the same power which is afterwards to be extended to the kindred spiritual natures that sprang out from her, the common mother of the spiritual life in the lower world (see above). The Soter is properly the former and ruler of the world, as he is also its redeemer; for the formation of the world is in truth the *first beginning* of the process of development, which is only brought to its full completion by the redemption. The Soter, as the inwardly operating principle, inspires in the *mundane soul*, destined to union (*syzygia*) with him,† the plastic ideas; and she it is who communicates them to the Demiurge, who thinks that he acts independently. In forming the world, the latter is, without knowing it, actuated and impelled by the force of these ideas. Thus the world is a picture of the divine glory, designed by the Sophia or the Soter, as its artists, while in the execution of it the Demiurge is employed simply as an instrument. Since, however, every picture is, from its nature, only an imperfect representation of the prototype, and can be properly understood only by him who has the intuition of that primal type, so the Demiurge with his creation is but an imperfect representation of the divine glory; and he only who has felt within himself a revelation of the invisible divine essence can rightly understand the world as a symbol or picture, and the Demiurge as a prophet of the Supreme God. The internal revelation of God, which is the portion of the *πνευματικοί*, is a confirmation of the outward, a testimony to

\* In the *τόπος μεσότητος*.

† So Heracleon says of the Soter in his relation to Christ. The former, he observes, receives from the latter the divine seed, yet undeveloped, out of the Pleroma; and gives it the first shaping towards determinate, individual existence, *τὴν πρώτην μόρφωσιν, τὴν κατὰ γένεσιν, εἰς μορφὴν καὶ φωτισμὸν καὶ περιγραφὴν ἀγαγὼν καὶ ἀναδείξας*. Orig. in Joann. T. II. c. 15. To bring to light, to shape, to individualize, are, with the Gnostics, equivalent notions. The indeterminate, unorganized, answers in the spiritual province to the *ἄλη*. Accordingly in the Valentinian fragments, in Irenæus, lib. I. c. 8, s. 4, to the *προβάλλειν σπειματικῶς τὴν ἄλην οὐσίαν* is opposed the *μορφοῦν, φωτίζειν, φανεροῦν*. Christ scatters the seed, the Soter gathers the harvest. Orig. in Joann. T. XIII. p. 48.

‡ Κάτω σοφία, Achamoth.



the Demiurge, as God's representative. Valentine himself expresses the matter thus :\*—"As the portrait falls short of the living countenance, so does the world fall short of the living God. Now what is the cause of the picture? The majesty of the countenance, which furnished the painter with his type, in order that it might be glorified by the revelation of its name; for no picture is devised as a self-subsistent thing (every picture necessarily refers back to an original type). But as the name of the object supplies what is deficient in the picture, so the *invisible* of God (his invisible essence as it reveals itself in the spirit which is related to God) contributes to the verification of the copy."

Man is the being through whom the name of God is to be revealed in this world; who, through the invisible revelation of God *in himself*, was to be the link of connection betwixt the copy and the prototype, and so to supply what was lacking to the world *in itself* towards a complete revelation of the Divine Being. That man occupies this important position in creation is one of the fundamental ideas of the Valentinian system. Humanity and revelation of God are conceptions which here stand in intimate connection with each other. Accordingly the primal man is represented as one of the Æons; and this idea in another Valentinian statement is thus expressed :—"When God willed a revelation of Himself, this was called man."† But in this respect also it is necessary to dis-

\* Strom. l. IV. f. 509: 'Οπόσον ἐλάττων ἢ εἰκὼν τοῦ ζῶντος προσώπου, τοσοῦτον ἦσαν ὁ κόσμος τοῦ ζῶντος αἰῶνους (which name, according to what we have already observed, is a distinctive appellation of the Supreme God himself). Τίς οὖν αἰτία τῆς εἰκόνος; Μεγαλωσύνη τοῦ προσώπου, παρεσχημένου τῷ ζωγράφῳ τὸν τύπον, ἵνα τιμηθῇ δι' ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ (I understand this as referring to his own name, which was to be revealed by the creation), οὐ γὰρ αὐθιγτικῶς εὐρέθη μορφή· ἀλλὰ τὸ ὄνομα (the name as it reveals itself immediately in the higher self-consciousness, or in the spiritual natures) ἐπλήρωσε τὸ ὑστέρημα ἐν πλάσει· συνέργει δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἄσφατον εἰς πίστιν τοῦ πεπλασμένου. (This is without doubt the neuter = πλάσσεια). It may be that Valentine here supposed the Demiurge, and the world formed by him, to constitute one image of the Supreme God, analogous to the Θεὸς γενητός of Plato, in the same way that Philo, in many places, unites together the Logos and the world animated by him. Yet this does not necessarily follow from his language in this instance.

† 'Οτι ἡθέλησεν ἐπιδειξάι αὐτὸν, τοῦτο ἄνθρωπος ἔλεχθη. Iren. lib. I. c. 12, s. 3.

tinguish what the Demiurge intended, and what he was compelled unconsciously to do, as the instrument of the higher order of the world. He and his angels in a higher ethereal region (paradise, the third or fourth heaven)\* combined together to create man as their common image. Man, as lord of the world, was in it to represent the Demiurge. But in this matter also the Demiurge acted as the instrument of a higher order of the world, according to ideas inspired in him by the Soter and the Sophia. Unknown to himself some of the seed of divine life was communicated to him from the Pleroma, and from him it passed over to man.† Thus in the appearance of man was revealed the prototype of the heavenly man from the Pleroma; and he, who was intended to represent only the perfection of the cosmical principle, exhibited in his manifestation something far higher. The Demiurge and his angels, when they beheld a strange and higher power enter within their kingdom, were seized with amazement; for they had not as yet attained to a conscious recognition of that higher order of the world, and to that free obedience to it, which could only be brought about after the redemption. Thus they were alarmed at their own work, which threatened to exalt itself above themselves. As Valentine saw the same law pervading every grade of existence, so he supposed he could find it recurring in all those cases wherein men, under the inspiration of lofty ideas, and endeavouring to represent them in their works, produce effects not anticipated by themselves, and are set in astonishment by their own productions. This he illustrates by the instance of the artist, who, having formed the image of a god, afterwards falls down and worships it. On this point Valentine thus expresses himself:—"Just as fear seized the angels in the presence of that form when, because a seed of the higher essence had been invisibly imparted to it, it uttered greater things than they expected from such a creation, so also among the generations of men in this world their works became objects of fear to their very authors; as statues, pictures, and all that is wrought by

\* See those Gnostic excerpts of the Didascal. Anatol. or Θεοδοῦτος ἐπιτομαί, opp. Clement. f. 797, B.: "Ἀνθρώπος ἐν τῷ παραδείσῳ τῷ τετάρτῳ οὐρανῷ δημιουργεῖται, and Iren. lib. I. c. 5, s. 2.

† Ἐσχεν ὁ Ἀδάμ, ἀδήλως αὐτῷ, ὑπὸ τῆς σοφίας ἐνσπαρὲν, τὸ σπέρμα τὸ πνευματικόν. Didascal. Anatol. f. 797.

human hands exhibit the name of God; for Adam, who had been formed to represent the name of man, awakened a dread of the primal man, as if forsooth the latter were enshrined within him.”\*

The cosmical principle must, therefore, endeavour to maintain itself in its self-subsistence and authority against the danger with which man, bearing witness of the supramundane essence, threatened it. The Demiurge and his powers combine to hold man in subjection, and to suppress the consciousness of his higher nature. They plunge him from the psychical region of the third heaven into the world won from and built on the verge of the Hyle, and they veil his psychical nature in a body formed out of matter.† But that this should so happen was no result of the will of the Demiurge. In this also he acted as the instrument of a higher wisdom; in carrying out his own will he was forced to minister to the ends of a higher will. The principle of divine life was to penetrate through all grades of existence, to spread even to the bounds of the Hyle, and even to enter the realms of death itself, in order to bring about its destruction. But this was the only way in which it could be done.

That, therefore, which is to represent humanity at large is actually realized by the higher spiritual natures alone—by those only who bear within them that higher germ of divine life which accrued to the Demiurge by an invisible communication. They are the salt and light of the earth, the leaven for the whole lump of humanity. The soul (*ψυχή*) is but the vehicle by which the *πνευματικόν* enters into the temporal world, in

\* Καὶ ὥσπερ φόβος ἐπὶ ἐκείνου τοῦ πλάσματος ὑπῆρξε τοῖς ἀγγέλοις, ὅτε μείζονα ἐφθίγγατο τῆς πλάσεως, διὰ τὸν ἄδρατον ἐν αὐτῷ σπέρμα διδακτότα, τὴν ἀνωθεὶν οὐσίαν καὶ παρῆρσιαζόμενον, οὕτω (here the apodosis begins), καὶ ἐν ταῖς γενεαῖς τῶν κοσμικῶν ἀνθρώπων φόβοι τὰ ἔργα τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοῖς ποιοῦσιν ἐγένετο, ὅον ἀνδριάντες καὶ εἰκόνες καὶ πάντων (here an *εἰ* has doubtless slipped out, or πανθ' *εἰ* may be the reading), αἱ χεῖρες ἀνύουσιν εἰς ὄνομα θεοῦ· εἰς γὰρ ὄνομα ἀνθρώπου πλασθεὶς Ἀδάμ φόβον παρέσχεν προόντος ἀνθρώπου, ὡς δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ καθεστῶτος. Strom. lib. II. f. 375.

† The coats of skin, the *χιτῶνες δερμάτων* of Genesis, which were commonly so understood by the Theosophists of this period. Thus we must supply the hiatus which has come down to us in Valentine's system, when it is said at the conclusion of the above-cited passage, “The angels would have speedily destroyed their work;”—or we must suppose that sentence was hypothetical, *i. e.* they would have destroyed it unless they had been prevented in an invisible manner by a higher power.

which it is to develop itself to maturity. When this end is attained, the *spirit*, which is destined only for the life of intuition, will leave this vehicle behind it in the lower sphere; and every spiritual nature, as the passive, feminine element in relation to its higher spiritual world, will be exalted to an union (Syzygia) with its corresponding angelic nature in the Pleroma. The higher faculty of immediate intuition alone—this is Valentine's meaning—will then be active; all those powers and modes of operation of the soul which are directed to the temporal and to the finite, (such, for instance, as the faculty of reflection,) of which, according to Valentine, the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  is the sum, will then, in the Pleroma, fall entirely away.\*

The attractive power with which the godlike operates on everything, even while those that are affected by it are unable to understand it or explain it to themselves, is a favourite idea of Valentine's. Without knowing the reason of it, the Demiurge was attracted by the spiritual natures among the Jewish people. He made, therefore, of such, prophets, priests, and kings. And hence it came to pass that the prophets particularly were able to point to that higher order of things which through the Soter was first to enter into humanity. According to the Valentinian theory there was a four-fold principle at work in the prophets:—1. The psychical principle, the humanly finite, the soul left to itself; 2. *The inspiration* of this  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ , which proceeded from the Demiurge's influence upon it; 3. The  $\piνευματικόν$ , or spiritual element, left to itself; 4. The pneumatic inspiration, which proceeds from the informing Sophia.† Accordingly, with a reference to these four principles, Valentine could, in the writings of the prophets, distinguish different passages of a higher and lower kind and import, and also higher and lower senses of the same passage:—1. The purely human. 2. The several prophecies of future events, which the Demiurge was able to communicate;—for, though not omniscient, he glanced nevertheless through a wide and large circle of futurity;—the prediction, for instance, of a Messiah proceeded from him, but still enveloped in a temporal, Jewish form; and depicting him such as the Demiurge meant to send,—a psychical Messiah for the psychical natures, the ruler over a kingdom of this world. 3. The ideas touch-

\* Comp. Aristot. de anima, lib. III. c. 5.

† Vid. Iren. lib. I. c. 7, s. 3 et 4.



ing on the Christian economy, and pointing to it,—the transfigured Messianic element, set forth with more or less of purity, according as it proceeded merely from the higher spiritual nature, or from the immediate influence of the Sophia. This view was calculated to give rise to important investigations on the mixture of the Divine with the Human in the prophets, and to fruitful results for the right exposition of their writings. We here observe, presenting itself for the first time, a more profound study of the idea of inspiration—a desire to make the religious and scientific interests to harmonize with each other in the exposition of the Old Testament.

The question now arises whether Valentine held that the rays of higher truth and spiritual natures existed solely among the Jews, or whether he allowed that they were diffused also among the Gentiles. It is true that, according to Heracleon,\* he taught that the Jews belong to the kingdom of the Demiurge, the Gentiles to the kingdom of matter, or of Satan, and the Christians to the people of the Supreme God; but this does not prove that he denied a higher nature altogether to the Gentiles. For in Judaism—although he assigned it preëminently to the Demiurge—he recognised sprinklings of the higher pneumatic element; and although he made Christendom the property of the Supreme God, he nevertheless saw, even among Christians, a large psychical class. He is speaking, then, of the *predominant* character only; and therefore even among the Gentiles, notwithstanding the predominance of the *Hylic* element in Heathendom, he may have recognised a sprinkling of the Pneumatical. He must indeed do so on his own principles; since the higher, spiritual life (the *πνευματικόν*) had to pass through every grade of existence to the utmost bounds of matter, in order to prepare the way for the total destruction of the kingdom of the *ἑλγ*. Valentine's observations, in the passage above cited, on the power of art exerted in fashioning the images of the gods, allow of the inference that he judged the polytheistic system with more lenity than the ordinary Jews, who looked upon the Gentile gods only as evil spirits; that, resting on Acts xiii. 23, he believed it possible even in this system to trace indications (corrupted, however, by the predominance of the Hylic principle) of an unknown God, extend-

\* Orig. in Joann. T. XIII. c. 16.

ing over all an influence which they comprehended not. Accordingly, in an extant fragment of a Homily,\* Valentine actually alludes to the vestiges of truth scattered throughout the writings of the heathens, wherein is revealed the inward nature of God's spiritual people, of the πνευματικοί, intermingled with the whole human race: "Much of that which is written in the books of Gentiles is found written in the church of God; this common truth is the word out of the heart, the law written in the heart; it is the people of the beloved (i. e. this common higher consciousness is the characteristic mark of the members of the Soter's community, of the πνευματικοί) who are loved by him and love him in return."

The Soter, who from the beginning has directed *the whole process of development* of the spiritual life-germs that fell from the Pleroma to form a new world, *the invisible framer and ruler* of this new world,—he must now at last interfere *immediately* in the mundane course, in order to extend the act of redemption,—which he had originally accomplished on the mother of all spiritual life, the *world-soul*, the *Sophia*,—to all the spiritual life that has emanated from her, and must thus bring his whole work to an end. Everything, down to the Hylic element, struggling against all existence, was capable, *each in its own degree*, of being ennobled. The Soter, therefore, in order to train everything, the psychical no less than the spiritual, for its fit stage of higher life, must enter into union with all these grades of existence. Moreover, in obedience to the course which is in harmony with nature, he could only enter into union with its kindred spiritual nature, and as such, in this world of time, only in junction with a soul (ψυχή).

The Christology must always be affected by the view which is entertained of the relation of the world to God, and by the doctrine of human nature. In both respects this system clearly sets forth the necessity of a redemption, and that too in its true import, as a *grand historical fact*, intended to restore harmony between the different grades of existence, to fill up the chasm which separated the world from heaven, and to raise the pneumatic natures (who by themselves alone never could have attained to a full consciousness and full exercise of their

\* Clem. Strom. I. VI. f. 641.

higher nature) to fellowship with the higher world, which is akin to their own essence. But still it was a consequence grounded in the separation here supposed between the kingdom of the Demiurge and that of the Supreme God, that all in this world could not be equally fitted for redemption and equally penetrated by its principle. Certain repulsive tendencies were assumed to exist in human nature itself, which excluded the possibility of a uniform appropriation, through the Redeemer and the redemption, of this nature in its completeness. In this system the purely Human (the psychical nature) was too far separated from the properly Divine (the pneumatic nature), the oneness of God's image in man was too feebly recognised, to give room for a complete apprehension of the historical Christ being admitted as the realization of the original type of Humanity. The antagonisms which were insisted upon, as originally given in the cosmology and anthropology of this system, must necessarily make their appearance again in its Christology. We cannot admit that the tendency of the Valentinian system was to teach a merely prototypic or ideal Christ, and to make the Christ of history a purely accidental point to which this idea attached itself. Still on this matter we can say *nothing more* than that its principles admitted only of a one-sided, mutilated apprehension, not only of the prototypic, but also of the historical Christ. This fundamental defect is to be traced, in one word, to the reaction of the great principle of the ancient world in its conception of the *godlike* as being *superhuman*. Though Valentine could attribute to the human element in Christ a greater value than Basilides could, still, consistently with those principles, he never could recognise the full significancy of the human element in combination with the divine, nor understand their true union in him, nor even allow the Human itself to be altogether human, for according to his theory there must ever be something in the human that belongs exclusively to the kingdom of the *ὑλη*.

The Demiurge had promised his people a Redeemer, a Messiah, who should release them from the dominion of the Hylic power, effect the annihilation of all that was opposed to his own kingdom, who should rule in his name over all, and bless the obedient with all manner of earthly happiness. He sent down from his heaven this Messiah, the express image of the Demiurge; but this exalted being could enter into no union

with matter. Destined to effect the annihilation of the material element, how indeed could he take anything from it? With a material body there would have been associated a kindred material spirit of life,\*—that fountain of all evil lusts; and how could he be the Redeemer, if the principle of evil were present in his own being? The Demiurge, therefore, formed for the psychical Messiah a body of the finest ethereal elements of *the* heaven from which he sent him down into the world. This body was wonderfully constituted,† so as to be visible to outward sense, and undergo all sensible actions and affections, and yet in a way altogether different from that of ordinary earthly bodies.‡ It was, however, in this that the miraculous birth of Jesus consisted: the psychical nature that descended from the heaven of the Demiurge, together with the ethereal body which it brought with it from the same region, was ushered into the light of this world through Mary, merely as through a channel.§ And yet this psychical Messiah would have been inadequate to the task of accomplishing the work assigned him by the Demiurge. It required a higher power to conquer the kingdom of the ὕλη. The Demiurge acted here, as in everything else, simply as the unconscious instrument of the Soter. The latter had determined the time when he would unite himself with this psychical Messiah as his instrument, in order to accomplish the work ordained and promised by the Demiurge, in a far higher sense than the Demiurge himself had divined, by founding a Messianic kingdom of a far loftier description, whose true character had been intimated only in those most sublime of all the descriptions of the prophets which the Demiurge himself had been unable to understand.

The psychical Messiah, who had no presentiment of the destination that awaited him when united with the Soter, meanwhile exhibited from the beginning the ideal of ascetical sanctity. By virtue of the peculiar constitution of his body, he could exercise an extraordinary control over matter. He ate and drank, it is true, like others; in this respect letting himself down to human infirmity, but yet without being

\* The ψυχὴ ἀλογος.

† Ἐξ οἰκονομίας.

‡ Σῶμα ἐκ τῆς ἀφανῶς ψυχικῆς οὐσίας. Theodot. Didascal. Anatol.

§ Ὡς διὰ σωλῆνος.



subject to like affections with other men. He did everything after a godlike manner.\*

At his baptism in the Jordan, where he was to receive from John the Baptist, as representative of the Demiurge, his solemn consecration to the office of Messiah, the Soter, under whose invisible guidance everything had been directed to this point, entered into union with him, descending in the form of a dove. As to the question whether the psychical Messiah possessed with his soul a pneumatic element also, there would seem to have been difference of opinion among the Valentinian schools themselves.† Some may have held that the *πνεῦμα* descended at the same time with the soul as its vehicle, for the purpose of unfolding itself in this world to maturity, and then serving as the instrument of the descended Soter, while it may have

\* Clem. Strom. lib. III. f. 451.

† The latter seems to be the view expressed in a passage of Heracleon, Orig. T. VI. s. 23. Grabe, Spicileg. T. II. p. 89, in which passage I once supposed (see my *Genetische Entwicklung*, p. 149), though erroneously, that I had found the doctrine of a proper incarnation of the Soter, and of his union with the human nature from its first development. Heracleon—on John i. 27—explains the passage after his usual manner, in the first place, correctly, namely, that “John acknowledged himself unworthy to perform even the meanest service for the Redeemer,”—but then proceeds arbitrarily to introduce into these simple words a higher sense, in accordance with his own theosophical ideas: *Οὐκ ἐγὼ εἰμι ἱκανὸς, ἵνα δι' ἐμὲ κατέλθῃ ἀπὸ μεγέθους καὶ σάρκα λάβῃ, ὡς ὑπόδημα, περὶ ἧς ἐγὼ λόγον ἀποδοῦναι οὐ δύναμαι, οὐδὲ διηγήσασθαι ἢ ἐπιλῦσαι τὴν περὶ αὐτῆς οἰκονομίαν.* We can hardly understand by “the flesh” here, which the Soter took on him when he descended from the higher region bordering on the *πλήρωμα* and the *τόπος μεσότητος*, the body of the psychical Messiah, formed by a special *οἰκονομία*; for the subject of discourse here is undoubtedly the Soter, who revealed himself to John at the baptism; and this Soter, at all events, united himself, according to the Valentinian theory, not with the *body*, but with the *psychical Messiah, who was clothed with this body*. Consequently John, here representing the person of the Demiurge, could not have thus expressed his wonder at this wonderful body, which had been formed by the Demiurge himself. But the Valentinians were used to denominate every *outward envelop, every vehicle* of a superior being that descended to a lower region of existence, a *σάρεξ*. The *Σοφία* gave the Soter a *σπέρμα πνευματικόν*, that so with this vehicle he might descend to the earth, and, through its medium, enter into union with the *ψυχή*. We have the evidence of this in the commencing words of the Didascal. Anatol., which are as follows: “Ὁ προϊβαλὲν σαρκίον τῷ λόγῳ, (equivalent to the Soter,) ἡ σοφία τὸ πνευματικὸν σπέρμα, τοῦτο στολισάμενος κατέλθεν ὁ σωτήρ. It was of this wonderful economy, then, that Hera- cleon was speaking.

been the opinion of others that the Soter, on his first entrance into this world, received from the Sophia a spiritual nature as his vehicle, so as to be able to unite himself with a human nature, and that the higher pneumatic principle was thus first communicated to the Messiah of the Demiurge at his baptism.

According to Valentine's doctrine, as well as that of Basilides, the *appearance* of the redeeming spirit in humanity and his union with the psychical Messiah, his revelation and communication of himself by the latter, must constitute the principal thing in the work of redemption. He agreed with Basilides also in supposing that at the passion the Soter abandoned the psychical Messiah to himself; and this passion, as in his theory it did not affect a material body, capable of suffering, but only a psychical one, could not possibly be regarded by him in its full import. Yet it is certain that, with respect to the view of Christ's passion, the Jewish element, in the case of the Valentinian Gnosis, exercised far less influence than it did on the Gnosis of Basilides; the Valentinians must have more duly appreciated the passion and have seen its import for the Christian consciousness. A power for overcoming of evil, and for purifying nature which was beset with it, was ascribed to the sufferings of the psychical Christ. We have, in fact, already become acquainted with the ruling idea of the Valentinian system, that in order to the *restoration of the harmony of the universe the same law must be carried into effect in all the different stages of existence*. The cross, as we have already observed, was in this system considered a symbol of the power that purifies every being from all foreign elements, and leads it not only to self-limitation within the bounds of its proper nature, but also to fixedness and constancy there. Now the crucifixion of Christ represented the activity of this power in the lower world. The manner in which the psychical Messiah was stretched on the cross, and, by that means, over the lower creation, and was seen taking part in the sufferings of humanity, is a symbol of that first redeeming act, when the Soter received the suffering Sophia with the Stauros, stretched himself over her, purified her from every foreign element, and brought back her dissipating existence within its proper confines. A similar effect is now brought about in the psychical world by this act of the psychical Christ, in which was now

copied that which had been previously accomplished in the highest region. Even in and by itself, this copying cannot be an idle, fruitless, and merely symbolical act; there must be connected with it an influence similar indeed, but adjusted to this particular stage of existence. Accordingly, Heracleon could say that by the cross of Christ all evil is destroyed,\* and that his passion was necessary in order that the church, cleansed from the influences of the material spirits, might be converted into a house of God.† So, too, he spoke of a spiritual appropriation of Christ's sufferings, by which is brought about a participation in the kingdom of the Divine life, in the marriage supper of the church.‡ By the words, "Father, into thy hands I commit my spirit," the psychical Christ commended to the care of the Heavenly Father the πνευματικὸν σπέρμα, which was now forsaking him, that it might not be detained in the kingdom of the Demiurge, but rise free to the upper region; and at the same time he commended to him all spiritual natures, who were represented by the one united with himself. The psychical Messiah rises to the Demiurge, who gives to him the sovereign power and government in his own name; while the pneumatic Messiah ascends to the Soter, whither all the redeemed spiritual natures will follow him.

The important point, the main thing in the work of redemption, so far as it concerns spiritual natures, is the redemption of which man's nature became capable by its union with the Soter at the baptism in Jordan. This must be repeated in the case of each individual. Of the sanctifying effects flowing from inward communion with the Redeemer, Valentine speaks as follows: "There is one good Being, whose free manifestation is his revelation by the Son; and through *him alone* can the heart be made pure, after every

\* Ἀνηλωσθαι καὶ ἡφανίσθαι τοὺς κυβευτὰς, ἐμποροὺς (an allusion to the narrative of Christ's driving the money-changers from the temple, and without doubt meaning here the demons, or effluxes from matter, whereby God's doubt in humanity had been defiled), καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν κακίαν. Orig. in Joann. T. X. c. 19.

† Ἵνα τὴν ἐκκλησίαν κατασκευάσῃ, οὐκέτι ληστῶν καὶ ἐμπορῶν σπήλαιον, ἀλλὰ οἶκον τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ. L. c.

‡ From the typical meaning of the paschal supper. Δυόμενον μὲν τὸ πάθος τοῦ Σωτῆρος τὸ ἐν κόσμῳ ἐσήμενιν, ἐσθιόμενον δὲ τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν τὴν ἐν γάμῳ. L. c. s. 14.

malign spirit has been driven out of the heart ; for many spirits take up their abode there and do not allow it to be pure. Each of these is busily employed in his own work, while they, all in various ways, shamefully defile it by unseemly lusts. And it seems to me to fare with such a heart much as with an inn ; for the inn is worn and trodden to pieces, often covered with dirt, while all men indiscriminately resort to it, having no interest in the place since it is none of their own. So is it with the heart : until it receives the heavenly grace it remains unclean, being the abode of many evil spirits. When, however, the Father, who alone is good, adopts it as his, it becomes holy and resplendent with light ; and accordingly, he who possesses such a heart is pronounced to be blessed, for he shall see God.” \*

The Valentinians were penetrated with a conviction that Christianity even on earth imparts a divine life, and therein also communion with heaven. This conviction is thus expressed in the Valentinian form of intuition : “ As every pneumatic soul has its other half in the upper world of spirits (namely, its attendant angel), with which it is destined to be united, so through the Soter it receives even now the power to enter into this union (Syzygy) through the spiritual life.” †

But it is self-evident that the Valentinians must have distinguished the effects of baptism and of the redemption relatively to the two positions of the Pneumatici and the Psychici. The psychical man obtains forgiveness of his sins, is released from the dominion of the hylie principle, and receives power to withstand it. The pneumatical man is, through communion with the Soter, incorporated into the Pleroma, attains to a full consciousness of his nature akin to the latter, and exalted above the kingdom of the Demiurge, and is made able to develop it free from the restraints by which it was before shackled. He is released from the cramping power of the Demiurge.

The two classes differ also in the way by which not only they arrive at Christianity, but also by which they appropriate and apprehend it. The psychical men must be led to the faith by outward causes, by facts of the sensible world, by

\* Strom. lib. II. f. 409.

† Heracleon, in Origen, T. XIII. s. 11 : Κομίζεσθαι παρ’ αὐτοῦ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκασιν πρὸς τὸ πλῆρωμα αὐτῆς.



As the origin of the Christian life is here different, so there is a difference also in its several positions; and hence arises the distinction of a psychical and a pneumatical Christianity. By the one the psychical Christ only is recognised; the other rises to the divine Soter within him. In the one men rest satisfied with historical Christianity; in the other they grasp it in its connection and coherence with the whole theogonical and cosmogonical process. While by the first class Christ is acknowledged as a divine teacher only on account of the miraculous works by which he was accredited, and what he revealed is received on his authority; by the second, on the other hand, the necessity of the facts of Christianity—the necessity grounded in the very process—is understood; and on that very basis reposes a conviction raised above all doubt. It was to the psychical class that St. Paul said that he knew nothing, and could preach nothing to them, save Christ crucified; § that he could not announce to them that wisdom of the perfect which is hidden even from the Demiurge and his angels. According to these different positions in the Christian life, Christ is presented in different ways to the consciousness; just, indeed, as the angels, by reason of their different natures, have not all an equal vision of the counte-

§ Didascal. Anatol. of a twofold mode of preaching by St. Paul. In reference to the psychical men: Ἐχάρυξε τὸν σωτῆρα γεννητὸν καὶ πα-  
 θητὸν.

nance of the Father.\* The acknowledgment of a necessary difference in the mode of contemplating Christ's person and work, grounded on the different degrees of religious development, is a fundamental truth of the Valentinian doctrine.

Those spiritual men are the salt, the soul of the outward church — those by whom Christianity is propagated as the principle that is to mould and renovate humanity.† By them is the way prepared for the purification of the whole terrestrial world, and for the final destruction of all that is material and evil; which will follow as soon as matter shall have been deprived of all those germs of life which it has seized on, and when, being purified, these shall have attained to a development agreeable to their essence. It was necessary, therefore, that the divine life should be merged in the world of death, in order that the latter might be overcome. Valentine thus addresses the spiritual men: "Ye are, from the beginning, immortal, and children of eternal life, and ye were willing to apportion death among you, that you might swallow up and destroy it, and that in you and through you death might die. For if ye dissolve the world (prepare the way for the dissolution of the material world) but are not yourselves dissolved, ye are masters and lords over the creation, and over all that is perishable."‡

Though the Christian principle appears, in this Valentinian line of thought, corrupted by a certain theosophical pride and an element of Oriental austerity, still there gleams through these words a profound consciousness of what Christ intended when He called those who really possessed His word and spirit the salt of the earth: we recognise in it a sense of the high vocation and mission to the whole world of those who truly displayed the image of Christ and realised the idea of Christianity, who were to be scattered abroad in the midst of an impure world, and connected with it by numberless

\* L. c. : 'Ιδίως ἕκαστος γνωρίζει τὸν κύριον, καὶ οὐχ' ὁμοίως πάντες τὸ πρόσωπον τοῦ πατρὸς ὁρῶσιν οἱ ἄγγελοι.

† See the proof directly, where we speak of Haracleon.

‡ 'Απ' ἀρχῆς ἀθάνατοί ἐστε καὶ τέκνα ζωῆς αἰωνίας· καὶ τὸν θάνατον ἠθέλητε μερίσασθαι εἰς ἑαυτοὺς, ἵνα θανατήσητε αὐτὸν καὶ ἀναλώσητε, καὶ ἀποθάνῃ ὁ θάνατος ἐν ὑμῖν καὶ δι' ὑμῶν. "Ὅταν γὰρ τὸν μὲν κόσμον λύητε, ὑμεῖς δὲ μὴ καταλύησθε, κυριεύετε τῆς κτίσεως καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς ἀπάσης. Strom. l. IV. f. 509, B.

gradations, in order to prepare the way for its gradual purification.

As soon, then, as the end for which these spiritual men were to prepare shall be attained, the whole material world being dissolved, the Soter will be united in one "syzygia" with the Sophia, and under him the matured spiritual natures, pairing with their respective angels, will enter into the Pleroma; while, under the Demiurge, the psychical minds will occupy the last grade of the spiritual world; \* for they, too, are to receive the measure of felicity answering to their peculiar nature. The Demiurge rejoices at the appearance of the Soter, through whom a higher world, to which he was before a stranger, has been revealed to him, and by whose means, moreover, he himself, relieved from his toilsome labours, will be enabled to enter into rest and enjoy a reflection of the glory of the Pleroma. He is the friend of the bridegroom (the Soter), who standeth and heareth him, and rejoiceth greatly because of the bridegroom's voice—rejoiceth at the consummation of the espousals.† It was as a representative of the Demiurge that the Baptist spake these words—John iii. 29.

#### DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS OF THE VALENTINIAN SCHOOL.

In the Valentinian school Heracleon was distinguished for the cool, scientific, reflective character of his mind. He wrote a commentary on the Gospel of St. John, of which considerable fragments have been preserved by Origen; ‡ perhaps also a commentary on the Gospel according to Luke. Of the latter only a single fragment, the exposition of Luke xii. 8, has been preserved by Clement of Alexandria.§ It may easily be conceived that the spiritual depth and profundity of St. John must have especially attracted the Gnostics. To the exposition of this gospel Heracleon brought a profound religious sensibility, which penetrated to the inward meaning, together with an understanding invariably clear when not led

\* The τόπος μυστήτος.

† The union of the Soter with the Sophia, of the angels with the spiritual natures in the Pleroma.

‡ In his *Tomis on John*, in which he frequently has reference to the expositions of Heracleon.

§ Strom. l. iV. f. 503.

astray by theosophical speculation. What he was chiefly deficient in was an appreciation of the simplicity of St. John, and an earnest application to the necessary means for evolving the spirit out of the letter—a deficiency among the Gnostics generally which we have already remarked upon. Heracleon, indeed, so far as we can see, believed honestly that he had derived his theology from St. John. But his judgment was entirely warped by his system, and with all his habits of thought and contemplation he was so carried away by it that he could not move freely, and, in spite of himself, introduced its views and its ideas in the Scriptures, which he regarded as the fountain of divine wisdom.

As a proof of this assertion, let us consider Heracleon's interpretation of that noble passage which contains our blessed Saviour's conversation with the woman of Samaria. With the simple facts of the history Heracleon could not rest content; he was not satisfied with a calm psychological contemplation of the Samaritan woman in her relation to the Saviour. He saw immediately in the woman, who was attracted by the words and appearance of Christ, the type of *all* spiritual natures that are attracted by the godlike, and to his mind the history represented immediately the whole relation of the *πνευματικοί* to the Soter and to the higher, spiritual world. For him therefore the words of the Samaritan woman have a double sense—that of which she was herself conscious, and that which, as the representative of the whole class of the *πνευματικοί*, she expressed unconsciously; and in the same way the words of the Saviour must be taken in a two-fold sense, a higher and a lower. He seized, it is true, the fundamental idea conveyed by the Saviour's language, but he allowed himself to be drawn away from the principal point by seeing too much in the several incidents of the story. "The water which our Saviour gives," says he, "is from his Spirit and his power. His grace and his gifts are something that never can be taken away, never can be exhausted, never can pass from those who have received a portion of them. They that have received what is richly bestowed on them from above communicate again of the overflowing fulness which they enjoy, to the everlasting life of others also." But now, from the truth that Christ intended the water which he would give to be understood in a symbolical sense, he goes on to make the wrong



inference that the water of Jacob's well must be understood in the same way. It was a symbol of Judaism inadequate to the wants of the spiritual nature—an image of its perishable, earthly glory. The words of the woman, "Give me this water, that I thirst not, neither come hither to draw," express, according to him, the burthensome character of Judaism, the difficulty of finding in it any nourishment for the spiritual life, and its inadequacy when found.\* When our Lord afterwards bids the woman call her husband, the latter is the symbol of her other half in the spiritual world, the angel belonging to her;† and the command indicates that, coming with him to the Saviour, she is to receive power from Him to become united and blended with this her destined companion. And the reason given for this arbitrary interpretation is, that "Christ could not have spoken of her earthly husband, since he was aware that she had no lawful one. In the *spiritual* sense,‡ the woman knew not her husband§—she knew nothing of the angel belonging to her; in the literal sense, she was ashamed to confess that she was living in an unlawful connection." The water being the symbol of the divine life communicated by the Saviour, Heracleon went on to infer that the water-pot was the symbol of a recipient *spirit for this divine life on the part of the woman. She left her water-pot behind with him*; that is, having now a vessel of this kind with the Saviour, in which she had just received the living water, she returned into the world to announce to the psychical natures the coming of Christ. ||

In many of his interpretations, in which he distinguishes himself by his healthy feeling for the simple and for the profound in simplicity, he is too simple for the artificial Origen, who finds fault with him for adhering to the letter,

\* Τὸ ἐπίμοχθον καὶ δυσπόριστον καὶ ἄτροφον ἐκείνου τοῦ ὕδατος.

† Τὸ πλήρωμα αὐτῆς. See above.

‡ Κατὰ τὸ νοούμενον.

§ Κατὰ τὸ ἀπλοῦν.

|| We must do Heracleon the justice of acknowledging that here, as in many other places, Origen wrongly accuses him of contradicting himself,—for how, says Origen, could the Samaritan woman announce Christ to others, when she had left behind, with him from whom she had parted, the recipient organ of divine life? But Heracleon was perfectly consistent here: in applying the allegory, the notion of "leaving behind," in any special reference, did not, in fact, enter his mind.

and not penetrating more deeply into the spiritual sense.\* Explaining the words of Christ in John iv. 34, he says, "The Lord here calls it his meat to do the will of his Father; for this was to him his nourishment, his refreshment and strength, and his power. But by his Father's will he meant that men should come to the knowledge of his Father and be blessed. And accordingly this discourse with the Samaritan woman was part of this meat of the Son."† On John iv. 35, he says, "Christ here speaks of the material harvest, which was yet four months distant; while on the other hand the harvest on which he discourses was already present as respected the souls of the faithful."‡

As the Gnostics excepted against the Jewish element in the doctrine of faith and morals, they uniformly insisted on the principle that everything spiritual must proceed from the inner life and temper, and opposed the tendency to detach good works from this connection, and to attribute to them a value of their own. This reaction of the Christian spirit evinced itself among the Gnostics, in a protest against the exaggerated estimate of the *opus operatum* of martyrdom, which, as we have seen, tended to promote a deifying of man among the multitude, and spiritual pride and false security among the martyrs and confessors. We formerly remarked that Basilides opposed himself to this excessive veneration of the martyrs, but, on the other hand, under the influence of the false premises of his system, sought to depreciate martyrdom. But the way in which Heracleon attacked the wrong notions on this point had no connection whatever with such errors. His only concern was to show that the witnessing to Christ ought not to be *isolated*, as a mere outward act, but to be regarded in its connection and agreement with the entire course of the Christian life. "The multitude," says he, § "look upon confession before the civil powers as the only one; but without reason. This confession hypocrites also may make. This is

\* 'Επὶ τῆς λείψανος ἔμεινε, μὴ οἰόμενος αὐτὴν ἀνάγεσθαι. Orig. in Joann. T. XIII. s. 41.

† It is deserving of notice that Origen censures Heracleon on account of this sound exposition: "Ὅτις νομίζω σαφῶς παντὶ ὁρᾶσθαι καὶ ταπεινῶς ἰζηλῆσθαι καὶ βιβιασμένως. L. c. s. 38.

‡ L. c. s. 41.

§ In the fragment above cited of his commentary on Luke.

but one *particular* form of confession—it is not that *universal* confession to be made by all Christians, and of which Christ is here (Luke xii. 8) speaking—the confession by works and actions that correspond to the faith in Him. This universal confession will be followed by that special one also in the hour of trial, and when reason requires it. It is possible for those who so confess Him in words, to deny Him by works. They only confess Him in truth, who live confessing Him, in whom also He Himself confesses Himself—*having received them to Himself as they have received Him to themselves.\** For this reason He can *never deny Himself.*†

*Ptolemæus* is also deserving of mention, who, if we may judge from the work of Irenæus (which was aimed chiefly against *his* party), contributed greatly to the diffusion of Valentinian principles. It may be questioned whether Tertullian is correct in saying that Ptolemæus differed from Valentine principally in his representation of the *Æons*; that, whereas the latter regarded them as powers residing in the divine essence,‡ the former rather viewed them under the form of hypostases. At least it may be doubted whether this was a distinction of much importance; for the representations which the Gnostics framed of the *Æons* were invariably very far removed from abstract notional attributes, and bordered closely on hypostasical existences.

A very important production of Ptolemy's, which is still extant—his letter to Flora, a lady whom he endeavoured to convert to the Valentinian doctrine §—shows that he was well qualified to present his views to others in an attractive form. As the Christian lady to whom he wrote belonged in all probability to the Catholic Church, it was particularly necessary for him to remove the *offence* she was likely to take at the *opposition between his views and the doctrine of the Church*, and at the position that neither *the Old Testament* nor *the creation of the world proceeded from the Supreme God*. To meet

\* Ἐντελεσμένοις αὐτοῦ καὶ ἰσχύμενος ὑπὸ τούτων.

† Which must happen if those who are thus connected with him could be brought to deny him.

‡ Nominibus et numeris æonum distinctis in personales substantias, quas Valentinus in ipsa summa divinitatis, ut sensus et adfectus et motus incluserat. Adv. Valentinian, c. 4.

§ Epiphan. hæres. 33, s. 3.



the first difficulty, he appeals to an apostolic tradition, which, by succession, had come down to himself, and to *the words of the Saviour*, according to whom all doctrine should be settled. By the tradition he meant probably an *esoteric* one, which, *being himself deceived*, he traced to some reputed disciple of the apostles; and as regards the words of Christ, he could easily adapt them to his system by the Gnostic mode of interpretation. As to the second difficulty, we may well suppose that he exhibited his principles in the mildest possible form, in order to gain admittance for them with one who was not as yet among the initiated. But still we find nothing in his position which is at variance with the Valentinian principles. He combats two opposite errors—the error of those who held the creation of the world and the Old Testament to be the works of an evil being, and that of those who considered them as the works of the Supreme God. The latter of these parties erred, in his opinion, because they knew the Demiurge alone, and not the Father of All, whom Christ, who alone knew him, first revealed to them; the other, because they knew nothing of such an intermediate being as the Demiurge. Ptolemy probably would say, then, that the first error was entertained by those who in Christianity continued still to be Jews; the second, by those who had passed at once, without any medium of transition, from heathenism, with its worship of matter and Satan, to the knowledge of the Supreme God in the gospel; and who, because they had themselves made at once this immense leap in knowledge and religion, supposed there was also a like chasm in the nature of things. “How can a law,” he asks, “that forbids sin proceed from the evil being who is opposed to all moral goodness?” and he says, “the man must be blind, not only in the mind’s eye, but also in that of the body, who cannot discern in the world the providence of its maker.”

Firmly persuaded that the world could not have taken its origin from an evil being, he was also strongly convinced that its author could not be the perfect God whom the Saviour was first enabled to reveal. *His* essence is pure goodness: Christ, indeed, called him the being who alone is good. It would also seem that Ptolemy considered retributive justice to be irreconcilable with this perfect goodness. On the other hand, he represented justice, in the more limited sense, to be



the peculiar attribute of the Demiurge, as marking a stage intermediate between evil and perfect goodness. He distinguished justice in *this* sense from justice in the highest sense, which coincides with perfect goodness.\* That which is intermediate† he considered as the essence of the Demiurge and his kingdom. He professes adherence to the doctrine of one primal Essence, the One Father who is without beginning, from whom all that exists proceeds, and on whom it depends—a being who would in time show himself greater and mightier than the evil principle. He writes to Flora that she ought not to be uneasy even though it should appear strange to her that, from a perfect primal essence, two natures should proceed, so alien to it as the perishable essence‡ and the Demiurge, which occupies the intermediate position, notwithstanding that the good, from its very essence, necessarily produces only what is like itself; “for,” he adds, “you shall come to know the beginning and origin of this also in its proper time.” If, in all this, Ptolemy was not accommodating his teaching, for the occasion, to the principles of the church, or representing it in a mild form, with a view of gradually leading his pupil still farther, we should have to reckon him among the Gnostics before described, who ultimately reduced Dualism to an original Monism; for, according to this view, he must have laboured to show not only that the realm of the Demiurge, as a subordinate stage of existence in the general development of life, but also must ultimately have taught that the very *ὑλη* arose, either as the extreme limit of all, or as an antithesis necessary to appear once and to be overcome. §

Agreeing entirely with the Valentinian notion of inspiration, according to which all is not regarded as alike divine, but a coöperation of different agents is supposed in the pro-

\* The proof is in what Ptolemæus says concerning the Demiurge: *ἦν ὡς λεχθεῖσα ἂν δίκαιος, τῆς κατ' αὐτὸν δικαιοσύνης ἂν βραβευτῆς, καὶ ἔσται μὲν καταδείκτερος τοῦ τελείου Θεοῦ καὶ τῆς ἐκείνου δικαιοσύνης ἐλάττων οὗτος ὁ Θεός.*

† The *μίσρον*, answering to the *τόπος μισότητος* in Valentine's system.

‡ The *φθορά*, the *ὑλη*.

§ Perhaps Secundus also belonged to the party who supposed evil to be a necessary momentum in the process of development, if he distinguished in the first Ogdoad a *τίτρω* διζιά and a *τίτρω* ἀριστερά, calling the first light, and the second darkness. Vid. Iren. lib. I. c. 11, s. 2.

duction of the Old Testament, Ptolemy distinguished several elements in it. He divided the religious polity of Moses into three parts:—1. That which proceeded from the Demiurge; 2. That which Moses ordained under the dictates of his own independent reason; 3. The additions made to the Mosaic law by the elders.\* The Saviour, as he maintained, plainly distinguished the law of Moses from the law of God (of the Demiurge), Matth. xix. 6, &c. Yet afterwards he excuses Moses, and endeavours to show that the contradiction between him and the Demiurge is only apparent; that he merely yielded through constraint to the weakness of the people, in order to avoid a still greater evil. What came from the Demiurge he divides again into three parts:—1. The purely moral portion of the law, unmixed with any evil, which was called distinctively the law, and in reference to which our Saviour says that he came not to destroy the law but to fulfil; for as it contained nothing foreign from Christ's nature, it only required completion. For example, the precepts Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not commit adultery, were completed in the precepts which forbid anger and impure desires. 2. The law, corrupted by an evil intermixture, as, for example, that which permitted retaliation; Levit. xxiv. 20; xx. 9. "Even he," Ptolemy says, "who retaliates wrong for wrong, is none the less guilty of injustice, since he repeats the same action, the order only being reversed." Yet here, as in the case of Moses, he recognised a pædagogical element. "This command," says he, "was, and perhaps still continues to be, a *just* one, given not without overstepping the *pure law* in consideration of the weakness of those who were to receive the law. It is alien, however, from the essence and from the goodness of the Universal Father; though perhaps agreeable to the nature of the Demiurge,† but more probably extorted even from him. For *he* who forbids to kill in one place, and commands it in another, has allowed himself unawares to be

\* Ptolemy assumes that the Pentateuch did not come from Moses. He supposed, probably, with the Clementines, that when the law was written down from oral tradition many inconsistent additions were mixed up with it by the elders.

† I have translated according to a correction of the text (l. c. c. 3.) which seemed to me necessary: ἵσως τοῦτω κατάλληλον. The *ο*. need only be altered to *ω*.

surprised by a *sort of necessity*." The Demiurge, he used to say, was not wanting in the will, but in the power, to vanquish evil. This part of the law, as conflicting with the essence of the Supreme God, is now wholly abolished by the Saviour. It is plain that Ptolemy must have looked upon the execution of the murderer as only a second murder. The state generally, according to his doctrine, which represents retributive justice as altogether irreconcilable with the nature of the Supreme God, can belong only to the kingdom of the Demiurge. And it follows that those who have separated themselves from the kingdom of the Demiurge, the genuine Gnostic Christians, must decline all offices of civil trust. We here again trace a defect in the ethical system of these Gnostics, having its ground in their speculative theology. Because, according to the latter, the former could never become the animating principle of a state, therefore the possibility was denied to it of ever becoming a form of manifestation for the kingdom of God. No doubt there was at the bottom of this position the true principle that civil laws and civil constitutions cannot be derived immediately from the essence of Christianity. 3. The third element of the Demiurge's law was the typical, ceremonial law, which contained the figure of higher, spiritual things; the laws, *e. g.*, concerning sacrifices, circumcision, the sabbath, the passover, and fasts. "All that was merely type and symbol is changed as soon as the truth has appeared. The visible and outward observance was abolished; it has passed into a spiritual service, in which, however, the names are the same, while the things are altered. For even the Saviour commands that we also should bring our offerings; not offerings, however, of brute beasts or of burning incense, but the spiritual sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving to God—of doing good and communicating to our neighbours. It is his will also that we be circumcised—not however with the outward bodily rite, but with the spiritual circumcision of the heart. He wills, moreover, that we should keep the sabbath, for he would have us rest from doing evil; also that we should fast,—not however with bodily abstinence, but with spiritual, which consists in abstaining from all sin. And yet the practice of outward fasting is observed even by us; for even this may be profitable to the soul, if rationally performed,—not from imitation of any one, not from custom, not from

regard to the day, as if *one* day were particularly designed for it—but to remind us of the *true* fast, that those who as yet are unable to keep the latter may nevertheless by the outward fasting be led to keep it in view.” Ptolemy was thoroughly persuaded of the loftiness of the true Christian position, as superior to all the constraints of time and place. In the order of set fasts, and doubtless also feast-days, he saw something Jewish.

Among the so-called disciples of Valentine, *Marcus* and *Bardesanes* were distinguished. We say *so-called*; for it would be more correct perhaps to say that both drew from the same common fountain with Valentine—Syria, the native country of Gnosticism. *Marcus*, who lived in the latter half of the second century, came probably from Palestine, as we may gather from his frequent use of forms from the Aramæan liturgy. If in the theosophy of Heracleon and Ptolemy the *scientific* tendency of the *Alexandrian* school predominated, in that of Marcus, on the other hand, the tendency was to the *poetical* and *symbolical*. He set forth his system in a *poem*, in which he introduced the divine *Æons* discoursing in liturgical forms, and with gorgeous symbols of worship (we shall presently adduce some examples of the latter). After the fashion of the Jewish Cabbala, he discovered special mysteries in the numbers and position of letters. The idea of a λόγος τοῦ ὄντος, of a word manifesting the hidden divine essence in the creation, was spun out by him into the most subtle details—the entire creation being, in his view, a continuous *utterance* of the ineffable.\* The way in which the germs of divine life,† which lie shut up in the *Æons*, continually unfold and individualize themselves more and more, is represented as a spontaneous analysis of the several *names* of the Ineffable into their several sounds. An echo of the Pleroma falls down into the ὕλη, and becomes the forming principle of a new, but lower creation.‡

\* Τὸ ἀρρητὸν ῥητὸν γενησῆναι.

† The σπέρματα πνευματικά.

‡ In general it is a peculiar Gnostic idea that the hidden godlike has various utterances which descend to an *echo*, and finally to a *cessation of all sound*; and that again the echo increases to a *clear tone*, to a distinct *word*, for the revelation of the divine, &c.—ideas which they could apply in a great variety of shapes. Thus Heracleon says, The Saviour is the *word*, as the revealer of the godlike; all prophecy which foretold his



Bardanes (the second of the two mentioned above) can only with still less propriety be considered a disciple of Valentine: he lived in Edessa of Mesopotamia. This is indicated by his name Bar-Desanes, son of Daisan, from a river so called near the city of Edessa. He was very famous for his extensive learning. Many of the older writers speak of alterations in the system of Bardanes. According to Eusebius, he was at first a follower of Valentine, but, having convinced himself by careful examination that many of his doctrines were untenable, he came over to the orthodox church; but still he retained many of his earlier tenets, and so became the founder of a particular sect. According to Epiphanius, he passed from the orthodox church to the Valentinians. But of all these changes not a word is said by Ephraim Syrus, the learned writer of the fourth century, who lived in the country of Bardanes, wrote in his language, and had read his works; and the origin of these false reports admits of being easily explained. Bardanes, like other Gnostics, when he spoke publicly in the church, may have been in the habit of accommodating himself to the *prevailing* opinions; he probably let himself down, in this way, to the level of the *psychical natures*. In many points he did, far more than other Gnostics, really agree with the orthodox doctrine. He could even write, from honest conviction, against many other Gnostic sects then spreading themselves in Syria; as, for instance, against those that denied any connection between the Old and New Testaments; that derived the visible world from an *evil* being; that taught a doctrine of fatality destructive of moral freedom.

coming, without being distinctly conscious of the idea of the Messiah in its spiritual sense, was only an isolated *tone* that preceded the revealing word; John the Baptist, standing midway between the Old and New Testament economy, is the *voice*, which is already closely related to the word that expresses the thought with consciousness. The *voice* becomes *word*, by John's becoming a disciple of Christ; the *tone* becomes *voice*, when the prophets of the Demiurge, together with himself, attain to the conscious recognition of the higher order of the world which the Messiah revealed, and thenceforth serve this higher system with self-conscious freedom. Orig. T. VI. in Joann. s. 12. 'Ο λόγος μὲν ὁ σωτὴρ ἐστίν, φωνὴ δὲ ἡ ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ πᾶσα προφητικὴ τάξις, τὴν φωνὴν οἰκιοστρίαν εὐσαν τῷ λόγῳ λόγον γενέσθαι. Τῷ ἤχῳ φησὶν ἔσσεσθαι τὴν εἰς φωνὴν μεταβολὴν, μαθητοῦ μὲν χώραν δίδου τῇ μεταβαλλούσῃ εἰς λόγον φωνῇ ἢ (it should perhaps read τῇ), δούλου δὲ τῇ ἀπὸ ἤχου εἰς φωνήν.

In truth, the Gnostic Ptolemy had also written against such sectarians, without prejudice to his Gnosticism.

In perfect conformity with the Valentinian system, Bardesanes recognised in man's nature something altogether superior to the whole world in which man's consciousness in time is unfolded—something above its own comprehension—the human soul—a seed sown from the Pleroma. Its essence therefore, and its powers, which proceeded from this lofty region, remain hidden to itself, until it shall attain to the full consciousness and to the full exercise of them in the Pleroma.\* According to the *Gnostic system*, however, *this* properly could be true only in respect to the *spiritual* natures; but to the *psychical* also he must, according to that system, attribute a *moral freedom* superior to the *constraint* of *natural influences*, or to that of the *Hyle*. Hence, though, like many of this Gnostical tendency, he busied himself with astrology, he yet combated the doctrine that the stars exercised any such influence (εἰμαρμένη) as determined with *necessity* the life and actions of men. Eusebius, in that great literary treasure—the προπαρασκευὴ εὐαγγελική, has preserved a considerable fragment of this remarkable production. In it Bardesanes, among other proofs that the stars do not possess any irresistible influence on the character of nations, adduces the fact of the multitude of Christians scattered through so many different countries.† “*Wherever they are,*” says he of the Christians, “they are neither conquered by bad laws and customs, nor constrained by the dominant constellations that presided over their birth, to practise the sin which their Master has forbidden. To sickness, however, to poverty, to suffering, to that which is accounted shameful among men, they are subject. For as our *free* man does not allow himself to be forced into servitude, but, if forced, resists; so on the other hand our phenomenal man, as a man for service, cannot easily escape subjection. For if we had all power, we should be the *All*; and so, if we had no power, we should be the *tools of others* and not our own. But if God helps, all things are possible, and nothing can be a hindrance, for nothing can resist His will. And though it may seem to be resisted, yet this is so *because God is good*,

\* Vid. Ephræm. Syr. opp. Syr. lat. T. II. f. 553 et 555.

† See Vol. I. p. 110.—Præpar. evangel. l. VI. c. 10, near the end.

*and allows every nature to preserve its own individuality and its own free will."* In conformity with his system, he sought for traces of truth among people of every nation; thus, in India he noticed a class of sages who lived in habits of rigid asceticism (the Brahmins, Saniahs), and, although in the midst of idolaters, kept themselves pure from idolatry and worshipped only one God.

We shall now pass to the consideration of those Gnostics who were opposed to Judaism; and in the first place to those who, in their aim to sever Christianity from its connection with Judaism, were inclined to bring Christianity into union with heathenism.

### *The Gnostic Sects in conflict with Judaism.*

*The Sects which, in opposing Judaism, inclined to the side of the Pagan Element.*

#### THE OPHITES.

The Ophites will form the most natural transition to this class of the Gnostics; for we are here shown how the same ideas, by a slightly different turn, could lead to wholly different results.

In the system of this sect, as in that of the Valentinians, there predominated the idea of a mundane soul,—a feeble ray of light out of the Pleroma, which, plunging into matter, communicated life to the inert mass, and was itself, however, not unaffected by it. The doctrine of a mundane soul, the source of all spiritual life, which attracts to itself whatever has emanated from it—the pantheistic principle of which a germ existed even in the Valentinian system—becomes prominent in the system of the Ophites, while the properly Christian element retreats into the background. Different modifications, however, in this respect, seem to have existed in different branches of the Ophitic sect. The same *fundamental principles might in the same period* be seized and applied in different ways, according as the *Christian*, or the *purely Oriental and theosophical*, or the *Jewish element*, most predominated. The Ophitic system represented the origin of the Demiurge (which it named Ialdabaoth) in the very same way as the Valentinian; moreover, in the doctrine of his relation to the higher system of the world, it is easy to mark the transition-point between the two systems. The Valentinian Demiurge is a limited being, who in his limitation imagines he



acts with independence; the higher system of the world is originally strange to him; he serves it as its unconscious instrument. By the phenomena, or appearances which come from that higher world, he is at first bewildered and thrown into amazement; this, however, is the fault not of his malignity, but of his ignorance. Finally, however, he is attracted by the godlike, rises from his unconsciousness to consciousness, and thenceforward ministers to the higher order of the world with joy. According to the Ophitic system, on the other hand, he is not only a limited being, but altogether hostile to the higher order of the world, and remains so for ever. The higher light which he is possessed of in virtue of his derivation from the Sophia he only misemploys by revolting against the superior order of the universe, and by seeking to render himself an independent sovereign. Hence it is the purpose of the Sophia to deprive him of the spiritual nature that has flowed to him, and to draw it back to itself, that so Ialdabaoth, with his entire creation being stripped of all rational entity, may go to ruin. According to the Valentinian system, on the contrary, the Demiurge constitutes through eternity a grade of rational, moral existence, of subordinate rank indeed, but still belonging to the harmonious evolution of the great whole. Yet here again we trace an affinity of ideas, since the Ophites represent the Demiurge as unconsciously and involuntarily subservient to Wisdom, and accomplishing its plans, and ultimately bringing about his own downfall and annihilation. But if Ialdabaoth, without willing or knowing it, is an instrument to the purposes of divine wisdom, this, however, gives him no distinction in the Ophitic, as it did in the Valentinian system. He is even put on a level with absolute evil; for this subservience does not proceed from the excellence of his nature, but from the almighty power of the higher order of things. Even the evil spirit—the serpent-spirit (*ὄφιομόρφος*)—that took its existence from Ialdabaoth, full of hatred and jealousy towards man, looking down into the *ὑλη* and imaging himself on its surface,—even he must, though against his will, serve as an instrument in promoting the purposes of wisdom. Moreover, the doctrine of the Ophites concerning the origin and destination of man has many points of resemblance with the Valentinian theory; but much also which belongs to quite another branch of the Gnostic heresy.



The empire of Ialdabaoth is the starry world. The stars are the representatives and organs of the cosmical principle, which seeks to hold man's sprit in bondage and servitude, and to surround it with all manner of delusions. Ialdabaoth and the six angels begotten by him are the spirits of the seven planets, the Sun, the Moon, Mars, Venus, Jupiter, Mercury, and Saturn.\* It is the constant endeavour of Ialdabaoth to maintain his independence as Lord and Creator, to keep his six angels from throwing off their subjection, and to prevent looking up and observing the higher world of light, by fixing their attention upon some object in another quarter. With this view he urges the six angels to create man, after their own common image, as the crowning seal of their independent, creative power.† Man is created; and being simply in their image, is nothing but a huge corporeal mass without a soul. He creeps on the earth, and has not power to lift himself erect. They therefore bring the helpless creature to their Father, that he may animate it with a soul. Ialdabaoth breathed into it a living spirit,‡ and thus, unperceived by himself, the spiritual seed passed from his own being into the nature of man, whereby he was himself deprived of this higher principle of life. This had the Sophia ordained. In man (i. e. those men who had received some portion of this spiritual seed) was concentrated the light, the soul, the reason of the whole creation. Ialdabaoth is now seized with amazement and rage, when he beholds a being created by himself, and within the bounds of his own kingdom, rising both above himself and his kingdom. His object, therefore, is to prevent man from becoming conscious of his higher nature, and of that higher order of things to which through the former he has become related—to keep him in a state of blind unconsciousness, and thus of slavish submission. It was this jealousy of the mean and narrow Ialdabaoth that led to a commandment being given to the first man; but the mundane soul employed the serpent-spirit (the *ὄφιόμορφος*) to defeat the purpose of Ialdabaoth, by tempting the first man to disobedience. According to another view, the serpent was itself a symbol or disguise of

\* There is much also in the religious books of the Sabians on the manner in which these star-spirits deceive men.

† Thus they explained Gen. i. 26.

‡ They supposed they found this in Genesis ii. 7.

the mundane soul;\* and, strictly speaking, it is only that part of the sect which adopted *this* view that rightly received the name of Ophites, for they actually worshipped the serpent as a holy symbol. And to this they may have been led by an analogous idea in the Egyptian religion; according to which the serpent is looked upon as a symbol of Kneph or the ἀγαθοδαίμων, who resembled the σοφία of the Ophites.† At all events, it was the mundane soul that directly or indirectly opened the eyes of the first man. The fall of man—and this presents a characteristic feature of the Ophitic system, though even in this respect it was perhaps not altogether independent of the prior Valentinian theory—was the transition point from a state of unconscious limitation to one of conscious freedom. Man, now become wise, renounces the allegiance of Ialdabaoth, who, in anger at his disobedience, banishes him from the upper region of the air, where until now he had dwelt in an ethereal body, to the dark earth, and drives him into a dark body. Man now finds himself in a situation where, on the one hand, the seven planetary spirits seek to hold him in thrall, and to suppress the higher consciousness in his soul; while, on the other hand, the *wicked* and purely material spirits tempt him into sin and idolatry, which would expose him to the vengeance of the severe Ialdabaoth. But the “Wisdom,” or Sophia, continually imparts new strength to man’s kindred nature by fresh supplies of the higher spiritual influence; and from Seth, whom the Gnostics generally regarded as a representative of the πνευματικοί—the contemplative natures—it is able to preserve, through every age, a race peculiarly its own, in which the seeds of the spiritual nature are saved from destruction.

In respect to the relation of the *psychical Christ*, or Jesus, to the *Christ of the Æon world*, which latter united himself to the former at the baptism, the Ophites taught similarly to Basilides and the Valentinians. All that was peculiar to the

\* The serpent, a type of the ζωόγονος σοφία: the winding shape of the entrails presents the form of a serpent,—a symbol of that wisdom of nature, that soul of the world, which winds in concealment through all the different grades and orders of natural life. Theodoret. hæret. fab. vol. I. 14. We perceive the pantheistic principle here shining forth more distinctly.

† Comp. Creutzer’s Symbolik. Th. I. S. 312, u. 504. 2te Aufl.

former was the doctrine that the higher Christ, in descending through the seven heavens of the seven angels, or in wandering through the seven stars on his way to the earth, appeared in each of these heavens under a kindred form, as an angel of the same kind; in this way he hid his own higher nature from those angels, while he absorbed whatever of the spiritual seed they still possessed, and crippled their power. The way in which these Gnostics endeavoured to prove that the heavenly Christ first became united with Jesus at his baptism, and forsook him again at the passion, explains in some measure the origin of their whole view. They appealed, for instance, to the circumstance that Jesus wrought no miracle, either before his baptism or after his resurrection. This fact they imagined could be no otherwise explained than by supposing that the higher being was only united with him from the time of his baptism to his death. A remarkable fact, beyond all doubt, and worthy of special notice, that Christ wrought miracles only from a certain point of time to another certain point of time; only they gave it a false explanation.

Ialdabaoth, the God of the Jews, must have felt himself deceived in what he had expected from his Messiah, since the latter did not advance his kingdom, but rather, as an instrument of the higher Christ, proclaimed the unknown Father, and threatened to overthrow the law of Ialdabaoth, that is, Judaism. On this account he determined to get rid of him, and brought about his crucifixion. After his resurrection, Jesus remained eighteen months on the earth, during which He received by inspiration of the Sophia a clearer knowledge of the higher truth, which he communicated to a few only of his chosen disciples, whom he knew to be capable of entertaining such high mysteries. Upon this he is raised by the celestial Christ to heaven, and sits at the right hand of Ialdabaoth, unobserved by him, for the purpose of drawing and receiving to himself every spiritual being that has been emancipated and purified by the redemption, as soon as it is released from its tabernacle of sense. In proportion as Jesus becomes enriched in his own spirit by this attraction to himself of kindred natures, Ialdabaoth is deprived of his higher virtues. The end of all this is, to emancipate the spiritual life confined in nature, and to bring it back to its original fountain, the mundane soul, from which all has flowed; Jesus being

the channel through which this is to be accomplished. The planets, therefore, must ultimately be deprived of all the rational entity which exists within them. Of this class of Gnostics there were some who carried out their Pantheism still more consistently. These held that the *same soul* is diffused through all living and inanimate nature; and that, consequently, all life, wherever it is dispersed and by the bonds of matter confined within the limits of *individual* existence, is ultimately to be attracted and through that channel re-absorbed by the mundane soul, or the Sophia—the original source from whence it had flowed. Such Gnostics said, “When we use natural things for food, we absorb into our own being the souls which are diffused in them, and with ourselves carry them upwards to the original fountain.”\* Thus eating and drinking was for them a sort of worship. In an *apocryphal* gospel therefore of this sect the mundane soul or Supreme Being says to the initiated, “Thou art myself, and I am thou; where thou art, I am; and I am diffused through all. Where thou pleasest thou canst gather me, but in gathering me thou gatherest thyself.”†

By their very nature, Pantheism, and that confounding of the natural and the divine which results from it, can never promote morality; and where the reaction of a moral element does not oppose itself to that of the subjective temper, it will naturally lead to immorality. Pantheism, and the wildly fanatic spirit of defiance to Ialdabaoth, and his pretended, cramping ordinances, seem in truth to have led these Ophites into the most unnatural extravagances.

A statement of Origen deserves special notice, who reports that the Ophites were not Christians, and that they admitted none to their assemblies who did not curse Christ. From this the important inference might be drawn that this sect sprang from a religious party which existed before the appearance of Christianity; and of which one portion afterwards appropriated to themselves some of the elements of Christianity, while another, holding fast to the traditional principles of their sect, opposed Christianity altogether. We should thus be led to the hypothesis of an ante-Christian Gnosis, which subsequently either received Christian elements into itself, or else took up

\* Epiphan. hæres. 26, c. 9.

† Chap. 3.



a bitter hostility to them. In fact, Origen names, as the founder of this sect, a certain *Euphrates*, who may have lived before the birth of Christ.\* Moreover, the striking relationship between the Ophitic system and the systems of the Sabæans and Manichæans, might be considered as pointing to some older common source in an ante-Christian Gnosis. But, on the other hand, it cannot be denied that the Ophitic formulas of exorcism, which Origen cites immediately after making this assertion, plainly contain allusions to Christian ideas. And it might be that the opposition of the Ophites to the Christ of the church, the psychical Messiah, was to be traced to a certain peculiar turn that had been given to their principles; that the distinction they made between the pneumatic and the psychical Christ—the light estimation in which they held the latter—may have been changed, among a portion of their sect, into a position of hostility, and, therefore, also to the Christ whom the majority of believers acknowledged,†—so that to curse the limited Messiah of the psychical natures became at last a mark of true discipleship to the higher Christ. We meet with something very like this in the sect of the Sabæans, who transferred many things from the history of Christ to a *heavenly Genius, the messenger of life, the Mando di Chaia*—whom they worshipped as the proper Christ, from whom the *true baptism* proceeded, while they referred the rest of the history to Jesus the anti-Christ, who, sent by the star-spirits to betray mankind, had corrupted the baptism of John. And something similar to this we shall soon meet with in a corruption of the Basilidean sect.

#### PSEUDO-BASILIDEANS.

These stand in a similar relation to the original Basilideans as the Ophites to the genuine school of Valentine. The prudent and moderate spirit of the Basilidean system ‡ was here

\* Orig. c. Cels. lib. VI. c. 28, ff. The obscure and inaccurate Philaster, who places the Ophites at the head of the ante-Christian sects, cannot be considered a good authority.

† I am indebted for this last remark to the profound critique of my work on the Gnostics, by Dr. Gieseler.

‡ Had not Clement of Alexandria spoken of the existence among certain false followers of Basilides of practical errors precisely similar to those we meet with in this sect, we might be led to suspect that the so-called Basilideans of Irenæus had no connection whatever with Basilides.

quite extinct; the distinction between the Supreme God and the Demiurge being exaggerated to an absolute Dualism, out of which was developed a wild defiance of the God of the world and his laws,—a bold antinomianism. According to their theory the redeeming spirit \* could not enter into any union with the detested kingdom of the Demiurge; he only assumed an apparently sensible form. When the Jews wished to crucify him, having, as an exalted spirit, the power of clothing himself in every possible semblance of sensible forms, and of presenting whatever shape he chose before the eyes of the carnal multitude, he caused Simon of Cyrene (Mark xv.) to appear to the Jews under *his own shape*; while he himself took the form of Simon, and rose without hindrance to his invisible kingdom, mocking the expectations of the deluded Jews. To this sect the doctrine of Christ crucified was foolishness. They ridiculed all who confessed him, as confessors of a phantom, deluded by a sensuous illusion. Such men, they allowed, were no longer Jews, but neither were they Christians. They contemned the martyrs as men who sacrificed their lives for the confession of a phantom. Those who were initiated into the true mysteries were well aware that only one in a thousand could comprehend them. As the *νοῦς* according to them possessed the faculty of making himself invisible to all, they also had the same power.† They could assume every form of sense, make themselves everything in appearance, in order to delude the gross multitude, and to escape their persecutions.‡

### CAINITES.

Closely related in their practical tendencies to these Pseudo-Basilideans were the Cainites; though, by the fundamental principles of their system, they belonged to the great stock of the Ophites. Among them, as well as among the Sethians,

\* The *νοῦς*. See above, the system of Basilides.

† This faculty of becoming invisible was claimed also by the Cabalistic school. We have a remarkable example of this folly in S. Maimon's life of himself, published by Moritz;—and in general it may be observed that a great many interesting points of resemblance to Gnosticism may be traced in the later Jewish sects, which Beer has described in his instructive History of Sects among the Jews (Brünn, 1822).

‡ Iren. lib. I. c. 24.

who were of the same stock, we meet with this fundamental idea—that in the midst of the Demiurge's world the *Sophia* found means to preserve, through every age, a race bearing within them the spiritual seed which was related to her own nature. But while the Sethians, whom we must place in the first class of Gnostics, regarded Cain as a representative of the Hylie, Abel of the Psychical, and Seth, who was finally to reappear in the person of the Messiah,\* of the Pneumatic principle; it was, on the other hand, the characteristic distinction of the Cainites that they assigned the highest place to Cain. In their wild hatred to the Demiurge and to the Old Testament, these fanatical antinomians went so far as to take for their leaders the worst characters of the Old Testament, as having been rebels against the laws of the Demiurge. They regarded them as the sons of the Sophia, and the instruments she employed in combating the Demiurge. To such thinkers the apostles appeared too narrow and restricted in their views. Judas Iscariot alone possessed, in their opinion, the true Gnosis. He, they held, brought about the death of Christ from good motives; because he knew that the kingdom of the Demiurge would thereby be destroyed. They had also, under the name of Judas, a gospel containing their Gnosis. Their principle, destruction to the works and ordinances of the Demiurge, served as a pretext to cover every species of immorality.† We ought not to wonder if such a sect, so audaciously perverse, so partial to the traitor Judas, should finally become hostile to Christ himself. But the language of Epiphanius, which might lead us to conjecture that such was actually the case with regard at least to a portion of the sect, is too vague and obscure to allow our adopting his statements on this point.

#### CARPOCRATES AND EPIPHANES; PRODICEANS, ANTITACTES, NICOLAITANS, SIMONIANS.

To those Gnostics whose licentious tendencies, so absolutely opposed to Christianity, could only find an accidental point of union in the ferment which it excited, belonged *Carpocrates*.

\* An idea nearly related to the doctrine of the Clementines.

† Vid. Iren. lib. I. c. 31. Epiphan. hæres. 38.

He lived probably in the reign of Hadrian, at Alexandria, where at that time there prevailed a certain religious eclecticism or syncretism which attracted the notice of that emperor himself.\* He formed a system of doctrines, which came into the hands of his son Epiphanes. The latter, who died at the early age of seventeen, employed and abused great natural talents in the defence of a perverse and most pernicious theory. According to Clement of Alexandria, Carpocrates had studied the Platonic philosophy, and taught it to his son. Indeed in this system we catch glimpses of Platonic ideas of the soul's preëxistence, and of that higher species of knowledge which under the form of a reminiscence came from some earlier, heavenly state of being. Its authors seem to have borrowed much from the Phædrus of Plato especially. Their *Gnosis* consisted in the knowledge of one supreme original Being,† the highest unity, from whom all existence has emanated, and to whom it strives to return. The finite spirits, who rule over the several portions of the earth, seek to counteract this universal tendency to unity; and from their influence, their laws and arrangements, proceeds all that checks, disturbs, or limits the original communion, which is the basis of nature, as the outward manifestation of that highest unity. These spirits, moreover, seek to retain under their dominion the souls which, emanating from the highest unity, and still partaking of its nature, have lapsed into the corporeal world, and have there been imprisoned in bodies, in order under their dominion to be kept within the cycle of migration. From these finite spirits the popular religions of different nations derive their origin. But the souls which, from a reminiscence of their former condition, soar upward to the contemplation of that higher unity, reach to such perfect freedom and repose, as nothing afterwards can disturb or limit, rise superior to the popular deities and religions. As examples of this sort, they named Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle among the heathens, and Jesus among the Jews. To the latter they ascribed nothing more than an especial strength and purity of soul, which, by means of reminiscences of his earlier existence, raised him to the highest flight of contem-

\* See his letter, cited p. 142.

† Hence called, in Clement of Alexandria, *γνώσις μοναδική*.



plation, set him free from the narrow laws of the God of the Jews, and, although educated in it himself, overthrew the religion which had proceeded from him. By virtue of his union with the Monad (*μόνας*), he received a divine power which enabled him to overcome the spirits of this world, and the laws by which they govern the operations of nature, to work miracles, and to endure suffering with undisturbed calmness. By the same divine power he was afterwards able to ascend in freedom, above all the powers of these spirits of the world, to the highest unity,—in short, to accomplish what in the system of Buddha is the ascension from the world of appearance to Nirwana. This sect accordingly *made no distinction* between Christ and the wise and good men among every people. They taught that any other soul which could soar to the same height of contemplation might be regarded as equal with Christ. In opposition to such as would make religion a matter of mere outward observances, they adopted the side of St. Paul, but on a directly opposite principle ; not on the principle of faith, in the apostle's sense, but on that of an antinomian Pantheism, which despised all moral action soever. Hence they foisted a foreign meaning upon St. Paul's positions as to the vanity of good works, and as to justification by faith alone, and not by works. By faith they understood nothing but an absorption of the mind in the original Unity. "All depends upon faith and love," they said ; "externals are altogether matters of indifference. He who ascribes moral worth to these makes himself their slave, subjects himself to those spirits of the world from whom all religious and political ordinances have proceeded ; he cannot, after death, pass out of the sphere of the Metempsychosis. But he who can abandon himself to every lust without being affected by any, who can thus bid defiance to the laws of those mundane spirits, will after death rise to the unity of that original one, with whom he has, by uniting himself, freed himself, even in the present life, from all fetters." \* Epiphanes wrote a work on justification, in which he advances the position, "All nature manifests a striving after unity and fellowship ; those laws of man which contradicted these laws of nature, and yet could not subdue the appetites implanted in human nature by the Creator himself,

\* Iren. lib. I. c. 25.

had first introduced sin. Thus did he wrest the language of the apostle respecting the inadequacy of the law to justify men, and its design to awaken a consciousness of guilt, in order to treat the Decalogue with bold contempt. This sect was much given to the art of magic. Whoever, by union with the primal one, was able to rise above the subordinate gods, who, like all things else, are subject to change,—above the finite spirits of the world,—could show forth this superiority by his works, by producing effects transcending the laws of nature, which proceeded from those inferior spirits. Thus did they explain the miracles of Christ; every one might do the same who raised himself to similar unity with the primal one. These Carpocratian doctrines embody a great deal which bears a close affinity to the Hindoo mind,\* and particularly to Buddhism.† The Carpocratians paid divine honours to an image of Christ, which, as they maintained, came originally from Pilate. The same honours they paid also to the images of pagan philosophers, who had taken their stand, like Christ, above the popular religion, and they also made use of heathen ceremonies—a practice irreconcilable with the system of Carpocrates and Epiphanes, and to be imputed rather to the superstition of their followers. At Same, the principal city of the island of Cephalene in the Ionian Sea, the native place of the maternal ancestors of Epiphanes, this youth is said to have made so great an impression on the minds of the multitude, that a temple, a museum, and altars were erected to him, and divine honours paid to his name. As we have this account from the learned Clement of Alexandria,‡ a man not given to credulity in such matters, we have no reason to question the fact, which indeed fully accords with the spirit and

\* See Colebrooke's *Dissertation on the school of Sankhya*. *Essais sur la philosophie des Hindous* par Colebrooke, traduits par G. Pauthier. Paris, 1833. P. 32. By this, however, I do not mean to assert—what, however, might well be possible considering the intercourse between distant nations at that time—that these doctrines were derived, indirectly, from such a source; for the tendency of mystic Pantheism exhibits itself in similar phenomena quite independently of all such influences; and in cases of this sort, instead of extrinsic communication, it is sufficient to suppose an inner relationship of spirit; as in the instance of the Beghards of the middle age.

† See the remarks which follow, on Manicheism.

‡ Clement. Strom. l. III. f. 428.

temper of the times. Perhaps, however, it was only from the members of his own sect, who would probably meet with a cordial reception on this island, that he enjoyed these honours, as the greatest of wise men.\*

To the same licentious class of Antinomians belonged the sect of Antitactes. Their doctrine is denoted by their name. The good and gracious God, said they, created all things good; but one of his own creatures rebelled against him. This was the Demiurge, the God of the Jews, who sowed the tares, and engendered that principle of evil wherewith he has enthralled every one of us. By this perhaps we must understand the material body as the fountain of all sin, with which the souls banished from above are environed. Thus he has placed us at enmity with the Father, and we in turn set ourselves at enmity with him.† To avenge the Father on him, we do directly the reverse of what he wills and commands. As a proof that the Old Testament bore witness against itself, they appealed to Mal. iii. 15, quoting the language of the godless as words of truth.‡

To the same class belonged the Prodicians, who were followers of a certain Prodicus. They maintained that they, as sons of the Supreme God, as the royal generation, were bound to no law, since for kings there is no written law; they were lords of the sabbath, lords over all ordinances. They made the whole worship of God to consist, probably, in the inner contemplation of divine things. They rejected prayer, and perhaps all external worship, as suited only to those limited minds which were still held in bondage under the Demiurge; and they were in the habit of appealing to the authority of certain apocryphal books, which they quoted under the name of Zoroaster.§

To this class of Antinomian Gnostics belonged also the Nicolaitans—if, indeed, the actual existence of such a sect

\* We make no mention here of the Cyrenian inscriptions of which so much has been said in modern times, for, although conceived in perfect conformity with the spirit of this sect, they have been proved to be not genuine.

† Ἀντιτασόμεθα τούτῳ.

‡ Ἀντίστησαν τῷ Θεῷ, καὶ ἰσώθησαν; where, moreover, they interpolated the word ἀναιδῶ. By resisting the unabashed God, men are delivered from his bondage. Clem. Strom. i. III. f. 440.

§ Strom. i. I. f. 304; i. III. f. 438; i. VII. f. 722.

can be proved. Irenæus, indeed, notices such a sect as existing in his time. He derived it from the Nicolaus mentioned among the seven deacons in the Acts of the Apostles; and he supposed the same sect to be described in the second chapter of Revelations.\* But it may be doubted whether Irenæus was right in his interpretation of this passage of Revelations—whether the word Nicolaitans, which occurs in this place, is in truth the proper name of a sect, and more particularly of a Gnostic sect. The passage seems to relate simply to a class of people who seduced Christians to participating in the sacrificial feasts of the heathens, and in the excesses which attended them—just as the Jews of old were led astray by the Moabites (Num. xxv.). It is quite possible, too, that the name Nicolaitans is employed purely in a symbolical sense (agreeably to the general style of the Apocalypse), to signify corrupters, seducers of the people, like Balaam—in this sense Balaamites.† It was a favourite idea with Irenæus, that, even at his early date, the Apostle John had come into conflict with many classes of the Gnostics; and he was wont to search in the writings of John for condemnatory allusions to the Gnostic heresy. As, then, he found that many of the errors reprov'd in this passage of the Revelation resembled those that prevailed among the Gnostics of his time, he concluded that the practical errors denounced by the apostle sprang out of a theoretical Gnosticism, and the name may have suggested to him the Nicolas mentioned in the Acts as its probable author. The remarks, however, relative to this sect in Irenæus are so obscure, that we have no reason for supposing that he knew anything about it from his own personal experience. Had we therefore no other account than that of Irenæus, we should be obliged to allow it to be possible, at least, that the tradition about this sect had grown out of some misconstruction of the passage in Revelations, though it would still seem strange that Irenæus,

\* Iren. l. I. c. 26. Speaking of their practical errors he says, *Qui indiscrete (ἀδιαφόρως) vivunt*. L. c. l. III. c. 11, he speaks of their speculative errors; where, however, he does not so distinguish them from other Gnostics as to make their peculiar characteristics clearly prominent.

† Balaam = *νικόλαος*,—according to the etymology from *נִלָּא* and *נָא*.



without any assignable motive, should represent as the founder of a heretical sect a man who had been elected by the apostles themselves to a public office. But no such mistake can be supposed to have existed in the case of the learned and unprejudiced Clement of Alexandria, who in the first place was better practised in historical criticism, and moreover appeals to facts which could not have been fabricated. The Nicolaitans were those who maintained the pernicious principle, already mentioned, that the lower passions were to be subdued by indulgence, without allowing the spirit to be affected by them. Men were to abuse the flesh and so destroy it by means of itself, and by showing their contempt for it. Their motto consisted of certain words to this purport which they ascribed to Nicolas the deacon.\* In a passage which follows,† the same Clement speaks of another incident in the life of this Nicolaus, which was often appealed to by the sect in justification of their extravagances. When accused by the apostles of jealousy of his wife, in order to prove the groundlessness of the charge he is said to have led her forth and said, Let him that chooses marry her. Clement himself, however, was very far from believing that the Nicolas of the Acts was the founder of this sect, although claimed by them as such. On the contrary, he defends the character of the man as a member of the apostolic church, and refers to a tradition which testified that this Nicolas lived to the last in honourable wedlock, and left behind him children who led decent and pious lives. We see, then, that Irenæus was not wrong in asserting the existence of such a sect, but only in not more carefully examining into the truth of its pretended origin. It was, as we have often observed, the custom with such sects to attach themselves to some celebrated name or other of antiquity, in the choice of which they were mostly influenced by perfectly accidental circumstances. Thus the Nicolaitans claimed Nicolas the deacon as their master, though he had done nothing to entitle him to that evil distinction. Clement supposes his words and actions had been misinterpreted, and endeavours to explain them in a milder sense; but it may be doubted whether, in this case, Clement carried his criticism

\* Το δὲ διὺν παραχεῖσθαι τῇ σαρκί. Clem. Strom. l. II. f. 411.

† L. c. l. III. f. 436.

far enough. Everything imputed to Nicolas by this tradition wears an apocryphal aspect. Perhaps the sect possessed a life of him, drawn up by themselves or others from fabulous accounts and unauthentic traditions, in which the whole of this was contained. If this sect was really derived from those Antinomians who were called Nicolaitans in the age of the Apostle John—a point which cannot be absolutely decided \*—then possibly this very name in the Apocalypse, the Nicolaitans, may have led the more recent sect to name themselves after Nicolas. Belonging, as they probably did, to the anti-Judaistic party, and consequently acknowledging no other apostle than St. Paul, they may have seized upon what they found asserted in the Apocalypse as affording evidence of the antiquity of their sect, since, having been attacked so long ago as by the Judaizing St. John, the resemblance of names would naturally invite them to refer its origin back to the Nicolas mentioned in the Acts. We have already noticed examples of the Gnostics choosing for their nominal leaders persons whose characters appear in an unfavourable light in the Old or the New Testament.

We have still to mention the *Simonians*—an eclectic sect, who can scarcely be brought, however, under any one specific class. They seem to have accommodated themselves, sometimes to paganism, at others to Judaism or to the religious opinions of the Samaritans, and at others again to Christianity; sometimes they appear to have been rigid ascetics, at others wild scoffers at all moral law (the Entychites). Simon Magus was their Christ, or at least a form of manifestation of the redeeming Christ, who had manifested himself also in Jesus; whether it was that they actually derived their origin from a party founded by the sorcerer of that name mentioned in the Acts, or whether, having sprung up at some later period, they, of their own fancy, chose for their Coryphæus Simon Magus, a name so odious to the Christians, and forged writings in his name which made preten-

\* Even though the name Nicolaitans in the Revelation were really the proper name of a party which owed its rise to some person of the name of Nicolas, and it was only the already existing name that gave occasion to the allusion to Balaam, yet still it could not be inferred from this fact that the party then existing was a Gnostic one. See, respecting this sect, my *Apostol. History*, vol. II. p. 533.

sions to a higher wisdom. The opinion of some learned writers that another Simon, distinct from the older Simon Magus, was the founder of the sect, and afterwards became confounded with this latter, is an arbitrary conjecture, by no means called for to explain the historical fact.\*

\* This Simon Magus, who cannot properly claim a place even among the founders of Christian sects, has acquired unmerited importance in the Christian church by being held up as the great father of the Gnostic heresy. As the representative of the whole *theosophico-goetic* tendency, in opposition to the simple faith in revelation, he became, so to speak, a *mythical* personage, and gave occasion to many fictitious legends, such, for example, as his dispute with the Apostle Peter, and his unsuccessful experiment in the art of flying. The most ingenious version of this story is to be found in the Clementines. It is a singular fact, however, that Justin Martyr, in his second apology to the Roman Emperor, mentions a pillar erected in honour of this Simon at Rome, on an island in the Tiber (ἐν τῇ Τίβερει ποταμῷ, μεταξὺ τῶν δύο γειφυρῶν), with the inscription *Simoni deo sancto*. Although sorcerers of this stamp could often find access even to persons of the highest rank, yet it is incredible that the folly should ever be carried to such an extent as that a statue should be erected, and the senate should pass a decree enrolling Simon Magus among the *deos Romanos*. The correctness of Justin's statement might therefore be called in question, even though it were impossible to point out the source of his mistake. But the occasion of his mistake may now, as it would seem, be explained. In the year 1574 a stone was dug up at the spot described by Justin, which appears to have served as the pedestal of a statue, and on it was the inscription, *Semoni Sango Deo Fidio sacrum*. True, this stone was not erected by the Roman senate, nor by the emperor, but by a certain Sextus Pompeius. But Justin, with his head full of the legends about Simon Magus, overlooked all this, and confounded the *Semo Sancus* (a *Sabino-Roman* deity, probably unknown to Justin, who was better versed in the Greek than in the Roman mythology) with the words *Simo sanctus*; for it is to be observed that the cognomen of that deity was sometimes written *sanctus* instead of *sancus*. Tertullian, who had a more familiar knowledge of Roman antiquities, might, it is true, be expected to know better; but even he was too prejudiced in such cases, and too ignorant of criticism, to institute any further examination into the correctness of a statement which was in accordance with his taste, and which besides came to him on so respectable authority. The more critical Alexandrians take no notice of the matter. Origen's remark (lib. I. c. Cels. c. 57) that this Simon was not known beyond Palestine by any but Christians, who became acquainted with him from the Acts of the Apostles, would seem to imply that he looked upon the story of the pillar erected to him in Rome as a fiction. The Samaritan Goetæ and Heresiarchs, Dositheus and Menander (the latter of whom is represented to have been a disciple of Simon Magus), deserve still less to be particularly noticed in the history of Christian sects.

*Anti-Jewish Gnostics, who strove to apprehend Christianity, however, in its Purity and absolute Independence.*

Strongly contrasted with those Gnostics whom we have just been considering, and who were carried far away from the ethical spirit of Christianity by their own prevailing bias of mind, were another class, who, under the influence of a mistaken Christian zeal, were led to oppose Judaism and were betrayed into Gnosticism by their one-sided mode of apprehending the ethical element of Christianity. In the section of the present history which relates to the Christian life, we formerly observed how likely it was that, in the course of its progressive movement, a one-sided ascetical tendency should spring up, leading to a most mistaken opposition to the world and to nature. Now a tendency of this sort might easily unite itself with the absolute Dualism of the Gnostics, and find a speculative support in the latter doctrine. Thus arose those peculiar phenomena of the Gnosis, in which the practical, ascetical element especially predominated, and which were distinguished by a certain earnestness of moral spirit, which, however, ran into the extreme of a rigid ascetism.

#### a. SATURNIN.

Of these we shall first mention Saturnin, who lived at Antioch in the time of the emperor Hadrian. His doctrines, so far as they can be ascertained from our imperfect information,\* were as follows:—At the lowest stage of the world of emanations, on the boundary between the kingdom of light and the kingdom of darkness, or of the  $\epsilon\lambda\eta$ , stand the seven lowest angels, the star-spirits. These combine together to seize from the kingdom of darkness a territory on which they may erect an independent empire of their own. Thus arose this terrestrial world, through whose different regions these spirits of the stars dispersed themselves. At their head stood the God of the Jews. They are engaged in an incessant war with the kingdom of darkness, and with Satan its prince, who is unwilling that their kingdom should grow at the expense of his own, and constantly seeks to destroy what they build up.

\* Irenæus and Epiphanius.



From the higher kingdom of light a feeble ray alone gleams down upon them. This gleam of light from above fills them with a longing for it; they wish to make it their own, but are too weak for that: whenever they try to grasp it, it retires from them. They therefore enter into a combination to charm this ray of the higher light, and to fix it in their own kingdom, by means of an image fashioned after the shape of the light floating above them. But the form made by the angels cannot raise itself towards heaven, cannot stand erect; \* it is a bodily mass without a soul. At length the Supreme Father looks down with pity from the kingdom of light on the feeble being man, who, however, has been created in his own image. He infuses into him a spark of his own divine life, and man now, for the first time, possesses a soul, and can raise himself erect towards heaven. In those *human* natures where it has been implanted, the godlike germ is destined to unfold itself to distinct, personality, and to return after a determinate period to its primal source. The men who, carrying within them these divine seeds, are appointed to reveal the Supreme God on earth, stand opposed to those who, possessing nothing but the hylic principle, are instruments of the kingdom of darkness. Now it was to destroy this empire of the planetary spirits, of the God of the Jews, which would set up itself as an independent kingdom, as well as to annihilate the empire of darkness, and to save those men who, through the divine seed of life, have become partakers of his own nature, that the Supreme God sent down his *Æon*, the *νοῦς*. But as it was impossible for the latter to enter into any union with the kingdom of the stars or the material world, he could only appear under the disguise and semblance of a sensible form.

It is evident of itself how such a system would naturally lead to that ascetical tendency above-mentioned, which shows itself in an undue estimate of celibacy.

#### b. TATIAN AND THE ENCRATITES.

Tatian, who traced his descent from Assyria, lived at Rome as a rhetorician, where he was converted to Christianity by Justin Martyr, who, owing to their common philosophical cha-

\* See above, concerning the Ophites.

racter as Platonists, was intimate with him. As long as Justin lived, Tatian adhered to the doctrine of the church. While still entertaining the same views, he composed, after Justin's death, an apology,\* which, however, contains very much which admits of accommodation with the doctrines of Gnosticism. In this discourse Tatian, like his teacher Justin, adopted from Philo the whole Platonic doctrine concerning matter, inconsistent as it was with a theory in which the doctrine of the creation from nothing was still maintained. It was this Platonic doctrine which swayed him to adopt also the hypothesis of an ungodlike spirit of life wedded to its kindred matter—a soul resisting the dictates of reason; and from this he derived the evil spirits, whom he describes as *πνεύματα ὑλικά*—inconsistent as this hypothesis also was with the Christian doctrine concerning the nature of evil spirits, and concerning the origin of evil. Even in this discourse he already advances a theory which, from Jewish theology, had early passed into Christian speculation, modifying it in many respects—that the human soul, like everything else formed out of and partaking of matter,† is by its own nature mortal; that the first man, living in communion with God, had within him a *principle of divine life* exalted above the nature of this soul which had been derived from matter, and that this is properly the image of God,‡ by virtue of which he was immortal. Having lost this image by sin, he became subject to matter and to mortality.

It is easy to see how these opinions, loosely strung together as they were in Tatian's system, would furnish a convenient stay for the Gnostic idea of the *ἔλλη*, and of the distinction between the *ψυχικόν* and the *πνευματικόν*, and how they would naturally result in an asceticism which should strive after an absolute estrangement from the things of sense.§ According to the report of Irenæus,|| Tatian formed a doctrine of *Æons* similar to that of the Valentinians; yet this point is not sufficient

\* His λόγος πρὸς Ἕλληνας.

† Α πνεῦμα ὑλικόν.

‡ Θεοῦ εἰκὼν καὶ ὁμοίωσις.

§ According to Irenæus, Tatian was the first to assert the condemnation of the first man; which indeed would agree with the above-mentioned distinction between the *ψυχικόν* and the *πνευματικόν* in the nature of the first man, he having lost the latter by sin. Lib. I. c. 28.

|| Comp. Clem. Strom. lib. III. f. 465, C.

of itself to warrant the conclusion that *his* system bore any affinity to the Valentinian. According to Clement of Alexandria,\* he belonged to the anti-Jewish Gnostics, and transferred St. Paul's statement of the contrariety between the old and the new man to the relation of the Old and New Testament; yet he might perhaps have expressed himself in this way even according to the Valentinian Gnosis, though it did not by any means suppose an absolute contrariety between the two economies. A remark too of Tatian's would seem to imply that he was far from entirely separating the Demiurge, the God of the Old Testament, from all connection with the higher world. He looked upon the expression in Genesis, "Let there be light" (and this instance may serve to illustrate his arbitrary mode of interpreting scripture), not as the commanding, creative word, but as the language of prayer. The Demiurge, seated on the dark chaos, prays that light may shine from above.† Tatian's fanatical asceticism, however, might perhaps warrant the conclusion that he drew a broader line of distinction between the creation of the Demiurge and the higher world, and consequently between the Old Testament and the New, than was admitted by the principles of the Valentinian school; for this practical repugnance to the creation of the Demiurge is usually connected with an opposition to it in theory.

Tatian acknowledged that the system of Christian morals must be derived from the contemplation of the life of Christ, and take its laws from thence. On this principle he wrote a work, in which he endeavoured to show how true perfection might be attained by the imitation of Christ.‡ Only he was deficient in a right understanding of the life of Christ in its completeness, and in its relation to His mission as the redeemer of mankind, and the author of a new creation of divine life, which, in the further course of its development from Him, was designed to embrace and pervade alike all human relations. Paying no regard to this, he held the life of celibacy and the renunciation of all worldly possessions, after the pattern of Christ, to be the essential mark of Christian perfection. But

\* L. c. f. 460, D.

† Theodot. Didascal. Anatol. f. 806.—Origenes de orat. c. 24.

‡ Περὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν σωτῆρα καταρτισμοῦ.



to such as appealed to the life of Christ considered in this light Clement of Alexandria replied, "The specific character by which Christ was distinguished from all other men did not allow of marriage in His case; that need of mutual completion which has its ground in the relation of the sexes found no place in Him. The only analogy in His case to the marriage estate is the relation He bears to the church, which is bound to Him as His bride. From Him, as the Son of God, no bodily issue could proceed." \* The strong bias of Tatian in this particular direction led him to understand the Apostle Paul, in 1 Cor. vii. 5, as teaching that marriage and unchastity were one and the same thing — both equally the service of Satan.† It is not improbable, too, that, besides the canonical gospels, he made use of apocryphal histories, in which the delineation of Christ had been modified under the influence of theosophical and ascetical modes of view.‡ As the tendency to theo-

\* Οὐκ ἴσασι τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ μὴ γῆμαι τὸν κύριον, πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἰδίαν νύμφην εἶχε τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἔπειτα δὲ οὐδὲ ἀνδρῶπος ἦν κοινός, ἵνα καὶ βοηθοῦ τινος κατὰ σάρκα διηθῇ, οὐδὲ τεκνοποιήσασθαι ἦν αὐτῷ ἀναγκαῖον, αἰδίως μένοντι καὶ μόνῳ υἱῷ Θεοῦ γεγενῆσθαι. Clem. Strom. lib. III. f. 446.

† St. Paul, he affirms, only ostensibly gives the permission in this place, and immediately shrinks from what he had permitted when he says that those who followed his permission would serve two masters; but that, by mutual continence and prayer, they would serve God, whereas by incontinence they would serve unchastity and Satan. Strom. l. III. f. 460. According to Eusebius, l. IV. c. 29, he was accused of attempting to garble and alter many expressions in the writings of St. Paul; but from the words of Eusebius, *τινὰς αὐτὸν μεταφράσαι φωνὰς, ὡς ἐπιδιορθοῦμενον αὐτῶν τὴν τῆς φράσεως σύνταξιν*, it is impossible to determine whether the alterations were made in favour of his own dogmatic and ethical principles, or whether they were changes from the Hebraistic into a purer Greek; and then the question arises whether Tatian actually allowed himself in the practice of such an arbitrary sort of criticism (which certainly is quite possible), or whether only he had in his possession certain readings varying from the received text, which, it was assumed as a matter of course, must be regarded as intentional falsifications.

‡ We should know something more on this point if Tatian's "*εὐαγγέλιον διὰ τεσσάρων*" were still extant. The old writers seem to have looked upon this work as a compendious harmony of the four gospels, Euseb. l. IV. c. 29; but it may be doubted whether Tatian really confined himself to our four canonical gospels, whether at least he did not make some use of several apocryphal gospels; since, according to Epiphanius (who we must admit is extremely vague), this collection possessed some resemblance to the *εὐαγγέλιον κατ' Ἑβραίους*. Theodoret found more than two hundred copies of this work in use within his Syrian diocese, and thought it his duty to withdraw them, probably because he found



sophical asceticism, which sprang up in the East, was now widely spread, it is nothing surprising if there were different kinds of *abstinent*\* sects, who had no special connection with Tatian, and who belonged in part to the Jewish and partly to the anti-Jewish party.†

### c. MARCION AND HIS SCHOOL.

In the Gnostics whom we lately considered we observe the *dualistic* element asserted chiefly on its practical side, on the side of ethics, while the speculative retires proportionally out of view. This is still more clearly apparent in the case of Marcion. He forms the natural close of this whole development, since he belongs to the Gnostics only in one respect. He stands on the boundary line between the predominantly speculative tendency of Gnosticism, and a paramount practical direction of mind diametrically opposed to speculation; so that, considered in this point of view, the Alexandrian theology, which is recognised by the catholic church,

them to contain much heretical matter. Theodoret. hæret. fab. I. 20. Tatian might also, on the ground of his peculiar Gnostic views concerning Christ, have contrived to omit those parts of the gospel which contain the genealogies, and all perhaps that related to Christ's nativity.

\* Ἐγκρατῖται, ἀποτακτικοί, ὕδροπαραστάται (because they made use of water only at the communion).

† Among these belonged Julius Cassianus, in whose doctrines we may recognise, perhaps, the lingering influence of the Alexandrian-Jewish theology; the εὐαγγέλιον κατ' Αἰγυπτίους being the source, indeed, whence he derived his knowledge of the gospel history. Regarding Adam as a symbol of the soul degraded from a state of heaven to the corporeal world, he made it the chief duty of man to gain the mastery over matter by means of ascetical austerities, and for this reason denied that Christ had appeared in the corporeal world. He was considered one of the leading men among the Docetæ. In his ἑξηγητικά he endeavoured, by means of an allegorical method of interpretation, to introduce his doctrines into the Old Testament. See Clem. Strom. lib. I. f. 320; lib. III. f. 465. The Severians, moreover, belong to a class which passes generally under the name of Encratites. They are said to have sprung from a certain Severus, and to have rejected the epistles of St. Paul and the Acts of the Apostles. Theodoret. hæret. fab. I. 21. Their hostility to the Apostle of the Gentiles might be considered, perhaps, as an indication of their origin from the Jewish-Christian party. This inference, however, is not unquestionable, since the peculiar spirit of their doctrine may have led them to that hostility.

has more affinity with Gnosticism than that of Marcion does. The *Christian* interest is more directly asserted by him than by any other of the Gnostics, because his whole character had a far deeper root in Christianity. Indeed the Christian principle constituted the ground-tone of his whole inner life, and of his whole mode of thinking in religion and theology. In the case of the other Gnostics, it was only one (although it was sometimes the predominant one), among many other spiritual tendencies, and was associated, moreover, with much that was of a wholly foreign character. It is instructive to observe how a tendency proceeding from the very heart of Christianity may, by its one-sided exclusiveness, be so presented as to adopt elements decidedly unchristian. It leaves upon our minds a sad impression of human weakness when, from the example of this remarkable man, we observe how a system excogitated by abstract speculation may be utterly inconsistent with all which moves and animates the inmost life of the man, and how, misunderstanding his own self, he caused others, who ought to have been bound to him by the fellowship of the same higher life, to misunderstand, to misjudge, and to condemn him; and those, too, the very persons who came nearest to him in the fundamental features of their mental character. This world, in which we know neither God, nor ourselves, nor each other, directly, but only through a glass by broken and refracted rays, is full of misunderstandings. What Marcion had in common with the Gnostics, and particularly with the last-mentioned class of them, consisted partly in the distinction he made between the God of nature and of the Old Testament and the God of the gospel, between the purely human and the purely divine generally, and partly in various speculative elements which he wrought into his religious system. At the same time it is evident that he had arrived at the principle which he held in common with them by a very different method. His idea of God he had first found in Christ, and then that glory of God which was revealed to him in Christ he was unable to find again anywhere in nature or in history. The speculative elements which he borrowed from other Gnostics were to him but expedient devices to fill up the chasm necessarily left in his system, which had been formed out of a bent of mind radically different and purely *practical*. It clearly was not his object,

as it was of the other Gnostics, to complete Christianity by the speculative results of other doctrinal systems; but the design he started with was simply to restore Christianity to its purity, which in his opinion had been corrupted by foreign additions. The one-sided position from which he started on this design was the occasion of most of his errors.

He did not make a secret traditional doctrine the source of this genuine Christianity. But neither was he willing to be confined to the *general tradition of the church*: for in this, according to his opinion, foreign elements had already become mingled with the pure apostolical Christianity. Taking his stand on the ground of positive Christianity (a position which so far is in the spirit of true Protestantism) he refused to admit that anything but the words of Christ and of his genuine disciples ought to be considered as the fountain-head of the true gospel. Unfortunately, however, instead of recognising the many phases of Christianity presented in the multiplicity of the organs chosen for its promulgation, he indulged in an arbitrary and one-sided distinction among them. His desire to adopt only the earliest records of pure original Christianity led him into historical and critical investigations which were foreign to the contemplative direction of mind peculiar to other Gnostics. But here also he affords a warning example of the facility with which such investigations, when overruled by preconceived dogmatic opinions in which the understanding has entangled itself, lead to disastrous results, and of the ease with which, in opposing a careless facility of belief, an arbitrary temper of hypercriticism may be formed, as well as of the readiness with which, while combating one class of doctrinal prejudices, we may fall into another.

The other Gnostics united with their theosophical idealism a mystical, allegorizing interpretation of the scriptures. Marcion, simple in heart, was decidedly opposed to this artificial method of interpretation. He was, on the other hand, a zealous advocate of the *literal interpretation* which prevailed among the antagonists of Gnosticism; and his example will serve to show how even this method of interpretation, unless it is united with other hermeneutical principles, and carried to an extreme, must lead to arbitrary conclusions.

The opposition between *πίστις* and *γνῶσις*, between an exoterical and an esoterical Christianity, was among the essen-



tial peculiarities of the other Gnostic systems ; but by Marcion, who adhered so closely to the practical Apostle St. Paul, no such opposition could possibly be allowed. To the merely outward and more truly Jewish than Christian notion of *πίστις*, which had found admission into the church, he opposed—not a self-conceited Gnosis, but the conception of *πίστις* itself apprehended according to the genuine sense of St. Paul. In his view *πίστις* was the common fountain of the divine life for all Christians. He knew of nothing higher than the *illumination which every* Christian ought to possess. What he recognised as genuine Christianity was to be recognised as such by all capable of receiving Christianity in any sense. He could allow of no other distinction than that between the riper Christians and those that still needed to be instructed in Christian principles (the catechumens).

In a twofold respect Marcion is a phenomenon of high import in the history of the whole world. In the first place, he stands a living monument of the impression which Christianity, as something wholly new and supernaturally divine, produced on men of profound minds. We see in what light Christianity appeared to such a person, from the point of view of his age, and relatively to all that had proceeded from the previous development of mankind. It is a fact which here speaks to us. In the next place, the great significance of Marcion consists in this—that we perceive in him the first symptoms of a reaction necessary in the course of the historical evolution,—a reaction of the Pauline type of doctrine, reclaiming its rightful authority against the strong leaning of the church to the side of St. James and St. Peter—a reaction of the Christian consciousness, reasserting the independence acquired for it by the labours of St. Paul against a new combination of Jewish and Christian elements—a reaction of the protestant spirit against the so-called catholic element now swelling in the bud. At its first appearance, this reaction, by following out its opposition too exclusively, might easily be led wrong. It was needful that various *momenta* should be evolved, before the reaction could be a pure one, clear in itself, and therefore certain of the victory. As Marcion gives us the picture of St. Paul, not in all the harmonious *many-sidedness* of his great mind, but only in a single aspect of it, we consequently find in Marcion the irresistible ardour, but not the



calm prudence,—the practical, but not the dialectic spirit of Paul; we find in him the acuteness and perspicacity which distinguished the apostle in discerning and setting forth opposites, but not the conciliatory wisdom for which the apostle was no less eminent. We shall now endeavour to paint the character of Marcion in its connection with that stage of development the church had arrived at in his time. Unfortunately we are devoid of adequate information as to the genetical process by which his mental character was formed. This deficiency we must endeavour to supply by the aid of historical combination.

Marcion was born at Sinope, in Pontus, near the beginning of the second century. According to one report,\* which is not, however, beyond all doubt, his father was bishop of the church in Sinope. In this country there were beyond question families, even thus early, in which Christianity had been handed down from parents to children; so that Marcion might have been led to the Christian faith through a Christian education; yet, even supposing that his father was a bishop, it would not necessarily follow that this was the fact. He speaks of the “ardour of his first faith,” † words which seem to refer to the first glow of a new convert. ‡ Perhaps he belonged to the number of those who were first brought to the faith, not by the tradition of the church, but by their own study of the written word. And as he appropriated Christianity in a way somewhat independent of tradition, so in the subsequent development of his Christian views he ever pursued this independent direction, and refused to submit to any human tradition. Perhaps it was the majesty of

\* In Epiphanius, and in the later additions to Tertullian’s *Præscriptiones*. It does excite some doubt to find that Tertullian has made no use against Marcion of this fact, of his having abandoned the catholic church in which his father was a bishop. The silence of Tertullian, who had been at great pains to inform himself of all the particulars of Marcion’s life, on a point which he had so much occasion to speak of, leads to a suspicion of the correctness of Epiphanius’ report, who contrasts the heresy of the son with the orthodoxy and piety of his father. Yet it does not oblige us to reject the account.

† *Primus calor fidei*.

‡ Although we grant that this might also be said in the first ardour of pious feeling by a person who had been educated in Christianity, especially in this period, when the baptism of infants was not practised, yet the other is the most obvious construction.

Christ, as it shone upon him in the contemplation of His life and the study of His words, that attracted Him to Christianity. And the Pauline type of doctrine, which most completely harmonized with his tone of mind, may have been the form in which he first learned to understand Christianity, and which chained his spirit once for all. In this manner, the peculiar shape which the Christian faith assumed in his case may have been determined from the beginning.

Like many others, he felt constrained by the ardour of his first Christian love to renounce every earthly possession. He presented to the church a considerable sum of money, and began a life of rigid abstinence, as a “continens” or ἀσκητής.\* His contempt of nature, which, proceeding from a false notion of the contrariety between the natural and the divine, was at first simply *practical* and *ascetical*, might lead a man of his enthusiastic prepossessions and strong antipathies to carry out theoretically a broad distinction and separation between the God of nature and the God of the gospel. The contemplation of this period brings before us minds of the most opposite stamp—those that were for combining all things, for blending together elements the most heterogeneous, and those again who everywhere saw nothing else but oppositions, and knew of no means to reconcile them. To the latter class belonged Marcion. The consciousness of redemption formed the ground-tone of his religious life,—the fact of redemption he regarded as the central point of Christianity. But as it is only through numberless stages of transition and intermediate points that everything can ultimately be referred to this as the central point,—as the whole development of the world in history and nature were therein to be reduced to unity,—the impatient Marcion, who was averse to all gradual measures and intermediate steps, who was for having everything alike complete and at once, could not so understand it. Tertullian aptly characterizes him when he says, “While in the Creator’s uni-

\* See above. Pecuniam in primo calore fidei ecclesiæ contulit. Tertullian. adv. Marcion, l. IV. c. c. It amounted to two hundred sesteritia. See Tertullian. præscript. c. 30. Epiphanius, in calling Marcion a μονάζων (recluse) only confounds the relations of his own time with those of an earlier period. We must consider the μονάζων as equivalent to the ἀσκητής. Ephraem Syrus accuses Marcion of acquiring by his asceticism a deceptive show of sanctity. Opp. Eph. Syr. lat. Sermo I. f. 438 seq.

verse all things occur in the order of a gradual development, each in its proper place, with Marcion, on the other hand, everything is sudden."\* To his heart, filled and glowing with the image of the God of mercy and compassion, who had appeared in Christ, Nature appeared as something wholly inconsistent with the way in which this God had revealed himself to him in his soul. In history too, Marcion, possessed with the majesty of the gospel, could find no trace of the God that had there revealed Himself to him; and to the demon world of heathenism he, like so many other zealous Christians, looked back only with horror and aversion—he saw nothing there but the *kingdom of Satan*. The same mental tendency which made it impossible for him to recognise in nature the God of the gospel, allowed him to see nothing but contrariety, no fundamental unity, between the Old Testament and the New. The jealous God of the Old Testament, inexorably severe, and the God of the gospel, whose essence is simply love—the Messiah of the world, with his worldly kingdom, and Christ, who declined all earthly power and glory, and would not found a kingdom of this world—seemed to him irreconcilable. We must here consider the alternatives, none of which could satisfy his mind, between which Marcion was placed. On the one side were those half-educated Christians who, by their grossly literal interpretations of the Old Testament, framed to themselves the most unworthy notions of God; † on the other side were those who contrived, by artificial and allegorising expositions, to introduce into the Old Testament the whole system of Christian truth. But the very simplicity of Marcion's character naturally made him an enemy of that allegorical interpretation of the Bible, and he consequently opposed to it one which adhered uniformly to the literal sense.

A man of Marcion's mind and disposition would be easily impelled, in combating one erroneous extreme, to fall into the opposite one. And so it happened with him in the contest

\* Sic (subito) sunt omnia apud Marcionem, quæ suum et plenum habent ordinem apud creatorem. Lib. IV. c. 11.

† As Origen says: Οἱ ἀκραιότεροι τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκκλησίας αἰχλύντων συγχάνειν, τοῦ μὲν δημιουργοῦ μίζονα οὐδὲνα ὑπεκλήφασιν, τοιαῦτα δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσι περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅποια οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ ἁμοτάτου καὶ ἀδικωτάτου ἀνθρώπου. De princ. l. IV. s. 8.



with that Chiliastic, material tendency of mind, confounding the Jewish with the Christian element, which he found so generally diffused in Asia Minor. In the churches of Asia Minor he believed it impossible to recognise the genuine Christianity which had been preached to them by the Apostle St. Paul. Accordingly this conviction may have given rise to purify Christianity from the foreign Jewish elements with which it had been mixed, and to restore it to its primitive form. From this spirit of opposition it may have been that he conceived a prejudice against the conciliatory course which had originated with the labours of St. John in Asia Minor. Perhaps he had attached himself to some ultra-Pauline element which had already manifested itself in opposition to the Apostle St. John.\* And so step by step he was continually driven to place the Old and the New Testament in sharper antagonism to each other.

This peculiar dogmatic tendency of Marcion's mind was probably the occasion of his being excommunicated from the church at Sinope.† He now hoped to find in the Roman church, to which he betook himself, a better reception, both on account of its origin, as derived from St. Paul, and its original Pauline character, and on account of a prevailing anti-Judaizing tendency,‡ which in many respects still existed in it. If the statement of Epiphanius is well founded, he proposed a question to the Roman clergy as to the explanation of Matthew ix. 17, with a view to draw from their own lips the

\* See my *Age of the Apostles*, vol. II. p. 558.

† The statement in the spurious additions to Tertullian's *Prescriptions*, in Epiphanius and Esnig, that Marcion was excommunicated from the church for unchastity, is undoubtedly an invention of odium hereticale. Had anything of the kind got abroad in Tertullian's day, even in the form of a rumour, he certainly, to judge of his usual practice, would not have passed it over without notice. On the contrary,—what may be considered the most decided testimony against the truth of this statement,—he contrasts Marcion's disciple, Apelles, on the score of his unchastity, with his rigid master. Tertull. *Præscript.* c. 30. Although the Armenian bishop Esnig, of the fifth century, (whose account of Marcion has been made known by Prof. Neumann, in a German translation, in Ilgen's *Zeitschrift für historische Theologie*, Bd. IV. J. 1834, 1 St.), is a more credible authority for all that relates to Marcion's doctrine, which he probably drew from the latter's own writings, yet in his outline of Marcion's life he follows the less authentic narratives of the writers belonging to his own age.

‡ See above, in the history of public worship.



confession that men could not pour the new wine of Christianity into the old bottle of Judaism without spoiling it. But at Rome, too, his Dualistic view of divine revelation could not fail to meet with opposition, since the acknowledgment of one God, and of one divine revelation in the Old and New Testaments, belonged to the essential doctrine of the universal church. Rejected by the church at Rome, he was driven to give his anti-church tendency the finished shape of a self-consistent system, and to found an independent church. Hitherto his system had only a *practical* basis;—the conviction that Christianity had appeared as something entirely new, unexpected, and undreamt of in humanity; that it had imparted to it a divine life, to which nothing in human nature had up to that time borne any affinity; that the God who was manifest in Christ had before revealed Himself neither in nature, nor in reason, nor in the Old Testament; that nothing witnessed of him; nothing was his work but Christianity alone;—such was the foundation on which Marcion proceeded to build. The God who had revealed himself in Christ was in his view altogether different from the Spirit which had hitherto ruled in the world; and wherever Christianity found admittance, the latter was in all cases to be displaced from his throne to make room for a higher Spirit. Accordingly Marcion was compelled to distinguish from that God hitherto unknown to the world, the God of the world and of the Old Testament, and his angels with him. Profoundly studying, with this direction of ideas, the epistles of his favourite apostle, St. Paul, he might easily believe that he found confirmation of these ideas when he read of a God of this world, of the princes of this world (*ἀρχόντες τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου*), who, if they had known him, would not have surrendered up the Lord of glory to the death of the cross—of the *ἀρχαῖς* and *ἐξουσίαις*, whom Christ vanquished by his crucifixion. And it is quite explicable how, by reason of the truth which lay at the root of them, these ideas exercised a powerful influence over his mind. The ruling spirit of the ante-Christian world, so far as that world was not wholly given to evil, was to Marcion's mind objectively presented and personified in the Demiurge. This being could not understand the new divine principle which through Christ was brought into the world. The hidden glory in Christ's appearance was something strange

to him. He must inflict death on the being who had come to destroy his kingdom; but this very death was to bring about the dethronement of this Spirit of the World. The idea of matter, as the source of all lusts and passions, was one of the current notions of his times. It does, therefore, in fact, easily admit of explanation how, amidst the intellectual atmosphere of this period, Marcion, without any connection whatever with the Gnostic sects, might have been led to form his system out of his own peculiar Christian convictions. Nevertheless, although, for the reasons already hinted at, we cannot think that the influence of those sects on his mode of thinking was very great, we are not disposed to deny, what the ancients unanimously affirm, that at Rome he attached himself to a teacher from Antioch of the name of *Cerdo*, who held to the purely Dualistic Gnosis, and borrowed much from him for the completion of his dogmatic system.

The essential character of Marcion's mind would make him labour more earnestly and assiduously than other Gnostics in the propagation of his principles. For while others believed it impossible to communicate their higher knowledge to any save a small number of Christians, the *spiritual men*, Marcion, on the other hand, was convinced that his doctrine was no other than the primitive Christian one, which was to come to all men. He must have felt himself constrained to communicate to all Christians the light of truth which had fallen to his own share. Hence he made frequent journeys, and spent his life in an uninterrupted series of conflicts with heathens and with Christians. To be hated, and to suffer, he looked upon as the destination of every Christian. "Fellow objects of hate, and fellow-sufferers" (*συμμισούμενοι καὶ συνταλαίπωροι*), was his common form of salutation to his brethren in the faith.\* He was, perhaps, residing in Rome when the aged bishop Polycarp of Smyrna came on a visit to the Roman bishop Anicetus.† Marcion, who probably in his youth had enjoyed the friendship of Polycarp, and now saw him again after many years, went to him and addressed him in these words: "Dost thou remember me, Polycarp?" But the old man, otherwise so amiable, could not extend his love to the enemies of the gospel; and as such Marcion

\* Tertull. c. M. l. IV. c. 36; l. IV. c. 9.

† See vol. I. p. 413.

appeared to him, for he was unable to discern the Christian element which lay at the root of his very errors.\* He is said to have replied to him, "Yes, I remember thee, the first-born of Satan." Tertullian relates† that Marcion testified at last his repentance for the schism which he had occasioned, and desired to be restored to the fellowship of the church; that this request was granted on the condition that he should bring back to the church those whom he had led astray, but that his premature death prevented the fulfilment of this condition. But the testimony of Tertullian in matters of this sort is not of sufficient weight to establish the truth of this report. It is very possible that he adopted the story on the credit of some rumour not very well founded. It was what men would most desire that the heretic should in the end repent of his defection from the church, and yearn for readmission to its bosom. But as the continuance of the breach which Marcion had made was a fact testifying against this supposition, some legend was necessary to reconcile the discrepancy. Marcion was too clearly conscious of an opposition in principle between himself and the church to allow of our believing the story without better warranty for its truth. And yet there must have been some ground for such things being said of Marcion in particular, and not of the other Gnostics. If no conciliatory expression of Marcion's gave occasion to the statement, its remote cause must at any rate be sought in a conviction, glimmering through even the blinding influence of polemical hatred, that this man stood in a very different relation to Christianity and to the Christian church from that of the other Gnostics;—that he was connected with both by a tie which could not be sundered by any power of intellectual error.

It now remains for us to enter into a detailed examination of Marcion's system in its later and complete development. In its fundamental principles it coincided with the other Gnostic systems of the last-mentioned class, but with this single difference—that everything is viewed by him on its *practical* rather than on its *speculative* side, and that the latter element is with him a matter of inferior interest. He assumed three fundamental principles: 1. An  $\epsilon\lambda\eta$  existing from eternity.

\* Iren. l. III. c. 3, s. 4.

† Præscript. c. 30.

2. The perfect, almighty, and holy God,—the God who is eternal love ; the Good, ὁ ἀγαθός, who alone is properly to be named God ; who, by virtue of his holy nature, is incapable of entering into any contact whatever with matter ; creates, only by communication of himself, a life in affinity with himself, but does not form it from without. 3. The Demiurge, a subordinate being of limited power, intermediate between good and evil, who is named God in an improper sense only, (as the divine title is just transferred to other beings in Ps. 62),\* who is in a constant conflict with matter, seeking to conquer and to fashion it according to his own ideas, but never able wholly to overcome its resistance.† Matter, with regard to which he adopted the common ideas, was regarded by him as the stuff furnished for the creative might of the Demiurge ; the female potency in relation to the latter.‡ He described it also as the power or the essence of the earth. Out of that part of it however which resisted the formative might and the dominion of the Demiurge, proceeds evil, a wild, ungodlike impulse. All this is concentrated in Satan. The distinction between true moral perfection, which consists in love or goodness, whose essence it is only to communicate itself, only to bless, to make happy, to redeem—and mere justice, which metes out everything by desert, rewards and punishes, requitēs good with good and evil with evil, which gives birth to mere outward discipline, can communicate no power of moral enthusiasm,—this was Marcion's great *practical* and fundamental idea, which formed the nucleus of his whole theory. But between love and a justice which revealed itself in punishment he found no means of reconciliation. While he gave an exclusive prominence to the love of God, the revelation of which in the gospel had penetrated his whole soul, he allowed all the other divine attributes to retire out of view. Seeking only to insist upon that which belonged peculiarly to Christianity, but rending it from its connection with its groundwork of the Old Testament, he determined to know nothing at all of a retribution grounded in the holiness of God, of God's righteous anger ; he lost sight of that which belongs to the essential distinctions between the theistic position of Christianity and that of

\* Clem. Strom. lib. III. f. 431. Tertull. c. M. lib. I. c. 7-15.

† Ephr. Syr. Orat. XIV. f. 468, D.

‡ See Esnig, l. c. p. 72.



the old Nature-religion. And as he comprised in the notion of justice (thus severed from all connection with the other divine attributes) all those marks which he believed might be derived from the Old Testament, as characteristic of the Demiurge, that notion itself became to him an inconsistent and self-contradictory one. The inner coherence and consistency was ever in his case more in the *heart* than in the *head*.

Vague and indefinite also, to judge from the accounts that are extant, appears Marcion's conception of the relation between the Demiurge and the perfect God,\* in respect to the origin of the former. As we find among the other Gnostics only *Dualistic* systems—none which assumed *three principles, wholly independent in their origin*—it seems most natural to conclude that Marcion also derived the imperfect Demiurge through a series of evolutions from the perfect God; a course which, as a consistent thinker, he must have felt himself constrained to adopt by his own fundamental principles. Yet it is singular that no one of Marcion's opponents gives any information as to the method by which he connected the one with the other, although, in speaking of the systems of other Gnostics, this is a point which they never fail to notice. We must infer, then, that in his writings he did not himself express any opinion on this subject. In fact, there was in his system—another circumstance whereby he was distinguished from other Gnostics—a want of a doctrine of emanation, which must necessarily be presupposed in order to such a mediation and derivation.† The predominantly practical interest, the unspeculative and unsystematic spirit of Marcion, will perhaps account for these *lacunæ*.

The point of practical importance with Marcion was, in short, to assert the absolute newness of the *creation* by Christianity; to sever every thread of connection between it and the world as it had subsisted before. And thus it became impossible for him to apprehend in its true significancy this new creation itself, since it can be understood only as a restora-

\* The church teacher, Rhodon (Euseb. l. V. c. 13), says that Marcion supposed only two principles, δύο ἀρχαί. Esnig, however, ascribes to him a Triarchy.

† That nothing akin to the emanation system of other Gnostics is to be found in Marcion seems to follow from the remarks of Tertullian, c. Marcion, lib. I. c. 5.

tion and fulfilment of the original one. And this is the source of the defects of his moral system.

The Demiurge of Marcion does not work after the pattern of higher ideas, of which, though unconsciously, or even against his will, he is the organ; but he is the absolutely independent, self-subsistent creator of an imperfect world, answering to his own finite nature. To this world Marcion assigned also the nature of man, in which he did not, with the other Gnostics, acknowledge the existence of any higher element. The Demiurge — so he taught — created man, his highest work, after his own image, to represent and reveal himself. Man's body he formed of matter — hence his evil desires: to this body he gave a soul in affinity with himself and derived from his own essence. He gave him a law as a trial of his obedience, with a view either to reward or to punish him, according to his deserts. But the limited Demiurge was unable to give to man a godlike principle of life, capable of overcoming evil. Man yielded to the seductions of sinful lust, and thus with his whole race became subject to the dominion of matter and of the evil spirits which sprang out of it. From the whole race of fallen humanity the Demiurge selected only *one people* to be under his special guidance: to this people, the Jews, he made a special revelation of himself, and gave a religious polity answering to *his own* essence and character; consisting, on the *one* hand, of a ceremonial worship attached to external rites — on the *other*, of an imperative but defective system of morals, without any inner godlike life, without power to sanctify the heart, without the spirit of love. Those who faithfully observed this religious law he rewarded by conveying them at death to a state of happiness suited to their limited natures, in the society of their pious forefathers.\* But all who suffered themselves to be seduced by the enticements of the  $\epsilon\lambda\eta$  to disobey the Demiurge, and all who abandoned themselves to idolatry — a system to be traced to the influence of this  $\epsilon\lambda\eta$  — he cast down into perdition.†

Not powerful enough to make his people supreme and to extend his kingdom over the whole earth, the Demiurge promised them a Redeemer, a Messiah, by whose means he hoped,

\* Apud inferos, in sinu Abrahami. Tertull. c. M. lib. III. c. 24. Clem. Strom. lib. V. f. 546.

† See Esnig, l. c. p. 74.

in conflict with the hostile powers of the *ὑλη*, finally to accomplish this end, to gather all the Jews from their dispersion, to bring the heathens and sinners to a strict judgment, and conduct his own people to the peaceful enjoyment of all earthly felicity in a kingdom embracing the whole world. But the perfect God, whose essence is mercy and love, could not suffer this severe sentence to be executed on men whose fall was owing to nothing but their inherent weakness. It is not consonant with his character to wait, like the Demiurge, for merit, but out of his own free love he pities those who are alienated from him and lost. He does not begin with giving a law, and making man's destiny depend on his observance or disobedience of it, but he reveals and communicates himself to all who are willing to enter into fellowship with him as the fountain of divine life and blessedness. The appearance of Christ was the *self-manifestation*\* of the Supreme God, till then altogether hidden from this lower creation.

According to the earlier accounts of Marcion's doctrine, we might suppose that he represented the Supreme God himself as appearing without any mediator in the kingdom of the Demiurge, or upon the earth. If so, he probably had adopted himself the theory, so widely diffused in Asia Minor, of the Patripassionists,† in which form, too, he perhaps first received the doctrine of Christ. This theory was exactly suited to his predominantly practical tendency, to the element of Christian feeling which in his case prevailed over every other. Pervaded by the conviction that Christianity was nothing else than the communication of the Supreme God himself, that in Christ men have God himself immediately, the theory of subordination in the church doctrine of the Logos might be offensive to him. In this peculiar tendency, then, of his doctrine concerning Christ to simplification, he would, as in many other essential points, differ from the other Gnostics, whose speculation tended to multiply the hypostases. The illegitimate conception that God the Father manifested Himself immediately in a human body might easily pass into the notion that this manifestation was merely in appearance. But however much this inference may be supported by the

\* Tertull. c. M. lib. I. c. 11.

† Concerning whom we shall speak further in the section relating to the formation of church doctrine.

accounts which formerly were the only ones known,\* we cannot any longer venture to hold it now that Bishop Esnig's account has been communicated to the world. For, according to this, Marcion expressly distinguished Jesus, as the Son sent down from the heaven of the Supreme God, from the latter as his Father. And to this distinction Marcion must in truth have been also led by the authority of him who, in his estimation, was the only apostle.

Marcion's Docetism was not grounded solely in the view he entertained of matter, but was also closely connected with the whole essence and spirit of his dogmatic system. According to this Christianity necessarily made its appearance of a sudden, as an unprepared fragment, having no connection with aught besides; with him, in fact, all of it was *sudden*. His gospel began with the Son of God coming down, in the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius, to the city of Capernaum, and forthwith appearing as a public teacher.†

Jesus, therefore, was not, according to Marcion's theory, the *Messiah, promised through the prophets by the Demiurge*, since, indeed, he wanted many of the tokens of the Messiah contained in the prophetic writings; while, on the other hand, all that *was* peculiar in his character and conduct was in no wise to be found among the characteristic traits of the Messiah announced by the prophets. Marcion attempted to exhibit in detail the contrast between Christ as he is represented in the gospel history, and the Christ of the Old Testament. And herein we see how deeply Christ's image had imprinted itself on his warm heart; but he fell into error by requiring that the type presented to the prophetic vision under a temporal drapery should correspond exactly to the reality of the manifestation. According to Marcion, therefore, when Jesus called himself the Messiah, it was only in *accommodation* to the Jews, from a wish to meet their prejudices and to gain their confidence by adopting some well-known form, to which he would afterwards give a higher meaning.‡

\* Even when Tertullian (lib. I. c. 19) says in the sense of Marcion, concerning Jesus, *Descendit de cœlo spiritus salutaris*, a distinction is implied between the redeeming Spirit and the Supreme God.

† Tertull. c. M. lib. IV. c. 17.

‡ Ut per solenne apud eos et familiare nomen irreperet in Judæorum fidem. L. c. lib. III. c. 15.



Vainly to labour to bestow the greatest benefits on men who were wholly alien from him was the characteristic of his whole life. That Docetism was far from denying the reality of the works done by Christ appears from the importance which Marcion attached to Christ's miracles, as acts of His succouring love and signs of His power over the kingdom of the Demiurge. He represents the Supreme God saying to his Son, when He sent him down to men, "Heal their wounds, bring their dead back to life, make their blind to see, accomplish among them the greatest cures without reward." \* The characteristic mark which distinguished the miracles of Christ from those of the prophets consisted, according to Marcion, in this—that, to compass such effects, he needed no instrumental matter, borrowed from the kingdom of the Demiurge, but was able to do all by his word and his will alone—a proof this of His superiority over the kingdom of the Demiurge.† Christ required no prophecies to confirm his divine mission; his self-manifestation by godlike actions above the power of the Demiurge to accomplish was an evidence which rendered all else superfluous. ‡

But as he only required an humble reception of the higher element which he came to bestow on men, he naturally met with a readier reception among heathens, pressed by a sense of their own wretchedness, than among the men who were content with their state of imperfection in the kingdom of the Demiurge. As to the Demiurge himself, who saw in Jesus only the Messiah promised by himself, who, like the Jews, held him to be a man like all other men—he looked upon him as his own instrument. He must therefore have been the more exasperated when he found himself deceived in his expectations, and saw him performing works which so far exceeded his own power, especially as he could not fail to

\* See Esnig, l. c. p. 74.

† In his *Antitheses*, the work where Marcion treated of the opposition between the Old and New Testaments, this remark occurred: *Heli-sæum materia eguisse, aquam adhibuisse, et eam septies; Christum vero verbo solo et hoc semel functum curationem statim repræsentasse.* Tertull. c. M. lib. IV. c. 9. As Christ healed the ten lepers, *sine tactu et sine verbo, tacita potestate et sola voluntate.* L. c. c. 35.

‡ *Non fuit ordo ejusmodi (preparation by means of prophecy) necessarius, quia statim se et filium et missum et Dei Christum rebus ipsis esset probaturus per documenta virtutum.* L. c. lib. III. c. 3.

perceive how men would be seduced by this Jesus to revolt against his law ; in short that he threatened to destroy that very kingdom whose interests he was to have promoted. He therefore caused him to be crucified by those whom he employed to execute his purposes.

The heart of Marcion could not fail to be touched by the idea of a love that suffered, and conquered through suffering—so great importance did he find the writings of his own Apostle St. Paul, attaching to the mediatorial sufferings of Christ. This, however, did not harmonize well with his Docetism. Although, therefore, he could not, according to that theory, ascribe any real suffering to Christ, he yet laboured to show how this very delusion, designed with reference to the Demiurge, conduced to the accomplishment of the saving purposes of the Supreme God.

While the church taught that Satan deceived himself, and saw his own power destroyed in consequence of his supposing Jesus to be subject, like other men, to death, Marcion simply substituted the Demiurge for Satan. We have already remarked how he may have fancied that he could find some confirmation of this view in the words of the Apostle St. Paul. Moreover, he received from catholic tradition the article of the *descensus Christi ad inferos*, and to this perhaps he referred the words in St. Paul's epistle to the Laodiceans (Ephesians), iv. 9. But his aversion to the Jews and preference of the Gentiles led him to give to this doctrine also another turn, so as to make it harmonize with his own system.

The Demiurge wished to consign to hell him whom he placed in the same class with all others that had revolted from his empire, but here also he found himself deceived. Christ descended there for the purpose of taking to himself the poor Gentiles whom the Demiurge had condemned to everlasting punishment. Finding them possessed of the faith which he had not been able to find among the self-righteous Jews, he released them from the power by which they had hitherto been held in bondage, and raised them along with himself to the Father of love in the third heaven.\* By this the wrath of the Demiurge was excited afresh ; “he eclipsed his sun, and veiled his world in darkness”—an allusion, perhaps, to the phenomena which took place at the death of Jesus.

\* Vid. Iren. lib. I. c. 27, s. 2; cfr. lib. I. c. 24. Esnig, l. c. p. 74.

Then Christ revealed himself to the Demiurge in his true form, and divine essence. Compelling the latter to acknowledge a higher God above himself, he brought him to a consciousness of his own guilt, in violating his own laws, and shedding the blood of an innocent person, who had shown to his creatures nothing but benevolence. Therefore the Demiurge must bow before a higher power.

It seems (although it is a point which cannot be determined with certainty) that Marcion taught that the Messianic predictions of the Old Testament would still be actually accomplished in behalf of the believers in the Demiurge. The Messiah promised by the Demiurge would yet appear and bring to a rigid judgment those who had not been freed from his power by faith in the higher Christ, and awakening those who had died Righteous according to the Old Testament, would unite them all in a millennial reign of earthly felicity. The *eternal heavenly kingdom* to which the Christians belonged would then form the direct antithesis to this perishable, *earthly kingdom*. The souls of Christians would lay aside their gross bodies, as the bird rises out of the egg, as the seed casts off its shell or leaves its husk behind in the earth, and lifts itself in freedom to the daylight, or as the ripe fruit drops from the stem.\* The God of love does not punish; those, however, who refuse to accept the proffered fellowship with him will fall under the power of the Demiurge and his avenging justice.† Whoever, on the other hand, enters into fellowship with the Father, through faith in the Son of God, becomes partaker even on earth of a divine life superior to the power of the Demiurge and of the Hyle. For him there is no longer any judgment. Delivered from the power of the Demiurge, he is under the special protection of the God of love. Plotinus, in his work against the Gnostics, censures, among others, those who maintained a *προνοία* of the Supreme God which extended to themselves but not to the whole world. We are not of opinion ‡ that he had the Marcionites particularly in view here, but we must at least suppose such a doctrine in the case of Marcion. From the whole context of Marcion's ideas

\* Tert. c. M. l. III. c. 3, 4, et 24; l. IV. c. 29. Ephr. Syr. Orat. CII. 6, f. 551 et 552.

† Abjuncti, ab igne creatoris deprehenduntur. Tertull. c. M. l. I. c. 28.

‡ See above, p. 34, &c.

resulted the antithesis between those who remained subject to the Demiurge's government, and those who, released from his power, become objects of the providential care of the Supreme God, whom He trains for His kingdom, with whom all things shall work together for good, and conduct them onward to the end for which eternal love has destined them. Providence, both *general* and *special*, Marcion must have attributed to the Demiurge. But it was that providence alone which has been designated by the term *providentia specialissima* that he could attribute to the Supreme God in reference to his elect.

A dogmatical system like Marcion's, in which the antithesis between *law* and *gospel* was thus expressed, could not fail to be followed by a pregnant system of morals. Accordingly he made this distinction between the two—that the *former*, by its precepts, could not confer on man any true, inward sanctification—any power to obtain the victory over sin; while the *latter*, by faith, brought man into such union with the fountain of divine life as must necessarily manifest itself by a triumph over sin and by holiness of living. Even Marcion's warmest opponents, who raked together everything bad which could be imputed to him, and who refused to acknowledge the essential difference between his system and all other forms of Gnosticism, could not deny that the Marcionites entirely differed in their moral conduct from the Gnostic Antinomians—that, for example, in their abhorrence of the heathen games and pastimes \* they came fully up to the standard of the most rigid Christians. While many Gnostics, who held an accommodation to prevailing errors to be allowable, and taught that no importance was to be attached to externals, found no difficulty in evading the obligation to become martyrs, the Marcionites, on the other hand, felt themselves undoubtedly bound to bear witness to Christianity, the dearest object of their hearts.† We have, in our previous remarks, alluded to the inevitable defect in Marcion's system of morals, which had its ground in his peculiar doctrine of the creation and the origin of man. The ascetical mode of life which he had adopted still earlier, when he was a member of the catholic

\* Tertull. c. M. l. I. c. 28.

† See, e. g., Euseb. l. IV. c. 15; l. VII. c. 12. De Martyr. Palæstin. c. 10.



church, and in which, as we observed above, his system found a natural point of attraction, was now again still further promoted by the mature and perfect doctrines of his system. He held that the mode of life which, in the catholic church, was followed only by a particular class of ascetics, belonged to the *essence* of genuine Christianity; Christians should lead, even here on the earth, a heavenly life, pure from all the contaminations of matter. Whoever is as yet incapable of leading such a life must remain in the class of catechumens, and could not yet be admitted to baptism.\*

Marcion, there is no doubt, regarded S. Paul as the only genuine apostle—the only one who had remained true to his calling. He taught that Christ, after revealing himself in his divine character to the Demiurge, and compelling him to acknowledge a higher power, manifested himself to S. Paul (referring doubtless to that revelation of Christ to the apostle of which the latter himself testifies), and commissioned him to preach the gospel.† All the scriptures of the New Testament except the epistles of S. Paul were rejected by him; not because he supposed that they had been interpolated at a later period, but because he did not acknowledge their authors to be genuine teachers of Christianity. Besides the epistles of S. Paul, he made use of a pretended original gospel, which he asserted was the record of the evangelical history cited and used by Paul himself.‡ All the other gospels he traced to those corrupters of the gospel against whom S. Paul himself had warned men. § But here we must not lose sight of the fact that it was the older apostles themselves that Marcion regarded as such corrupters. As he supposed in every part of the church a corruption of the primitive truth, and the image of these Judaizing corrupters haunted him like a ghost,

\* Tertull. c. M. lib. I. c. 34: Quomodo nuptias dirimis? nec conjungens marem et feminam, nec alibi conjunctos ad sacramentum baptismatis et eucharistiæ admittens, nisi inter se conjuraverint adversus fructum nuptiarum.

† See Esnig, l. c. p. 75.

‡ Perhaps in the apostolical churches of Asia Minor there still lived a remembrance of such an evangelical collection which St. Paul had brought with him.

§ See Tertull. c. M. lib. IV. c. 2 et 3. Origenes in Joann. T. V. s. 4 V. Dialog. de recta in Deum fide in Orig. opp. ed. de la Rue. T. I. f. 807.

he required that even those religious records whose authority he acknowledged in common with the church should first be restored to their original state by a critical process of his own, which should purge them of every element of Judaism. What he pretended was the original gospel, used by the Apostle Paul, seems to have been a mutilated copy of the gospel according to S. Luke.\* His critical expurgation does not seem to have been very consistently carried out, many things being allowed to remain which could only be brought into harmony with Marcion's system by resorting to a tortuous exegesis, which the prevailing ignorance of the right principles of interpretation alone rendered possible.

### THE MARCIONITES.

Marcion differed from other Gnostics in this respect also—that while the latter (as Clement of Alexandria has said of them) endeavoured to found schools only,† he, on the other hand, wished to establish a church, a community. To restore the primitive church designed by Christ and founded by the Apostle S. Paul was the aim of his life. And being rejected by every branch of the catholic church, he was compelled, in preaching what he considered the pure doctrine of Christ, to found communities of his own.‡ The generally intelligible and practical character of Marcion's doctrines, the zeal with which these principles were promulgated, may have given this sect a wider diffusion than any other. Very soon, however, differences of opinion necessarily began to manifest themselves within it.

While, in the case of the other Gnostics, their arbitrary fictions and great variety of speculations furnished occasion for the later disciples to depart in many respects from the doctrines of their first masters, so, on the other hand, the predominantly practical tendency of Marcion's system, with its poverty

\* Detailed investigations into Marcion's canon of the New Testament would be out of place here. On this subject the learned and ingenious inquiries of my friends Hahn and Olshausen may be consulted, as also my Genetic development of the Gnostic systems. On Marcion's gospel, see Thilo's edition of the Apocryphal writings of the New Testament, T. I.

† Διατριβαί.

‡ Concerning the ecclesiæ, which were founded by Marcion or his disciples, cons. Tertull. c. M. lib. IV. c. 5.

of speculation compared with the other Gnostic systems, was the source of changes which his followers introduced, who were not so exclusively governed as he was himself by the practical interest. In order to supply the defects which many of them thought they detected in the system, they adopted elements from other Gnostic systems altogether unsuited to Marcion's theory. Many, like the Marcionite Marcus,\* admitted the doctrine of the Syrian Gnosis as to the formation of man;† according to which the Supreme God communicated to man a portion of his own divine life (the πνεῦμα), which man however lost by sin,—a doctrine at variance with the whole character of the Marcionite system. While Marcion probably gave himself no further thought concerning the final destiny of the Demiurge and of the “psychical natures,” the Marcionite Lucas, on the other hand, thought himself compelled to believe that everything “psychical” was perishable; but that the πνευματικόν only, which participated of the divine life, was immortal.‡

In the case of *Apelles*, who abandoned for a long period the predominantly practical tendency of Marcion, and indulged in various speculations foreign to the primitive Marcionite system, the original tendency finally regained its ascendancy in a remarkable manner. Tertullian draws an unfavourable picture of the moral character of this man;§ but Rhodon, a teacher of the catholic church in the beginning of the third century, (whose testimony, as being that of an opponent, is beyond suspicion,) fully exonerates him of this charge, for he describes him as a person || whose moral character commanded universal respect. Probably it was the intimacy which (altogether blameless) subsisted between Apelles and *Philumene*, a certain female theosophist, that furnished occasion for the charge, and unfortunately at all times men are only too much disposed to misjudge all the actions of him who has once been stigmatized as a heretic. The only reproach that can be brought against *Philumene* is that she forgot her mission as a woman, and hence was betrayed into fanaticism,—against *Apelles*, that he confirmed her in her delusion, and looked upon the fanciful discourses that proceeded from her distempered mind as *reve-*

\* In the *Dialogue de recta fide*. Vid. opp. Origen, T. I.

† See above in the case of the Ophites and of Saturninus.

‡ See Tertull. de resurrect. carn. c. 2. Orig. c. Cels. l. III. c. 27.

§ Præscript. hæret. c. 30.

|| Euseb. lib. V. c. 13.

iations, which he gave himself the trouble of expounding.\* The statement of Tertullian, however, that the protracted residence of Apelles in Alexandria effected a change in his *Marcionite* views, seems not improbable; since all we can gather from the scattered accounts in Tertullian, Origen, Epiphanius, and in the work of Ambrosius, "*De Paradiso*," goes to intimate a modification of his system, through the influence of the Alexandrian Gnosis. And this will account for his having brought the visible and invisible orders of the world, the Demiurge and the Supreme God, the Old and the New Testaments into closer connection with each other than Marcion's principles and system could admit. Starting with the principle that the Old Testament came from different authors, partly under the inspiration of the Soter, partly under that of the Demiurge, and in part under that of the evil spirit, who corrupted the revelations of the divine things,† he was for holding fast the good everywhere. "I use *all* the scriptures of the Old Testament," he said, "and gather from them what is profitable."‡ He appealed to a saying, often cited by the ancients, and which, perhaps in the *εὐαγγέλιον κατ' Ἑβραίων* was attributed to our Saviour, "Be skilful money-changers, ever ready to distinguish the genuine from the counterfeit, the true from the false" (*γίνεσθε δοκιμοὶ τραπεζίται*). While Marcion, who was inclined to give an objective value to everything, received the whole of the Old Testament as true to the letter, but ascribed it not to the Supreme God, but to the Demiurge; Apelles, on the other hand, found in the Old Testament fables wholly destitute of truth.§ We see exemplified in this man the force of any tendency which rules the minds of a particular age—the great difficulty, which individuals who would gladly emancipate themselves from it, still experience in asserting their freedom. Thus Apelles felt the weight of the dualistic principle, though he acknowledged its incompatibility with Christianity, to which however he saw himself continually driven back again by the power that it exercised over his

\* His work of *φανερώσεις*, which has not reached our times.

† He endeavoured, in a work which he entitled "*Conclusions*," *συλλογισμοί*, to point out the contradictions in the Old Testament.

‡ *Χρῶν ἀπὸ πάσης γραφῆς, ἀναλέγων τὰ χρήσιμα*. Epiphanius, *hæres.* 44, s. 2.

§ *Μῦθος τὰ Ἰουδαίων γράμματα*. Origen, *c. Cels.* lib. V. c. 54.



thoughts. Accordingly, at an advanced age he concluded his inquiries with the confession that he could not do otherwise, that he felt himself absolutely compelled to *believe* in One Eternal God, the author of all existence; but that scientifically to demonstrate how all existence could be traced back to one original principle transcended his ability. The church-teacher Rhodon, a stranger to such mental conflicts, could not understand the confession, and laughed at him for professing to be a teacher, while at the same time he avowed that he only *believed*, but was unable to *prove* what he taught. Apelles seemed at last to have lost all interest in disputing on these matters. "Let every man," said he, "stand fast by his faith; for all that put their trust in Christ crucified shall attain salvation, if only they prove their faith by their works."

#### APPENDIX.

##### I. *Concerning the Worship or Cultus of the Gnosis.*

The different directions which Gnosticism followed, and which we have thus far contemplated, had great influence also on the views which they entertained of divine worship. The reaction that sprang out of Gnosticism against every fusion of the Jewish and Christian positions, and against the conversion of religion into an outward thing, could not fail to manifest itself strongly on this particular side. Indeed we have already observed this in the declarations of Ptolemy respecting festivals and fasts. But the tendency, so opposite to the Christian principle of ennobling the natural and the human, (which also grew out of the Dualism of the Gnostics,) to a total estrangement from the world and to the deadening of all human affections, must, when consistently carried out and pushed to the extreme, have led to the rending asunder in the case of worship of all that Christ had, for man's benefit, joined together. And the exaggerated value placed on knowledge in religion—that twilight-knowledge which set up itself as the supreme good—was likely to end in a proud contempt of all those means of grace which had been furnished to the Christian life;—a similar tendency having in fact, at a still earlier period, grown out of the Jewish Gnosis at Alexandria. Accordingly among the Christian Gnostics we find those who

said that salvation consisted in knowledge; that in knowledge man had all that he wanted. As the world of sense had sprung out of an alienation from the divine, it was a degradation of the transcendent things of God to attempt to represent them by sensuous, imperfect, perishable things.\* But the same theological tendency might also bring with it a symbolical worship, full of mysterious pomp and ceremony—as we see in the case of the Marcosians,† from whom Irenæus derives the Idealists (mentioned above), who rejected all external rites of religion. By virtue of the distinction between a *psychical* and a *pneumatical* Christianity, they were led to distinguish also *two kinds of baptism*—a baptism in the name of Jesus, the Messiah of the psychical natures, whereby believers obtained forgiveness of sin and the hope of eternal life in the kingdom of the Demiurge; and a pneumatical baptism, in the name of the Christ from heaven united with Jesus, whereby the spiritual nature attained to self-consciousness and to perfection, and entered into fellowship with the Pleroma. The ceremony of baptism and the baptismal formula probably differed, according as the candidate received the *first* or the *second* baptism, was received into the class of psychical or into that of pneumatical Christians. The latter was probably accompanied with greater pomp than the former. According to the Gnostic idea, already explained, that the baptized and redeemed pneumatical nature entered into a spiritual marriage (syzygy) with its other half in the spiritual world (with the *angel*, i. e., with which it constituted one whole), they celebrated this second baptism as a wedding, and decorated the room where the ceremony took place like a bridal chamber. One baptismal formula for the Pneumatics ran

\* Their words are to be found in Irenæus, lib. I. c. 21, s. 4: Μὴ δαῖν τὸ τῆς ἀρρήτου καὶ ἀοράτου δυνάμειος μυστήριον δι' ὁρατῶν καὶ φθαρτῶν ἐπιτελεῖσθαι κτισμάτων, καὶ τῶν ἀγεννῆτων καὶ ἀσωμάτων δι' αἰσθητῶν καὶ σωματικῶν. Εἶναι δὲ τελείαν ἀπολύτρωσιν αὐτὴν τὴν ἐπίγνωσιν τοῦ ἀρρήτου μεγάλους. Theodoret. hæret. fab. I. c. 10. If the Cajanites, attacked by Tertullian in his work “de Baptismo,” were identical with the Gnostic Cainites, with whom they are sometimes confounded, these last must also be placed in the same class, what, indeed, the general tendency of their teaching would also warrant. But the reasons alleged by those Cajanites against the necessity of outward baptism have no resemblance whatever to the wild, fanatical spirit of the Cainites; and the sect generally exhibits none of the Gnostic peculiarities

† Adherents of Marcus.

thus :—"In the name which is hidden from all the divinities and powers (of the Demiurge), the name of *truth*,\* which Jesus of Nazareth has put on in the light-zones of Christ, the living Christ, through the Holy Ghost, for the redemption of the angels,†—the name by which all things attain to perfection." The candidate then said, "I am *established* and redeemed,‡—I am redeemed in my soul from this world, and from all that belongs to it, by the name of Jehovah, who has redeemed the soul of Jesus§ by the living Christ." The whole assembly then said, "Peace (or salvation) to all on whom this name rests." Next they bestowed on the person baptized the sign of consecration to the priestly office, by anointing him with oil (according to the custom of the church). The oil employed for this purpose was a costly balsam; and its precious, far-spreading fragrance was intended to be a symbol of that transcendent bliss of the Pleroma which had been appointed for the redeemed. It is among these Marcosians that we first meet with the ceremony of extreme unction. The dead were anointed with this balsam mingled with water, and a form of prayer was pronounced over them, to the end that the souls of the departed, freed from the Demiurge and all his powers, might be able to rise to their mother, the Sophia.¶ The Ophites also had similar forms of adjuration for the departed. To the same sect belonged too the well-known mystical table (the *διάγραμμα*), which contained a symbolic representation of their system.

The reforming tendency of Marcion shows itself also in reference to the forms of worship. His simple, practical bent

\* The *ἀλήθεια*, self-manifestation of the Bythos.

† *Εἰς λύτρωσιν ἀγγελικὴν* To the same redemption, of which this spiritual nature, as well as the angel belonging to it, must partake, in order that both might be capable of entering into the Pleroma, which neither could do separately, but only in mutual union.

‡ *Ἐσθῆριγμαί καὶ λιλύτρωμαι*. See above on Horus.

§ I suppose that in the above formula τοῦ Ἰησοῦ should be read instead of αὐτοῦ.

¶ *Iren. lib. I. c. 21*. The practice of exorcism at baptism was in accordance also with the theory of the Gnostics respecting the indwelling of the various πνεύματα ἑλικά until redemption. *Exorcism* (*ἔδωρ ἑξορκίζον*) occurs for the first time, still earlier than in the North African church (see above), in the Didascal. Anatol. f. 800, col. II. D. It may have been cited here, however, not as a peculiarly Gnostic custom, but as belonging to the Alexandrian church generally.

kept him remote from that mysticism which delights in outward pomp and show, but at the same time also from a proud, contemplative idealism. His aim in this matter, too, was the restoration of the worship of God to its primitive Christian form, and he attacked many of the new regulations as corruptions of that original simplicity.\* Thus he opposed, among other things, the custom of dividing the service into the two portions of the *missa catechumenorum* and the *missa fidelium*. He required that the catechumens should share in all the privileges of their teachers,† and not be dismissed at the beginning of the prayer which introduced the celebration of the Lord's supper; for he insisted that the holy rite could not be profaned by their presence.

It would indeed be a contradiction with what has just been said, if it is true that Marcion was the author of a superstitious custom (founded on a mistaken interpretation of 1 Cor. xv. 29), which practised a vicarious baptism of the living for those who had died catechumens; but it is without reason that the introduction of such vicarious baptism is imputed to Marcion, to whose simple spirit such a superstition was altogether repugnant. Even if the practice had become prevalent among the Marcionites who in the fifth century had spread themselves among the rural population of Syria, still we should by no means be warranted to infer from the customs of such ignorant and uneducated men, who were hardly capable of comprehending the spirit of Marcion, that the practice was authorized by himself.‡

\* In all probability Tertullian had in view particularly the Marcionites when he says of the heretics (*Præscript. c. 41*), *Simplicitatem volunt esse prostrationem disciplinæ, cujus penes nos curam lenocinium vocant.*

† To this point Marcion, by a forced interpretation, applied the passage in Gal. vi. 6. See vol. I. p. 454.

‡ Tertullian (*de res. carnis, c. 48*, and *adv. Marcion, l. V. c. 10*) by no means so expresses himself as if such a vicarious baptism was anywhere practised in his own time, but he only supposes the possibility that such a custom existed in the time of the apostle, and that the latter spoke in reference to it; and in the latter passage he in fact considers another explanation of 1 Cor. xv. 29, as the more probable one. As to Chrysostom's remarks on this passage, they can only apply to the ignorant Marcionites of *his own time*, but in no wise to Marcion himself and the older Marcionites.



II. *Mani and the Manicheans.*

Christianity had come forth victorious out of its conflicts with that reaction of the fundamental principle of the old world which we have contemplated in the Gnostic sects. Christian Theism had vanquished Oriental Dualism. Gnosticism had accomplished its destined work. It had aroused men's minds to a thoughtful appropriation and digestion of Christian truth, established a clearer conviction of the peculiar essence of Christianity and the subject-matter of its principal doctrines. After Gnosticism had thus deeply influenced the progressive movement of Christian doctrine and theology, it retired into the background; it survived only in its more remote consequences; but it was not till a later period that these received their greater significance as reactions against that Jewish-Christian element, when it became still further developed.

When, however, the period of Gnosticism had already passed, a new attempt was made, towards the close of the third century, by the Persian Mani or Manes, to blend together Christianity and the religions of ancient Asia. Such attempts were called forth by the intrinsic relation of Christianity to those ancient religions. For the facts of which the gospel witnesses—redemption, the union of God with humanity—answer to a fundamental want of man's religious nature, which powerfully revealed itself in those old religions, and in fantastic caprice anticipated that which, in the fulness of the times, was destined to be given in the form of historical reality.\* A superficial judgment, or one still entangled in the prejudices of the old world, might therefore, in comparing Christianity with its ancient religions, lead us to imagine that we found in them the same divine element, only in a more multi-form shape. But all becomes a different matter when the view is based on a different notion of the Divine Being, and his relation to the world, and of creation; since in all those forms of the religion of nature, instead of the idea of a personal, living God, such as he declares himself in revelation, the Pantheistic conception predominates. Hence the seeming

\* It is in such resemblances of the Christian element in the old religion that Tertullian thought he discovered the *ingenia diaboli quædam de divinis affectantis*.

resemblance soon transforms itself into an essential difference. And if those old religions were, by virtue of such supposed relationship, to be adopted into Christianity, this could only be effected by severing Christianity itself from its natural connection with the preparatory revelation of religion in Judaism, and by fusing it with a Pantheistic religion of nature, and thereby transforming Christianity into an entirely different thing.

In this respect mainly Manicheism differs from Gnosticism, that in the former the element of an old Oriental theosophy introduces itself to a far greater extent into Christianity, and so appropriates it as a symbol for ideas foreign to its nature as often to make Christian terms appear only as mere accidents. Moreover, in this system, which grew up in countries unreached by the influence of Platonic philosophy and of ideas which were derived from such sources Jewish theology could not be mixed up with the Oriental theosophy. Throughout the Manichean system there distinctly glimmers the Zoroastrian doctrine of the conflict of Ormuzd and Ahriman, which we have already observed in the Gnostic systems. No one can fail to see that Mani set out from the characteristic principle of the Parsic religious view; that he was for reconciling, for fusing together, the Zoroastrian and the Christian religions. The remarks which we formerly made respecting Gnosticism, and the opposition of its whole mental tendency to the original Parsism,\* apply to Manicheism also; indeed it is here still more strongly marked. That leaning to a morose estrangement from the world, which is altogether alien from the original Parsism, constitutes a characteristic difference between the latter and Manicheism. In Manicheism we find the aim to be perfection, the utmost possible estrangement from all that pertains to the world; in Parsism, a plastic influence on the world. And this practical opposition stands connected with a radical difference in the whole view of things. According to the original Parsism it is on a pure creation, proceeding from Ormuzd, that Ahriman exercises a disturbing, destructive action. Hence the genuine champion in the service of Ormuzd has to combat this influence. According to the Manichean theory there is an evil principle at work in the whole of creation, and holding in bondage the elements

\* See above, p. 14.

which came from the kingdom of light. Deliverance from this bondage, so that the emancipated spirit may once more be united with its original source, is therefore the highest end. Now it is true that, to account for this radical difference, it might be sufficient to suppose that by a mixture of Parsism with Christianity, and especially with the Christian principle apprehended after a one-sided and ascetical manner, the character of Parsism itself must have undergone great alterations. It may be conceived that the commixture of two systems might have given birth to a third, wearing in its general aspect and in its details a type different from either. Yet there is much in Manicheism—as, for example, the doctrine of metempsychosis, of a soul fettered in every part of nature; the reverence shown by the perfect Manichean for all that has life, which arose from his belief that the same spirit of heavenly origin is more or less straitly imprisoned and confined in all natural objects; the cautious fear which it gave rise to of injuring even the leaf of a tree—which betrays a striking affinity between Manicheism and that religion which is the most widely extended in Asia, which, through its institutions, akin to the monasticism of the middle ages, and through the feelings of gentleness and of self-sacrificing benevolence which it awakened, became to many tribes a means of transition from the wildest barbarism to semi-civilization—we mean Buddhism.\* Moreover we are not merely led to this hypothesis by comparing the inner character of the two systems, but there are distinct outward and historical indications which go far to show that Mani attached himself to Buddhism, having visited countries where the Buddhist missionaries and pilgrims had already spread themselves.

Among the forerunners of Mani, (if we may consider in this light one from whose writings Mani is supposed to have drawn largely,) Western tradition, which is built on many misapprehended facts, names *Buddas*. And of him it relates that

\* In the first edition of my Church History I had alluded only in a cursory way to the relationship of Manicheism and Buddhism; it is the great merit of Dr. Baur (constituting an epoch in this department of history) that in his work on the Manichean system (Tübingen, 1831) he has fully exhibited and unfolded this relationship, and thus opened a new path for the genetic exposition of Manicheism.

he pretended to have been miraculously born of a virgin. Something similar occurs also in the narratives of the birth of Buddha, when he appeared in humanity. Later Manicheans taught expressly that Mani, Buddas, Zoroaster, Christ, and the Sun are the same;\* and this view agrees entirely with the Buddhist doctrine that Buddha manifested himself on earth at different times, under different forms of human existence, either real or apparent, and that in all these different manifestations he published the same religion.

Mani is said, moreover, to have retired to a cave in the province of Turkistan, and when he came forth from it he set up the pretension of having received special revelations. Now sacred grottos occupy an important place among the sanctuaries of Buddhism, and in modern times such monuments of this religion have been discovered in the districts bordering on Persia and Bactria.†

It is highly probable that in the public life of Mani two epochs ought to be distinguished. And this view of the matter seems also to be confirmed by all our historical notices of him. In the first, his aim was simply to reconcile and blend together Parsism and Christianity; in the second, he has already in his travels become acquainted with Buddhism. From it a new light arose upon him, and he supposed that he had now attained to a better understanding of the truth in all the three religions. Dualism was now, in his case gradually to pass at last into the theory of the pantheistic one. For we cannot help considering Buddhism (although this view has been denied by many in modern times) as one phenomenal phase of Pantheism; as indeed we must regard in this light every doctrine which does not recognise God as a self-conscious cause of existence, that acts freely and with design. The Dualism of Buddhism is of quite a different kind from that of Parsism. It is not a positive kingdom of evil that in it stands opposed to the kingdom of good, and with a corrupting influence insinuates itself into the creation of the latter. But it means by Dualism nothing else than that the Divine Being

\* Τὸν Ζαράδαν καὶ Βουδᾶν καὶ τὸν Χριστὸν καὶ τὸν Μανιχαῖον καὶ τὸν ἥλιον εἶνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι. See Jacob. Tollii insignia itinerarii Italici. Traject. 1696. P. 134.

† See the work of C. Ritter. Die Stupa's, oder die architektonischen Denkmale der indo-baktrischen Königsstrasse und die Kolosse von Bamiyan. Berlin, 1838. S. 30, u. d. f.



is under the necessity of passing out of itself into manifestation; and the problem then arises, how from this manifestation it is to revert to pure being. Of this form of Dualism, in its connection with the pantheistic element, the same may be said as was said of the apparent Neo-Platonic Dualism, described in a former part of this work. There are two factors in it—the Spirit or God, and nature or matter. When the Spirit passes out of itself into nature, then there comes into existence the phenomenal world, the world of appearance, of Sansara—the Maia. The Spirit becomes more and more numbed in nature, more completely estranged from itself, even to entire unconsciousness. In man it has to pass through various stages of development and purification again before it can be wholly released from the constraining bonds of nature. Then being stripped of all limited, individual existence, it becomes conscious of its oneness with the primal Spirit, from which all life has flowed, and thereupon passes into it. This is to become Nirwana. Thus arises the opposition between the Spirit, in its estrangement from itself, in the world of manifestation or of appearance (Sansara, Maia); and the pure being of the Spirit (Nirwana). It is a characteristic feature of the Buddhistic mode of view, and an evidence of the unity which lay at the root of its Dualism, that it describes the highest stage of perfection to be that point of consciousness at which Sansara and Nirwana have become one; when the Spirit, no longer affected by appearances, can energize freely with them, and amidst the world of semblance, and recognising it as a semblance, and in its necessity, thinks pure being only—the entire oneness of the present and the future worlds.\* Thus Buddha descends to the

\* This non-difference of Sansara and Nirwana is a main position of Buddhistic wisdom; see Schmidt's *Essays on the fundamental doctrines of Buddhism*, in the *Memoirs of the Petersburg Academy of Sciences*, vol. I. 1832, pp. 223 and 235; also, the *History of the Eastern Moguls*, written from a Buddhistic point of view, in the German translation by Schmidt, published at Petersburg in 1829, in which (p. 271) it is said of a wise man that "he followed the doctrine of the nothingness of all things, and attained to the knowledge that there is nothing terrible either in Sansara or Nirwana." We may here compare the language of Jacob Böhmen, which no doubt admits of being understood in another sense than that of the pantheistic Buddhism: "He to whom eternity is as time, and time as eternity, is delivered from all strife." I have chiefly taken for the basis of my statement of Buddhistic doctrines the

world of Sansara for the redemption of the souls imprisoned therein, and both are one to him.

In all cases where Mani represented his ideas in images of sense, he adopted the Zoroastrian Dualism; but he introduced into them Buddhistic *notions*. Now we meet with various forms of representation in the Manichean system—those in which a Parsic investiture is the more prominent, and which exhibit a kingdom of evil actively attacking the kingdom of light; and those which seem to have more of a Grecian colouring, and which are chiefly occupied with the opposition between God and matter.\* We might indeed suppose that the latter mode of representation sprang from a transference of Mani's doctrines into the Hellenic style and language. But if we take into consideration the Buddhistic principles with which Mani had fused his Zoroastrian ideas, we shall rather see in it an original form of apprehension, in accordance with the system of Buddha. Moreover, Mani himself may perhaps have expressed himself differently, according as he employed conceptions and forms of the understanding, after the manner of Buddhism, or adopted the Parsic mode of representation, which made use of symbols chiefly.

If the two systems of religion which Mani combined with Christianity are considered in their relation to the latter, the whole matter will shape itself as follows. In its doctrine of a conflict between the kingdoms of good and of evil, of the mission of the servants of Ormuzd to exert a shaping influence on the world, and thus to counteract the destructive influence of Ahri-man, and also in its doctrine of the final victory awaiting the kingdom of light, and of the glorious regeneration of the world as well as of the resurrection, the religion of Zoroaster presents a point of agreement and union with Christianity. Moreover, the central idea of Christianity, the general idea of redemption, might probably adjust itself to the need of purification here supposed; but the more precise apprehension of the notion of redemption, the doctrine of a personal, historical Redeemer,

essays of Schmidt just referred to, and those which are found in the same Memoirs for the year 1834, vol. II.

\* So says Alexander of Lycopolis, in his work against the Manicheans in Combesis. Græcorum patrum auctarium novissimum. Paris, 1672, P. II. f. 4, where he says of Mani, ἀρχὰς ἐτίθετο θεὸν καὶ υἷον.

was something foreign to this system. On the other hand, Buddhism testifies most distinctly to the consciousness of the need of a redemption, and that too of one to be effected through a true entrance of the divine essence into the forms of human nature (the incarnation of the Buddha). But this resemblance between Christian and Buddhistic ideas is however only in appearance ; for the Christian notion of the redemption and of the Redeemer is peculiarly qualified by the Christian notions of that from which man is to be redeemed, viz. sin, and of Him who is the supreme cause of the redemption, viz. God. But the Christian notion of sin, which is grounded on the freedom of the creature, is quite foreign to Buddhism. The world of appearance, the Sansara, in so far as it holds the spirit in oppression and confinement, is the cause of all evil. Hence the tempter in the theory of Buddhism, who answers to Satan in the Christian representation, is not an intelligence fallen from his allegiance to God, nor even, as in the Parsic system, an originally evil principle ; but he is the king of the Shimnus (Demons), who stand at the head of the third world, or the world of sensual pleasures and of changeable forms, who, for the purpose of retaining the souls in bonds within the Sansara, of preventing them from rising to the Nirwana, deceives them with many a delusive show. He is, in short, nature personified, which seeks to retain everything within her enchanted circle, whose enticements the spirit must resist in order to attain to freedom. Redemption therefore is the release of the soul from the bonds of Sansara, from the circle of the metempsychosis, through which the spirits fettered in the bonds of nature must wander—it is the spirit's return to itself. The final end of it is the becoming Nirwana, and the means whereby this end is attained is coming to the knowledge of the essence of the spirit, and of the world of appearance. And as Buddhism knows no personal God, but substitutes in place of him the general notion of spirit, it could not entertain the idea of the incarnation of God in a determinate person,—of a redemption accomplished by this person once for all. On the contrary, it supposes a multitude of manifestations of Buddha, which thereupon commence new periods in the history of the world. And every man, by freeing himself from the bonds of the Sansara, is capable of raising himself finally to the dignity of a Buddha ; for in all there

exists in fact one and the same spirit. In Mani's doctrine of Christ, and of the *elect*, we find much which is in affinity with these views, mixed up however with Parsic and Christian ideas.

In its determination of the ultimate end to which the conflict of the kingdom of light with the kingdom of darkness is to lead, Parsism approaches nearer to Christianity than Buddhism. For, according to the latter, the ultimate end of the redemptive manifestations of Buddha is to deprive nature of spirit, and, after the spirit shall have gathered to itself every kindred element that is held bound under the fetters of Sansara, to accomplish its return to the original unity of the universal spirit. We shall see how Mani's doctrine agrees on this head more fully with Buddhism than with Parsism. On the whole, however, we cannot deny, that although Buddhism, besides the notion of redemption, contains many isolated practical elements, such as the doctrine of self-sacrificing love, self-denial, which might properly be combined with Christian ideas, it has, nevertheless, less that is in affinity with Christianity than Parsism has; and that the predominant spirit of speculative Buddhism might easily exert such an influence on the Christian doctrines brought in connection with it, as to deprive them of their true Christian import—a remark which we shall find corroborated by a closer examination of Manicheism.

Having convinced ourselves that an outward and inner connection exists between Manicheism and Buddhism, this result will have a tendency to modify our views of the relation between several of the Gnostic systems and Buddhism. It calls, no doubt, for special caution lest we fall into the error of tracing to such outward influences what may be satisfactorily and sufficiently explained by an inward intellectual affinity.\* Analogies of this sort, having a perfectly internal origin, often recur in the historical development of Christianity, wherever corruptions of purely Christian truth have sprung up. And all these may easily be recognised as earlier stages of religious development which here and there have mixed themselves up with Christianity; and to this cate-

\* Thus Schmidt, in his Essay on the affinity of Gnostico-theosophic doctrines with the religious systems of the East, especially Buddhism (Leipsic, 1828), has evidently gone too far in this respect.



gory belongs also the pantheistic element of Buddhism.\* But now, as we find in Manicheism so much that is in affinity with the earlier Gnostic systems, and as the derivation of the former from the influence of Buddhism is historically established, the question may perhaps arise whether we ought not to suppose a common source from which those earlier systems drew as well as this last? †

We will then first of all cast a glance at the early education of Mani. With regard to his history, we possess two distinct sources of information, which agree in only a few particulars, while in all other respects they are in direct contradiction to each other—a *Greek* and an *Oriental* version of it. The account of Cyril of Jerusalem, of Epiphanes, of the ecclesiastical historians in the fourth and fifth centuries, all point to one common source ‡—the Acts of a disputation said to have been held with Mani by Archelaus bishop of Cascar.§ But those Acts have come down to us, to say the least, in a very questionable shape. With the exception of some few fragments which have been preserved in the Greek, they appear only in a Latin translation from the Greek, which was perhaps nothing more than an unfaithful version from the Syriac.|| These Acts manifestly contain an ill-connected

\* When, in the legends of Buddhism, it is related of a Buddha that he addressed birds and fishes, who most devoutly listened to him, and that he thereby prepared the way for the emancipation of the spirits imprisoned in these creatures from the bonds of Sansara, the story is entirely consistent with the religious consciousness of this pantheistic theory. But, on the other hand, when we find a similar story in the life of St. Francis, we only see in this latter case how near the aberration of an eccentric religious feeling may verge on a position which is wholly foreign to and inconsistent with the Christian consciousness. [See also the Life of S. Philip Neri of the Oratory.—Eng. Ed.]

† For example, the gradual *de-spiritualizing* of the world in the Ophitic system; the thoroughly Buddhistic idea that he who has attained to the Nirwana in the midst of the Sansara is lord over the latter, can perform all miracles; in Carpocratianism, that he is even superior to the mundane deities, who are beings still subject to change.

‡ Eusebius, who wrote before this source of information became known, was unable to say anything relative to Mani's personal history.

§ If there is no mistake here in the name,—if it was not rather Carrhæ (ܩܪܗ), in Mesopotamia,—according to what we must allow to be a very uncertain conjecture.

|| Jerome reports (De vit. illustr. 72) that these Acts were written originally in Syriac; but the first oriental author who shows any

narrative, savouring in no small degree of the romantic. Although there is some truth at the bottom of it—as, for instance, in the statement of doctrine there is much that wears the appearance of truth, and is confirmed also by its agreement with other representations—still the Greek author seems, from ignorance of Eastern languages and customs, to have introduced a great deal that is untrue, by bringing in and confounding together discordant stories, through an uncritical judgment and exaggeration.\* How difficult it was for a Greek to enter into national peculiarities wholly foreign to his own is but too well known.

In some few points we may, even with the scanty means we possess for deciphering this historical enigma, trace the misapprehensions which lie at the bottom of these stories. The first origin of the Manichean doctrines is derived from a Saracen merchant, Scythianus by name, who, it is said, by many journeys to Asia, Egypt, and Greece, had accumulated a large fortune, and at the same time acquired an intimate knowledge of the Oriental and the Grecian philosophies. This Scythianus is said to have lived near the times of the apostles—a statement indeed which the story itself proves an anachronism; for otherwise Mani would have lived but a few generations after the same period. The heir and disciple of Scythianus is said to have been a certain Terebinth, who afterwards called himself Buddas. We have already stated what, without any question, is to be understood here by the name Buddas.† Now if it is clear that by Buddas we are not to

acquaintance with these Acts was Severus, the bishop of Asmonina in Egypt, who wrote about the year 978. See Renaudot, *hist. Patriarch. Alex.* p. 40. His account differs, however, in many respects, from the revision of the Acts which has come down to us. It is indeed much more simple; a fact which seems to show that his copy of the Acts was not the same with ours, but another of the same kind, and perhaps the original from which ours has been derived. Heraclian bishop of Chalcedon says (Photius, *cod.* 95) that a certain Hegemonius was the compiler of those Grecian Acts.

\* Beausobre properly rejected the Western narratives, whose want of authenticity he satisfactorily proved, and confined himself wholly to the Oriental. The objections urged by Mosheim against this course possess but little force.

† It has been justly observed that the Greek name Τερεβινθος is perhaps only a translation of the Chaldee ܬܪܒܝܢܬ, by which the Targums render the Hebrew word ܬܪܒܝܢ, which the Alexandrians again

understand any historical person, the name of Scythian also, as such a designation, becomes equally suspicious. One is naturally inclined to take it as simply a geographical name referring to those nations among which Buddhism first extended itself. However, we shall not venture to express a decided opinion on the point, especially as letters of Mani, addressed to a person of this name, are cited.\*

The Oriental narratives possess much more of internal consistency. They are found, it is true, in historians of much more recent date than the Grecian sources; but the Oriental writers have undoubtedly availed themselves of older records, in using which, moreover, they were not liable to fall into the same errors with the Greeks.†

Rightly to understand the phenomenon of such a man as Mani, we must figure to ourselves the circumstances and relations under which he was educated. By birth he was a Persian; but it is a question whether in this case Persia is to be understood in the strict sense, or whether it refers only to *some province* belonging to the great Persian empire. In favour of the latter interpretation is the fact that Mani composed his *works* in the Syriac language; from which it might be concluded that he was a native of one of those provinces of the Persian empire where Syriac was the vernacular tongue. This fact, however, by itself, proves nothing; for even without this inference it would easily admit of being explained if we suppose that the Syriac, through the intimate connection of the Persian Christians with the Syrian church, had very early become the written language of the Persian theologians. In which case Mani may have been induced to employ this language (although it was not his vernacular tongue),

translate Τερεβινθος. Another hypothesis has been started by Ritter, in the work above referred to, p. 29, viz. that the Grecized name Terebinthos is based on a predicate of Buddha, originating in those countries where Mani became acquainted with Buddhism,—Tere-Hintu, lord of the Hindoos. It is a point on which nothing certain can be ascertained. Possibly Terebinth may have been an historical person, to whom many things ascribed to Buddha had been transferred.

\* Vid. Fabricii bibl. Græc. vol. VII. f. 316.

† The oriental narratives in Herbelot's Bibliothèque Orientale, sub v. Mani,—in the Persian historian Mirkhond's History of the Sassanides, cited in Silvestre de Sacy, Mémoires sur diverses Antiquités de la Perse. Paris, 1793. In Abulpharag. and Pococke, Specimen hist. Arab.

by the hope of promoting by this means the introduction of his doctrine into other countries. He is said to have sprung from a family of the Magians (the Persian sacerdotal caste); at the age of manhood, if these statements are trustworthy, he embraced Christianity, and became presbyter of a church in Ehvaz or Ahvaz, the chief city of the Persian province Huzitis. At any rate, it is probable that Mani had been educated in the religion of Zoroaster, and embraced Christianity at some later period of life.

We are not sufficiently informed with regard to his early history to be able to determine whether, in the first instance, he abandoned the religion of his fathers and embraced Christianity from an honest conviction, and afterwards, offended at the form which the teaching of the church had given to it, he returned in his soul to the fundamental ideas of his earlier religion, under the belief that by being combined with these Christianity first assumed its true and proper light; or whether from the very first he had been attracted to Christianity by its affinity to many Persian views, without noticing the essential difference which might exist among similar ideas, according to the peculiar sense and position they assumed in Christianity or in the Persian religion. In the latter case he was from the beginning simply trying to construct a religious system of his own, by fusing together Persian and Christian elements.

The reëstablishment of their ancient empire, upon the expulsion of the Parthians, had called forth a desire among the Persians to purify the religion of their fathers from all foreign elements, and restore it to its original splendour. Consequently, disputes arose as to what was to be considered the pure doctrine of Zoroaster; especially on several points which had been left undecided by the previous religious tradition, as, for example, whether a primal essence was to be supposed, exalted above the two conflicting principles. Deliberations were held for the purpose of investigating the questions in dispute; and pretended prophets arose, who were for settling every difficulty by divine inspiration.\* The religion of Zoroaster, which now acquired fresh power, and set itself in opposition to all the foreign religions that had before been tolerated, was

\* See Hyde, *Hist. Relig. vet. Pers.* p. 276. *Mémoires sur diverses Antiquités de la Perse*, par S. de Sacy, p. 42.



brought into collision also with Christianity, which under the Parthian government had been suffered to advance undisturbed. Amidst such circumstances, the thought might occur to one of a lively and profound mind, like Mani, that he was called to work such a reformation of Christianity, which an intermixture of Judaism had corrupted, as should sever it from its connection with the latter, and bring it into more intimate union with ideas of the Zoroastrian religion. Mani—as was afterwards done by Mohammed—gave himself out to be the Paraclete promised by Christ.\* Hereby he in no wise understood the Holy Ghost, but a human person, an enlightened teacher promised by Christ, who was further to develop the religion revealed by him, in agreement with his spirit, and purifying it from the corruptions of Ahriman, especially from those which had sprung from its combination with Judaism, to lead the faithful to a conviction of those truths which in the earlier times men were not in a condition to understand. By him that *perfect* knowledge was to be given of which Paul had also spoken as a knowledge reserved for some future period, 1 Cor. xiii. 10.† Accordingly Mani could consistently denominate himself at one and the same time the promised Paraclete and the apostle of Christ. Accordingly the letter in which he designed to unfold the fundamental doctrines of his religious system (the *epistola fundamenti*, which was so famous among the Manicheans) opened with the following words: “Mani, called to be an apostle of Jesus Christ, through the election of God the Father. These are the words of salvation from the eternal and living fountain.”‡

He first came forward with these pretensions towards the close of the reign of the Persian king Shapur I. (Sapor), circa 270 A.D. To an ardent, profound mind, and lively imagination, he united varied knowledge and practical skill in the arts, of which he availed himself for the purpose of diffusing his doctrines. He is said to have been distinguished among his countrymen as a mathematician and astronomer; § as a painter

\* See Mirkhond in Sacy, p. 204.—Tit. Bostr. c. Manich. lib. III. in Canisii, lect. antiq. ed. Basnage and Galland. bibl. patr. T. V. f. 326.

† See Acta cum Felice Manichæo, lib. I. c. 9. Opp. Augustini, T. VIII.

‡ Augustin. c. epist. fundamenti, c. 5.

§ He, however, possessed no *great* knowledge, doubtless, in these sciences. Yet it is highly probable that a good deal in his system stood

the fame of his talents long survived in Persia. In the outset he succeeded in gaining the favour of the prince; but when his heretical doctrines, as they were regarded by the Magians, came to be known, he was obliged—if any confidence can be placed in the later legends, and if the hypothesis was not invented to account for the different portions of his doctrine—to seek safety from persecution by flight. He now made distant journeys to India, and even to China; and dwelt for a long time in Turkistan. At all events, his longer residence in the latter province seems to have had an important influence on the ultimate shape of his opinions. For it was here that he became acquainted with Buddhism, which acquired so great an influence on his mind as to give a peculiar stamp to his whole way of thinking, and to make him embrace the wide scope of blending together all the three religions. From one of the grottos consecrated to Buddhism he issued forth with those symbolical pictures which were designed sensibly to set forth the doctrines which, as he pretended, had been made known to him, in his retirement, by divine revelations. These symbols were long preserved in lively remembrance among the Persians, under the name of *Ertenki-Mani*.

After the death of Sapor, A.D. 272, Mani returned to Persia, where, together with his pictures, he was well received by Hormuz (*Hormisdas*), Sapor's successor. The latter assigned to him, as a safe place of residence, the castle of *Deskereh*, at *Chusistan* in *Susiana*. But this prince, after a reign of less than two complete years, was succeeded by *Behram* (*Varanes*). He also at first evinced a favourable disposition towards Mani, but perhaps only in appearance, and with a view to lull him and his followers into security. He caused a disputation to be held between Mani and the Magians, which resulted in Mani being pronounced a heretic. Refusing to recant, he was flayed alive,\* and his skin stuffed and hung before the gates of the city *Djondishapur*, A.D. 277,† as a terror to his followers.

Let us now proceed to unfold the Buddhist-Zoroastrian-Christian system of doctrine taught by Mani.

closely connected, when divested of its mythical dress, with a partial and defective knowledge of these sciences.

\* A cruel mode of punishment, which was doubtless resorted to in the East.

† The chronology in this case is, it must be admitted, quite uncertain.

It is still a disputed question whether, in the doctrine of Zoroaster, absolute Dualism is the starting-point, and consequently whether the hypothesis of a common principle from which both Ormuzd and Ahriman were to derive their being, viz. time without end and without beginning, the Zervan Aca-rene (answering to the Gnostic æon,  $\beta\tilde{\upsilon}\delta\omicron\varsigma$ , and to the Neo-Platonic  $\delta\tilde{\nu}$ ), arose out of a speculative need of reducing the duality to a higher unity; or whether the recognition of such a primal unity was the original doctrine, which, however, before the predominance of a dualistic theory in life, had been driven in the background of the consciousness. From the proclamation, still extant,\* of Mihr Nerseh, the Persian general and grand-vizier, published upon his invasion of Armenia, A.D. 450, it is clear that at that date the acknowledgment of a primal essence, which existed before the contrariety manifested itself in creation, was an article of the Persian orthodoxy. We find here a view of the matter which is akin to that Gnostic scheme that reduced Dualism to a unity,† and supposed the contrariety of good and evil to be somehow necessary in the evolution of life from God. The first germ of evil is in this document derived from the supreme essence, from the great god Zervan himself. This is the *Perchance*, which God spake, the principle of doubt, of uncertainty, which must once make its appearance, before all could shape itself into a certain and stable existence.‡ The opposite doctrine of an absolute Dualism was maintained by the Magusæian sect,§ and the latter was followed by Mani.

\* First communicated by St. Martin in his *Mémoires historiques et géographiques sur l'Arménie*, Paris, 1819, T. II. p. 472,—but more fully after another recension, in the *History of the religious wars between Armenia and Persia*, composed by the Armenian bishop Elisæus, and translated from the Armenian into English by Prof. Newman. London, 1830. P. 11, ff.

† See above, p. 15.

‡ This remarkable view is expressed in the following language :—“ Before heaven or earth existed, the great god Zervan prayed a thousand years, and spake : ‘ Were I *perchance* to obtain a son, Vormist (Ormuzd), who will create heaven and earth?’ and he begat two in his body, one by virtue of his prayer, the other because he said *perchance*.” The first was Ahriman, the son of doubt, the principle which makes everything a question. We here perceive the fountain-head of later Christian sects, in which Satan was designated as the first-born.

§ See Shahristani, in Hyde, l. c. p. 295.

Thus he was able to transfer the Persian Dualism to the Buddhist opposition of spirit and matter.

Accordingly he supposed two principles, absolutely opposed to each other, with their opposite creations; on the one side God, the original good, from whom nothing but good can proceed, and from whom all destruction, punishment, corruption is alien; the primal light, from whom pure light radiates;—on the other side, original evil, which can work only by destroying, decomposing,—whose essence is wild, self-conflicting tumult; matter, darkness, out of which flow powers of an wholly correspondent nature,—a world full of smoke and vapour, and at the same time full of fire that only burns but shines not. These two kingdoms subsisted at first wholly separate from one another. The Supreme God was the king of the empire of light, as the original source of an emanation-world in affinity with himself; and most nearly connected with him were the *Æons*, the channels for the diffusion of light from that primal light, to whom, as representatives of the Supreme God, his name was transferred; who therefore might be styled deities, without detracting from the honour due to the primal essence alone.\* In the letter in which Mani set forth the fundamental doctrines of his religion† he thus describes this Supreme God at the head of his kingdom of light:‡ “Over the kingdom of light ruled God the Father, eternal in his sacred race, glorious in his might, the truthful by his very essence, ever blessed in his own everlasting being, who bears within him wisdom and the consciousness of his life, with which he embraces the twelve members of his light, that is, the transcendent riches of his own kingdom. In each of his members are hid thousands of countless, immeasurable riches. But the Father himself, glorious in his majesty, incomprehensible in his greatness, has united with himself blessed and glorious *Æons*, who neither in numbers nor in greatness can be estimated, with whom this holy and most glorious Father lives,—for in his exalted kingdom no needy or feeble being dwells. But his resplendent realms are founded on the blessed earth of light, in such wise that no power exists by which they could ever be destroyed or

\* Like the *Amshaspands*, Ized of the Parsian religion.

† The *epistola fundamenti*.

‡ *Augustin. contra epist. fundamenti*, c. 13.



shaken.”\* The powers of darkness were contending in wild rage with one another, when in their blind struggle they approached so near to the realm of light, that a gleam from that hitherto unknown kingdom reached them for the first time. They now forgot their mutual strifes, and, involuntarily attracted by the splendour of the light, combined with one another to force their way into the kingdom of light, with a view of appropriating some of this light.† Now there seems to be something inconsistent in Mani, when, after having ascribed to the empire of light an unshaken stability, he proceeds to speak of a danger threatening it, which rendered precautionary measures necessary, and could thus express himself:—“Then the Father of the most blessed light beholds a vast desolation proceeding from the darkness, and threatening his holy *Æons*, unless he opposed to it an extraordinary divine power,‡ at once to conquer and destroy the race of darkness—so that, after its destruction, the inhabitants of the light might enjoy tranquillity.”§ Simplicius and Evodius have in fact here accused him of contradiction; but this charge applies rather to the mythical or symbolical form in which it is represented than to the train of thought which is therein embodied. The fundamental thought with Mani, as with the Gnostics, is this,—that the blind force of nature, which resists the godlike element, tamed and subdued by its mixture with it, must finally be rendered altogether powerless. And accordingly Mani passes from the Zoroastrian theory into the Buddhist,—that nature, by degrading, dissipating, and fettering the spirit, was to bring about its own

\* This earth of light Mani did not conceive to be anything distinct from the supreme, primal essence, but to be simply a shaping of the one divine light-essence.

† It is easy to discern the fundamental idea here,—that the evil principle is in conflict with itself, and becomes one only in struggling against the good; such is the attractive power which the good exerts on evil itself;—an idea, it must be allowed, in direct contradiction with the dualistic theory of an absolute evil.

‡ *Aliquod nimium ac præclarum et virtute potens nomen.* In the Zoroastrian system, also, the *Amshaspands* are represented as armed champions for the kingdom of light.

§ The *epistola fundamenti*, in the work *De fide contra Manichæos*, c. 11, of which Evodius, bishop of Uzala in Numidia, was perhaps the author—to be found in the Appendix to the eighth volume of the Benedictine edition of St. Augustin.

dissolution, and the final result would be, that of nature thus unspiritualized nothing would remain but the dead *residuum*, and this would fall a prey to utter annihilation.\* To this last result of all, according to the Buddhistic view of the world, Mani indeed, in his doctrine of final causes, did not proceed, as we shall see.

The ruler of the kingdom of light, in order to guard its boundaries, caused the *Æon, Mother of life*, to emanate from himself.† The name of this Genius points out that it stands for the *highest mundane soul*,—that the divine life was to separate itself from the unity of the realm of light, and in the conflict with the ungodlike element was to resolve itself into individual existences. The mother of *life*, like the *ἀνω σοφία* of the Valentinian system, could not as yet be affected by the kingdom of darkness. Here too we find the distinction between the higher mundane soul belonging to the kingdom of light, and a *reflection* of it, which mixes itself with the kingdom of darkness.‡ This mother of life generates the *primitive man*, with a view to make him an opponent to the powers of darkness—the same idea of the dignity of man's nature which we previously observed among the Gnostics.§ The primitive man, together with the five pure elements, fire, light, air, water, and earth enters upon the conflict. Here we again recognise ideas borrowed from Parsism—the reverence of an originally pure nature, which had only been corrupted by the interference of Ahriman. Moreover, according to the Parsian doctrine, a life which had flowed out from the kingdom of light is acknowledged to exist in the original elements. They were summoned to act as fellow-combatants against Ahriman's destroying influences, by means of their

\* See Schmidt's Essay on the thousand Buddhas. See the Memoirs of the St. Petersburg Academy, 1834, vol. II. p. 66.

† *Μήτηρ τῆς ζωῆς.*

‡ Simplicius (in Epictet. f. 187, ed. Salmas.) aptly describes the Manichean doctrine in this respect: Οὐτε τὸ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν κακύνεσθαι λήγουσιν, οὔτε τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ τὰ προσεχῶς αὐτῷ συνόντα, τὴν μητέρα τῆς ζωῆς καὶ τὸν δημιουργὸν (the ζῶν πνεῦμα) καὶ τοὺς ἐκτὶ αἰῶνας.

§ The *πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος* of Mani may be compared with the *πρῶν ἄνθρωπος* of the Valentinians, the Adam Kadmon, and especially the Kajomorts of the Zendavista, respecting whom many similar things are there said. It is quite probable that Mani adopted this Parsian idea into his system; and we shall hereafter see how he might have found something of a kindred nature even on this point in Buddhism.

fructifying, life-giving power. But this was, however, an element at variance with the Buddhistic view of nature; and we cannot fail to recognise in it the preponderant influence of the Zoroastrian spirit. Yet this is modified in Mani by the fact that in this doctrine matter does not mean the elements of *actual* nature, but the elements of a higher world—that which is itself—a radiation and form of the manifestation of the divine essence.\* When Mani opposes to the five pure elements of the kingdom of light the five elements of the kingdom of darkness, the only question is, whether the fundamental idea is that evil is ever the distorted image and counterfeit of the good, or that from the kingdom of light forms must go forth to the conflict with the kingdom of darkness, which seem like those of the latter. At all events, it was necessary to explain how visible nature arose because of matter, or the kingdom of darkness, having seized upon part of the divine essence or elements of the spiritual substance; and this again is a point which corresponds entirely with the Buddhistic scheme.

But the primitive man is worsted in the conflict; he is in danger of falling into the kingdom of darkness; in this strait he prays to the ruler of the kingdom of light; and the latter, to assist him, causes the *living spirit* to emanate.† This Spirit raises him up once more to the kingdom of light; but meanwhile the powers of darkness had succeeded in swallowing a part of the luminous essence of the first man, part of his armour. And this is the *mundane soul*, now mixed with matter.‡ Here again we perceive the affinity of Mani's ideas with those of the Gnostics; for, according to the latter, the *κάτω σοφία* was, it is true, delivered from the kingdom of the Hyle by the Soter sent to her assistance; but in the meanwhile a seed of the divine life had fallen into matter, and consequently must now go through a process of purification and development. And so it invariably comes about, that by the magical power of the divine life, of the light of the soul, or of the spirit, the wildly tumultuous kingdom of darkness is

\* *Quinque elementa nihil aliud quam substantia Dei.* Augustin. contra Faustum, l. XI. c. 3.

† The *ζῶν πνεῦμα* occurs also in the Gnostic systems, which contain a good deal that is analogous to Manicheism. Actis Thomæ, ed. Thilo, p. 17.

‡ The *ψυχὴ ἀπάντων*.

in time tamed in spite of itself, and finally rendered powerless.\* The subjugation of that tumultuous and blind Nature-power is in fact the end aimed at in the creation of the world. Mani, it is said, attempted to illustrate his doctrine by the following parable. A good shepherd sees a lion about to rush into the midst of his flock. He digs a pit, and casts into it a ram; the lion ravenously springs to the spot to devour his prey, but in so doing falls into the pit, from which he cannot extricate himself. The shepherd, however, contrives to deliver the ram, and keeps the lion confined in the pit, thus rendering him harmless to his flock.† In a similar manner the kingdom of darkness is rendered harmless; the souls it has devoured are finally delivered and restored to their native element.

After the *living spirit* had again raised man to the kingdom of light he began his preparations for purifying the souls which had been mixed up with the kingdom of darkness; which is the final cause of the entire creation, and the end aimed at in the whole course of the world.‡ That part of the soul which had not been affected by its mixture with matter or the nature of darkness he raised above this earth, and placed it in the sun and the moon, that *from thence* it might send forth its influence to release and draw back to itself, through the refining processes of the evolution of vegetable and animal life, the kindred soul diffused through all nature, and held in bondage by the kingdom of darkness.

Conformably with his mixed Buddhistic and Zoroastrian view of the world, Mani saw the same conflict of Ormuzd and Ahriman, of spirit and of matter, the same process of purification, going on in the physical no less than in the moral world. But in working out this principle he confounded together the physical and ethical elements, in contradiction to the essence

\* Titus of Bostra (c. Manich. lib. I. c. 12) well describes the Manichean doctrine in the following words: 'Ο ἀγαθὸς δύναμιν ἀποστέλλει τινὰ, φυλάξουσιν μὲν δηθὲν τοὺς ὄρνεις, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς δέλεαρ ἐσομένην εἰς ἀκούσιον τῇ ὕλῃ σωφρονισμόν, ἐδέθη τρέπον τινὰ ὡσπερ θηρίον.

† Disputat. c. Archelao, c. 25. This parable wears every mark of being genuine; it is at least quite in the spirit of Manicheism.

‡ As, in the Valentinian system, the Soter first puts forth his influence after he has been raised to the Sophia.



of Christianity, which, by freeing religion entirely from the mere intuitions of nature, distinctly separated these two elements. As in the Parsian religious system the sun and moon hold an important place in the conflict in the physical and spiritual world between Ormuzd and Ahriman, and in carrying on the universal process of development and purification, so they do also in the system of Mani. Almost everything that Zoroaster taught of Mithras, as the Genius (Ized) of the Sun, was by Mani transferred to his Christ—the pure soul, sending forth its influence from the sun and from the moon. Representing the soul as having sprung from the *primitive man*, he applied in this sense the biblical name “Son of man” (*υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου*). And as he distinguished between the *pure* and *free* soul which is enthroned in the sun, and its kindred soul which is diffused throughout nature, and corrupted by its mixture with matter, so he drew a similar distinction between a son of man superior to all contact with matter and incapable of suffering, and a son of man, so to speak, crucified in matter and suffering.\* Wherever the scattered seed burst forth from the dark tomb of the earth, unfolding itself into a plant with its blossom and its fruit, Mani beheld the triumphant evolution of the principle of light, gradually working its way onward to freedom from the bondage of matter. He saw therein the process by which the living soul, which had been imprisoned in the members of the Prince of Darkness, sets itself loose from confinement, rises to liberty, and mingles with its congenial element the *pure air*, where the souls completely purified ascend to those ships of light—the sun and moon—which are waiting to transport them to their native country. The soul, however, that still bears upon it various blemishes and stains is attracted to them only partially and gradually by the force of heat, being incorporated in the mean while with all kinds of trees, plants, and crops.

This much will serve as a specimen of his mystical philosophy of nature, which is presented sometimes in strange myths, not always most decent, though containing nothing offensive to an Oriental imagination—sometimes dressed in Christian expressions. Thus the Manicheans could speak of a suffering son of man hanging on every tree—of a Christ

\* The *υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου ἑμπαθής* and the *υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀπαθής*.

crucified in every soul, and in the entire world. They could give their own interpretation to the symbols of the suffering Son of Man in the Lord's supper. With equal, and even with still greater propriety (for this confounding of religion with the theory of nature savoured more of paganism than of Christianity) the Manicheans could employ the pagan fables as a drapery for their ideas. Thus the boy Dionysus torn in pieces, according to the Bacchic mysteries, by the Titans, was considered by them as simply representing the soul swallowed up by the powers of darkness, the divine life rent into fragments by matter.\*

Through the Sun-spirit's influence on the refining process of nature, the powers of darkness were now in danger of being gradually deprived of all the light and life which they held imprisoned in their members. The soul which they had seized, strives after freedom, and, being attracted by its kindred Sun-spirit, gradually liberates itself and evaporates; so that

\* See Alex. Lycop. c. 5. We will here adduce some peculiarly characteristic passages from Manichean writings, in proof of the exposition given above. From Mani's work entitled *Thesaurus*: "Viva anima, quæ earundem (adversarum potestatum) membris tenebatur, hac occasione laxata evadit, et suo purissimo aëri miscetur: ubi penitus ablutæ animæ adscendunt ad lucidas naves, quæ sibi ad evectionem atque ad suæ patriæ transfretationem sunt præparatæ. Id vero, quod adhuc adversi generis maculas portat, per æstum atque calores particulatim descendit, atque arboribus cæterisque plantationibus ac satis omnibus miscetur." Euodius de fide, c. 10. From Mani's letter to the Virgin Menoch: "Agnoscendo ex quo genere animarum emanaveris, quod est confusum omnibus corporibus et saporibus et speciebus variis cohæret." Augustini opus imperfectum contra Julian. lib. III. s. 172. In a passage from the Manichean *Faustus*, who lived in the first half of the fifth century, the Holy Spirit is represented as the quickening and fructifying power of God, exerting its influence through the air on the refining process of nature, and the history of Christ's birth from the Virgin (a doctrine which the Manicheans, being Docetæ, could not admit in the proper sense) is made a symbol of the birth of the Jesus patibilis from the virgin womb of the earth, through the informing power of the Holy Spirit: "Spiritus sancti, qui est majestas tertia, aëris hunc omnem ambitum fedem fatemur ac diversorium, cujus ex viribus ac spiritali profusione terram quoque concipientem gignere patibilem Jesum, qui est vita ac salus hominum, omni suspensus ex ligno. Quapropter et nobis circa universum (all the products of nature, as forms of the manifestation of the same divine principle suffering in the bondage of nature, of the same Jesus patibilis), et vobis similiter erga panem et calicem par religio est." Augustin. c. Faust. lib. XX.

at length, deprived of all its stolen light, the kingdom of darkness was in danger of being ere long left to its own intrinsic hatefulness and death. What was to be done? A being must be created, in whom the soul of nature, which was ever striving after liberty, might be securely bound and imprisoned—in whom might converge all the scattered light and life of nature, all that the powers of darkness still held imprisoned in their members, and which was being gradually taken from them by the powers of the sun. This is *man*, the image of that primitive man—destined by his very form for dominion over nature.\* The work was thus carried on:—That majestic shape of light, the primitive man (which probably also belonged to the Son of Man enthroned in the sun),† shines down from the sun into the kingdom of darkness, or material nature. The powers of darkness are seized with longing after the shape of light, but at the same time with dismay. Upon this their prince addresses them:—“What think you of that great light that yonder breaks forth? Behold how it shakes the pole, how it strikes to the ground so many of our potentates! It will be prudent in you therefore to give to me whatever light you may have in your power, and I will make an image of that lofty one who has shown himself so glorious, and by its means we shall be able to rule, and one day to liberate ourselves from our abode in darkness.” By this means human nature in this world of darkness is the image of a higher existence; an image by which the higher existence itself is to be attracted to it and held fast in its domain. When the spirits of darkness heard this speech, and had held a long deliberation, they deemed it best to comply with his desire, *for they had no confidence that they would long be able to retain this light among themselves.*‡ They thought it expedient, therefore, to intrust it to their prince, since they doubted not that in this way they would be able to attain to supremacy. The powers of darkness now intermarry and produce children, in whom the common powers and natures of the parents are once more represented; and in whom is reproduced all that they themselves possess of the essence

\* Compare the kindred doctrine of the Ophites.

† Alexand. Lycopolit. c. 4: Εἰκόνα δὲ ἐν ἡλίῳ ἑωρᾶσθαι τοιαύτην, οὗ ἐστι τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶδος.

‡ That is the main point.

of darkness and of light. These children, however, are devoured by the prince of darkness, who thus concentrates in himself all the substance of light that had been dispersed among the several powers of darkness. Thereupon he generates *man*, in whom all the powers of the kingdom of darkness and of light, which had been thus mixed together, are consequently united. Man is therefore a microcosm,—a copy of the entire world of light and darkness, a mirror of all the powers of heaven and of the earth.\* And this procedure is a fact that continually recurs in the course of nature; for at the birth of every man, the wild forces of matter, the powers of darkness, intermingle for his production, thus mixing together in human nature whatever they possess of the higher and of the lower life, endeavouring to retain the soul of nature, which is held captive by them, and which is striving to get free.

In this portion of Manichean doctrine it is necessary to distinguish the symbolic and mythical forms of representation, adopted from the imagery of Parsism, from the fundamental ideas corresponding to the doctrines of Buddhism, and clearly apprehended as such by Mani. Mani says himself that what then transpired is still repeated at the generation of each man, wherein the evil nature—matter—which forms the human body, absorbs the powers of light, in order to form man by this intermingling of the powers of light and darkness.† From these words it is quite clear that in the work of the prince of darkness, as represented in that fiction, the operation by which man is formed in the laboratory of spirit-absorbing

\* Mani, in the seventh book of the work bearing the title of *The-saurus* (cited in Augustin. *De natura boni*, c. 46) says, “*Construebantur et contexebantur omnium imagines, cœlestium ac terrenarum virtutum; ut pleni videlicet orbis id, quod formabatur, similitudinem obtineret.*” We have followed that construction of the Manichean system which Mosheim disputes, which makes it teach that man was formed at a later period than the rest of nature, for the very purpose of holding fast the fleeting soul in nature. In favour of this view are almost all the passages in our fragmentary sources of information, and the whole analogy of the Manichean system confirms it. Comp. Baur’s work on the Manichean system of religion, p. 120, ff. One passage from Alexander of Lycopolis, which I formerly thought militated against this view, has been correctly explained by Baur.

† Augustin. *De natura boni*, c. 46: *Sicuti etiam nunc fieri videmus, corporum formatricem naturam mali inde vires sumentem figurare, ita etiam antedictus princeps, &c.*



nature is meant to be symbolically exhibited. It is, perhaps, only another mythical mode of representing the same idea, when it is said that the powers of darkness, in order to escape the threatened doom of a total deprivation of spirit, which would be their utter destruction, and in order to detain the spirit in their own region, combine to create man, probably after the image of the heavenly, primitive man, in the hope that this form might exercise an entrancing power over the soul, which is ever striving to return to its original source, and that thus the latter might still be bound to the earth;\* just as, according to the Buddhistic doctrine, the prince of the Shinnus seeks, by various attractive and enticing objects, to detain the souls within his own kingdom, and to prevent them from elevating themselves to Nirwana. In all these forms of representation we find the same fundamental idea, marking the destiny by which the spirit is held bound to nature, but which, nevertheless, by passing through the transition-point of human organism is conducted onwards to freedom.

While the soul or essence of light, dispersed and broken up among the other kingdoms of nature, is prevented by the predominance of matter from becoming conscious of itself, that, on the other hand, which is concentrated in man, attains to a conscious and free development. It is in man that the spirit, which in the rest of nature is fettered by matter, is first released from these fetters, and in him returns to itself. In him first begins the realm of consciousness and of freedom, the spirit emancipated from the bonds of natural necessity. Man, therefore, in the Manichean, as in the Buddhistic system, occupies the loftiest position;—he forms the transition-point (whose condition is freedom of action) to a complete disenthralment of the

\* See Titus of Bostra, in the preface to the third book of his work against the Manicheans (in Canisii lect. antiqu. ed. Basnage, Antwerp, 1725, T. I. f. 137): *Ἐκαστος τῶν τῆς ὕλης ἀρχόντων ἐμόρφωσιν ἑαυτὸν εἰς θῆραμα τῆς ψυχῆς*,—and of Adam, as their production, *ὄργανον ἐπιθυμίας καὶ δίλαρ τῶν ἀνωθεν ψυχῶν*. And that a something is here represented as once beginning, which continually perpetuates itself in the generation of men, appears from what Mani says in his letter to the virgin Menoch, cited by Augustin. opus imperfect. contra Julian. l. III. c. 174: *Sicut auctor animarum Deus est, ita corporum auctor per concupiscentiam diabolus est, ut in viscatorio (analogous to that former bait whereby the souls were charmed into bodies), per concupiscentiam mulieris, unde diabolus aucupatur, &c.*

spirit, which, rising above the cycle of metempsychosis, reunites with the kingdom of light. According to the Buddhist system, he is the transition-point which is necessary to becoming Nirwana.\*

As the universal mundane soul seeks in the great mundane bodies to subject to itself matter in the mass, so the human soul, which is of the same origin with it, is to rule this corporeal world in detail. "The first soul," said Mani, "which flowed from the God of light, received this structure of the body for the purpose of subduing it by its own bridle."† The soul of the first man, as standing yet nearer to the original fountain of the kingdom of light, was consequently endowed with preëminent faculties.

But the first man, like each of his descendants, consisted of two opposite elements—a soul still living in the full possession of its original power, springing from and akin to the kingdom of light,‡ and a body derived from the kingdom of darkness, with a soul in affinity with it, and also a blind, material faculty of desire originating in the same source—the wild power of nature that resists the godlike (the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  ἀλογος).§ This

\* According to the Buddhist doctrine, man is in this respect superior even to the gods, who enjoy a life of serene blessedness, enduring through many periods of the world; for, like all other individual existence, the life even of the gods must some time or other come to an end, for it is only in Nirwana that an eternal rest from all possible change is to be found. By the brief duration of his existence, and the multifarious trials and sufferings which fall to his lot, man is admonished to strive after that higher end. But the gods, through default of such admonition, are easily drawn away from that highest end, and become so fettered to their individual existence (which also is one of the changeable forms of the spirit) as to forget to aspire to anything beyond it. To man, in this world of trials and conflicts, various means are given of rendering himself—by a series of meritorious works, actions conditioning destiny—worthy of the Nirwana; but to the gods these opportunities are wanting. See Schmidt's Essays, above cited, Vol. II. p. 37. 1834.

† *Operæ pretium est, advertere, quia prima anima, quæ a Deo luminis manavit, accepit fabricam istam corporis, ut eam fræno suo regeret.* Mani's words, in his letter to the virgin Menoch, in August. opus imperfect. c. Julian. lib. III. s. 186, T. X. opp. ed. Benedictin. P. II. f. 1122, Paris, 1690.

‡ *Quasi de primæ factæ flore substantiæ (namely, lucis Dianæ), says Mani, in his letter to a certain Patricius. L. c.*

§ Baur has endeavoured to show that the hypothesis of two souls in man (which cannot be demonstrated from the words of Mani himself to

element, akin to the realm of darkness, supplied a channel for the introduction of its influences. The powers of darkness now perceive that the light-nature, by concentrating itself in man, has become more powerful. They therefore again resort to the same artifices by which at first they sought to detain within their rule the element of light which had fallen into it, in order to keep under their ban this spirit concentrated in the human nature, which threatened to free itself from the bonds of matter, and to mount upward to its original source. They must therefore seek to attach him, by every possible enticement, to the lower world. They invited man, as it is symbolically expressed, to partake of all the fruits of the trees of Paradise. Only they desired to hinder him from eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; that is, they wished to suppress the consciousness of all that is in harmony with his true nature, and of all that is in contradiction to it. They wished in short to make him worldly. But an angel of light, or Christ himself (the Spirit of the sun), counteracted their artifices. This was the truth to be found in the account of Paradise and the forbidden fruit, considered from the Manichean point of view. In this picture of that earliest record they recognised simply the influence of the evil principle, thus reversing the several parts, and asserting that what ought to have been ascribed to the powers of darkness was transferred to God, while what belonged to the Genius of light was applied to the serpent, the symbol of Ahriman.\*

be a Manichean doctrine) does not belong to the system. It may be, perhaps, that the expression "two souls" is something foreign to Manicheism; since, according to Mani's doctrine, soul, spirit, light, god-like, are identical notions. But the thing itself (which the opponents of Manicheism, looking at it from *their own* point of view, may have designated with this name),—the hypothesis, viz., of such a motive principle in affinity with matter, the source of sinful desires,—agrees perfectly with the Manichean system.

\* This view of the matter we must ascribe to Mani, if what is cited as spoken from the Manichean point of view (in the preface to the third book of Titus of Bostra against the Manicheans, towards the end) may be taken to contain the thoughts of Mani himself. At least, I cannot see anything therein, as Baur professes to do, which is incongruous with the other ideas of Mani; but as I have explained it (keeping Baur's objections in view), it seems to me to agree perfectly well with Mani's general character of mind and train of thought. Still, I allow it does not form a necessary member of the Manichean system, and possibly some later writer

When the powers of darkness witnessed the consequent defeat of their plots against the spirit of light which had been concentrated in human nature, and which they sought, by every possible charm, to hold captive within the bonds of nature, they made trial of another expedient. Through his associate Eve, they seduced the first man to abandon himself to fleshly appetites, and thereby to prove faithless to his light-essence, and make himself the slave of nature. The consequence was that the soul, which by its original powers might have risen to the kingdom of light, became divided by propagation, and was bound once more to a material body, so that the powers of darkness were enabled continually to repeat that which they had done in producing the first man.

Since everything depended on man's learning to distinguish the two opposite elements of his nature, and since, according to the Manichean system, it is the doctrine of man's origin, combined with that of the origin of the world, which can alone furnish information on this point, Mani taught that it was of the utmost importance to obtain a right understanding of these doctrines. Accordingly, in his "epistle of the foundation," he says, "Had it been given to men to perceive clearly how it stood with the origin of Adam and Eve, they would not have been subjected to a transitory existence and to death." And hence he writes to the virgin Menoch,\* "May our God himself enlighten thy soul, and reveal to thee his justice, that thou art the fruit of a divine stock.† Even thou art become Light, since thou hast known what thou wert before, from what race of souls thou art sprung—which race, intermixed with all bodies, is connected with numberless forms; for as souls are begotten of souls, so the structure of the body is composed of the nature of body. What is born of the flesh, then, is flesh, and what is born of the spirit is spirit. But know that the spirit is the soul—soul from

may have given this exposition of the record in Genesis from a Manichean point of view. Moreover, Augustin favours the supposition that this was the Manichean doctrine (*de Genesi contra Manicheos*, lib. II. s. 39): *Sic isti credunt, quod serpens ille Christus fuerit, et Deum, nescio quem, gentis tenebrarum, illud præceptum dedisse confingunt, tanquam invideret hominibus scientiam boni et mali.*

\* Augustin. *opus imperfect.* c. Julian. lib. III. s. 172.

† The revelation consists precisely in this, that man is brought to a consciousness of his light-nature.



soul, flesh from flesh.” \* He appealed to the practice of infant baptism—a practice, therefore, which by this time must have become general in the Persian church—as a proof that Christians themselves implied by their practice the existence of such a stain in human nature. “I ask them,” says he, in the letter above cited,† “is all sin actual sin? Why, then, does an individual receive the cleansing by water before he has done any sinful act; when of and by *himself* he has contracted no guilt? But if he has done no wrong, and yet must be cleansed, then by this action they themselves do testify to the derivation from an evil stock. Yes, those very persons do so whose fatuity keeps them from understanding what they say or what they do.”

The light-spirit concentrated in Adam is the primal source from which all human souls descend; through, however, its continual division and mixture with matter, the spirit has lost much of the original power which it had when it gushed fresh from the kingdom of light. That original power of the free light-nature is what the law, in order to its old fulfilment, presupposes. “The law is holy,” said Mani, “but it is a holy law for *the holy soul*; the commandment is just and good,—but it is so for the *just and good soul*.” ‡ In another place,§ he says, “If we do good, it is not a work of the flesh, for the works of the flesh are manifest, Galat. v. 19; or if we do evil, it is not the work of the soul, for the fruit of the spirit is peace, joy. And the apostle to the Romans exclaims, ‘The good that I would, that do I not; but the evil that I would not, that do I.’ There you hear the voice of the struggling soul, defending her freedom against the slavery of lust; for she is pained that sin, that is, Satan, should work in her all manner of concupiscence. The authority of the law discovers to her evil; by the authority of the law she is first brought to the consciousness of evil—since it condemns the works of lust, which the flesh admires and prizes; for all the bitterness which is felt in renouncing lust is sweet to the soul

\* According to his system of light-emanation, Mani could make no distinction between the Spirit of God and the spirit of man,—between spirit and soul. This again coincides entirely with the Buddhistic doctrine.

† Augustin. opus imperfect. c. Julian. lib. III. s. 187.

‡ L. c. s. 186.

§ L. c. s. 177.

—it is that by which she is nurtured and attains to strength. In fine, the soul of that man who abstains from all the pleasures of lust is wakeful, grows, and becomes mature; but by the gratifications of lust the soul is wont to be enfeebled.”\* Now, to procure the final deliverance of the kindred soul from the power of darkness, to quicken it anew, to give it the complete victory over the evil principle, and raise it upward to himself, it was necessary that in humanity there should reveal itself the same Spirit of the Sun, the Mithra-Spirit, which had thus far conducted the whole refining process of nature, and of the spiritual world,—both of which, according to the principles of Mani’s system, as explained above, constituted one whole.†

But there can be no communion between light and darkness. “The light shines in the darkness,” said Mani, (explaining in accordance with his own views the words of St. John,) “but the darkness comprehends it not. The Son of primeval light, the Spirit of the Sun, was incapable of entering into any union with a material body; he only clothed himself in a seeming sensible form, in order that he might be perceived by sensual men.” “The Supreme Light,” he says, in another fragment,‡ “when it placed itself on a level with its own, also assumed a body among material bodies, although itself is all, and but one nature.” In defence of his Docetism he cited the fact (explained after his own arbitrary manner) that, on a certain occasion when the Jews would have stoned him, Christ, passed through the multitude: also, that at his transfiguration Christ appeared to the disciples in his true form of light.§ Jesus did not assume the title of Christ, or Messiah, except by a catachresis, and in accommodation to the notions of the Jews.|| The

\* Augustin. opus imperfect. c. Julian. lib. III. s. 177.

† Concerning the incarnations of the sun in the old oriental systems of religion, see Creutzer’s Symbolik, last ed. Vol. II. pp. 53, 207. It was in perfect accordance with the Manichean system that the Manicheans, cited in Alexander of Lycopolis (c. 21), said, Christ as the νοῦς is τὰ ὄντα πάντα. So too, in the Acta Thomæ, p. 10: Κύριε, ὁ ἐν πᾶσιν ὢν, καὶ διερχόμενος διὰ πάντων, καὶ ἐγκείμενος πᾶσι τοῖς ἔργοις σου, καὶ διὰ τῆς πάντων ἐνεργείας φανερούμενος.

‡ In the letter to a certain Adas or Addas. Fabricii Biblioth. græc. ed. nov. Vol. VII. f. 316.

§ See the fragments from Mani’s letters. L. c.

|| Ἡ τοῦ Χριστοῦ προσηγορία ὀνομά ἐστι καταχρηστικόν. L. c.

prince of darkness sought to bring about the crucifixion of Jesus, not being aware that he was superior to all suffering; the crucifixion was, of course, a mere semblance. This seeming transaction symbolized the crucifixion of the soul, sunk in matter, which the Spirit of the Sun designed to raise to itself. As the crucifixion of that soul which was dispersed through all matter contributed only to the destruction of the kingdom of darkness, so, but in a far higher degree, was this the effect of the *seeming* crucifixion of the *Supreme Soul*. Accordingly, Mani said, "The adversary, who hoped to crucify the Saviour, the Father of the righteous, was crucified himself. What seemed to be done in this case is one thing; what was *really* done, another." \* The Manichean theory, which represented the doctrine of Christ as a mere symbol, is clearly set forth in an apocryphal *account of the travels of the apostles*.† To St. John, afflicted at the suffering of his Master, Christ appears and tells him that all had been done simply for the sake of the lower populace‡ in Jerusalem. The human person of Christ now vanishes, and instead of it appears a cross of pure light, surrounded by a countless multitude of other forms, still representing, however, but one shape and one image (a symbol of the various manifestations of one and the same soul). A divine voice, full of sweetness, issues from the cross, saying to him, "The cross of light is, for your sakes, sometimes called the Word, sometimes Christ; sometimes the Door, sometimes the Way; sometimes the Bread, sometimes the Sun; sometimes the Resurrection, sometimes Jesus; sometimes the Father, sometimes the Spirit; sometimes the Life, sometimes the Truth; sometimes Faith, and sometimes Grace."

Siding with the advocates of an absolute Dualism among the Persians, Mani held the aim and purpose of the whole mundane development to be, not a reconciliation of the good and the evil principles—a supposition which would have been in-

\* From the epistola fundamenti, Euod. de fide, c. 28: Τὴν δύναμιν τὴν θείαν ἐνημερόσθαι, ἐνισταυρῶσθαι τῇ ὕλῃ. Alex. Lycopolit. c. 4: Christus in omni mundo et omni anima crucifixus. Secundin. ep. ad Augustin. The words of the Manichean Faustus, Augustin. c. Faustum, lib. 32: Crucis ejus mystica fixio, qua nostræ animæ passionis monstrantur vulnera.

† Περὶ ὁδοῦ ἀποστόλων. Concil. Nic. II. Actio V. ed. Mansi. T. XIII. f. 167.

‡ Τῷ κάτω ὄχλῳ.

consistent with his theory—but (in accordance with his Buddhist doctrine) a total separation of the light from the darkness, and the reduction of the latter to utter impotence. Matter, after having been deprived of all its foreign light and life, was by fire to be converted into an inert mass.\* All souls were able, by their luminous nature, to participate in the redemption; but if they voluntarily surrendered themselves to the service of sin or darkness, they would, in punishment, be banished, at the general separation of the two kingdoms, to the dead mass of matter, and stationed there as sentinels over it. On this point Mani, in his *epistola fundamenti*, thus expressed himself: “The souls that have allowed themselves by the love of the world to be seduced from their original nature of light, and have become enemies to the holy light,—all who, openly arming themselves to destroy the holy elements, and having entered into the service of the fiery spirit, have, by their deadly persecution of the holy church,† and of the elect who are found therein,‡ oppressed the observers of the heavenly commandments,—all such will be precluded from the blessedness and glory of the holy earth. And since they have allowed themselves to be overcome by evil, they shall for ever abide with this race of evil; so that the peaceful earth and the realms of immortality shall be shut against them. This shall happen to them because they have so devoted themselves to evil works as to become alienated from the life and freedom of the holy light. They will not be able, then, to find admittance into that kingdom of peace, but shall be chained to that frightful mass (of matter or darkness left to itself) over which a watch is also necessary. These souls, therefore, shall continue to cleave to the things they have loved, since they did not separate themselves from them when the opportunity arose.”§ It is clear that, in his doctrine of the last things, Mani did not agree either with Buddhism or with the Zoroastrian or the Christian system, but, by the fusion of the three, formed a peculiar theory of his own.

With regard to the views of the Manicheans on the *sources*

\* Tit. Bostr. I. c. 30. Alex. Lycopolit. c. 5.

† That is, the Manichean sect.

‡ Persecution of the Brahmins of the Manicheans, the Electi, was a crime of peculiar die, wholly in accordance with the oriental ideas of the priests.

§ De fide, c. 4.



*of religious knowledge*, they considered the revelations of the Paraclete, or Mani, as the highest and only infallible authority, whereby everything else was to be judged. They proceeded on the principle that Mani's doctrine embraced all absolute truths which enlighten the reason ;—whatever did not accord with them was contrary to reason, wherever it might be found. They received, it is true, in part, the scriptures of the New Testament ; but, to judge them by that supreme principle, in their doctrinal and practical exposition they indulged in the most arbitrary criticism.\* Partly they asserted that the original records of the religion had been falsified by various interpolations of the prince of darkness (the tares among the wheat) ; † partly that Jesus and his apostles had accommodated themselves to existing Jewish opinions, with a view gradually to prepare men for the reception of pure truth ; partly, that the apostles themselves, when they first came forward as teachers, were still entangled in many errors of Judaism. Hence they concluded that it was by the teachings of the Paraclete that men were first enabled to distinguish the true from the false in the New Testament. The Manichean Faustus lays down the principles of Manicheism on this point as follows : ‡ “ Of the New Testament we receive only what is said to the honour of the Son of glory, either by Himself or by His apostles ; and by the latter only after they had become perfect and believers. As for the rest, whatever was said by the apostles, either in their simplicity and ignorance, while they were yet inexperienced in the truth, or, with malicious design, inserted by the enemy among the truth, or incautiously asserted by authors § and transmitted to posterity,—of all this we desire to know nothing. I mean all such as this—that he was shamefully born of a woman ; that he was circumcised as a Jew ; that he offered sacrifices like a heathen ; that he was meanly baptized, led into the wilderness, and miserably tempted.” These same Manicheans, who slavishly submitted their reason to all the assertions of Mani, as to so many divine revelations,

\* This was said of them already by Titus of Bostra, in the beginning of his third book.

† See, above, the similar principles of the Clementines respecting the Old Testament.

‡ Apud Augustin. lib. XXXII.

§ Namely, the authors of the gospels who were not apostles.

were zealous for the rights of reason, and set themselves up as being alone *rational*, asserting that they only knew how to discern in the New Testament what was consistent with, and what was repugnant to, reason. The Manichean Faustus says to him who without inquiry believes whatever is contained in the New Testament, "*Thou who blindly believest everything, who banishest from humanity reason, that gift of nature, who makest it a matter of conscience to decline judging between the true and the false; thou that art as afraid of separating the good from its opposite as children are of a ghost!*" \*

The Manichean sect had a constitution of their own, suited to the distinction of esoterical and exoterical which prevails in the old religions of Asia;—the twofold mode of representation already described being based, in truth, on such a distinction within the sect itself. Mani, as must be evident from our previous remarks, differed altogether from most of the founders of Gnostic sects. The latter did not wish to alter anything in the existing Christian church; they desired only to add to the confession of faith for the *ψυχικοί* a secret doctrine for the *πνευματικοί*. Mani, on the other hand, wished to be regarded as a man of God, a reformer of the whole church, invested with divine authority. He sought to give a new shape to the whole church, which in his view had in every part degenerated † in consequence of the corrupt intermixture of Judaism with Christianity. There was to be but *one true Christian church*, and this was to be modelled after the doctrines and principles of Mani. Within this church there were two distinct grades. The great body, consisting of the exoterics, were to constitute the *Auditors*. To them the writings of Mani might indeed be read, and his doctrines presented in their symbolical and mythical form; but they were to receive no explanation of their inner meaning. The pitch of expectation may easily be imagined to which these Auditors were likely to be raised by hearing such enigmatical, mysteriously sounding things, and hoped, as usually happens, to find lofty wisdom in what was so obscure and unintelligible. The

\* Augustin. c. Faust. lib. XVIII., also lib. XI.

† Hence he called other Christians, not Christians, but Galileans. Fabric. Bibl. græc. vol. VII. f. 316.

Esoterics were the Elect or Perfect,\*—the sacerdotal caste, the Brahmins of the Manicheans.† According to the Manichean doctrine, they held a very important place in the great refining process; they formed the link of transition between the earthly world, the circle of the metempsychosis, and the kingdom of light (between the world of Sansara and the Nirwana);—they were those who had yet to pass through the last stadium of the purification of the spirit in redeeming itself from the bondage of nature. To this position their mode of life must answer; it must be an utter estrangement from the world, in the Buddhist sense, which was applied to Christian asceticism. They were to possess no worldly property, but were bound to lead in celibacy a strictly ascetic and contemplative life, abstaining from all strong drinks and from all animal food. They were to maintain a holy innocence that injured no living thing, and a religious reverence for the divine life which was diffused through all nature; they were, therefore, to refrain, not only from destroying or harming any animal, but even from pulling up a herb, or plucking a fruit or a flower. The whole round of their austere life was marked by three particulars, the *signaculum oris*, the *signaculum manuum*, and the *signaculum sinus*.‡ The Auditors were to see that they should be provided with all that was necessary for their subsistence, and to reverence them as beings of a superior order. They were to look upon them as their mediators with the kingdom of light. By the proofs of their love to the Elect the Auditors were to gain fellowship with perfection; and the defects adhering to them in consequence of their less rigid life would be made up thereby;—and among these defects were the neglecting to spare the life of animals or vegetables, and the eating of flesh. All this, however, was to be repaired by their sharing their own means of subsistence with the Elect.§ The importance attached by Buddhism to

\* *Τέλσιον*, according to Theodoretus,—a term which recurs once more among the Gnostic Manichean sects of the middle age.

† Faustus, quoted by Augustin, calls them the sacerdotal genus.

‡ See, *e. g.*, Augustinus de moribus Manichæorum, c. 10 et seq. The word *signaculum* seems to me to denote here, not a sign, but a seal, a means of safe keeping, as a translation of the Greek *σφραγίς*, applied, for instance, to the rite of confirmation.

§ To this Ephræm Syrus refers when he accuses the Manicheans of bestowing absolution in return for the bread given to them. See the

the offices of love which the pious might show to the Buddhas during their manifestations in a human shape was transferred by the Manicheans to the kind offices shown by the Auditors to the Elect. Moreover, according to the Buddhistic doctrine, by repeated kind offices of this sort, shown in the different modes of human existence which he had passed through in the metempsychosis, any one might gradually accumulate such a store of good works as to rise at length to the dignity of a Buddha.\*

From this sacerdotal class were chosen the presidents of the whole religious society. As Mani wished to be regarded as the Paraclete promised by Christ, he therefore, after Christ's example, chose twelve apostles. This regulation continued as long as the sect; and twelve persons, with the title of Magistri, had the government of the whole sect. At the head of these was placed a thirteenth, who, as the head of the sect, represented Mani. Subordinate to these, there were seventy-two bishops, answering to the seventy-two (the seventy) disciples of Jesus; † and under these last were presbyters, deacons, and lastly travelling missionaries.‡

As to the *mode of celebrating the sacraments* among the Manicheans, this is a matter involved in much obscurity. This difficulty arises from the very natural fact that no trustworthy account existed of what was administered only to the secret assemblies of the Elect; for as the Auditors answered to the catechumens in the dominant church, and the Elect to the Fideles, it is plain that the sacraments would be administered among none but the Elect. The argument already noticed, which Mani drew from the existing practice of infant baptism, has led—though wrongly, as Mosheim has shown—to the inference that the baptism of infants was practised among the Manicheans; but in this place Mani is simply refuting his opponents by appealing to their own practice as proof of a principle which it necessarily presupposed; without

extracts published by A. F. W. von Wegner, in his work *de Manichæorum indulgentiis*, Lips. 1827, p. 69 et seq.

\* Comp. Schmidt's Dissertation on the thousand Buddhas, in the *Memoirs of the Academy of St. Petersburg*. VI. series, T. II. A. D. 1834, p. 88, &c.

† According to the well-known various reading.

‡ Augustin. *de hæres.* c. 32.



however expressing any approbation of the practice itself. And it may also be questioned whether Mani would not object to this symbol as a Jewish rite derived from John the Baptist.\* Perhaps at first no other form of initiation prevailed among the Manicheans than the one which we afterwards meet with in the middle ages among the kindred sect of the Cathari. As to the *celebration of the Lord's supper*—it was easy to give it an explanation which should accord with the principles of their mystical philosophy of nature.† Augustin, while he was a Manichean Auditor, had learned that the *Elect* celebrated the Lord's supper; but of the way he knew nothing.‡ All that is certain is that the Elect drank no wine; whether they used water, like the Encratites (the so-called ὑδροπαρασάται), or how else they managed it, it is impossible to say. For the sake of mutual recognition, the Manicheans were

\* From the words of the Manichean Felix, lib. I. c. 19, *ut quid baptizati sumus?* it cannot be proved that the Manicheans looked upon baptism as a necessary ceremony of initiation. For in this case too the Manichean is employing the argumentum ad hominem; and very possibly he may have received baptism before he joined the Manichean sect. Nor again, from the passage in the *commonitorium, quomodo sit agendum cum Manichæis* (found in the Appendix to the 8th vol. of the Benedictine edition of Augustine), where a distinction is made between those Manicheans who, joined to the Catholic church, were received among the catechumens, and those who, having been already baptized, were received among the Pœnitentes, can it certainly be inferred that baptism was a customary rite among the Manicheans. And still less from the fact that a distinction of the same kind is made between the baptized and the unbaptized among the Elect themselves upon their joining the Catholic church, can it be argued that baptism was received by *such* of the Elect as chose it of their own free will. For here too the reference may have been to such persons as, before they joined the Manicheans, had been baptized in the Catholic church. Neither does it in any wise follow, from the passage in Augustin, *de moribus ecclesiæ*, c. 35 (where he represents the Manicheans as objecting to the Catholic Christians that the fideles et jam baptizati lived in the state of marriage, and in the family relation, possessing and managing worldly property), that there were among the Elect a certain class of persons voluntarily baptized, who were alone bound by an inviolable vow to a strictly ascetic life; for the fideles and baptizati—both terms being exactly synonymous—answer generally to the Electi among the Manicheans. Mosheim's distinction, therefore, between baptized and unbaptized Electi, which in itself is not a very natural one, appears to be altogether arbitrary.

† In accordance with the idea that the fruits of the earth represented the Son of man crucified in nature. See above.

‡ Augustin. *contra Fortunatum*, lib. I. Appendix.

accustomed, whenever they met, to give each other the right hand, in token of their common deliverance from the kingdom of darkness by the right hand of the redeeming Spirit of the Sun—since what happened to their heavenly father, the original man, had in their case been repeated; as he was on the point of sinking into the kingdom of darkness, he was rescued by the right hand of the living spirit.\*

With regard to their *festivals*: the Manicheans celebrated the Sunday of every week, not on account of its reference to the resurrection of Christ, for that would have been inconsistent with their Docetism, but as the day consecrated to the Sun, which was in fact their Christ.† On it they fasted, —contrary to the prevailing practice of the church. The Christmas festival was, of course, equally out of harmony with Manichean Docetism. If occasionally, according to the statement of Augustin, they conformed to the practice of the general church in celebrating the *festival of Easter*, we may suppose that it was but coldly observed by them, for they could not be affected by those feelings which rendered the day so sacred to other Christians. Far greater, however, was the respect which they paid to the festival of the martyrdom of their master, Mani, which fell in the month of March. It was called βῆμα, (suggestus, cathedra,) the feast of the pulpit,—the feast in remembrance of the divinely enlightened teacher. On this occasion a gorgeous and ornamented pulpit, ascended by five steps (symbolizing perhaps the five elements) and decorated with costly drapery, was usually set up in their places of assembling. To this all the Manicheans paid obeisance, after the custom of the East, by prostrating themselves on the ground.‡

As concerns the *moral character* of the Manichean sect, we possess too scanty information as to its *early followers* (and in the history of a sect its different periods should be carefully distinguished in this respect) to be able to pass any precise judgment. All that seems clear is, that Mani aimed at a strict system of morals; but without doubt the mystical language of the sect, which occasionally verges on immodesty,

\* Disputat. Archelai. c. 7.

† Besides many other places, comp. Augustin. c. Faustum, lib. XVIII. c. 5: Vos in die, quem dicunt solis, solem colitis.

‡ Augustin. contra ep. fundamenti, c. 8; c. Faustum, lib. XVIII. c. 5.

had a tendency, in the case of the uneducated, to lead to a sensual fanaticism dangerous to morality.

No sooner had the Manicheans begun to gain ground in the Roman empire than a violent persecution broke out against them. As a sect which had its origin in the Persian empire, then at war with the Romans, and in some sense allied to the Parsic religion, they were an object of peculiar hatred to the Roman government. The Emperor Dioclesian, A.D. 296, issued a law against them (already quoted in the first section of this history) condemning its leaders to the stake, and punishing its adherents, if they belonged to the common order, with decapitation and the confiscation of their property.\*

\* The edict, in its style both of thought and language, contains every internal mark of authenticity. It is scarcely possible to imagine by whom and for what purpose such an edict, in this particular form, could have been forged. A Christian, had he wished to fabricate an edict of this sort, with a view to excite succeeding emperors to persecute the Manicheans, certainly would not have chosen Dioclesian; and still less would he have put such language into his mouth. Though the later Christians had much that was analogous to the old heathen way of thinking about a dominant religion handed down from the Fathers, yet a Christian would never have expressed himself after this peculiar fashion.

What is there to forbid us supposing that the Manicheans had even thus early extended themselves to proconsular Africa, especially since the *Gnostics* had already paved the way for them, and as it is certain that Manicheans were at an *early* date to be found in these countries, and the chronology of the early history of this sect is so uncertain? Though the law runs, "si qui sane etiam honorati aut cujuslibet dignitatis vel majoris personæ ad hanc sectam se transtulerunt," it does not necessarily follow from this that the emperor had certain information of the spread of the doctrines of this sect among persons of the *highest* rank; and in the next place, considering the prevalent rage at that time among people of rank (a class ever prone to seize on anything which would distinguish their religion from that of other people) for theurgical speculations, and for fuller insight into the world of spirits, it would be nothing singular if a mysterious scheme of faith with high pretensions like this should meet with a welcome reception among them. The argumentum e silentio is, moreover, very unsafe in historical criticism, unless supported by other considerations; and the assertion that the older fathers make no mention of a law by Dioclesian, directed particularly against the Manicheans, may be very easily accounted for. But, in fact, this law is referred to by the Hilary who wrote a commentary on St. Paul's epistles, in ep. II. Timoth. III. 7.

### III. *Doctrine of the Catholic Church, as it proceeded to form itself in opposition to the Sects.*

A.—*Genetical Development of the Church Theology in general. Character of the several individual tendencies of the religious and dogmatic spirit, which exercised special influences on it.*

Having hitherto considered the different tendencies of the heretical element which grew up out of the reaction of ante-Christian principles, we shall now proceed to inquire how the development of the church theology in general, and in its several particular modifications, was affected by this opposition. If by the various heresies the unity of Christianity was split up into many opposite and mutually exclusive theories, the theology of the church, on the other hand, was eminently distinguished by the fact that in it the unity of the Christian consciousness asserted itself much more powerfully, so as to repress all extreme oppositions of doctrine. But even here, owing to the strong propensity in man's nature to narrow and exclusive views, the higher, comprehending unity necessarily resolved itself into oppositions of a subordinate kind—oppositions which, while they remained rooted in the essence of Christianity, might approximate to the position either of Judaism or of Gnosticism. The less call there was for the church, once raised to independence, to defend its principles in conflict with Judaism, while it had rather to assert them against Gnosticism, the more easy would it become for a Jewish element imperceptibly to gain possession of the theological intellect, and that too without being communicated from without, but, as we saw while tracing the history of the church constitution and of Christian worship, spontaneously springing up from within. Gnosticism, again, might be resisted in two different ways—either by an uncompromising hostility, which would refuse to recognise in it a single element of truth, and consequently would itself be liable to fall into some opposite extreme of error; or by such a method as should leave room for recognising alongside of the error a fundamental truth,—a true spiritual need, which was seeking there its satisfaction, whereas it was to be found in Christianity alone. And, in truth, Gnosticism could be effectually vanquished by no method but one,—that which should separate the true from the false, and should satisfy the spiritual need,



which, from being unrecognised and unsatisfied, had either originated or promoted the spread of Gnosticism. Yet even in this course there was the great danger lest, in the very effort to appropriate whatever of truth there was in Gnosticism, some of its errors might also be unintentionally included.

The two main tendencies of the theological intellect here denoted correspond to the two tendencies which, in the Christian process of transforming the world, necessarily go together, but of which either one or the other is ever wont to predominate—the world-resisting and the world-appropriating tendency of the Christian mind. The undue predominance of either has, in truth, its own peculiar dangers. And this stands connected with another contrariety. Christianity is based upon a supernatural revelation; but this revelation requires to be appropriated and understood by the organ of a reason which submits to it, since it is not destined to remain a mere extrinsic fact to the human mind. The supernatural element must be understood in its organic connection with the natural, which in the former finds its own fulfilment and completion. The fact of redemption, indeed, has for its very end and aim the removal of the gulf between the supernatural and the natural; the fact of the incarnation had in view the humanization of the divine, and the deification of the human. Hence there will ever exist two tendencies of the theological mind, evidently corresponding to the two we have just described, of which, while the one will seek to understand and represent the supernatural element of Christianity in its opposition to the natural, the other will endeavour to point out its connection with it. The one will seek to apprehend the supernatural and supra-rational element as *such*; the other will strive to apprehend it in its harmony with reason and nature—to portray to the mind the supernatural and supra-rational as being nevertheless conformable to nature and to reason. Thus there is formed a predominance of the *supranaturalistic* or of the *rationalistic* element, both of which, however, in a sound and healthy development of Christian doctrine, ought to exist in due measure and proportion. And so, from the predominance of the one or the other of these elements, opposite dangers arise.

It is easy to see that, while Christian science must have its root in faith, and set out in the interest of faith, and while

faith, which ought to receive to itself and to animate all the faculties of the human mind, must seek to create, out of itself, a scientific intelligence, one or the other of these tendencies will be formed according to the proportion in which the corresponding interest predominates. Accordingly we must now consider how this alternative was determined by the existing circumstances and conditions of the national life and intellectual culture prevailing in the period which we are now examining.

The first thing that here presents itself to our notice is the difference of character between the two great nations from which the civilization of those times proceeded—the Greeks and the Romans. In the Greek predominated the activity of the intellect—the scientific, speculative element. Greece was, in fact, the birthplace of philosophy. The Roman character, on the other hand, was less mobile, more solid and more tenacious of old usages, and more devoted to the practical. Both these forms of mental character must also, in the shaping of Christian doctrine and theology, especially manifest themselves in different circumstances, operate favourably or unfavourably on the process of their development. For both these peculiarities of character correspond to the main tendencies above described; and the most beneficial result would have followed if they could have been so made to act as mutually to balance and check each other. Alexandria,—the principal seat of philosophical culture, where the Platonic philosophy, which of all is most nearly akin to the religious element, was then supreme—where, at a still earlier period, we saw a Jewish philosophy of religion spring up—by blending in the centuries now under consideration the elements of Grecian civilization with Christianity, gave birth to a tendency which sought to make the new matter which was given by revelation harmonize with the previous development of reason. From the school of St. John, in Asia Minor, on the other hand, a tendency had issued which, opposed to the speculative caprice of the Gnostics, sought to preserve faithfully the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, and, by holding fast their peculiarities, to secure them against all corruptions. And this tendency it was which Irenæus (who had been educated in Asia Minor, in the school of those venerable presbyters who had been disciples of the Apostle St. John) trans-

planted to the West. This Father was distinguished for the sobriety of his practical Christian intellect. He evinced a peculiarly sound and discriminating tact by readily seizing in every doctrine whatever was of practical moment, and, profoundly penetrated with a sense of the grandeur of God's works and of the limits of the human understanding, perseveringly opposed the humility of knowledge to the arrogant pretensions of Gnostic speculation. He formed the connecting link between the church of Asia Minor and that of Rome, and represented in his own case whatever was common to them both. But as in the Roman intellect the interest for the practical left no room for the scientific, the Western church was in want of an organ whereby its prevalent spirit might gain the scientific utterance it needed. This organ was supplied by the church of North Africa, which sent forth a man in whom the elements of the Roman and of the Carthaginian character mutually pervaded each other. Such was Tertullian, who, wanting the chasteness and sobriety of mind which distinguished Irenæus, could not, though an opponent of speculation, resist the impulses of a profound speculative intellect. To a thoroughly practical element he united a speculative one, which, destitute, however, of a regular logical form, long continued to operate in the Western church, through many intermediate writers, until it finally impregnated the mind of that great teacher of centuries, Augustin, in whom Tertullian once more appears under a brighter and more glorious form. A great impression was made on Tertullian's peculiar temperament by the remarkable phenomenon which sprang up in the very midst of that spiritual tendency we have already described as existing in Asia Minor, and which we may designate as the extreme of the anti-Gnostic position. We mean Montanism. Not only does it form an essential element of his mental character, but also it was by him that the principles which lie at the basis of this system were systematically developed, and made to influence the history of Western theology. To this important phenomenon therefore we must now direct our attention.

We should ill understand this result which grew out of the development of the church in the second century, if we were to consider as the principal point the personal character of the founder, by whom the first impulse was given to it. Montanus

was hardly a man of sufficient importance to dispose us to place him at the head of any new and grand movement. If, under the impulse of fanatical excitement, an uneducated individual, in whom we recognise at once the mental characteristics of the Phrygian, produced ultimately great effects, these without question outran the measure of his capacity. A Tertullian, as the person from whom this intellectual tendency received its systematic shape, will assume here a more important place. Not that any new spiritual elements were now freshly called into life; a nucleus at most was furnished for elements existing long before, and a point of attraction around which they might gather. Tendencies of mind which were scattered through the whole church here converged towards each other. Montanism points to kindred elements previously existing in all quarters. Accordingly, when the impulse was once given, it produced a great and general movement, since the way had already been prepared for it by the course of the internal development of the church itself. While, however, we are not disposed to rate very highly the importance of Montanus, we must guard against the error of allowing him none at all.\* But for the impulse given by Montanus, this whole movement, which produced such a stir in the minds of men, and which we admit cannot be explained from his influence alone, would perhaps never have arisen. We must therefore, in the first place, cast a glance at the state of development in the church to which Montanism attached itself, and at the general mental tendencies which had their ground in and were represented by it; and then we may, secondly, proceed to examine both the personal character of the author, and also what must be ascribed to him as its author.

It was as a supernatural power that Christianity first forced its way among mankind, and as such it first presents itself to us in the character of its effects. The immediateness of inspiration was more strongly marked then than in later times—by the gifts of supernatural healing, of speaking with tongues, of prophecy; those effects which suddenly displayed themselves after baptism. Such were the signs of the

\* As is often done by a fantastical sort of exaggeration, when persons whose real existence, though our knowledge of them is extremely deficient, is sufficiently accredited by history, are therefore represented as mythical personifications of general tendencies.



new creation of which human nature had been the subject. But this opposition between the supernatural and the natural was not always to last; it was to be done away by the progressive development of Christianity. To bring about the harmonious union of the supernatural and the natural was its ultimate aim; just as the final removal of this discord, which had its ground in sin, was to be among the more remote consequences of redemption. The new, divine power, which in its outward manifestations had originally shown itself as an immediate agent, was to enter the sphere of human instrumentality, and gradually to appropriate to itself those natural organs and means which, on its first appearance, were not as yet suited to it. The Apostle St. Paul had indeed pointed to such an aim, both when he admonished Christians to estimate the charismata, not by the extraordinary and supernatural appearances which so prominently marked their effects, but, on the contrary, by the degree in which the natural therein was permeated by the supernatural, and according as the form in which the supernatural worked was one that grew out of the natural course of development; and when he distinguished the charismata of Gnosis and of Didascalia above all the others, as those which were most required for the edification of the church. Accordingly—as we remarked in our first section—those extraordinary operations of that divine power which was to be the dominant element in the future civilization of human nature, continually diminished, in proportion as the existing, natural enlightenment began to turn more and more to Christianity and to be attracted by it. Now, on the boundary-line between these two periods of development, there sprang up a reaction, which opposed the change required by Christianity, and sought to maintain, as perfect and abiding, the form which originally appeared in the working of Christianity. That which opposed itself to the healthy and natural course of development must necessarily be a morbid action. The enthusiasm which surrendered itself to such a tendency must inevitably degenerate into fanaticism.

Since Montanism opposed itself to that union and conciliation of the supernatural with the natural, which Christianity, in its progressive development, required and had prepared, it follows from what has been said that it would insist, in an exclusive spirit, upon the supernatural as contradistinguished

from the natural. In it the supernatural, the divine, presented itself to the religious consciousness as an irresistible power which did not allow of any human individuality exerting itself in free, independent development. Accordingly, from such a point of view, the ecstatic element was reckoned as an essential characteristic of genuine prophecy; the human consciousness must retire altogether when the voice of the divine Spirit allows itself to be heard. The soul, during inspiration, must remain perfectly passive; as Montanus characteristically remarked, God alone is awake, the man sleeps. The soul stands in the same passive relation to the divine operation as the lyre to the instrument (the plectrum) with which it is played.\* Here, too, in what Montanism alleged there was nothing new. This notion of inspiration had long been familiar to the Jews, as is apparent from the Alexandrian legend of the verbal agreement of the translations of the Old Testament made independently by the seventy interpreters. But such a form of inspiration is much better suited to the legal position of the Old Testament, which proceeds on such an alienation of the divine and the human, than to that of the New Testament, which aims at a union between the two by means of the redemption. When, however, this idea was once prominently set forth as belonging to the perfection of the Christian system, and requisite for the guidance and growth of the church, a foreign element was introduced, by which the regular process of development, grounded in the nature of the church itself, and the Spirit which quickens it, was so far from being promoted, that, on the contrary, it was greatly disturbed and hindered. By such influences of the Paraclete promised by Christ, and by revelations of prophets and prophetesses, uttered in this state of ecstasy, the development of the church was, it was held, to be carried continually onwards till it should attain to its final consummation. We must not, however, leave out of consideration the fact that Montanism was driven to this one-sided supranaturalism by a polemical opposition (which arose out of a genuinely Christian interest) to two aberrations of the Christian mind. Opposing itself, on the one hand, to the introduction of foreign speculations by the Gnosis, it wished to protect the pure Christian doctrine from

\* Thus Tertullian considered the *amentia*, the *excidere sensu*, as something necessarily connected with the *divina virtute obumbrari*.

all such corruptions ; while, on the other hand, it resisted a petrified, traditional element, which, leaving no room for any progressive and vital development of the church, desired to confine everything in fixed and unalterable forms.

As regards, however, the former opposition, it soon passed into a tendency hostile to all culture, to all art and science. And under the influence of this hostility to all mediate activity of the reason, even the resistance to the stiff and rigid tendency in the church could not but take a wrong direction. Montanism would tolerate no pause, no stop of any kind ; it demanded a progressive development from the foundation of that immutable Christianity, which was contained in the common tradition of all the churches, to the maturity of the perfect man. But as it had no confidence in the power of the intellect, though regenerated and enlightened by Christianity, to unfold the contents of Christian truth to still clearer consciousness, and to mould man's life more and more in conformity with it—as it disdained the instrumentality of reason, which was appointed to administer, by its own peculiar action, the treasure imparted to it from above,—nothing remained for it but to assume that Christianity must be continually integrated and perfected by fresh and extraordinary revelations continually accruing from without, in relation to which the human mind was to remain in a state altogether passive. Thus, an exclusive supranaturalism, which could not duly acknowledge the effects of redemption in converting the mind, when restored to communion with God, into an organ for divine things, was necessarily driven to deny the adequacy of the divine word which had been bestowed on the church for its guidance in knowledge and life, because it lacked the organ requisite for interpreting and applying it and for digesting the truths contained in it. A perfecting of Christianity was sought for in a way which disparaged the work of Christ. In this way a one-sided supra-naturalism led to the same result as a one-sided rationalism.

Now, that which, in order to the perfecting of the Christian life, required to be superadded from without, as it did not spontaneously result from the regular development of the Christian principle, might, under the name of perfecting, be in fact nothing else than a hindrance and corruption. The perfecting referred chiefly to the introduction of a more rigid

asceticism; and in this respect too we see in Montanism a one-sided tendency, which had long existed in the Christian life, carried to its extreme. Numberless additional precepts were to be imposed on the church by the new revelations of the Paraclete. But Christianity is distinguished from Judaism simply by the very circumstance that it substitutes the law of the Spirit in place of the imperious letter, and, through love, which is the fulfilling of the law, it has made an end of all positive commandments. In the first centuries much of the new precepts of Christ which are contained in the sermon on the mount was imperfectly understood, because men did not refer them to the one whole of the new law, which was grounded in love, and was identical with the essence of the Christian life itself, but regarded them as isolated positive precepts. The free development of the Christian spirit was, by a progressive spiritualizing, to remove everything positive. Montanism, on the contrary, was for holding the positive as something permanent, and as that by adding to which the church was to be perfected. Accordingly, it was the very essence of Montanism which of itself, without the aid of any outward influences, brought back the Jewish legal position. This fact, however, does not in the least degree warrant us in ascribing to Ebionism any influence on the development of Montanism. The latter, on the contrary, seems to have felt itself specifically called upon to set forth distinctly, and to carry out, whatever was new in Christianity and distinguished it from the Old-Testament position. And this was the end which the new epoch of development, introduced by the revelations of the Paraclete, was to promote. It could only have been unintentionally that Montanism so nearly adopted an element of that Judaism which, consciously and designedly, it desired to combat. By its theory of ecstasy, so fatal to Christian sobriety, it led to an intermixture of excited and rapturous feelings with the development of the divine life, and thereby, as we shall presently have occasion more particularly to observe, trenched close upon heathen notions.

The movement of which we speak originated with a Phrygian, Montanus by name, who lived in the village of Ardaban, on the borders of Phrygia and Mysia. The natural peculiarities of the old Phrygian race reveal themselves in his mode of conceiving Christianity, and in the shape which the zeal of



the new convert assumed. The religion of nature, which prevailed among the ancient Phrygians, bespeaks the character of this mountain race—inclined to fanaticism and superstition, readily believing every pretension to magic and ecstasy; and we are not surprised when we find the Phrygian temperament, which had formerly found a vent in the ecstatic frenzy of the priests of Cybele and Bacchus, exhibiting itself once more in the ecstasies and somnambulisms of the Montanists.

Montanus was one of those men in whom the first glow of conversion begets a stern opposition to the world. It ought to be remembered that he lived in a country where there prevailed a strong expectation that, just before the end of all things, the church was to enjoy on the earth, the theatre of its sufferings, a triumphant reign of a thousand years—and where were floating among the people various pictures, coloured by an enthusiastic imagination, representing the character of this approaching kingdom, the final millennial reign of Christ on earth (the so-called Chiliasm).<sup>\*</sup> The time in which he came forward as a teacher—either during those calamitous visitations of nature which led to the tumultuary attacks of the populace on the Christians,<sup>†</sup> or during the bloody persecutions of the emperor Marcus Aurelius<sup>‡</sup>—was altogether suited

<sup>\*</sup> Papias of Hierapolis had no doubt lived and laboured in Phrygia, to which country so many passages in the Pseudo-Sibylline books contain allusions. But there is no reason whatever for supposing, with Longue-rue and Blondel, that Montanus or any Montanists were themselves the authors of these passages; for in those Pseudo-Sibylline writings nothing which belongs to the *peculiar* ideas of Montanism is to be found. We rather see in them *the same* peculiarly Phrygian cast of mind of which Montanism itself is a reflection. Though in these oracles mount Ararat is, it is true, transferred to Phrygia, we see nothing in this fact but the same partiality of the Phrygians for their own country, which they held to be the oldest in the world, as led Montanus to fix upon the village of Pepuza, in Phrygia, for the destined seat of the millennial kingdom.

<sup>†</sup> See Vol. I. p. 144.

<sup>‡</sup> No distinct and well-authenticated facts exist from which we might form a certain conclusion as to the time of Montanus' first appearance. From the very nature of the case, indeed, the beginning of a movement of this kind rarely admits of being distinctly fixed. Eusebius, in his Chronicle, gives the year 171 as the date when Montanus first appeared. But, assuming that the Roman bishop who was induced by Praxeas to excommunicate the Montanists was not Victor, but Anicetus,—the reasons for which opinion I have given in my work on Tertullian,

to promote such an excitement of feeling, and such a direction of the imagination. About this time too a violent controversy had arisen between the speculative Gnostics and the advocates of the ancient, simple doctrine; much on every side was being said of the danger of falsifications of Christian doctrine. All this would naturally work on the mind of the Phrygian convert, already inclined by national temperament to fanatical enthusiasm. And we must also bear in mind that he lived in a period which has already been described as forming the boundary between two *stadia* in the development of the Christian church.

He fell into certain states of ecstatic transport, in which, no longer master of his own consciousness, but made the blind organ, as he fancied, of a higher spirit, he predicted, in oracular, mystical expressions,\* fresh persecutions of the Christians; exhorted them to a strict and self-denying conversation, and to an undaunted confession of the faith; and, extolling the blessedness of the martyr's crown, urged the faithful to risk everything in order to win it. He announced the judgments shortly impending over the persecutors of the church, the second coming of Christ, and the approach of the millennial kingdom, the blessedness of which he painted in the most attractive colours. Finally, he claimed to be considered a prophet sent of God to the whole church, as an inspired reformer of its whole conduct. By him the church was to be elevated to a higher stage of perfection in practice; and a loftier system of morals, befitting its maturity, was to be revealed. He appealed to Christ's promise, that he would, by the Holy Ghost, make known things which the men of those times were not yet in a condition to understand. He also believed himself to be called to give new instructions on the faith, by which the dogmatical questions most agitated in those districts were to be cleared and defended against the objections of heretics.

It is probable that in the history of Montanus different

p. 486,—it would follow that Montanus had already made his appearance in the lifetime of the Roman bishop Anicetus, who died A.D. 161. Apollonius, cited by Eusebius (V. 18), and Epiphanius, both speak in favour of the earlier date. The latter fixes the appearance of Montanus about the year 157.

\* *Ξενοφανίαι*. A contemporary writer cited in Eusebius, l. V. c. 16, uses the term *γλώσσαι*. Plutarch on the ancient oracles, de Pyth. orac. c. 24.

epochs ought to be distinguished. The sympathy with which, in that excited period, what he delivered as revelations from above was received, doubtless urged him to go still further, till at last he claimed for himself a higher mission than he may ever have thought of in the outset. On the other hand, the uncompromising opposition which he afterwards met with from other quarters may likewise have served to increase his enthusiasm. However, we possess too little information to be able accurately to separate and distinguish these several epochs. Montanus had associated with him two women, Prisca or Priscilla, and Maximilla, who also set up as prophetesses.

We will now proceed to a more detailed account of Montanism, as a tendency stamping itself on particular principles and doctrines. We mean that tendency of mind which, beginning with Montanus, was further developed, till it was reduced to a system by Tertullian.

We have seen that the fundamental principle of Montanism was a one-sided supranaturalist element, which placed the mind in a wholly passive relation to the divine influence. This principle appeared most strongly prominent in the *first* outpourings of religious feeling in Montanus and his prophetesses. But the affinity of this principle to the Old-Testament position is more clearly discernible in the earliest Montanistic oracles than in the later manifestations of Montanism. For in the outset they spoke of God the Almighty, not of Christ or the Holy Spirit. As the Almighty alone ruled the prophet, and his own self-consciousness retired altogether before Him, it was God therefore that spoke as it were in His own name from the prophet's soul, of which He had taken entire possession. Accordingly, one of these oracles of Montanus thus runs: "Behold! the man is as a lyre, and I sweep over him as a plectrum. The man sleeps, and I wake. Behold! it is the Lord who estranges the souls of men from themselves, and gives men souls."\* So, in another oracle: "I am the Lord, the Almighty God, who take up my abode in man:† I am neither an angel, nor a messenger; but I am

\* Ἴδου, ἄνθρωπος ὡς ἐν λύρᾳ, καὶ γὰρ ἵπταμαι ὡς ἐν τλήκτρῳ. Ὁ ἄνθρωπος κοιμᾶται, καὶ γὰρ γρηγορῶ. Ἴδου, κύριός ἐστιν ὁ ἐκστάνων καρδίας ἀνθρώπων καὶ δίδους καρδίας ἀνθρώποις. Epiphan. hæres. 48.

† Ἐγὼ κύριος, κύριος ὁ Θεός, ὁ παντοκράτωρ, καταγινόμενος ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ.

come as the Lord himself, God the Father." Also, in a prophecy of Montanus' associate, Maximilla, there is as yet no distinct mention of the Holy Spirit or the Paraclete; but the Spirit, to vindicate himself from the objection that he set men beside themselves, declares, "I am chased as a wolf from the midst of the flock. I am no wolf; I am word, and spirit, and power."\* On its first appearance, this principle of supernaturalism, which expressed itself in a form more agreeable to the Old than the New Testament, was consistently maintained by the Montanistic tendency in yet another respect. For these new prophets did not promise a progressive development of the church commencing with the new revelations, proceeding from themselves, but that which they announced was to bring to a close the whole course of its earthly progress. They pointed to the near approach of a new order of things, the final separation which was to be made by Christ himself, and the setting up of his millennial kingdom on earth. Maximilla is said to have declared expressly, "After me no other prophetess shall arise, but the end shall come."† The God who had determined to bring on the great judgment called on the faithful, by His voice in the new prophets, to prepare themselves for it by a stricter life, in order that the Lord at his second coming, which was near at hand, might find them well prepared. With this expectation of the near approach of the end of the world was intimately connected that contempt of life and of all earthly things, to which the new spirit of the prophets called men.

But though many of the predictions of the new prophets did not come to pass, yet the principle announced by them had a powerful and attractive influence on the minds of Christians in this period. And as these new revelations were made to harmonize with the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, which, in the theological system of the church, was as yet imperfectly unfolded, and with that of spiritual gifts, and with the promises of Christ respecting the Paraclete, the idea gained ground that there were certain seasons or epochs of the outpouring of the Holy Ghost, by which the progressive development of the church was to be promoted; a new spring

\* Ῥῆμα εἰμι, καὶ πνεῦμα, καὶ δύναμις. See Euseb. l. V. c. 16.

† The words are cited in Epiphanius: Μιστ' ἐμὲ προφῆτης οὐκέτι ἔσται, ἀλλὰ συντέλεια.



was thus to be added to its ordinary, regular course of development, in order to complete what was lacking in it.

When Tertullian adopted this principle and looked round for arguments in support of it, he endeavoured to show the necessity of such a progressive development of the church, by appealing to a law running through all the works of God in the kingdoms of nature and of grace. "In the works of grace," he said, "as in the works of nature, which proceed from the same Creator, everything unfolds itself by certain successive steps. From the seed-corn shoots forth first the shoot, which by and bye grows into the tree; this then puts forth the blossom, to be followed in its turn by the fruit, which itself arrives at maturity only by degrees. So the kingdom of righteousness unfolded itself by certain stages. First came the fear of God awakened by the voice of nature, without a revealed law (the patriarchal religion); then the childhood under the law and the prophets; then that of youth under the gospel; and lastly the development to the ripeness of manhood through the new outpouring of the Holy Ghost, consequent upon the appearance of Montanus—the new instructions of the promised Paraclete.\* How is it possible that the work of God should stand still and make no progressive movement, while the kingdom of evil is continually enlarging itself and acquiring new strength?" On this ground the Montanists denounced those who were for setting arbitrary limits to the agency of the Holy Spirit, as though his extraordinary operations had been confined to the times of the apostles alone. Thus, a Montanistic writing of North Africa forbids that "any weak and desponding faith should suppose that God's grace was powerful only among the ancients; since God works at all times, as He has promised, for a witness to the unbelieving and for a blessing to the faithful."† The later effusions of the Holy Spirit are indeed to surpass all that had gone before.‡ The Montanists appealed to the fact, that Christ himself had promised to believers the revelations of the Paraclete, as the perfecter of His church, through

\* Tertullian. *de virgg. veland.* c. 1.

† *Acta Perpetuæ et Felicitat. Præfat.*

‡ *Præfat. in Acta Perpetuæ: Majora reputanda novitiora quæque ut novissimiora, secundum exuberationem gratiæ in ultima sæculi spatia decretam.*

whom he would make known what the men of those times would have been unable to comprehend. By this they by no means intended to deny the general interpretation of this promise which refers it to the apostles. Their opinion was simply that the promise did not refer to them alone—was not, by its application to them, entirely fulfilled—but that, on the contrary, it referred also to the new revelations by the prophets now awakened,—that such prophets were a necessary complement and enlargement of that original revelation.\* The truth, springing from the latter and transmitted by the general tradition of the church, was invariably implied by the former as its immutable foundation. Indeed, the new prophets seem thereby to distinguish themselves from false teachers, and to prove their divine mission. But proceeding from this foundation, the Christian system of morals and the whole life of the church was by these new revelations to be carried out still further;—for the men who were just weaned from paganism and sensuality were not able to meet at once the requisitions of Christian perfection. Moreover, by these revelations, the Christian doctrines, continually assailed by new heresies, were to be defended. As the heretics, to suit their own notions, made use of arbitrary and false interpretations of the holy scriptures, by which they might most easily be refuted; so by these new revelations a fixed and settled authority would be established against them. Finally, they would supply means for explaining and settling all disputes on matters of faith and practice.† On these grounds the Montanist Tertullian, towards the end of his treatise on the Resurrection, addressing himself to those who were willing to draw from the fountain of these new revelations, says, “You will thirst for no instruction;—no questions will perplex you.”

Thus Montanism opposed to a rigid, lifeless tradition, a free, progressive movement. The occupiers of this new position were in some degree well prepared to distinguish between what was changeable and what was unchangeable in the development of the church, since, while they admitted *the immutability of the doctrinal tradition*, they yet maintained

\* Tertullian. de pudicitia, c. 12.

† Tertullian. de virgg. veland. represents as the administratio Paracleti, quod disciplina dirigitur, quod scripturæ revelantur, quod intellectus reformatur.

that the *institutions of the church, according to the exigencies of the times, might be altered and improved by the progressive instructions of the Paraclete*.<sup>\*</sup> While, moreover, according to the view of the church, the bishops, as the successors of the apostles and the inheritors of their spiritual power, were regarded as the sole organs for diffusing among its members the influences of the Holy Spirit, it was the opinion of the Montanists, on the other hand, that besides the ordinary organs of church guidance, there were still higher ones—the extraordinary organs, the *prophets awakened by the Paraclete*. The latter only, according to the Montanistic view, were the successors of the apostles in the highest sense, the inheritors of their complete spiritual power. Hence Tertullian opposes to the church, as consisting of a number of bishops, the church of the Spirit, which manifests *itself through men enlightened by the Holy Spirit*.<sup>†</sup> While it was the custom to derive the power belonging to the bishops from the authority to bind and to loose conferred on St. Peter, the Montanist Tertullian, on the other hand, maintained that these words personally referred only to this apostle, but mediately to all those who, like him, were filled with the Holy Ghost.<sup>‡</sup> They who followed the voice of the Holy Ghost speaking through the medium of the new prophets were as the spiritually minded, the genuine Christians (the Spiritales), and constituted the church in the proper sense; while, on the other hand, the opposers of the new revelations were usually styled the carnally minded, the Psychical.

Thus Montanism set up a church of the Spirit, consisting of the spiritales homines, in opposition to the prevailing outward view of that institution. Tertullian says, “The church, in the proper and preëminent sense, is the Holy Spirit, in which the Three are One,—and, consequently, the whole community of those who agree in this faith (that, viz., God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are one) is called, after its founder and consecrator (the Holy Spirit), the church.”<sup>§</sup>

\* Tertullian. de corona milit. c. 3.

† Tertullian. de pudicitia, c. 21: Ecclesia spiritus per spiritalem hominem, non ecclesia numerus episcoporum.

‡ Secundum Petri personam, spiritualibus potestas ista conveniet, aut apostolo aut prophetæ. L. c.

§ Nam et ecclesia proprie et principaliter ipse est Spiritus, in quo est

The Catholic [?] point of view expresses itself in the fact, that the *idea* of the church is put first, and by this very position of it made outward, while the agency of the Holy Spirit is represented as conditioned by, and therefore derived through, this mediation.\* Montanism, on the other hand, like Protestantism, places the Holy Spirit first, and considers the church as that which is only derived. Assuming this position, the order would be reversed: *Ubi Spiritus, ibi ecclesia; et ubi ecclesia, ibi Spiritus*. But the Montanistic conception does not coincide with the Protestant; for in the former it is not the *general* operation of the Holy Spirit which takes place in all believers that is meant, but the above-described extraordinary revelation. According to the Montanistic view, it is partly the latter, which is there placed as the original, and partly the acknowledgment of the same in its divine character, that constitutes the essence of the true church. The true church is that in which God awakes the prophets, and by which the prophets are recognised as such.

Since again, according to the Montanistic theory, prophets could be awakened from among Christians of *every* rank; since the Montanists expressly regarded it as one of the characteristics of this last epoch in God's development of His kingdom, that, according to the promises in the prophet Joel,† which were now passing into fulfilment, the gifts of the Spirit were to be dispensed without distinction to Christians of every condition and sex. Consequently those requisitions of holiness of life, which before had been confined wholly to the spiritual order, were extended by the new revelations to all Christians as such; they were thus led once more to give prominence to that *idea of the dignity of the universal Christian calling, of the priestly dignity of all Christians*, which had, in a measure, been suppressed by the confounding

trinitas unius divinitatis. Illam ecclesiam congregat, quam Dominus in tribus posuit (where two or three are gathered together in his name), atque ita exinde etiam numerus, qui in hanc fidem conspiraverint, ecclesia ab auctore et consecratore censetur. L. c.

\* As in the well-known words of Irenæus: *Ubi ecclesia, ibi Spiritus; et ubi Spiritus, ibi ecclesia*. [Does not Neander mistake his author's meaning? Is it not simply—in the church alone is grace to be obtained? —*Eng. Ed.*]

† Præfat. in Act. Felicit.



together of the fundamental principles of Judaism and Christianity.\*

But although the idea of the church and of its progressive development was in one respect apprehended by Montanism in a freer and a more spiritual light, yet, in another way, viz. of deriving this progressive development from new and extraordinary revelations, from a newly awakened prophetic order, it returned to the position of Judaism. While, according to the ordinary church principles, it was held that the Old Testament *priesthood had been* transferred to the Christian church, according to the Montanistic view it was the old Testament *order of prophets* that was thus transferred. Now it is remarkable that the church, which afterwards adopted many of the views of Montanism, which, from a correct evangelical point of view, she had in the beginning censured, also held much of what the Montanists asserted of the relation of the new revelations by their prophets to the groundwork of church tradition and scripture doctrine, but applied it to explain the relation of the decisions of general councils to both these matters. A new principle was, at a later date, superinduced on the church notion of tradition;—to the holding fast the original doctrine once delivered, was added the element of a progressive advancement in harmony with this doctrine, and derived from the Holy Spirit. But while, from the Montanistic point of view, this actuation of the Holy Spirit was regarded as proceeding from newly awakened, extraordinary organs; it was by the principles of the church transferred to the bishops, the regular organs of the church guidance.† And here comes in also what was formerly said concerning the Montanistic notion of inspiration.‡

But this way of considering inspiration, which, derived from the Jews, up to this time had prevailed also among the fathers of the church, was now gradually suppressed in the conflict with Montanism. The violent opponents of the latter absolutely condemned the ecstatic state, considering it

\* See, for example, Tertullian. de Monogamia.

† [Or rather to the papal see. See Newman on Development, and Rev. Archer Butler's Letters in reply.—*Eng. Ed.*]

‡ The definition of such an ecstatic state is to be found in Tertullian. c. Marc. l. IV. c. 22: In spiritu homo constitutus, præsertim cum *gloriam Dei conspicit*, vel cum *per ipsum Deus loquitur*, necesse est excidat sensu, obumbratus scilicet virtute divina.

rather as the sign of a false prophet. Unfortunately the work against Montanism by the Christian rhetorician Miltiades, in which it was argued that ecstasy is a state of mind at variance with the character of a true prophet,\* has not reached our times;—a work which, if it were extant, would probably shed much light on the interesting discussions of these times about inspiration. Men were inclined to derive the state of ecstasy from the agency of the evil spirit, as a spirit of confusion and of schism; and contrasted with it the influences of the Holy Spirit, as a spirit of soberness and clearness. The Montanistic notion of the prophet and the prophetic office was denounced in every respect; no attempt was made to separate what was true in it from what was false. Still the free and unbiassed spirit of the Alexandrian school reveals itself also in its judgment of these phenomena. It is true that Clement of Alexandria designates ecstasy as the sign of false prophecy, and of the influence of the evil spirit, whereby the soul is estranged from itself;† but yet he protested against those who, as he expresses it, with a blind zeal of ignorance, condemned beforehand everything that proceeded from these false prophets, instead of examining what was said, without respect to the speaker, and seeing whether it contained any portion of truth.‡ In contradicting Montanism, men fell into the opposite extreme of error. Unwilling to admit anything like unconsciousness in the prophets of the Old Testament, they attributed to them a clear, conscious knowledge of the meaning of the divine promises which they announced; §—a view of the matter which would necessarily obscure the right under-

\* *Περὶ τοῦ μὴ δεῖν προφήτην ἐν ἐκστάσει λαλεῖν.*

† Strom. lib. I. f. 311, where he says of the false prophets: *Τῷ ὄντι οὗτοι ἐν ἐκστάσει προφητεύουσιν, ὡς ἂν ἀποστάτου διάκονοι*, where, without doubt, there is a play on words in the use of the terms *ἐκστασις* and *ἀποστάτης*.

‡ His words are: *Οὐ μὲν διὰ τὸν λέγοντα καταγνωστέον ἁμαθῶς καὶ τῶν λεγομένων, ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν προφητεύειν νῦν δὴ λεγομένων παρατηρητέον· ἀλλὰ τὰ λεγόμενα σκοπητέον εἰ τῆς ἀληθείας ἔχεται.* Strom. l. VI. f. 647. As we might expect from Clement a more unbiassed judgment than was commonly entertained by others, we have so much the more reason to regret the loss of the work, in which he designed to speak more fully of Montanism—if, indeed, he ever executed that design—viz. his book *περὶ προφητείας*. Vid. Strom. l. VI. f. 511.

§ E. g. Orig. in Joann. T. VI. s. 2: *Προπειτῶς ἀποφήνασθαι περὶ προφῆτων, ὡς οὐ σοφῶν, εἰ μὴ νειοήκασιν τὰ ἀπὸ ἰδίου στόματος.*

standing of the relation between the Old and New Testaments, and prevent an unbiassed exposition of the latter.

Montanism, as we observed above, when we enumerated its general characteristics, by falsifying the Christian principle, bordered very closely upon Judaism on the one side and upon paganism on the other.

States which were akin to those of heathen divination, phenomena like magnetism and somnambulism, which occasionally occur in the heathen cultus, were mixed up with the excitement of Christian feelings. Christian women, who had been thrown into ecstatic trances during the time of public worship, were not only consulted for remedies of bodily diseases, but also for information with regard to the invisible world. On all these subjects questions were laid before them. In Tertullian's time there was one at Carthage, who, in her states of ecstasy, imagined herself to be in the society of Christ and the angels. The matter of her visions corresponded to what she had just heard read out of the holy scriptures, or recited in the psalms that had been sung, or prayers that had been offered.\* At the conclusion of the service, and after the dismissal of the church, she was made to relate her visions, and from them men sought to gain an insight into the things of the invisible world; as, for example, the nature of the soul.

The Jewish element discovered itself also in the pretended completion of the system of morals by new precepts which had particular reference to the ascetical life. Thus, fasting on the dies stationum, which till now had been considered a voluntary thing (see above), was prescribed as a law binding all Christians. The duration of the fast was also extended to three o'clock in the afternoon. For two weeks every year a meagre diet, like that which the continentes or *ἀσκήτραι* voluntarily adopted, was enjoined on all Christians.† Against

\* Tertullian. de anima, c. 9, says of her: Et videt et audit sacramenta, et quorundam corda dignoscit et medicinas desiderantibus submittit. Jam vero prout scripturæ leguntur, aut psalmi canuntur, aut allocutiones proferuntur, aut petitiones delegantur, ita inde materiæ visionibus subministrantur.

† The so-called Xerophagiæ.—*Sunday* and the *Sabbath* were excepted from these fasts. The Montanists were at difference with the Roman church in respect also to the not fasting on the Sabbath (see above). At the time of Jerome—when, however, in many respects, as, for example, in respect to the church constitution, the Montanists seem to

these Montanistic ordinances, the spirit of evangelical freedom still nobly and emphatically declared itself: but afterwards the tendency which first expressed itself in Montanism, also passed over into the [mediæval] church.

From Montanism itself proceeded a tendency which, instead of leading men in the true Christian spirit to value all the blessings of humanity according to their true relation to the supreme good—the kingdom of God—led them only to oppose the one to the other. And the same tendency, by the undue prominence it gave to the divine element as a power which suppresses all human action, must necessarily have led also to a quietism that crippled and discouraged human activity. On this principle both the blessings of this earthly life ceased to be estimated according to their real worth, and the use of means for securing and preserving them was no longer acknowledged as a duty. Such views naturally fostered a fanatical longing after martyrdom. The principle was advanced, that, if men were ready to submit to the divine will, they should do nothing to avoid those persecutions\* which it was God's will to bring upon the Christians for the trial of their faith. This spirit of Montanism characteristically expresses itself in the following oracle:—"Let it not be your wish to die on your beds in the pains of childbirth, or in debilitating fever; but desire to die as martyrs, that He may be glorified, who suffered for you." By the same mental tendency Montanism, in its anxiety to avoid a spirit of accommodation detrimental to the faith, was driven to the other extreme of a stern renunciation of all those usages of civil and social life which could in any way be traced to a heathen origin; and of a contempt for all those prudential measures by which it was possible to avert the suspicion of the Pagan authorities. It seems, among other things, to have been objected to the Montanists, that, by their frequent meetings for fasting and prayer, they openly defied the established laws against secret assemblies.†

have departed from their original institutions—they had three weeks of Xerophagiæ. These may be compared with Quadragesimal fasts in the later church; and so indeed they are called by Jerome (ep. 27, ad Marcellum): "illi tres in anno faciunt quadragesimas."

\* See Tertullian. de fuga in persecut.

† De jejuniis, c. 13: Quomodo in nobis ipsam quoque unitatem jejunationum et xerophagiarum et stationum denotaritis? Nisi forte in senatusconsulta et in principum mandata coitionibus opposita delinquimus.



This tendency of their ethical views led to an over-estimate of celibacy;—and the unmarried life was, even at this early date, particularly recommended by the Montanistic prophetess Priscilla to the clergy, as if it was only in this way they could be the worthy channels of the Holy Spirit, and could properly render themselves capable of receiving the divine gifts of grace.\* We here observe another instance in which a Montanistic error has passed into the [Roman] church.

Such an ascetical spirit is in most cases coupled with ignorance of the marriage state as a form for the realization of the highest good; and there usually goes with it a sensuous and simply outward conception of this relation. But Montanism united with the ascetical tendency a very different conception indeed of matrimony. The influence of the peculiar Christian spirit manifests itself in Montanism by the fact of its insisting upon that idea of marriage which Christianity first clearly suggested—as a spiritual union in one common life, consecrated by Christ, of two individuals, separated by sex. The Montanists held, therefore, that the religious consecration of such a union was a matter of the highest moment; they reckoned it as belonging to the essence of a truly Christian marriage, that it should be concluded in the church, in the name of Christ. A marriage otherwise contracted was regarded as an unlawful connection.† Regarding the institution in this light, it followed again, that *Montanism would allow of no second marriage, after the death of the first husband or the first wife*; for marriage, being an *indissoluble*

\* The words of Rigaltius, published in Tertullian's work *de exhortatione castitatis*, c. 11, are: *Quod sanctus minister sanctimoniam noverit ministrare. Purificantia enim concordat et visiones vident et ponentes faciem deorsum etiam voces audiunt manifestas, tam salutare quam et occultas.* [The whole Montanistic theory is adopted by Mr. Newman as a remarkable anticipation of Romish developments. See on Development, pp. 350, 351.—*Eng. Ed.*]

† Tertullian. *de pudicitia*, c. 4: *Penes nos occultæ quoque conjunctiones, id est, non prius apud ecclesiam professæ, juxta mœchiam et fornicationem judicari periclitantur, nec inde consortæ obtentu matrimonii crimen eludunt.* According to the principles of Montanism, the essence of a true marriage in the Christian sense is (*De monogamia*, c. 20): *cum Deus jungit duos in unam carnem, aut junctos deprehendens in eadem, conjunctionem signavit.* (Where, *i. e.*, to the marriage contracted by two parties while they were still heathens, the sanctifying consecration of Christianity has been superadded.)

*union* in the spirit, and not in the flesh alone, was destined to endure beyond the grave.\* In this instance, also, the Montanists, in their legal spirit, only pushed to the extreme a view to which others doubtless were inclined.† And it is clear that in this matter too the Montanistic element passed even into the [Roman] Catholic church; for the way was thus prepared for the sacramental view of the marriage institution.

The severe legal spirit of Montanism displays itself in the zeal it manifested for the more rigid principles of penance.‡ But the Montanists, inasmuch as, like their opponents, they did not rightly understand the relation of baptism to regeneration, and that of faith and the forgiveness of sin to the entire Christian life, were involved in the same error which was the foundation of the whole dispute on the extent of absolution.§ A true moral zeal against a false confidence in the efficacy of absolution, which tended to encourage the feeling of security in sin, is expressed in the following exposition of 1 John i. 7, which Tertullian aimed against a wrong application of the passage:—"John says, if we would walk in the light, as He is in the light, we have fellowship one with another, and the blood of Jesus Christ His Son cleanseth us from all sin. Do we sin then, if we walk in the light, and shall we be cleansed if we sin in the light? By no means. For whosoever sins, is not in the light, but in darkness. He is showing then how we shall be cleansed from sin, if we walk in the *light*, in which no sin can be committed; *for such is the power of the blood of Christ*, that those whom it has cleansed from sin it thenceforth preserves pure, *if they continue to walk in the light.*" ||

It is true, as we have remarked, that Montanism encouraged the fanatical enthusiasm for martyrdom; for, according to the Montanistic doctrine, the martyrs had this prerogative, that, immediately after death, they were entitled to enter into a higher state of blessedness, to which other believers could

\* See Tertullian. de monogamia and exhortat. castitatis.

† Athenagoras (legat. pro Christian. f. 37, ed. Colon) styles the γάμος δεύτερος ἐν πρεσβυτέρῳ μιχείᾳ. Origen (Tom. in Matth. f. 363) says that St. Paul gave permission for a second marriage after the death of the first husband or the first wife: πρὸς τὴν σκληροκαρδίαν ἢ ἀσθενίαν.

‡ See on this controversy, Vol. I. p. 217, ff.

§ L. c.

|| De pudicitia, c. 19; which work refers generally to this dispute.

obtain no admittance;\* and yet, on the other hand, anxiety for strictness of penitential discipline induced the Montanist Tertullian to oppose the undue homage which was paid to the martyrs. Since many, for instance, to whom Montanism refused absolution, could, through the mediation of the confessors, obtain it in the Catholic church,† Tertullian, therefore, spoke against this false confidence in their intercession, and also against their spiritual presumption. "Let it satisfy the martyrs," said he, "to have purged themselves of their own sins. It is ingratitude or arrogance, to spend upon others what it must be considered a great matter to have gained for one's self. Who, but the Son of God only, has by his own death paid the debt for others? For to this end he came, that, being Himself free from sin and holy, He might die for sinners. Thou, therefore, who emulatest Him in that thou bestowest, the forgiveness of sins, suffer for me then when thou art free from sin thyself. But if thou art a sinner, how can the oil of thy little lamp suffice at once for me and for thyself?"‡

It was in accordance with the one-sided *supra-naturalistic* element of the scheme we have been considering, that the Montanists did not duly consider the fact that Christianity, by beginning with its inward workings, was to transform the life of humanity, but rather looked for the kingdom of Christ to gain the dominion of the world by some outward miracle. This was the point to which their extravagant picture of Chiliasm attached itself; and in this respect also they only pushed to the furthest extreme a way of thinking which at this date prevailed very generally in the church.

If by *pietism* we understand a morbid direction of devotional feeling in which some arbitrary figment, some excrescence from without, and cast in one fixed mould, is substituted for the natural development of the Christian life—in other words, the reaction of a legal point of view within Christianity—then we shall have good cause to consider Montanism as the earliest form of manifestation of what may properly be styled pietism.

What tended to promote the spread of this party was both its relation to Christian principles previously existing, and

\* The Paradise; see Tertullian. de anima, c. 56.

† See Vol. I. p. 306.

‡ De pudicitia, c. 22.

also the contagious influence of fanaticism, and the food it furnished to spiritual pride; since he who acknowledged the new prophets might forthwith consider himself to be truly regenerate, a member of the select company of the spiritually minded (*Spiritales*), and despise all other Christians as carnally minded (*Psychici*), as not yet truly regenerated.

The controversy on Montanism was conducted with extreme ardour. In Asia Minor, first of all, were synods held for the purpose of inquiring into it, at which many declared themselves opposed to it. The proceedings of these bodies were then sent to the more distant churches, who were thereby drawn into the dispute. Unfortunately, from want of distinct statements, much obscurity hangs over the whole of these proceedings, and, consequently, over the gradual formation of the Montanistic sects, and their relation to the rest of the church. Though the Montanists considered themselves to be the only genuine Christians, and looked upon their opponents as imperfect Christians occupying an inferior position; though they thought themselves exalted above all the rest of the church, yet it does not exactly appear that they were inclined to separate from the latter, and to renounce its communion. They only wished to be considered the *ecclesia spiritûs* or *spiritalis*, within the *ecclesia* made up of the psychical multitude. From a practical point of view they introduced a similar distinction as the Gnostics had done from a theoretical one. It is true, by this practically aristocratic spirit, the essence of the Christian church was not exposed to so much danger as it must have incurred from the theoretical. Still the adherents of the new prophetic order could not be tolerated in that relation to the rest of the church within which they were continually seeking to extend themselves, without great injury to its vitality. For they claimed only toleration at first, in order that they might gradually establish their own supremacy.

The community at Lyons, when it was smitten by the bloody persecution under the emperor Marcus Aurelius, had among its members many who came originally from Asia Minor. These, from their close connection with the Asiatic church, were led to take a lively interest in the proceedings relative to Montanism. The community wrote to Eleutherus, bishop of Rome, and the presbyter Irenæus was the bearer of their letter. Much light would be shed on the whole subject, had we more



distinct information respecting the contents of this letter; but Eusebius\* barely remarks that its judgment on the matter was just and orthodox. Now, as Eusebius certainly considered the Montanistic tendency as heretical, we might infer from this remark that the judgment of the letter was unfavourable to the Montanists. But in that case the letter could not have had in view the end which Eusebius assigns to it, that of putting an end to the dispute. This object rather leads us to suppose that it was written in a spirit of Christian moderation, and by extenuating the importance of the disputed points, and by refuting the various exaggerated charges laid against the Montanistic churches, sought, amidst the diversity of views respecting the worth of the new prophetic order, to maintain Christian unity. On this supposition alone the favourable opinion which Origen expressed of the contents of the letter is explicable, which he could not have given had it breathed a decidedly Montanistic spirit. This supposition, moreover, best accords with the known character of Irenæus, a man of moderation and a lover of peace; as also with his opinions, which, without being Montanistic, were yet not wholly unfavourable to the Montanists. By this mission, Eleutherus was probably persuaded to make peace with those churches. But, soon after, Praxeas, a violent opponent of Montanism, came from Asia Minor to Rome; and partly by reminding the Roman bishop of the different conduct of his two predecessors, Anicetus and Soter,† partly by his unfavourable representations of the state of the Montanistic churches, persuaded him to revoke his previous decrees. The Montanists now proceeded to form and propagate themselves as a distinct sect. From their country they were styled *Cataphrygians*, and *Pepuzians*, because Montanus, it was said, taught that a place called Pepuza, in Phrygia (which probably was the first seat of the Montanistic church), was chosen to be the spot from which the millennial reign of Christ was destined to begin.

It follows from the relation of Montanism to the mental tendencies prevailing in the church, that there would be various gradations and stages of transition between the latter and a decided form of Montanism; as also many shades of

\* Lib. V. c. 3.

† The truth of this assertion depends, however, on the question whether the bishop before mentioned was Eleutherus or Victor.

difference amongst its opponents, from those who did not overlook the Christian element in this phenomenon—as, for example, a Clement of Alexandria—down to those who, by their uncompromising opposition, were driven to the opposite extreme, and to a contrary depravation of the Christian spirit. As Montanism confounded together the Old and New Testament positions, its antagonists drew therefore a broader line of demarcation between them. Their current watchword was borrowed from Matthew xi. 13, “The prophets and the law prophesied until John the Baptist—then they were to cease.” This maxim they opposed as well to the new ascetical ordinances and to the new precepts, which shackled Christian freedom, as to the new order of prophets, by which the church must submit to be governed.\* Tertullian remarks that they who so applied the above passage would have done better if they had banished the Holy Spirit entirely from the church, since they made His office so perfectly an idle one.† But his complaint is, in this case, unjust, for both parties were agreed in believing that the church could not subsist without the continued operation of the Holy Spirit. The only point of dispute between the two parties was the mode of that operation, whether it was one which was founded in the ordinary development of the church, or whether it was one continually created anew by a supernatural interposition of God. And it was the very antagonists of Montanism who seem to have brought forward, in contrast to the Old Testament view, the conception of the Holy Spirit, as the new, animating principle, both of individuals and of whole communities, alike actuated by Him. From this specific difference they drew the conclusion that the church was not to be made dependent on any new prophetic order. The most decided opponents of Montanism (such as the Alogi hereafter to be mentioned) either denied the continuance of the miraculous gifts, the charismata, which distinguished the Apostolic church, and which in form at least evinced something of a supernatural character; or refused to acknowledge the prophetic gift as consistent with the Christian position, considering it as belonging exclusively to the

\* Tertullian replies: *Palos terminales figitis Deo, sicut de gratia, ita de disciplina. De jejuniis, c. 11.*

† *Superest, ut totum auferatis, quantum in vobis tam otiosum. De jejuniis, c. 11.*

Old Testament. All such therefore refused to admit any prophetical book into the canon of the New Testament. It is to be regretted that our information is so scanty respecting the so-called Alogi, and that the work of Hippolytus on the *charismata*, which was probably written in opposition to these ultra anti-Montanists, has not reached our times. We should otherwise have been enabled to speak more definitely and certainly of this dispute, and of the way in which it was handled.

There were also antagonists of Montanism who, to a fanatical tendency to indulge the feelings, opposed a negative tendency on the side of the understanding, and who, from a dread of what was fanatical, rejected much also that was genuinely Christian. It is true, as must be evident from all that has been said, that Montanism formed the extreme point of the anti-Gnostic spirit. And yet that ultra spirit of intellectual anti-Montanism, if it wished to maintain itself in its stern sobriety, so hostile to everything of a transcendent character, must have been no less opposed to the speculative and mystical element in Gnosticism. And the dread of the Gnostic, no less than the dread of the Montanistic tendency, might push men to one-sided negations. It is easy to understand how persons with some partial leaning of this sort would probably be struck with the peculiar element of St. John as wholly foreign from their own views, and how they would be inclined to insist upon the differences between the gospel according to John and the other evangelists, which they were disposed to assent to,\* for the purpose of showing that the gospel which the Montanists were most accustomed to quote in defence of their doctrine on the new revelations was not a genuine one. Irenæus, from whom we have the first account of this party, most certainly goes too far when he asserts that they rejected the gospel of John simply on account of the passage in it which speaks of the Paraclete.† That passage

\* As, for example, according to the testimony of Epiphanius (*hæres.* 51), that the history of the temptation is omitted in John, that in the Synoptical evangelists mention is made of *one* passover, in John of *two*.

† Irenæus, lib. III. c. 11, s. 9. His words are: *Ut donum spiritus frustrentur, quod in novissimis temporibus secundum placitum Patris effusum est in humanum genus, illam speciem non admittunt, quæ est secundum Joannis evangelium, in qua Paracletum se missurum Dominus promisit.*

alone could not possibly have induced them to take such a step, for in truth they only needed to limit, as was actually done by others, the promise to the Apostles, in order to deprive the Montanists of this authority. As, however, it was their practice, when those words of Christ were adduced in favour of the Montanistic view, to pronounce the whole book which contained them spurious, it was only to indulge a propensity and to make inferences, which is but too common in theological polemics, to conclude that they had rejected the gospel solely on account of this single text.

Apart from the consideration that the antagonists of Montanism were disposed to reject the Apocalypse as a prophetic book, and favourable to Chiliasm, the whole drift and style of this book must have possessed something alien from the frigid intellectual spirit of this party. They made sport of the seven angels and the seven trumpets of the Revelation. Such a tendency, however, of the understanding, so prosaic as that described above, was something too foreign from the youthful age of the church to meet with a very general reception.

As in Montanism a tendency to reject and condemn the existing elements of culture appeared in its most decided form, so, on the other hand, the tendency which strove to reconcile with Christianity the existing enlightenment, and to cause it to be pervaded with the Christian spirit, presented itself. This was the case especially in the Alexandrian school. But here the question arises, from what source is this tendency to be derived, and what was the original aim of the school itself? Was it in the outset merely an institution for communicating religious instruction to the heathen, or had there long existed in Alexandria a school for educating teachers for the Christian church—a sort of theological seminary for the clergy? The notices of Eusebius\* and of

\* Lib. VI. c. 10, that a *διδασκάλειον ἱερῶν λόγων* had existed there from ancient times, which according to ecclesiastical phraseology may be most naturally interpreted as meaning a school for the expounding of the scriptures. But this is not sufficient to characterize the particular mode and form under which the Alexandrian school appeared; though it is easy to comprise under these words all that belonged to theological study in the sense of this school, when its condition and character are once understood. For its Gnosis was designed, without doubt, to furnish a key for the right understanding of scripture, and was to be derived from scripture by allegorical interpretation. A distinct classi-



Jerome\* are too indefinite to furnish any solution of this question; and, besides, neither of these fathers was duly qualified to distinguish the form of this school as it existed in *his own time* from that which it *originally* had. We must therefore content ourselves with what is known of the labours of the individual catechists who presided over the school, and do our best to deduce therefrom its general character. Now we find that originally a single person was appointed by the bishop of Alexandria to hold the office of catechist, whose business it was to give religious instruction to heathens, and probably also to the children of the Christians in that place.† Origen was the first to share the duties of this office with another person. For he found its duties too heavy to allow of his prosecuting at the same time his more scientific theological labours. The catechumens were then divided into two classes. Thus, even if originally the office of catechist at Alexandria differed in no respect from the same office in other cities, yet it must of itself have gradually become a very different thing.

Men were required for this office who possessed a perfect acquaintance with the Grecian religion, and most especially must they have received a philosophical education, so as to be able to converse and to dispute with any learned pagans who, after long investigations on other questions, might turn their attention to Christianity. It was not enough to teach here, as in other churches, the main doctrines of Christianity according to the so-called *παράδοσις*: with these enlightened catechumens, it was necessary to go back to the primitive sources of the religion in scripture itself, and to seek to initiate them into the understanding of it,—for such required a faith which would stand the test of scientific examination. *Clement*, who was himself one of these catechists, points out the need of high and rich talents in the holder of the catechetical office at Alex-

fication of different theological disciplines, as exegesis, dogmatics, &c., is not to be thought of in this age of the church, when everything was still in one chaotic mass,—as has been very clearly pointed out by Hr. Director Hasselbach of Stettin, where he explains this phrase in his *Dissertation de schola, quæ Alexandria floruit, catechetica*, Part I. p. 15.

\* De vir. illustr. c. 36.

† Eusebius (l. VI. c. 6) says that Origen, when a boy, had been a pupil of Clement.

andria, when he says,\* “He who would gather from every quarter what would be for the profit of the catechumens, especially if they are Greeks † (for the earth is the Lord’s and the fulness thereof), must not, like the irrational brutes, be shy of much learning, but he must seek to collect around him every possible means of helping his hearers:” and directly after, ‡ “All learning is profitable, but the study of holy scripture is particularly necessary, to enable us to prove what we teach, especially when our hearers come to us from the Greek learning.” § The patience and skill which these Alexandrian teachers required to possess, to answer the multifarious questions which were proposed to them, is indirectly intimated by Origen, when he reminds Christian teachers that, following Christ’s example, they ought not to get out of temper when questions are proposed to them, not for the sake of information, but for the purpose of putting them to the proof. ||

Much care was therefore necessary in selecting these Alexandrian catechists, and the office was conferred in preference on men of learning and philosophical minds, who had themselves been led to embrace Christianity by the results of philosophical inquiry; such, for example, as *Pantænus*, the first Alexandrian catechist of whom we have any distinct knowledge, and his disciple Clement.

The range of instruction imparted by these men gradually extended itself, for they were the first who, on the principles of the catholic faith, attempted to satisfy a want deeply felt by numbers—the want of a scientific exposition of the faith, and of a Christian science. To their school were attracted not only those educated pagans who, having by their teaching been converted to Christianity, and being seized with a desire

\* Strom. l. VI. f. 659, B.

† To complete the thought;—he ought not to be timid in exploring the vestiges of truth even in pagan literature, and to appropriate the useful; for all comes from God, and is, as such, pure.

‡ Strom. l. VI. f. 660, C.

§ With these remarks compare what Clement says generally with regard to those to whom the faith must be demonstrated after the manner of the Greeks.

|| In Matth. T. XIV. s. 16: Πειραζομένου τῆλικούτου σωτῆρος ἡκῶν, τίς τῶν μαθητῶν αὐτοῦ ἀγανακτοῖν τεταγμένος εἰς διδασκαλίαν, ἐπὶ τῷ πειράζειν ὑπὸ τινος καὶ πυνθανομένων οὐκ ἐκ φιλομαθείας, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ τοῦ πειράζειν εἰδέναι;

to devote themselves and all they possessed to its service, chose, with this in view, the Alexandrian catechists for their guides, but also those youths who, having been brought up within the Christian pale, were thirsting after a more profound knowledge, in order to prepare themselves for the office of church teachers. Thus quite spontaneously a theological school grew up. Alexandria thus became the birthplace of Christian theology in the proper sense, such as it sprang partly from the inward impulse of the mind longing for scientific knowledge, and partly from an outward aim and apologetic zeal to defend the doctrines of the church against the attacks both of philosophical Greeks, and also of the Gnostics.

Rightly to understand the early growth of this school we must consider its relation to the three different parties in connection with, or in opposition to, which it was formed, and whose different tendencies it believed it possible to combine by means of a higher principle which should reconcile their antagonistic views. I mean its relation, 1. To those seekers after wisdom, the Greeks, who despised Christianity as a blind faith that shunned the light of reason, and who were only confirmed in their contempt of it by the grossly material and sternly repulsive views of those uneducated Christians with whom they generally came in contact; 2. Its relation to the Gnostics, a numerous class in Alexandria, who at the same time that they spoke with contempt of the blind faith of the fleshly multitude, by the promise of a higher, esoteric knowledge of religion, won over to their sect not only those pagans who sought after wisdom, but also those Christians who were not satisfied with the religious instruction ordinarily afforded; 3. Its relation to the primitive class of the church teachers, who looked chiefly to the *practical* and *real*, and more especially to the *zealots* among them, whom the pride and arrogance of the Gnostics had rendered suspicious of all speculation and philosophy, and whatever in its tendency appeared to resemble a Gnosis, and who were in continual dread of a corruption of Christianity by the admixture of foreign philosophical elements. By means of a Gnosis having its root in and harmoniously adjusting itself to the faith,\* the Alexandrians hoped to be able to avoid whatever was partial and false in either of these tendencies, and even to reconcile them.

\* Γνώσις ἀληθινή, opposed to the ψευδώνυμος.

They differed from the Gnostics in their theory of the relation of the *γνώσις* to the *πίστις*, in this respect, that they acknowledged faith to be the foundation of the higher life for *all* Christians—the common bond, whereby all, however differing from one another in intellectual culture, were still united in one divine community. They also opposed the unity of the catholic church, grounded in the faith, with the strife of the Gnostic schools (*διατριβαί*). They did not assume distinct sources of knowledge for the *πίστις* and for the *γνώσις*, but the same for both, namely, the common tradition handed down in all the churches concerning the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, and the holy scriptures. They made it the business of the Gnosis simply to place in the clear light of the consciousness what had been first appropriated by faith, and received into the inward life; to unfold all that was contained therein in its intrinsic coherence; to place it on the basis and under the form of science; to prove that this was the genuine doctrine that came from Christ; to give a history of it, and to defend it against the objections of its enemies among pagan philosophers and heretics. They used as their motto one which seems to have been currently handed down from some earlier period, and which, from the time of Augustin to the establishment of the scholastic theology for which he prepared the way, was subsequently employed to mark the relation of faith to knowledge. This was Isaiah vii. 9—a passage, it must be allowed, which in the Alexandrian version only admits of the sense they ascribed to it, and there only when isolated from the context: \*—“Ἐὰν μὴ πιστεύσητε, οὐδὲ μὴ συνήτε,” “If ye do not believe, neither shall ye understand.” These words were first used to signify that he who believes not the gospel can obtain no insight into the spirit and essence of the Old Testament, but afterwards in the kindred sense, that without faith in Christianity and its several doctrines it is impossible to understand the nature of either. According to the measure of faith, it was held, would be the progress in

\* Just as, in more recent times, many texts from Luther's translation of the Bible came to be current as proofs for propositions relating to Christian faith or practice, although this application of them was wholly inconsistent with the sense which they had in the original.



understanding the truth—the degree of knowledge will correspond to the degree of faith.\*

Clement of Alexandria defends the value of faith against those pagans and Gnostics who confounded it with opinion. “It is plain,” he says, “that faith is something godlike, that can be destroyed neither by the power of any other love, however worldly, nor by present fear.”† He places faith in the same relation to the higher life as that of the breath to the sensible life.‡ It is with him an important feature in the essence of faith, that it spontaneously seizes the godlike, anticipating the conception, and proceeds from well-disposed sentiments.§ In this phase of faith, so far as it presupposes an attractive power of the godlike on the human heart, and, on the part of the latter, a spontaneous surrender to that power, he has well understood its essential character. He supposes that in human nature there is a sense for truth, which is attracted by it, and repelled by whatever is false.|| Accordingly he characterizes faith as something positive—a positive union with the godlike; and, on the other hand, unbelief as a negative quality, which, as such, presupposes the positive.¶ Together with faith, according to this view, there is at the same time given the highest thing of all—the divine life itself. As he elsewhere remarks,\*\* “He that believes the Son hath eternal life. If they who believe, then, have life, how can there be anything higher for them than life eternal? Faith wants nothing; it is complete in itself and self-sufficient.” Clement here sets it down as the characteristic of faith that it carries with it the pledge of the future, that it anticipates the

\* Stromat. l. I. f. 273, A.: l. II. f. 362, A.; l. IV. f. 528, B. and Orig. in Matth. ed. Huet. T. XVI. s. 9: Ἐκ τοῦ πεπιστευκέναι κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τῆς πίστεως, τὸ συνείναι.

† Θεῖόν τι εἶναι, μήτε ὑπὸ ἄλλης φιλίας κοσμικῆς διασπαμμένην, μήτε ὑπὸ φόβου παρόντος διαλυομένην. Strom. l. II. f. 372.

‡ Τὴν πίστιν οὕτως ἀναγκαίαν τῷ γνωστικῷ ὑπάρχουσαν, ὡς τῷ κατὰ τὸν κόσμον τόνδε βιοῦντι, πρὸς τὸ ζῆν τὸ ἀναπνεῖν. L. c. f. 373.

§ Ὑπόληψις ἐκούσιος καὶ πρόληψις εὐγνώμονος προκαταλήψεως. L. c. f. 371.

|| Τὸν ἀνθρώπον, φύσει μὲν διαβεβλημένον πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ψεύδους συγκατάθεσιν, ἔχοντα δὲ ἀφορμὰς πρὸς πίστιν τ' ἀληθοῦς. L. c. f. 384.

¶ Ἡ ἀπιστία ἀποσύστασις οὕσα τῆς πίστεως δυναμὴν δείκνυσι τὴν συγκατάθεσιν τι καὶ πίστιν, ἀνυπαρξία γὰρ στίρησις οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο. Strom. l. II. f. 384.

\*\* Pædagog. lib. I. c. 6.

future as if it were present.\* When this divine life, received by faith, permeates and cleanses the soul, it puts it in possession of a new sense for the discernment of divine things. So Clement remarks, "Behold I will do a new thing, says the Logos, Isa. xliii. 19, which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive, 1 Cor. ii. 9; which can be seen, heard, and conceived only with a new eye, a new ear, a new heart, through faith and understanding; since the disciples of our Lord speak, conceive, and act spiritually."†

This intimate connection between knowing and living belongs to the peculiar character of the Alexandrian Gnosis. The Gnosis was conceived by this school, not as a mere thing of speculation, but as a result of the whole tendency of the new inward life growing out of faith and manifesting itself in the conduct—as a *habitus practicus animi*. This is expressed in the following words of Clement: "As is the doctrine, so also must be the life; for the tree is known by its fruit, not by its blossoms or its leaves. The Gnosis comes, then, from the fruit and the life, not from the doctrine and the blossom. For we say that the Gnosis is not merely doctrine, but a divine science; it is the light that dawns within the soul out of obedience to the commandments, which makes all things clear, teaches man to know all that is contained in creation and in himself, and how he is to maintain fellowship with God; for what the eye is to the body, such is the Gnosis to the mind."‡ There can be no such thing as a knowledge of divine things without that living them out, which is the fruit of faith. *Knowing and living here become one.* This unity of the theoretical and the practical element, of the objective and the subjective, presented itself to Clement out of the depths of his own Christian consciousness, although the Neo-Platonic philosophy lent him a form for the expression of it, in what it taught concerning the identity of subject and

\* Ἐκεῖνο δὲ τὸ (τῷ) μιστεῦσαι ἤδη προσιληφότις ἐσόμενον, μετὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν ἀπολαμβάνομεν γινόμενον.

† Strom. i. II. f. 365, B.

‡ Φῶς ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐργινόμενον ἐκ τῆς κατὰ τὰς ἐντολὰς ὑπακοῆς, τὸ πάντα κατὰδὴλα ποιοῦν, τὰ τε ἐν γενέσει αὐτὸν τε τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἑαυτὸν τε γινώσκειν παρασκευάζον, καὶ θεοῦ ἐπίβολον καθίστασθαι διδασκον. Strom. i. III. f. 444.

object—of the νοῦν and the νοητόν, at the highest position of knowledge.\*

This therefore, according to the Alexandrian scheme, is the *subjective* condition, and the *subjective* essence of the Gnosis. As respects the objective source of knowledge whence the Gnostic is to seek to gain still deeper and clearer views of the truths which he has received by faith into his inner life: this, according to Clement, is Holy Scripture. If many, devoid of the requisite training to search the scriptures for themselves, simply adhered to the essential and fundamental truths of the creed which, in agreement with the *Paradosis*, had been communicated to them in their earliest instruction, yet the Gnostic must distinguish himself from these ordinary believers by his ability to prove and deduce those truths from a comparison of the different parts of holy scripture, and from the same source to refute all opposite errors. Instead of a faith grounded on the authority and tradition of the church, such an one should possess a faith grounded on the knowledge of the Bible. Accordingly Clement says,† “Faith is the compendious knowledge of essentials; Gnosis, the strong and stable demonstration of the things received by faith, erected on the foundation of faith, through the doctrine of our Lord, whereby faith is raised to an irrefragable scientific knowledge.” The same father, in answer to the pagans and Jews, who objected that, owing to the multitude of sects among the Christians, it was impossible to know where the truth was to be found, refers them to the infallible criterion of holy writ, and observes, “We rely not on men, who merely give us their opinions, to which we, in like manner, may oppose our own. But since it is not enough merely to give our opinion, and since it is necessary to prove what we affirm, we do not wait for the testimony of men, but prove it by the word of the Lord, which is the most certain of all arguments, or rather the only argument—the form of knowing whereby those who

\* Ὡς μηκέτι ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν καὶ γνῶσιν κεκτηῖσθαι, (τὸν γνωστικόν,) ἐπιστήμην δὲ εἶναι καὶ γνῶσιν. L. c. l. IV. f. 490.

† Ἡ μὲν οὖν πίστις σύντομός ἐστιν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπῆν, τῶν κατεπιγόντων γνῶσις, ἡ γνῶσις δὲ ἀποδείξις τῶν διὰ πίστειος παρελημμένων ἰσχυρὰ καὶ βέβαιος, διὰ τῆς κυριακῆς διδασκαλίας ἐποικοδομουμένη τῇ πίστει, εἰς τὸ ἀμετάπτωτον καὶ μιστ' ἐπιστήμης καταληπτὸν παρὰ πᾶσι μπουσα. Strom. l. VII. f. 732.

have simply tasted of the scriptures become *believers*, and those who have made greater progress and become accurately acquainted with the truth are *Gnostics*.”\*

Hence Clement denominates that Gnosis which results from comparing different passages of scripture, and which deduces the conclusions that flow from the acknowledged maxims of faith—a scientific faith.† The Gnostic, according to him, is one who has grown grey in the study of the holy scriptures, whose life is nothing else than works and words corresponding with the transmitted doctrine of our Lord.‡ But it is only for the Gnostic that the holy scripture generates such a knowledge of divine things, because he only brings to them the appropriate believing spirit. Where this is wanting the scriptures appear unfruitful.§ This inner sense, however, is not sufficient of itself to deduce from the holy scriptures the truths they contain, to unfold them in all their bearings, and combine them into an organic whole, as well as to defend them against the objections of heathens and heretics, and to apply them to all the results which human knowledge had previously been allowed to attain to. For all this there is required a preparatory scientific culture, and such a culture could not be created anew and at once by Christianity. The Alexandrians felt and perceived the necessity of pressing into the service of Christianity the Greek learning; of infusing into the latter the virtue of the former, as the leaven which was to leaven the whole lump of humanity.||

Here the Alexandrian Gnosis drew upon itself numerous objections from the other party, who despised the learning of the Greeks as altogether repugnant to Christianity. Against these it had to defend itself and vindicate its peculiar method,

\* Strom. VII. f. 757.

† Ἐπιστημονικὴ πίστις. Strom. I. II. f. 381.

‡ Strom. I. VII. f. 762 et 763.

§ Strom. I. VII. f. 756. Τοῖς γνωστικοῖς κεκυήκασιν αἱ γραφαί.

|| Which similitude of the leaven Clement illustrates in a very beautiful manner. He calls it “the power bestowed on us by the Word, which by small means effects much in a secret, invisible manner, attracting to itself every one who has received it, and reducing his whole nature to unity.” Ἡ ἰσχὺς τοῦ λόγου ἡ δοθεῖσα ἡμῖν, σύνταμος οὔσα καὶ δυνατὴ, πάντα τὸν καταδιξάμενον καὶ ἐντὸς αὐτοῦ κτησάμενον αὐτὴν, ἐπικεκρυμμένως τε καὶ ἀφάνως πρὸς αὐτὴν ἔλκει καὶ τὸ πᾶν αὐτοῦ σύστημα εἰς ἐνότητα συνάγει. Strom. lib. V. f. 587.



and most interesting is the conflict which they had to carry on, and it is one which has often been repeated in history. Against the Alexandrians it was argued, that the prophets, and the apostles at any rate, knew nothing of philosophical learning. Clement answered: "The apostles and prophets undoubtedly, as disciples of the Spirit, spake what the Spirit communicated to them; but *we* can rely on no such guidance of the Holy Spirit superseding all human means of culture to enable *us* to unfold the hidden sense of their words. A scientific culture of the mind is necessary to enable us to evolve the full meaning of what was imparted indeed to them by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, but which they conveyed in their own words. He who in his thoughts wishes to be enlightened by the power of God, must previously accustom himself to philosophize on spiritual things, must have already inured himself to that form of thought, which is now to be animated by a new and higher spirit. A logical cultivation of the mind is requisite in order duly to distinguish the ambiguous and equivocal words of scripture." \* In answer to those who would have men satisfied with faith alone, and who rejected all science which others wished to employ in the service of faith, he says, "It is as though they would look for the grapes at once, without having bestowed any previous culture on the vine. Under the figure of the vine our Lord is presented to us, from which we must expect only fruit proportionate to the reasonable care and art of the husbandman. It is necessary to prune, to dig, and to train, and whatever else is to be done; the hook, the hoe, and other implements used in the culture of the vine, must be employed, that it may yield us the pleasant fruit." † According to this, the proper business of the Gnosis appears to have been to unfold the matter of the faith, to digest it, and to preserve it from the intermixture of foreign elements.

Clement had to defend the Alexandrian Gnosis against the objection, that divine revelation was not admitted to be in itself the sufficient source of truth, but was represented as standing in need of additional aid, and of a support from without, so that those who did not possess the advantage of scientific culture, were precluded from understanding it. To this he

\* Strom. lib. I. f. 292.

† L. c. f. 291.

answers,\* “If for the sake of those who are always ready to complain, we must draw a distinction, then we would call philosophy a coöperating aid to a knowledge of truth; a seeking after truth; a preparatory discipline of the Gnostic; but that which is simply a coöperative means we make not the cause nor the principal thing. Not as though the latter could not exist without philosophy; for, in fact, nearly every one among us, without the general scientific culture,† without the Grecian philosophy—many of us indeed without even being able to read or write, but captivated by that divine philosophy which came from the barbarians, have, by the power from on high, received through faith the doctrine of God. Complete and sufficient in itself, then, is the doctrine of the Saviour, as the power and wisdom of God; and even when to this is added the Grecian philosophy, it makes not indeed the truth more powerful; all that it does is to render futile the attacks of sophistry, and as it wards off all delusive machinations against the truth, has been properly denominated the wall and hedge of the vineyard.‡ The truth of faith is like the bread which is indispensable to life; the preparatory discipline may be compared to that which is eaten with the bread, and to a dessert.”

In general, Clement was distinguished for the mildness and moderation with which he met the opponents of the Alexandrian Gnosis. Generally he acknowledged the justice of their anxiety as excited by the phenomena of the times, and accordingly he felt constrained to acknowledge the true zeal for Christianity which lay at the bottom of their opposition. Occasionally, however, the blind zeal of his opponents, and his own conviction that their grossly material and one-sided tendency was a serious obstacle to the spirit of Christianity in its effort to ennoble the whole man, and that many in consequence took offence at it—all this seduced him into the fault of speaking in somewhat rough terms of his opponents, and of refusing to do justice to their honest zeal; as, for instance, when he says,§ “It is not unknown to me (what

\* Strom. lib. I. f. 318.

† “*Ἄνευ τῆς ἐγκυκλίου παιδείας.*”

‡ What the ancients said of logic in its relation to philosophy, that it was the *θριγκός*, the Alexandrians applied to the relation of philosophy itself to the Christian gnosis.

§ Strom. lib. I. f. 278.

many an ignorant brawler\* has at his tongue's end) that fait should cling to the most necessary things, to all essential points, and reject all those foreign and superfluous matters which would occupy us to no purpose with what has no bearing on our great object;" and again:† "The multitude dread the Grecian philosophy,‡ as children do a mask, fearing it will carry them off. But if their faith is of such a sort (for knowledge I certainly cannot call it) as can be overthrown by specious words, it is always liable to be subverted; for saying this they confess that they have not the truth; since truth is invincible, but false opinions are overthrown at any moment." We recognise in all this Clement's magnanimous confidence in the might of Christian truth, which had nothing to fear from opposition, but rather would come forth from the conflict with brighter lustre—although we must own that this confidence leads him to be unjust upon a faith which, in the consciousness of its own weakness, is over anxiously concerned for the safety of what it prizes above all earthly possession. The Gnostic, according to Clement,—who is here applying a saying ascribed in the apocryphal gospels to our Saviour—"γίνεσθε δοκιμοὶ τραπεζίται," (be ye skilful money-changers)—should in all cases distinguish truth from specious error, as genuine from counterfeit coins, and therefore fear no power of semblance. The Christian needed the Grecian philosophy, for the very purpose of pointing out to the philosophically educated pagans its errors and its insufficiency, of refuting them on their own principles, and of conducting them from this to the knowledge of the truth. "Thus much," observes Clement,§ "I would say to those who are so fond of complaining: if *the philosophy* itself is unprofitable, still the *study* of it is profitable, if any good is to be derived from thoroughly demonstrating that it is an unprofitable thing. Then again, we cannot convince the heathens by merely pronouncing sentence on their dogmas; we must enter with them into the development of

\* Ἀμαθῶς ψευδῶς.

† L. c. lib. VI. f. 655.

‡ Clement, Stromat. VI. 659, wittily remarks, "Most Christians treat the doctrine in a boorish manner; like the companions of Ulysses, they seek, not to avoid the Syrens, but their rhythm and song, ignorantly stopping their ears, for they know that, if they once lend an ear to the Greek philosophy, they would be unable to make good their escape from it."

§ Stromat. lib. I. f. 278.

details, until we force them to acquiesce in our sentence. For that refutation wins the fullest concurrence which is combined with a thorough knowledge of the matter in hand. In another place he says,\* “For to the Greeks, who seek after that which passes with them for wisdom, we must offer things of a kindred nature, so that they may come to the belief of the truth (and we have a right to expect they will come) by the easiest way, through what is already familiar to them. For I become all things to all men, says the apostle, that I may win all.”

The most violent opponents of this liberal tendency, in order to bring about a total condemnation of the study of the Greek philosophy, adopted the Jewish legend contained in the book of the pseudo-Enoch, which represented all higher kinds of knowledge as having come to the heathen in an unrighteous way through the agency of fallen spirits; and on this authority they made all the heathen philosophers, without exception, to be organs of the evil spirit. They considered the whole pagan world before Christ to be a direct opposition to Christianity; confounding what was really heathenish with the original and divine element, to which heathenism, while it adulterated and obscured it, owed its existence; they refused to recognise any affinity between Christianity and that part of man's nature in which, amidst all its corruption, a relationship to God gleams forth, and without which Christianity never could have been transplanted in the soil of heathenism. Or else, like the stern and fiery Tertullian, the friend of nature and all original manifestations of life, but the foe of art and false cultivation, they saw in philosophy nothing but the hand of Satan, falsifying and mutilating the original form of nature. Clement endeavoured to confute this party also on their own principles: “Even if this view were correct,” he says, “yet even Satan could deceive men only by clothing himself as an angel of light; he must draw men by the appearance of truth, by mingling the true with the false; we must therefore search for, and acknowledge, the truth, from whatever quarter it may come. And even this communication cannot take place except in accordance with the will of God; it must therefore be included in God's plan of education for the human race.” †

\* L. c. lib. V. f. 554.

† The sense of the passages in Strom. lib. VI. 647, and lib. I. 310.



Speaking, however, from his own position, he declares himself strongly against such a view. "Is it not strange," he says, "when disorder and sin are the appropriate works of Satan, to represent him as the bestower of so good a thing as philosophy? for in this case he would seem to have been more benevolent to the good men amongst the Greeks than Divine Providence itself."\*

Clement, on the other hand, traces in the progress of Greek philosophy the working of a divine education of mankind,—a sort of preparation for Christianity suited to the peculiar character of the Greeks. It was the favourite idea of Clement that the divine plan for the education of mankind constituted a great whole, of which he considered Christianity to be the end, and within which he included not merely the providential dealings of God with the Jewish people, but *also*, though in a different way, the providential dealings of God with the heathen world.† In reference to that narrow and partial conception of history, which would confine the overruling agency of God in preparing for Christianity exclusively to the Jewish nation, Clement remarks, "Every stimulus of good comes from God. He employs those men who are peculiarly fitted to guide and instruct others,‡ as his organs to work on the larger portions of mankind. Such were the better sort among the Greek philosophers. That philosophy which forms men to virtue cannot be a work of evil; it must be the work of God, from whom is every stimulus of good. And all gifts bestowed by God are bestowed for right ends, and received for right ends. Philosophy is not found in the possession of bad men, but was given to the best men among the Greeks: it is evident, therefore, from what source it was derived, viz. from that Providence which bestows on each whatever is most appropriate to his peculiar temperament. It is clear, therefore, that to the Jews was given the law, to the Greeks philosophy, until the appearance of our Lord. From this period a universal call has gone forth for a peculiar people of the righteousness by faith, since the common God of both Greeks and barbarians, or rather of the entire human race, has brought all together by one common Lord.§ Before the coming of our Lord,

\* Strom. lib. VI. f. 693. † See the General Introduction, vol. I.

‡ The ἡγούμενοί and παιδευτικοί.

§ Strom. lib. VI. f. 693 et 694.

philosophy was necessary to the Greeks as a *means of righteousness*; but now it is *useful* in the service of piety as a sort of preparation for demonstrating the faith: for thy foot will not stumble if thou derivest all good from Providence, whether it belong to the heathens or to ourselves; since God is the author of all good—both in a special sense, as the gifts of the Old and the New Testament, and also in a more indirect sense, as in the case of philosophy. And perhaps the latter also was given to the Greeks in a special sense, as preliminary to our Lord calling the Gentiles, since it educated them as the law did the Jews, for Christianity; and philosophy was a preparatory step for those who were to be conducted through Christ to perfection.”\* When Clement speaks of a righteousness to be obtained by philosophy, he does not mean that philosophy could lead men to the end of their moral destination, and qualify them for attaining to everlasting life; on the contrary, he held that redemption was absolutely necessary for that; nothing could, in his opinion, be an adequate substitute for this fact. All else only served to prepare for the appropriation of this as its ultimate end. How firmly he was convinced on this point is evident indeed from the fact—which we shall consider more minutely in another connection—that he held a particular ordinance to be necessary after death, to bring even those heathens of whom he judged so mildly to a conscious appropriation of the redemption. He distinguishes between a doctrine that makes man righteous, which in his view is the gospel only, and a doctrine which could do no more than prepare the way for that.† He distinguishes between a certain stage in the awakening of the religious and moral consciousness, a certain excitement of the moral impulse, of moral training, and that universal and complete righteousness which is the end of man’s nature generally,‡ in contradistinction to that partial cultivation of human nature which belongs to a distinct period of human development. He himself says§ of the Greek philosophy, that it is too weak to fulfil the precepts of our Lord; that it only serves, by ennobling the manners and by encouraging a belief in Providence, to prepare

\* Strom. lib. I. f. 282.

† Διδασκαλία ἢ τε δικαιοῦσα, ἢ τε εἰς τοῦτο χειραγωγούσα καὶ συλλαμβάνουσα. Strom. lib. VI. f. 644.

‡ Ἡ καθόλου δικαιοσύνη. Strom. I. 319:

[ § L. c. I. f. 309.

the minds of men for the due reception of the royal doctrine.\* “As God willed the well-being of the Jews,” says Clement, “by giving them the prophets, so he separated from the mass of common men the most eminent among the Greeks, making them appear as the prophets of that people in their own language, according to the form in which they were capable of receiving his blessing. And as now, in due season,† comes the preaching of the gospel, so in due season the law and the prophets were given to the Jews, and to the Greeks philosophy, that their ears might be practised for this proclamation.”‡

In fact Clement speaks from the experience which he had made in the case of many of his contemporaries who had been led by the Platonic elements of their philosophical education to embrace Christianity, and probably also in that of his own mental development. In proof, therefore, of what he had said, he appeals to the fact that among those who had embraced the faith were those who had been conducted by the discipline of the Greeks, no less than by that of the law, to the one family of the people of the redeemed.§ “As the Pharisees, who mingled human ordinances with the divine law, came through the medium of Christianity to a right knowledge of the law, so the philosophers, who by human *one-sidedness* had obscured the revelation of divine truth in the mind of man, came through Christianity to the true philosophy.”|| To illustrate the transfiguration of philosophy by Christianity, Clement uses the comparison of the graft, a figure which had already been employed by the apostle in an analogous sense, and which happily sets forth the ennobling influence of Christianity on human nature. “The wild olive,” he observes, “is not wanting in sap, but in the power of rightly digesting the sap which flows to it. But as soon as a branch from the noble olive-tree is grafted upon it, the graft receives more sap, which it assimilates to itself while the cluster acquires the power to digest it. In like manner the philosopher, who may be compared to the

\* Ἀμνηγίση σωφρονίζουσα τὸ ἥθος καὶ προτυποῦσα καὶ προστύφουσα εἰς παραδοχὴν τῆς ἀληθείας τὸν πρόνοιαν δοξάζοντα.

† Κατὰ καιρὸν, i. e., when, under the previous guidance of Divine Providence, mankind had become prepared for it:

‡ Τὰς ἀκοὰς ἐθίζουσα πρὸς τὸ κήρυγμα. L. c. lib. VI. f. 636, seq.

§ Strom. lib. VI. f. 636 et. 637.

|| L. c. f. 644.

wild olive, is possessed of much crude and undigested matter, since he is full of an active spirit of inquiry, and longs after the noble sap of truth; and when at length, through faith, he receives the divine power, he digests the nutriment conveyed to him, and becomes a noble olive-tree." \* This comparison is certainly eminently suited to express the thought which Clement had in his mind, that, as all the riches of human learning cannot make up for the want of the divine life, which it needs in order to its ennoblement; so the new divine principle of life imparted by Christianity requires all the treasures of human culture, in order to acquire a shape, and to incorporate itself therein. Clement employs another happy simile, when he says that the full, pure revelation of divine truth in Christianity stands in the same relation to the fragmentary, partial, and turbid apprehension of it in human systems, as the pure, clear rays of light beaming forth immediately from the sun, do to those which are artificially collected by the burning-glass.† Thus Clement secures a footing for a more impartial consideration of the developing process of religious truth, as well in the period after, as before, Christ's appearance; as well in the Christian heresies, as in those systems of Greek philosophy which professed more or less of a religious interest. Everywhere Clement could find, alloyed, dissipated, and sundered from its natural and original unity, what in the pure primitive Christianity is exhibited as a whole, which combines together all the *momenta* in harmonious unison. Error arises only from giving undue prominence and isolation to particular verities, which owe their truth to their combination in a whole. In this view Clement says, ‡ "Since the truth, then, is one,—for falsehood only has a thousand by-paths, a thousand fragments, just as the Bacchantes cut to pieces the limbs of Pentheus,—so the sects that come from the barbarians (the Christian sects) and the sects of the Greek philosophy boast of that portion of truth which they possess, as if it were the whole truth; but by the rising of the light everything is brought into day." "As," he says, "Eternal

\* L. c. f. 672.

† Ἡ μὲν ἑλληνικὴ φιλοσοφία τῇ ἐκ τῆς θράλλιδος ἔοικε λαμπήδονι, ἣν ἀνάπτουσιν ἄνθρωποι παρὰ ἡλίου, κλίπτοντες ἐντέχνως τὸ φῶς, κηρυχθέντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου, πᾶν ἐκπίνο τὸ ἄγιον ἐξέλαμψε φῶς. Strom. I. V. f. 560; I. VI. f. 688.

‡ L. c. I. 298.



existence in a moment brings to view what in time is divided into past, present, and future, so truth has the power of bringing together its kindred seeds, although they may have fallen on an alien soil. The Greek and the barbarian philosophies have in a certain way rent into fragments eternal truth—not a Dionysus, as in the mythus, but the divine revelation of the eternal Word. But he who brings together again what they have rent asunder, and reduces the Word to its completeness and unity, will without danger discern the truth.”\*

Thus Clement was the first to give utterance to the idea of a scientific conception of history having its ground in Christianity,—the idea of a true understanding of the history of doctrines, as a developing process going forth from the Christian consciousness, exhibiting itself, with more or less of purity, in all forms, whether within or without the church,—an idea which, after it had once been started, and propagated in the Alexandrian school, being compelled to yield to a one-sided dogmatical and to a narrow polemical spirit, was soon lost, to rise again, and to find—after many and great revolutions of the human mind both in religion and science—a more congenial soil in far later times. Thus, even in heresy, the Alexandrians wisely discerned a Christian truth lying at the bottom of it; and with much discrimination measured the importance of controverted questions by their different relations to the essence of Christianity.†

In one aspect of the case it might seem then as if Clement, so far from acknowledging the distinction which the Gnostics made between an esoteric and an exoteric Christianity, had maintained the *one* life of faith in all Christians, and had understood by Gnosis simply the scientific knowledge and development of the doctrines contained in the faith; and consequently conceived the difference between the *γνώσις* and the *πίστις*, not as a *material*, but only as a *formal* one. But although such a view was suggested to him by the connection

\* "Ἦτε βάρβαρος ἦτε Ἑλληνικὴ φιλοσοφία τὴν αἰδίων ἀλήθειαν σπαραγμόν τινα οὐ τῆς Διονύσου μυθολογίας, τῆς δὲ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ ὄντος αἰὶ θεολογίας πεποιήται. Ὁ δὲ τὰ διηρημένα συνθεῖς αὐθις καὶ ἐνοποιήσας τέλειον τὸν λόγον, ἀκινδύνως εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι κατόψεται τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

† See, for example, in Strom. lib. VI. f. 675, the important distinction between *Οἱ περὶ τινα τῶν ἐν μέρει σφαλλόμενοι* and *οἱ εἰς τὰ κυριώτατα παραπίπτοντες*. Compare also Clement's judgment on Montanism, cited above, page 214.

of the Christian life with Christian thinking, yet it was something too novel to be at once fully apprehended and consistently carried out. The all-pervading Christian principle, as distinguished from the aristocratic principle of education and scientific culture among the ancients, had, even in those minds to which it found access, to contend with various reactions of the earlier systems. And this continued to be the case until it had given rise to an independent Christian theology and system of faith; as we shall see when we come to consider the genetic development of these principles down to the revolution brought about in the Western theology by Augustin. Accordingly we find Clement perpetually verging towards the Gnostic or the Platonic position. With an idea of faith which flowed from the very essence of Christianity there was associated in his mind the still lingering notion, derived from the Platonic philosophy, of an opposition between a religion of cultivated minds, and arrived at by the medium of science, and a religion of the many, who were shackled by the senses and entangled in mere opinion (*δόξα*).

To judge from several of his explanations, he seems to understand by *πίστις* only a very subordinate position of subjective Christianity—a carnal faith, implicitly adhering to the mere letter of authority, such as is very far from the proper spirit and essence of Christianity, and answers rather to the position of the law than to that of the gospel. Gnosis, on the other hand, is according to him an inward, living, spiritual Christianity, a divine life, similar to what the mystic opposes, as true inward Christianity, to mere historical faith. While the simple believer is impelled to goodness by the fear of punishment and the hope of future blessedness, the Gnostic, on the other hand, is stimulated to all that is good by the inward and free impulses of love. He requires no outward evidence to convince him of the divine character of Christianity—he lives in the consciousness and immediate intuition of divine truth, and feels himself to be already blessed therein. While the mere believer (*πιστικός*) acts from obscure feelings, and consequently sometimes misses what is right, or at least fails to perform it in the right way, the Gnostic, on the other hand, acts uniformly with clear Christian convictions under the guidance of an enlightened reason.\* Clement makes the

\* Strom. f. 518, 519, et 645.

distinguishing characteristic of the Gnostic to be that which belongs to the very essence of the pure Christian position generally — namely, that through love the future is already become present.\* What the Stoics said of the wise man, he applied to the Gnostic. The latter alone does right for the sake of the right end, to which the whole life should be referred, with a clear consciousness of what he is doing. All his actions therefore are, as Clement terms them by an application of the Stoic terminology, κατορθώματα. The good, on the other hand, which the πιστικός does, more unconsciously, — instinctively, — is a μέσον, something intermediate between good and evil.† This resembles what the Gnostics said of the good works of the mere psychical Christians. Hence the γνῶσις is its own supreme end — not a means to something else; for it is the life in the godlike itself; it would live only in the uninterrupted contemplation of the godlike, and struggles only to arrive at possession of itself. But the πίστις is a means, inasmuch as it is impelled to the avoidance of sin and to obedience by the fear of punishment and by the hope of reward.‡ We find in Clement a remarkable exposition of the difference between intuition, knowledge, and faith, wherein he defines their relation to each other. Faith receives the fundamental doctrines, without intuition, only with a view to practical exercise; the intuition of the spirit soars immediately to what is highest; the intermediate step by demonstration is what he calls γνῶσις and ἐπιστήμη.§

When Clement is speaking of the progressive steps in the divine education of man, and represents the Logos as the Θεῖος παιδαγωγός, he says, || “All men belong to him, some with

\* Ἔστιν αὐτῷ δι' ἀγάπην ἐνεστώς ἤδη τὸ μέλλον. L. c. l. VI. f. 652.

† Τοῦ δὲ ἀπλῶς πιστοῦ μίση πρᾶξις λέγεται· ἂν μὴ δέπω κατὰ λόγον ἐπιτελοῦμένη, μὴδὲ τὴν κατ' ἐπίστασιν κατορθοῦμένην. Strom. lib. VI. f. 669. With which may be compared, perhaps, what he says of the ὁρδοδόξασται καλουμένοις. Ἔργοις προσφέρονται καλοῖς, οὐκ εἰδότες ἃ ποιοῦσι. L. c. lib. I. f. 292.

‡ L. c. lib. VI. f. 663.

§ The different meanings of φρόνησις, according to the different ways of employing the conception: Ἐπειδὴν μὲν ἐπιβάλληται τοῖς πρώτοις αἰτίοις, νόμοις καλεῖται· ὅταν δὲ ταύτην ἀποδεικτικῶς λόγῳ βεβαιώσῃται, γνῶσις τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ὀνομάζεται· ἔν δὲ τοῖς εὐλαβείαν συντείνουσιν γενομένην, καὶ ἄνευ θεωρίας παραδείξιμην τὸν ἀρχικὸν λόγον, κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ ἐξηγασίας τήρησιν, πίστις λέγεται. L. c. lib. VI. f. 691.

|| L. c. lib. VII. f. 702.

consciousness of what He is to them, others not as yet ; some as friends, others as *faithful servants*, others barely as *servants*. He is their Teacher, educating the Gnostics by the revelation of mysteries (the inward intuition of truth), the believer by good hopes, and the hardened by the corrective discipline of suffering." Thus then what Clement says on the relation of the *γνωστικός* to the *πιστικός*, in respect to subjective Christianity, seems to agree entirely with what the Gnostics taught concerning the relation of the *πνευματικός* to the *ψυχικός* in the same respect. But still there is an important difference between them in two points. First of all, Clement did not derive these two different positions from original differences in human nature, but recognised in all alike a capacity for attaining to the highest ; so that everything depends simply on the cultivation which that capacity should receive from the activity of each individual. In the second place, he differs from the Gnostics in admitting a common foundation of objective Christianity for both the higher and lower position of Christian knowledge and life. It might be said that, inasmuch as this distinction is no arbitrary invention of his, but corresponds to the different positions to be discerned in the Christian life as it manifested itself in his age—and which, moreover, since it is grounded in the gradual process of the development of the Christian principles in life, recurs again in later times—therefore the language employed to denote it is not of so much importance ; for it can make no so great difference whether we suppose two several degrees in the development of faith and of the life in faith, or whether, like Clement in many passages of his writings, we attribute the true spiritual life of faith to the Gnosis only. Yet this distinction is by no means so insignificant as it might at the first glance be deemed, but it both possesses a deeper ground and is followed by more important consequences. The reason why the Alexandrians conceived the matter in this way lay partly in their predominantly intellectual tendency, and partly in the form under which faith was presented to them in the case of many of the Christians of their day.

As regards the first point, it is evident that, by the predominantly contemplative and speculative tendency of their mental character and their entanglement in the forms of the Platonic philosophy, the Alexandrians were hindered from



recognising, in its full extent, the independent practical power of faith to transform by its own unassisted energy the whole spiritual life from within; although, in order to arrive at this truth, Clement needed only to unfold what was clearly involved in his own language (already quoted) on this subject.

As to the second point, we must bear in mind the particular shape under which, in many cases, faith was presented to the Alexandrians,—appearing to be little else than a blind belief on authority, associated, as it would seem, with a sort of sensuous Eudemonism. They could not fail to observe, it is true, the ameliorating influence of faith on life, even where it presented itself under this form, as soon as they compared the condition of these men as Christians with what they had previously been as pagans; and indeed, as we have already remarked, they were far from denying it. But still they thought they could see in it nothing of the ennobling influence of Christianity on the whole inner nature of the man—nothing of the divine life of the spirit; and this sensuous Christianity was repugnant to their own spiritualizing mode of thought. They might, too, be led, by the repulsive impression which this sensuous form made upon them, to overlook the divine life which, unable as yet to break through the hard shell, lay hidden under this incrustation. And again we ought not to forget that, when the new spiritual world first began to be formed out of Christianity, much still lay confused in a chaotic mass that by slow degrees only could be separated and reduced to order; as, for example, the different parts of theology, which afterwards mutually set bounds to each other. This was the case especially with the different branches of a theology which was to spring immediately out of Christianity, and of a Christian philosophy which was to receive from Christianity its main impulse and direction. Thus much that was vague and erroneous may be traced to the fact that in the souls of these men different interests and requisitions were as yet confounded together, although the immediate religious interest was invariably the predominant one. Hence it was that, forgetting the immediate and originally practical aim of holy writ, they sought in it for the solution of questions which it was never designed to answer.

Such a mistake discovers itself in Clement's answer to those who opposed the humility of knowledge to the Alexan-

drian Gnosis. "The wise man is convinced," they urged, "that there are many things incomprehensible; and it is precisely in making this acknowledgment that his wisdom consists." But Clement replied, "This wisdom belongs as well to those also who are capable only of very narrow and limited views. The Gnostic comprehends what to others appears incomprehensible; for he is convinced that to the Son of God nothing is incomprehensible, and that there is nothing, therefore, concerning which he may not be made wise by Him; for He who suffered out of love to us could withhold from us nothing which is necessary for our instruction in the Gnosis."\*

The fundamental ideas here unfolded respecting different stages of development in Christianity we find presented once more by *Origen*, the second great teacher of the Alexandrian school; but in such a way as leads us to recognise in him a disciple gifted with creative powers of his own. For although he may have been excited by ideas transmitted from another, or passing current in a certain circle, still he did not adopt them as mere matters of tradition, but, apprehending and digesting them in a form peculiarly his own, reproduced them in an independent manner out of the common sense of his own Christian experience and reflection. And here we must bear in mind the fact that he did not belong to those who by the Platonic element of philosophical culture had been conducted from paganism to Christianity, but that he came to the pursuit of a Gnosis from the position of a well-assured faith and childlike piety. This earnest and settled faith he had received from a Christian education; and to this he ever remained true, amidst all the changes of his outward and inner life. As the fervour of his piety, when a child, had led him to seek martyrdom, so in the evening of life, when his fundamental principles in theology and dogmatics had undergone a complete change, he still displayed the same zeal which exposed him to great sufferings in the cause of his faith. Even from the position of his Gnosis, he was far from wishing to resolve Christianity into a certain system of general ideas, and to consider the historical element as nothing but their drapery. The acknowledgment of the great facts of Christianity in their reality—this was the preliminary axiom which his Gnosis

\* Strom. i. VII. f. 649.

adopted from faith; and it was the very aim of that Gnosis to arrive at a full understanding of the significance of these facts in their connection with the whole development of the universe. The Gnosis was to demonstrate that without these facts the universe could never reach the ultimate goal of its completion. This striving to penetrate into the inmost meaning of things was not (as in the case of such a tendency might well be suspected) combined with any inclination to sublimate everything into the subjective; but, on the contrary, its aim was to arrive at an understanding of the great phenomena of religion in their objective import, and in their connection with supernatural factors. We will illustrate this position by a remarkable instance. In commenting on the sudden conversion of entire populations or cities, Origen seeks for the cause, not in their previous course of development, but in the impression which the appearance of Christ produced on the spiritual powers presiding over these populations; just as, in the case of the Gnostics, the effect of Christ's appearance on the spirit of humanity and of history was represented objectively as an effect on the Demiurge.\*

In his controversies with the pagans, who reproached the Christians with their blind faith, Origen often insists upon it as the peculiar excellence of Christianity—as a revelation from the God who cares for the salvation of *all men*—that it possesses a power to attract the great masses of mankind, who are incapable of scientific inquiry, and, by virtue of bare faith,† to operate with divine energy for their sanctification. He appeals to the experience of many who could bear testimony to this influence of Christianity, and also to the whole analogy of life, wherein every act that has a future end in view must proceed on faith and trust.‡ Those who had first attained to the faith in this way, and become improved by it, might afterwards of themselves be inclined to enter by degrees more deeply into the sense of the holy scriptures.§

\* Origen, T. XIII. s. 58: 'Εγὼ δὲ νομίζω καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντάς τι γίνεσθαι, μεταβαλόντας ἐπὶ τὸ βελτίον ἐν τῇ Χριστοῦ ἐπιδημίᾳ, ὥστε τινὰς ὅλας πόλεις ἢ καὶ ἔθνη οἰκειότερον πολλῶν ἐσχηκέναι τὰ πρὸς τὸν Χριστόν.

† Ψιλὴ πίστις, πίστις ἄλογος.

‡ Compare, e. g., c. Cels. lib. I. c. 9, and lib. VI. c. 12, seq.

§ Μετὰ τὴν ἀπαξ γινομένην εἰσαγωγὴν, φιλοτιμήσασθαι πρὸς τὸ καὶ βαδύτερα τῶν κικρυμμένων νοημάτων ἐν ταῖς γραφαῖς καταλαβεῖν. Philocal. c. 15.



The *Pistis* he considers to be the lowest position of Christianity, which must exist precisely on this account, "that the simple also, who to the best of their power devote themselves to a pious life, may obtain salvation." Above this he places the position of the Gnosis and of the Sophia. The latter is a divine wisdom communicated by divine grace to such souls as are capable of receiving it, and as seek after it by the study of the scriptures and by prayer to God. Human wisdom, the wisdom of this world, is only a preparatory discipline of the soul, designed by the exercise of the thinking faculty to qualify it for the attainment of that higher wisdom which is the supreme end.\* If the Gnostics confined the faith which is awakened by miracles exclusively to the psychical natures, Origen, on the contrary, appealed to the instance of the Apostle St. Paul, who was brought to the faith by a miraculous vision.† To the fundamental Montanistic principle he formed the due contrast by placing the gifts of knowledge and teaching above that of miracles, and appealed to the fact that, in that passage of the second epistle to the Corinthians which treats of the mutual relation of these charismata, St. Paul assigns to the former the highest rank.‡

Like Clement, Origen, in many passages, expresses himself emphatically with regard to the nature of faith, and insists that it is a fact of the inner life, whereby man enters into a real communion with divine things; and from this living faith he distinguishes that which is built and rests only on outward authority. Thus, in his exposition of St. John viii. 24, § he says, "Faith brings with it a spiritual communion with him in whom we believe; and therefore also a kindred disposition of mind, || which must manifest itself in works. The object of faith is taken up into the inner life, and there becomes an informing principle. Where this is not the case it is only a dead faith, and deserves not the name of faith. Now, as

\* Γυμνάσιον μὲν φάμεν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην σοφίαν, τέλος δὲ τὴν θεϊάν. C. Cels. l. VI. c. 13.

† In Joann. T. XIII. s. 59.

‡ Ἐπεὶ τον λόγον προτίμα τῶν τεραστίων ἐνεργειῶν, διὰ τοῦτο ἐνεργήματα δυνάμεων καὶ χαρίσματα ἰαμάτων ἐν τῇ κατωτέρῳ τίθῃσι χώρα παρὰ τὰ λογικὰ χαρίσματα. c. Cels. l. III. c. 46.

§ In Joann. T. XIX. s. 6.

|| Διακρίσθαι κατὰ τὸν λόγον καὶ συμπεφυκέναι αὐτῷ.



Christ, as the Logos who has appeared in humanity, presents himself to the religious consciousness under various relations,\* so the faith will correspond to these various relations; and as Christ is an object of faith in these different relations, and is received as such into the inner life, this fact must be actually manifested, so that nothing that conflicts with what Christ is in these several relations may gain admittance into that inward life. Thus, together with faith in Christ as the Righteousness, the Wisdom, the Power of God, there is also given the appropriation of all that is involved in these conceptions, and whatever contradicts them is excluded." It might be said, it is true, "that Origen is here speaking rather of an ideal than of an historical Christ. Were the latter left wholly out of the account, and those general attributes of which Christ is depicted in the history as the personal representative substituted for Him, nothing would be thereby changed." But assuredly this would be to foist a wholly foreign meaning upon the great teacher. He, whose higher life had sprung out of a belief in the history of Christ, and ever continued to be rooted in that faith,—he, moreover, to whose mind this Christ had certainly been all that he denoted by these conceptions, was, we may well affirm, very far from separating what was so closely united in his own inner experience. From such a spiritual communion with this real Christ, as had its root in faith, all these qualities must be developed in each individual case—an order of connection which, moreover, in his ideas (hereafter to be explained) is grounded on the relation of the ἐπιδημία νοητῇ τοῦ λόγου to the ἐπιδημία αἰσθητή. And he says expressly, with the Apostle St. John, that whosoever denies the Son, the same hath not the Father in any form, "neither for the Pistis nor for the Gnosis."† It is true, as we have just seen, that Origen acknowledged the importance of miracles as a means of awakening religious faith, and he recognises a certain stage of faith arising primarily from the impression produced by miracles; but yet he requires that the faith should rise beyond this stage, up to the *spiritual* apprehension of the truth. Accordingly he distinguishes ‡ a sensuous faith in miracles from faith in the

\* The different ἐπινοῖαι τοῦ Χριστοῦ.

† In Joann. T. XIX. s. 1. Ed. Lommatzsch, T. II. p. 143.

In Joann. T. XX. c. 25.

truth. He says, comparing St. John viii. 43 and 45, "Those sensuous Jews had indeed been impressed by the miracle, and believed in Jesus as a worker of miracles; but they had not the requisite temper for the reception of divine truth, and did not believe in Jesus as a revealer of the more profound truths of religion:"\* and he adds, "We may see the same thing at the present day exemplified by multitudes, who wonder at Jesus when they contemplate his history, yet, when some more profound doctrine, exceeding their own power of comprehension, is unfolded, believe in him no longer, but suspect that it is false. Let us therefore take heed, lest he say to us also, 'Ye believe me not, because I tell you the truth.'"

Origen sometimes compares the relation of the *Pistis* to the *Gnosis* with the relation of the present world to the future,—of that which is in part to that which is perfect,—of faith to intuition; as, for instance, when he says, "They who have received the charisma of the *Gnosis* and of the *Sophia* live no longer in faith, but in sight;—they are the spiritually-minded, who are no longer at home in the body, but even while here below are present with the Lord. But *they* are still at home in the body, and not yet present with the Lord, who do not understand the spiritual sense of scripture, but cleave wholly to its body (its letter, see below). For if the Lord is the Spirit, how can *he* be otherwise than still far from the Lord who cannot as yet seize the spirit that maketh alive and the spiritual sense of scripture? But such a person lives in faith."† He is at great trouble to explain, in favour of his own views, what St. Paul had said, 2 Cor. v., so directly contrary to them, concerning the relation of faith to sight, combating, not without sophistical equivocation, the position correctly maintained by most of the fathers of the church, that Paul spoke of himself as one who still lived in faith, and had not yet attained to sight. He assumes that the phrases, "to be present in the body" and "in the flesh," and "to live after the flesh," are synonymous; and so arrives at the conclusion that Paul asserted this, not of himself and all spiritually-minded men, but only of believers who were still carnally-minded.

\* As if Christ would have said, Καθ' ὃ μὲν τεράστια ποιῶ, πιστεύετε μοι, καθ' ὃ δὲ τὴν ἀληθεῖαν λέγω, οὐ πιστεύετε μοι.

† In Joann. T. XIII. s. 52.

Yet we ought not to infer too much from a single passage of this kind. We should wholly misunderstand Origen if for this reason we supposed that he placed the Gnosis of this present life on a level with the intuition of the life eternal. He was very far indeed from so doing. The longing after a divine life beyond this world was too deeply rooted in his exalted mind to find so easily its satisfaction in the self-delusion of over-strained speculations. He longed after a knowledge of divine things no longer confined within the limits of this earthly existence. In passages like that alluded to he is adopting an analogical language, in conformity with the principles of a method of interpretation which allowed the same biblical expression to be variously explained, according to its several grades of application. Thus, in order to explain the relation of the Old Testament to the New,—the relation of the Pistis to the Gnosis,—he might employ the same expression which, in its highest and fullest sense, had reference to the relation of the present world to the world to come.\* In other passages he expresses himself strongly to the effect that not only the knowledge of this life, as a knowledge only in part, shall vanish away as soon as the fulness of the eternal life appears, but that the same shall be true also of *all the good things* pertaining to the present life. He considers even the faith of this earthly life as being only in part, and describes a perfect faith, which is destined to arrive at the same time with a perfect knowledge. Now, of that *which is denominated* faith, in this higher sense, *that* of course could not be predicated which is affirmed of the faith belonging to the “many,” and which is opposed to the Gnosis.†

The two different stages or positions of the Pistis and of the

\* Τῶ ἐρχομένῳ τελείῳ καταργοῦντι τὸ ἐκ μέρους, ὅταν τὸ ὑπερέχον τῆς γνώσεως Χριστοῦ χωρῆσαι τις δυνήθῃ, οὐ συγκρίσει πάντα τὰ πρὸ τῆς τηλικαύτης καὶ τοσαύτης γνώσεως οὐ σκύβαλα τῇ ἰδίᾳ φύσει τυγχάνοντα, σκύβαλα ἀναφαίνεται. In Matth. T. X. s. 9.

† Ὡς πρὸς τὸ τέλειον, ὅπερ ὅταν ἔλθῃ, τὸ ἐκ μέρους καταργηθήσεται, πᾶσα ἡ ἐνταῦθα πίστις ἡμῶν ὀλιγοπιστία ἐστὶ καὶ ὡς πρὸς ἐκεῖνο οὐδέπω νοοῦμεν οἱ ἐκ μέρους γινώσκοντες. In Matth. T. XII. s. 6. “Ὅπερ ἐπὶ γνώσεως ἔρχεται· ἄρτι γινώσκω ἐκ μέρους· τὸδε καὶ ἐπὶ παντὸς καλοῦ ἀκόλουθον οἶμαι λέγειν· ἐν δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἡ πίστις. Διόπερ ἄρτι πιστεύω ἐκ μέρους· ὅταν δὲ ἔλθῃ τὸ τέλειον τῆς πίστεως, τὸ ἐκ μέρους καταργηθήσεται, τῆς διὰ εἶδους πίστεως, πολλῶν διαφερούσης τῆς, ἢ οὕτως ἔγω, δὲ ἰσόπτρου καὶ ἐν αἰνίγματι, ὁμοίως τῇ νῦν γνώσει, πίστει. In Joann. T. X. s. 27.

Gnosis stand, according to this view, in the same relation to each other as the *χριστιανισμὸς σωματικός* to the *χριστιανισμὸς πνευματικός*, and *σωματικῶς χριστιανίζειν* to *πνευματικῶς χριστιανίζειν*. He who stands at the position of the fleshly Christianity continues to adhere only to the letter of scripture, to the history of Christ;—he cleaves to the outward form of the manifestation of the godlike, without elevating himself in spirit to the inward essence therein revealed. He stops short at the earthly, temporal, historical appearance of the divine Logos; he does not mount upward to the intuition of the Logos Himself. He occupies himself exclusively with that which is the outer shell of the doctrines of Christianity, without reaching the spiritual kernel within; he goes by the mere letter of scripture, in which the spirit lies bound. The spiritual Christian, on the other hand, sees in the temporal appearance and actions of Christ a revelation and representation of the eternal government and operation of the divine Logos. The letter of scripture is for him but a covering of the spirit; and he knows how to set free the spirit from its envelope. With him everything temporal in the form of the manifestation of divine things is resolved into the inner intuition of the spirit;—the sensuous gospel of the letter\* becomes spiritualized into the revelation of the eternal, spiritual gospel.† For him the highest problem is, to discern the latter in the former; to translate the former into the latter; to understand the holy scriptures as a revelation of one coherent plan of the divine Logos for the progressive education of humanity,—of His unremitted care for the salvation of fallen man—the central point of which is His appearance in humanity (the sensible representation of His eternal, spiritual agency),‡ and its end the return of every fallen being to God. Since Origen makes everything to have a reference to *this*, it follows that by the gospel, as he views it, all scripture is transfigured into gospel. As Origen believes, therefore, it is only by spiritual fellowship with the divine Logos—by receiving the spirit of Christ into the inner life,§ that each one attains to true spiritual Christianity, and to the right, spiritual understanding of all scripture. Now,

\* Τὸ εὐαγγέλιον αἰσθητόν.

† Τοῦ εὐαγγελίου πνευματικοῦ, αἰωνίου.

‡ The ἐπιδημία αἰσθητή, symbol of the ἐπιδημία νοητὴ τοῦ λόγου.

§ The ἐπιδημία νοητὴ τοῦ Χριστοῦ.



as the prophets, even before *Christ's manifestation in time*, shared in the spiritual fellowship with the divine Logos, and by virtue thereof were enabled to announce beforehand the whole of Christianity;—as they therefore possessed, even in their day, a spiritual perception of the meaning of the Old Testament, and in a certain sense were Christians even before the appearance of Christianity; so, on the other hand, after the appearance of Christ there are still to be found among Christians men who have not as yet become partakers of this spiritual fellowship with the divine word—men who, like the Jews of old, are still slaves of the letter, and of whom the same may be asserted as Paul said of the Jews before the appearance of Christianity, Gal. iv., that they are children to whom “the time appointed of the Father” has not yet come; and that, *as children*, they are still under tutors and governors, still held in thrall by those habits of thinking which are nothing more than means to prepare them for receiving the true spiritual Christianity. “Every soul,” says Origen, “which enters on its childhood, and finds itself on the way to maturity, needs, till its appointed time of maturity arrives, a taskmaster, tutor, or governor.”\*

Accordingly Origen compares the different stages of the development of Christianity in the *same period* with the different stages of religious development in the *succession of time*. His theory is, that, as Judaism was a necessary preparation for Christianity, so also there is even in the Christian church a Jewish position, which forms a preparatory stage and a transition to the true spiritual apprehension of Christianity; that as, under the Old Testament, there was, it must be admitted, a spiritual revelation of Christ preceding His temporal appearance, and an anticipation of what is characteristic of the Christian, so, under the New again, there must be supposed to exist, in the case of the great mass of believers in a Christ historically manifested, a stage of religious faith approaching much nearer to a Jewish than to a Christian position. “We must know,” says he,† “that Christ’s spiritual presence was revealed, even before He appeared in the body,

\* Commentar. in Matth. 213. Πᾶσα ψυχὴ, ἐρχομένη εἰς νηπιότητα καὶ οὐδύουσα ἐπὶ τὴν τελειότητα, δοῦται μέχρις ἐκείνης αὐτῇ τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου, παιδαγωγοῦ καὶ οἰκονόμων καὶ ἐπιτρόπων.

† Orig. in Joann. T. I. s. 9.

to those perfected ones who had passed their season of childhood ; to those who were no longer under tutors and governors, but to whom the spiritual fulness of time had appeared ; the patriarchs, viz., Moses the servant of God, and the prophets who saw Christ's glory. But as, before his visible appearance in the flesh, *He Himself appeared* to these perfect ones, so too, subsequently to his incarnation, to such as are still children, and therefore are under tutors and governors, and not yet come to the fulness of time, there have appeared *those precursors* of Christ, the ideas which are suited to the minds of children, and which may be said to be necessary for their education. But the *Son Himself*, the divine Word, has not as yet appeared to them in His glory ; since He waits for that preparation of mind which must take place in the case of those men of God who are destined to comprehend His divine dignity. And again, we should know that as there is a law which is but the shadow of those good things to come which are revealed by the promulgation of the true law (in Christianity), so, too, it is only the shadow of the Christian mysteries which is presented in that gospel which every reader supposes he understands. *That* gospel, on the contrary, which John calls *everlasting*, which may be properly called the *spiritual* gospel, brings clearly before the eyes of all who understand it whatever pertains to the Son of God Himself, the mysteries typified under His discourses, and the things of which His actions were the symbols. Accordingly we must believe that, as there is a Jew which is one outwardly, and a circumcision which is outward in the flesh, so there is also an outward Christian, and an outward baptism."

This theory of two different positions in Christianity is, in Origen's case, closely connected with the theory of different forms of the revelation of Christ with reference to these different positions. While the Gnostics resolved the revealing and redeeming power of God into various hypostases,\* according to the different positions of the spiritual world, corresponding to certain differences of nature, and while, consequently, they had a Monogenes, a Logos, and a Soter, an *άνω* and a *κάτω Χριστός*, a *pneumatical* and a *psychical* Christ ; Origen, on the contrary, acknowledged the unity of essence, and of the divine and human elements in Christ's manifestation.

\* See Part II.

According to him, there was but one Christ, Who is *all*. Only He appears under different predicates, through different ways of perception, in different relations to those to whom He reveals Himself, according to their different capacities and wants, and hence, either in His divine majesty, or in His human condescension. It is a thought which we often meet with in Origen, that, in a more divine sense than St. Paul did, the Redeemer becomes all things to all men, in order that he may win all.\* “The Redeemer,” he says, “becomes many things, perhaps even all things, according to the necessities of the whole creation to be redeemed by Him.”† Those predicates which belong essentially to the divine Word, as the eternal revealer of God to the whole spiritual world, the fountain of all truth and goodness, must be distinguished from those which he has only assumed for the sake of those fallen beings who are to be redeemed by Him, and in condescension to the different positions at which they have arrived. “Happy are they,” says Origen, ‡ “who have advanced so far as no longer to need the Son of God as the Physician that heals the sick, no longer as the Shepherd, no longer as the Redemption; but who need Him only as the Truth, the Word, the Sanctification, and in whatever other relation He stands to those whose perfect manhood enables them to comprehend what is most glorious in Him.” Historical, practical Christianity, the preaching of Christ crucified, was regarded by Origen as nothing more than a subordinate position: above this he places a certain wisdom of the perfect, which knows Christ no longer in the humble condition of a servant, but recognises Him in his exaltation as the divine Word. Origen, however, still acknowledged the former to be a necessary preparation, by which men were to rise from the temporal to the eternal revelation of God, in order that, being cleansed by faith in the Crucified, and sanctified by following the Son of God as He appeared in man’s nature, they may become qualified for the spiritual communications of His divine essence. “When thou canst understand the difference between the Divine word,” says Origen, § “according as it is published in the foolishness

\* In Joann. T. XX. s. 28.

† In Joann. T. I. s. 22, where, as I suppose, instead of *καθαρίζει* we should read *καὶ ὁ Χρῆς αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐλευθερώσθαι δυνάμειν πᾶσα κτίσις*.

‡ In Joann. T. I. s. 22.

§ In Matth. p. 290.

of preaching, or set forth in the wisdom of the perfect, thou shalt perceive how the divine Word has for the beginners in Christianity the form of a servant; whereas it is in the majesty of the Father that He comes to the perfect, who are able to say, We behold His glory, the glory of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth; for to the perfect the glory of the Word appears as He is, the only-begotten of the Father, and as He is, full of grace and truth; which *he* cannot comprehend whose faith stands in the *foolishness of preaching*." In another place\* he says, "To them that live in the flesh he became flesh; but to them who no longer walk after the flesh he appears as the divine Logos, Who in the beginning was with God, and Who reveals to them the Father. That stage of faith which desires to know nothing save Christ crucified he regarded as a subordinate one; from which however, through the sanctification it bestows, it is possible to advance to the higher, spiritual Christianity." On this point he thus remarks: "If a man belongs to those Corinthians among whom St. Paul was determined to know nothing save Jesus Christ and Him crucified; if of Him he has learned only that for our sakes He became man; still even through the man Jesus he may be formed into the man of God, he may in the imitation of his death die unto sin, and in the imitation of his resurrection rise to a life of righteousness." Thus the *intellectualizing* mysticism of Origen did not allow him rightly to understand the meaning and force of St. Paul's determination not to know anything save Jesus the crucified. What with the great apostle is the highest, Origen held to be a subordinate position, above which the Gnostic is bound to rise. It is true he does not really contradict St. Paul when, under the name of Gnosis, he asserts the existence of a wisdom of the perfect, which cannot be attained at any lower and carnal position. Yet there is this difference between the views of the two. According to the doctrine of St. Paul, one must attain to that higher wisdom in a practical way, by being continually purified more and more from the selfishness of nature, from all that is opposed to the influences of the Divine Spirit, by becoming ennobled by the spirit of love and humility; Origen, on the other hand, still fettered by his Platonic *Intellectualism*, makes the progress

\* In Matth. p. 268.

† In Joann. T. I. e. 11.



to that higher wisdom depend principally on the stripping off, in action and in contemplation, all that is sensuous,—in short, on a direction of life and cognition to the superhuman. According to the doctrine of St. Paul, the *facts* of Christ's appearance as the Son of God on earth, His passion, and His resurrection, are the central point on which, not only the whole of Christianity turns, but also that wisdom of the perfect which is founded on a more profound understanding of *historical* Christianity. According to Origen's doctrine, the Gnosis, while it acknowledges and presupposes the importance of those facts in their bearing on the salvation of fallen beings, and searches into their deeper grounds, ultimately strives at this,—namely, to rise from the historical Christ to the spiritual essence of the Logos, as He is in Himself, and thence still higher to the absolute *itself*, the *ὄν*,—it seeks, in short, to attain to the understanding of the life and conduct of the historical Christ, as a symbol of the ever-enduring, controlling agency of the *Divine Logos*. From this spiritual revelation of the Logos the Gnostic has still more to learn than he can derive from the holy scriptures, however accurately understood; for the latter contain, after all, but a few comparatively insignificant elements of the whole of the Gnosis, and a very brief introduction to it.\* We must not omit to remark, that Origen, like Clement, confounding the provinces of a Christian system of faith and of Christian speculation, wished to find in Holy Scripture information on many points which revelation generally was never intended to furnish—on matters to which the wisdom of the perfect, in the Pauline sense, did not in the least refer.

However, in what Origen says of different stages in the Christian development, according as the Jewish principle was mixed up with, or was conquered by, the Christian spirit, we recognise a pregnant truth for the study of history, and one which, suppressed at first by the prevalence of a narrow, dogmatical, and ecclesiastical spirit, was not destined until long after to make good its rightful claims. And intimately connected with this mode of contemplation was the magnanimous toleration which distinguished Origen as well as

\* Οἶμαι τῆς ὅλης γνώσεως στοιχεῖά τινα, ἐλαχίστας καὶ βραχυτάτας εἶναι ἰσαγαγὰς ὅλας γραφὰς, καὶ ἅν πάνυ νοηθῶσιν ἀκριβῶς. In Joann. T. XIII. s. 5.

Clement. In the case of the former, however, where it stands alongside of a fully developed system of doctrines, it shines forth the more brightly, leading him as it did to look for and to acknowledge the Christian spirit which presented itself with more or less of purity in different stages of development. He was an enemy to that intellectual pride which could wantonly injure the Christian feelings of such as appeared to entertain lower views, or which hesitated not to reject their opinions with haughty contempt. "As St. Paul," he says, "could not profit those who were Jews according to the flesh, unless (where there was good reason for so doing) he caused Timothy to be circumcised, shaved his own head, presented an offering, and, in a word, became a Jew to the Jews, in order that he might win the Jews; so he, who would wish to profit many, cannot, by spiritual Christianity alone, educate and advance to a higher and better stage those who still remain in the school of sensuous Christianity: therefore he must combine the spiritual with the sensuous.\* And whenever it is necessary to preach the gospel of sense, by virtue of which one is determined to know nothing among sensuous-minded men save Jesus and Him crucified, then this must be done. But when they show themselves to be well grounded, bringing forth the fruits of the Spirit, and when they love the heavenly wisdom, then we must communicate to them the Word which, from its appearance in humanity, is now once more exalted to that which it was in the beginning with God."† Thus from the words of Christ, in Matthew xix. 14,‡ he deduces the duty of becoming a child to children, in order to win the children for the kingdom of God; just as Christ himself, although in the form of God, nevertheless became a child; and he then goes on to say, "This we must rightly understand, in order that we may not, out of any conceit of our own superior wisdom, as great ones in the church, despise the little ones and the children; but, remembering how it has been said that 'of such is the kingdom of

\* Πνευματικῶς καὶ σωματικῶς χριστιανίζειν. In like manner Clement, where he speaks of the *οἰκονομία* of the Gnostic, Strom. l. VII. f. 730. Comp. the ideas of Philo, vol. I. p. 52, &c.

† In Joann. T. I. s. 9.

‡ In Matth. l. c. 374, 375. Ed. Huet. or T. XV. in Matth. s. 7, ed. Lommatzsch, T. III. p. 340.

heaven,' we must so demean ourselves that by our means the salvation of the children may be promoted. It is not enough not to prevent their being brought to the Saviour; but we must, while we become children with children, do His will; that so, when the children, through our means who become children, shall enter into bliss, we, as having humbled ourselves, may be exalted of God." Origen is here censuring those who, like the Gnostics, because the ordinary teachers, wanting in the advantages of a high mental cultivation, presented the simple gospel in a rude and unattractive form, were wont to despise them as acting unworthy of so great a Saviour and Master.\* "Even after we have attained to the highest perception of the word and of the truth, we shall assuredly not altogether forget the *sufferings* of Christ; for to these were we indebted for our introduction to this higher life during the period of our earthly existence."†

It must now be evident, from what has been said, that, corresponding to these two different ways of apprehending Christianity, there would also be two different modes of interpreting the sacred writings, according as the literal and historical, or the higher spiritual sense, was followed. To the mind of Origen the highest problem of the interpretation of scripture is, to translate the gospel of sense into the gospel of the spirit;‡ just as it is the highest aim of Christianity to rise from the earthly appearance of the incarnate Word to spiritual fellowship with Him, and to the contemplation of His divine essence. Thus he saw in every part of scripture a condescension of the infinitely exalted, heavenly spirit to the human form which is so incompetent to grasp it, a condescension of the divine teacher of humanity to the wants and weakness of man; the whole of scripture being, as it were, a humanization of the Logos. Profound and pregnant are the ideas which Origen here advances,—ideas which, adopted and elaborated by sober, logical thought, might, when applied to hermeneutics, or exegesis, and the defence of revealed religion, as well as to doctrinal theology, have been prolific of

\* Βλεπέτω οὖν τις τινὰ τῶν ἐπαγγελιομένων κατήχησιν ἐκκλησιαστικὴν καὶ διδασκαλίαν, προσφέροντα τὰ μαρὰ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τὰ ἐξουδενωμένα καὶ τὰ ἀγενή.

† In Joann. T. II. s. 4.

‡ Τὸ μεταλαβεῖν τὸ αἰσθητὸν εὐαγγέλιον εἰς τὸ πνευματικόν.

the most valuable results, had not Origen been prevented from carrying them out by the inherent defect of his fundamental principle of theology. Thus he says,\* “All which is here called the word of God is a revelation of the incarnate, and—in regard to His divine essence—the self-renouncing divine Word. Hence we see the Word of God on earth when He became man under a human form; for, in the scriptures, the Word *continually* becomes flesh,† in order to dwell among us. But when we have leaned on the bosom of the incarnate Word, and are able to follow Him as He goes up into the high mountain (Matt. xvii.), then we shall say we have seen His glory. Such is the transfiguration of scripture for all who, from a vivid communion with Christ, rise with Him, and learn to understand its spirit.” He went upon the principle of an analogy between holy scripture, as the work of God, and the whole creation, as proceeding from the same divine author. Accordingly he says,‡ “We ought not to be surprised if, in every text of scripture, what is superhuman in the thought does not become immediately obvious to the unlearned; for even in the case of providence, which embraces the whole world, some manifest themselves at once and in the clearest manner as works of such a providence, whilst others are so obscure as to leave room for that unbelief which refuses to acknowledge a God superintending all with inexpressible wisdom and power. But as we do not, when really convinced that such a providence exists, question it on account of things which we do not understand, so neither can we doubt the divinity which pervades the whole body of the sacred scriptures, because our weakness is unable to trace, in every one of its declarations, that hidden glory of the doctrine which is veiled beneath an unpretending simplicity of expression; for we have the treasure in earthen vessels.” He says in another place,§ “Whoever has once acknowledged that these writings are the word of the God Who created the world must be con-

\* See Philocal. c. 15.

† Clement also remarks that the character of the scriptures is parabolical, just as the whole appearance of Christ is parabolical—the divine under an earthly veil. Παραβολικὸς γὰρ ὁ χαρακτηρ ὑπάρχει πῶν γραφῶν, διότι καὶ ὁ κύριος οὐκ ὦν κοσμικός, ὡς κοσμικός εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἦλθεν. Strom. l. VI. f. 677.

‡ Philocal. c. II. p. 10.

§ L. c. c. 2, p. 61.



vinced that the same kind of difficulties which are encountered by those who attempt to explain the creation will also arise in the case of the holy scriptures. There is much in scripture, as well as in creation, which human nature, if at all, cannot fully fathom; and yet we are not warranted, on this account, in finding fault with the Creator of the universe, if, for example, we know not the reason why basilisks and other venomous animals were created. For in such matters it becomes the modesty of true piety, remembering the weakness of our race, and how impossible it is fully to comprehend the creative wisdom of God, to leave them to God, who will hereafter, if we are found worthy, reveal to us those things about which we now are piously in doubt." How full Origen's faith was that a divine spirit breathes through the whole of scripture, and how firmly convinced that it can be understood only by the exercise of an humble, believing temper of mind, is beautifully set forth in the following words: \* "Man must believe that not one tittle of holy scripture is lacking in the wisdom of God; for He who said to man, 'Thou shalt not appear before me empty' (Exod. xxxiv.), will be much less likely Himself to say anything that is empty; for the prophets receive what they say out of His fulness: all therefore breathes this fulness; and there is nothing either in the prophets, in the law, or in the gospel, which does not flow out thereof. That breath may be felt by those who have eyes to perceive the revelations of the divine fulness, ears to hear them, and a sense to inhale the savour which they diffuse. But whenever in reading the scriptures thou comest upon a thought which is, so to speak, a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence to thee, lay it to thy own account; for doubt not but this stone of stumbling contains important meaning, and so that shall be fulfilled which is written: 'He that believeth shall not be brought to shame.' Believe first, and then, beneath that which thou accountest an offence, thou shalt find much that is profitable for holiness."

But however correct these principles of Origen may have been, yet he was nevertheless prevented from making a right use of them, by a false view of the spirit and aim of holy scripture, and of all divine revelation through the Word. And this false view again was intimately connected with the

\* Philocal. c. 1, p. 51.

wrong conception he had formed of the relation of the Gnosis to *πιστις*. In both respects he was led astray by his predominantly speculative view of religion, which disqualified him for distinguishing between what belongs to a Christian creed and what belongs to a Christian philosophy, and prevented him from keeping duly in view the essentially practical end of all divine revelations, and of Christianity in particular. He did not refer everything to what ought to be the sole end of all the efforts of human nature—to redemption, regeneration, sanctification, and the salvation resulting therefrom; but in his view the practical end of man's reformation was a subordinate one, designed especially for the great mass of believers, who were as yet incapable of anything higher and nobler. With him speculation was the highest end; the aim above all others ought to be, to communicate the higher truths to the spiritual men who were competent to understand them—to the Gnostics. These higher truths related chiefly to the following questions: \*—"First, concerning God, what is the nature of His only-begotten Son, and in what sense is He the Son of God; what was the reason why He condescended to enter into human nature; what is the effect of this act, and on what beings, and when does it reach them? Secondly, concerning the higher kinds of rational beings who have fallen from the state of bliss, and of the causes of their fall; of the different kinds of souls, and whence these differences arise? What is the world, and why was it created? whence is there so much evil on the earth, and then whether it exists on the earth only, or is to be found also in other parts of the creation?" As Origen regarded the solution of these questions to be the main thing, many parts of scripture (if he kept simply to their natural sense) must have appeared to him to contribute nothing to this most essential end. The whole history of earthly events, and all legislation with regard to mere earthly relations, he therefore explained as being simply a symbolical veil of a higher history of the spiritual world, and of higher laws relating to a spiritual kingdom. Thus the higher and the subordinate ends of scripture were to be united; the revelation of the higher truths required to be veiled under a letter which should be suited for the instruction of the multitude. "The mass of genuine and simple believers,"

\* Philocal. c. 1, p. 28.

says Origen, "testify to the utility even of this inferior understanding of the scriptures." Between these two senses of scripture Origen supposed there was also another adapted to the capacity of those who had not yet attained to that loftier contemplation of the spirit. And this was an allegorical one; an application not so elevated and profound, but suited to general purposes of moral instruction and edification (of such passages, *e. g.*, as 1 Cor. ix. 9, which originally relate to particular cases). Thus he refers to this class most of the allegorical expositions of scripture employed at that time for popular instruction. Thus, according to the theory of Origen, the three-fold sense of scripture corresponded to the three parts of human nature—to the properly godlike in man, the *spirit*, which tends to the eternal, and finds its appropriate life in the contemplation of things divine; to the *soul*, which moves within the sphere of the finite and temporal; and to the *body*. As Origen agreed with Philo in the essential features of this view, so too he laboured generally to deliver objective truth from the historical letter, which he held was given merely as an envelope of the spirit.\* Yet he found passages where the letter seemed to him to be untenable; either because he was destitute of correct principles of interpretation, and of the necessary helps thereto, or because he was unable to separate in scripture the human element from the divine;† or because (which would agree with what we lately remarked), starting from exaggerated notions of inspiration, he could not suppose there were any contradictions in scripture, even in unimportant matters and, in such cases, he believed that the only way of removing the difficulty was by spiritualizing the meaning.‡ And, like Philo, he combined with these views such a reverence for holy scripture that he could say that these things, so untenable according to the letter—these mythical passages as veils of a higher sense—are, by the Holy Spirit who inspired the Sophia, interspersed as stones of stumbling, for the purpose of exciting men to deeper investigation.§

\* Τὸ σαματικὸν τῶν γραφῶν, τὸ ἔνδυμα τῶν πνευματικῶν.

† For example, he considered the story of Uriah to be in its literal meaning untenable; because in David he saw only the inspired of God, and not the *sinful man*.

‡ Ἀναγωγή εἰς τὸ νοητόν.

§ Σκάνδαλα, προσκόμματα.

These principles Origen applied, not to the Old Testament alone, but also and expressly to the New and to the Gospel history.\* Many a difficulty, as he imagined, could be solved by supposing that the apostles had represented what they had to say respecting a different agency of the divine Logos † under the figurative dress of various sensible facts.‡ The difficulties which he would *thus* remove were partly such as a subtlety devoid of a healthy simplicity had created, and in part such as really existed, but which he could have solved in a better way, and without prejudice to the historical truth, by soberly comparing the different accounts, by distinguishing the divine from the human element in the sacred scriptures, and by separating the essential from the unessential. The application to these of his own profound idea of the humanization of the divine Logos in the holy scriptures, of the Word assuming in the letter the form of a servant, and of the treasure contained in earthly vessels, would have led him, had he been free from the fetters of his mystical *intellectualism*, to another and sounder mode of reconciling discrepancies.

Such principles, it must be allowed, tended to surrender the historical facts in which Christianity is grounded to all manner of subjective caprice, and Origen seems to have been aware of the threatening danger. He endeavoured to guard against it, and never failed to insist on the fact that, in most cases, the letter and the spirit must both be adhered to, and that it was not right to give up the letter except after the most careful examination. But how arbitrary and dependent on caprice were even these limits!

We cannot deny, however, that in Origen's own case this danger was, as regards the main facts of the gospel history, averted by the fact that he was animated by a sincerely devout, believing temper of mind, and one which was fully penetrated with the historical truth of Christianity. Nor should we forget that, in his case, truth and error were combined together

\* See the passages already cited from the *Philocalia*;—also c. 15, p. 139.

† From divers communications of the ἐπιδημία νοητὴ τοῦ Χριστοῦ.

‡ Προίκετο αὐτοῖς, ὅπου μὲν ἐνεχώρει, ἀληθεύειν πνευματικῶς ἅμα καὶ σωματικῶς, ὅπου μὴ ἐνεδέχιστο ἀμφοτέρως, προκρίνειν τὸ πνευματικὸν τοῦ σωματικοῦ, σωζομένου πολλάκις τοῦ ἀληθοῦς πνευματικοῦ ἐν τῷ σωματικῷ, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις, ψεύδει. In Joann. T. X. s. 4.



in a manner which can only be explained from the personal character of the man, and by his relations to a period agitated by so many various and conflicting influences. He saw how the carnally-minded Jew, clinging to the letter of the Old Testament, could not attain to the faith in the gospel; how Christians of a similar character were, in the same way, led to form the rudest notions of God and of divine things: he saw how anti-Jewish Gnostics were, by this same way of regarding the Old Testament, betrayed into the contrary error, refusing to acknowledge as the God of the gospel a being who appeared so material, and so were led to set up their system of Dualism. Origen opposed to all these conflicting errors this spiritualizing method of interpretation, as equally able to refute them all.\* It was by no means his intention by this course to bring down all that is divine in the sacred scriptures to the level of the human; on the contrary, he went too far towards the other extreme, of deifying the human.

And yet the Alexandrian tendency of mind, had it met with no opposition, and even if it had been carried out without restraint of that pious spirit which tempered it in the case of a Clement and an Origen, would, unquestionably, have led to an Idealism subversive of all the historical and objective truths of Christianity. For the mystical interpretation, much as it differed from the mythical, both in the principles from which it started, and in the religious, philosophical, and doctrinal principles on which it proceeded, was calculated to produce the same results with the latter, and to run into the same mythical conclusions. But fortunately, as we shall see from the conflicts which the school of Origen had to undergo towards the end of the present period, this tendency met with a counteracting check in the *Realism* of the Western church; while the latter, in its turn, felt the spiritualizing influence of the Alexandrian school.

Having thus endeavoured to present a general sketch of the principal directions of the theological mind in their relation to each other, we shall now proceed to consider the influence of their fundamental diversity on the treatment of particular doctrines; and while we shall thus furnish the proof of the

\* After adducing all those errors, he says, Philocal. c. 1, p. 17, Αἰτία δὲ πᾶσι τοῖς προσηγμένοις ψευδοδοξῶν καὶ ἀσεβειῶν ἢ ἰδιωτικῶν περὶ Θεοῦ λόγων οὐκ ἄλλη τις εἶναι δοκεῖ ἢ ἡ γράφῃ κατὰ τὰ πνευματικά μὴ νενοημένη, ἀλλ' ὡς πρὸς ψιλὸν γράμμα ἔχειλημμένη.

correctness of our general view, we shall at the same time adduce evidence of the fact that both tendencies, notwithstanding their antagonism, would still meet and coincide in the fundamental truths of Christianity.

B.—*Development of the several Main Doctrines of Christianity.*

We should never forget that Christianity did not deliver to men a *speculative* knowledge of God and of divine things, nor a ready-made doctrinal system in a permanent form; but that it announced *facts* of a revelation of God to man, by which the human race was placed in an entirely new relation to the Creator, the recognition and appropriation of which was to lead to an entirely new direction and shaping of the religious consciousness, and to modify whatever had previously characterized it. The fact of the redemption of sinful man by Christ constitutes the central point of Christianity. From the influence which the reception of this fact necessarily exercised on man's inward life, this new shaping of the religious consciousness developed itself; and from the latter, again, there proceeded a gradual regeneration of his habits of thinking in so far as they came into direct or indirect contact with religion.

This influence extended itself also to the general notion of the Divine Being — the consciousness of the God in whom we live, move, and have our being. *This*, too, became in believers more vivid and more profound. They felt more strongly the all-pervading presence of that God who made himself to be felt in nature, and whose existence is to the spirit undeniable. It was to this undeniable fact of man's consciousness that they appealed in their endeavour to lead the pagans from the gods which they had made to themselves to the only true God. Amid all the differences of form which mark the various statements of the Fathers upon this subject, this one common feature is discernible, not only in those whose education had led them through the Platonic philosophy, but also in such men as Tertullian, who, a stranger and an enemy to philosophical culture, testified in an original manner to that which had penetrated deeply into the vigorous but stern individuality of his character. Clement appeals to the fact that all scientific proof supposes something which cannot be proved,

which can only be apprehended immediately by the intellect. To that which is highest, simple, superior to matter, he says,\* faith only can raise itself. He contends, therefore, that there can be no knowledge of God except so far as He has revealed Himself to man. God cannot be comprehended by demonstrative science, for this starts from the more original and better known; but nothing has priority to the Eternal. It remains, therefore, that the knowledge of the Unknown must be arrived at by divine grace and by the revelation of his eternal Word. He then quotes the speech of St. Paul at Athens concerning the unknown God.† And then in another place he says, “The great first Cause is exalted above space, time, name, and conception. Hence even Moses asks of God that He would reveal Himself to him ‡—plainly intimating that what God is no man can teach or express, but that He only by his own power can make Himself known.” The same father recognises in all men an efflux from God, a divine particle,§ which constrains them, in despite of themselves, to acknowledge One Eternal God. What the philosophical schools had taught of a recognition of the Absolute, which is presupposed in all demonstrative science, and grounded in the immediate consciousness of the intellect, was, it is true, transferred by him at once, and without any middle term, to an immediate conviction of a living God, derived from quite another source than any exercise of the thinking mind—from the living God, bearing witness of Himself by his own self-manifestation. In place of the undeniable Absolute of speculative reason he substituted the God known in the universal consciousness of mankind without any mediation of reasoning.||

As Origen, employing the language of philosophy, places

\* Strom. l. II. f. 364.

† L. c. l. V. f. 588.

‡ L. c. l. V. f. 582.

§ 'Αποόρροια θεϊκή. Protrept. p. 45.

|| Εἰ δέ τις λέγοι τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀποδεικτικὴν εἶναι μετὰ λόγου, ἀκουσάτω, ὅτι καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἀναπόδεικτοι: and after remarking that neither τέχνη nor φρόνησις can arrive at these principles, he concludes, Πίστις οὖν ἐφικέσθαι μόνῃ οἰόντι τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἀρχῆς. Strom. l. II. f. 364, and l. V. f. 588: Λέγεται δὲ θεία χάρις καὶ μόνῃ τῷ παρ' αὐτοῦ λόγῳ τὸ ἀγνωστὸν νοεῖν. Compare Aristot. Ethic. Magn. I. p. 1197, ed. Bekker: 'Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμη τῶν μετ' ἀποδείξεων ὄντων ἐστίν, αἱ δ' ἀρχαὶ ἀναπόδεικτοι, ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλ' ὁ νοῦς. Of which, or some similar passage, what Clement says is a copy.

the idea of one God among the κοινὰς ἐννοίας (the ideas common to the consciousness of all mankind),\* so he considers the notion of a Godhead which is natural to man to be a mark of its relationship to the Divine Being. Theophilus of Antioch recognises a revelation of God in the whole of creation; but at the same time, in order to receive this revelation, he supposes a certain sensibility to be necessary. Where the one is sluggish, the other becomes unintelligible to man. To the common question of sensual pagans, "Where is your God? show him to us"—he replied, *Show me thy man, and I will show thee my God*. Show me that the eyes of thy soul see, that the ears of thy heart hear. All have eyes to see the sun, but the blind cannot see it. As a soiled mirror is incapable of receiving an image, so the impure soul is incapable of receiving the image of God. True, God has created all things for the purpose of making Himself known through his works, just as the invisible soul is discerned by its operations. All life reveals Him; His breath quickens all; without it, all would sink into nothing: but the darkness of the soul itself is the reason why it does not perceive this revelation." He therefore says to man, "Submit thyself to the physician, who can heal the eyes of thy soul; submit thyself to God."†

While Clement, who had passed through the Platonic philosophy to Christianity, was fain to discover something akin to Christian ideas and sentiments in the sayings of the ancient philosophers, and from this desire suffered himself to be misled into changing with one another coins of very different value, Tertullian, on the other hand, the friend of nature, the foe of art and of all school-wisdom, was secure against any such temptation. He appealed rather to the spontaneous testimony of the soul untrained in the schools, but simple, rude, and uneducated.‡ While others industriously collected from the stores of ancient learning, and even from spurious writings, testimonies to the truth which Christianity supposed to exist in the religious consciousness of all mankind, Tertullian preferred to point to an obvious testimony, accessible to all, and of indisputable genuineness, those outpourings of the soul (eruptions

\* C. Cels. lib. I. c. 4.

† Ad. Autolye. lib. I. c. 2.

‡ De testimonio animæ. See vol. I. p. 247.



animæ) which are a tacit pledge of an inborn consciousness.\* Marcion alone, under the influence of a misconception, and of imperfectly digested truths (see above), and by a direction of the Christian feelings neither well understood nor duly moderated, denied that any testimony concerning the God of the gospel was to be found in the works of creation, or in the common consciousness of mankind. The more vehemently, therefore, does Tertullian, in opposition to him, insist on this testimony.† “Never,” says he, “will God be hidden, never will God be wanting to mankind; always will He be recognised, always perceived, nay, even seen when He wills it. God has for a witness of Himself all that we are, and all that is around us. He therefore proves Himself to be God, and the one only God, by the very fact that He is known to all; *for the existence of any other would require to be demonstrated.* A consciousness of God is the original dowry of the soul; the same, and differing in no respect, in Egypt, in Syria, and in Pontus: for all souls acknowledge the God of the Jews as their God.”

As regards, however, the development of the idea of God, it was only by degrees, and after overcoming many obstacles, that Christianity succeeded by its spiritualizing and ennobling influence in removing the sensual elements in which that idea had been veiled. Though it was preached that “God is a Spirit,” it still required a new form of thought, resulting from the regeneration of the thinking faculty itself, to develop all that this idea involves, and to understand what spirit is. By minds still wedded to the forms of sense, what was termed *πνεῦμα* might nevertheless be conceived as a species of matter, though of a more attenuated, ethereal kind; and fancy, overruling the understanding, had numberless ways of depicting it in this light.‡ Accordingly no single idea could effect much in this case; the counteracting influence must come from the whole cast of thought. Where this general spiritualization had not yet been attained to, that profound and fervid religious feeling, which gave birth to the wish to hold everything in its reality and to avoid all subtle refinement, would the more easily become blended with the sensuous element. We have

\* See the passage referred to in the last note.

† c. Marcion, lib. I. c. 10; comp. c. 18 and 19

‡ See Orig. in Joann. T. XIII. c. 21.

seen an instance of this in Tertullian, who could not conceive the real, but as being, in some way or other, corporeal.\*

What contributed to the spiritualization of the idea of God was of two kinds. On the one hand there was a sober and chaste practical bias in the Christian mind, which, springing immediately from Christianity, inclined men to rise to the conception of God rather by means of the heart than by speculation and fancy, and which, in the depths of the Christian consciousness, perceived that the image of divine things was nothing but an image, and a feeble expression of that which by divine communication becomes the portion of each believing soul in its own inner life. And on the other hand it was promoted by the scientific reflection exercised on the subject-matter of Christian doctrine, such as we see in Clement, Origen, and the Alexandrian school generally. The former of these tendencies we meet with in such men as Irenæus and Novatian. Irenæus says, "Whatever we predicate of God is only by way of illustration. These attributes are but the images which love conceives, and into which feeling introduces something else, still greater than anything that lies in the images in and by themselves."† And Novatian remarks, of God's essence,‡ "It is that which Himself only knows, which every human soul feels, although it cannot express."§ The same writer observes, that, although Christ (since the human mind necessarily advances in religious development) employed fewer *anthropomorphical* images than the writers of the Old Testament, yet even He, in speaking of that Being who transcends all human conception and language, was forced to employ such images as fell far short of the reality itself.

From *Anthropomorphism* we distinguish *Anthropopathism*, employing both terms in the sense which seems chiefly authorized by their etymology and their historical use. The latter, so far as it denotes a diseased process of thought, consists in ascribing to the Absolute Spirit the limitations and defects which cleave to the human. But there is one very important

\* Tertullian. *de carne Christi*, c. 11: *Nihil incorporale, nisi quod non est. Adv. Praxeas*, c. 7: *Spiritus corpus sui generis*.

† *Dicitur quidem secundum hæc per dilectionem, sentitur supra hæc secundum magnitudinem. Lib. II. c. 13, s. 4.*

‡ See cap. 6 and 8.

§ *Quod mens omnis humana sentit, etsi non exprimit.*

respect in which this anthropopathism differs widely from anthropomorphism. For the former is based on an undeniable and inherent necessity; since man, being created in the image of God, and being a spirit in affinity with the Father of spirits, feels constraint and a warrant for framing his idea of God after this analogy. There is, therefore, a true as well as a false anthropopathism; and it is possible to err as well as to be right in seeking to avoid it, according as the analogy is correctly or wrongly observed. We see all these tendencies manifesting themselves in the period before us. Both among Jews and among pagans (as we observed in the general Introduction) a gross and sensuous humanization of the idea of God met with a decided opposition, which, proceeding mainly from the Platonic school, spiritually refined upon it, and rejected all human analogies. As Christianity presented a complete image of God in Christ, and once more restored it in human nature, so in anthropopathism must Christianity purify the true from every false admixture, not indeed by repressing but by ennobling it, which, however, could only be effected by a reconciliation of existing antagonistic tendencies of mind which became mixed up even with the development of the Christian idea of God.

While to the ruder conceptions of God's anger and retribution Marcion opposed the equally partial notion of a love which excluded justice altogether, the religious element of those conceptions which he sought to banish entirely from the body of the faith found a powerful advocate in Tertullian—that enemy to all spiritualizing subtilty. He thought he could convict Marcion of inconsistency by arguing that redemption and the forgiveness of sin, which Marcion acknowledged to be alone the work of his God, presuppose the existence of guilt in the eye of God as a holy Being.\* He therefore maintained against him the necessary connection between God's goodness and his justice. The latter he regarded as the principle of order, which gives each thing its due, and assigns to all things in the created universe their mutual relations and limits—the *justitia architectonica*, as it was afterwards called; so that justice and moral evil were not necessarily correlative notions, but the notion of a retributive justice, which was the

\* Sed et peccata dimittere an ejus possit esse, qui negetur tenere; et an ejus sit absolvere, cujus non sit etiam damnare; et an congruat eum ignoscere, in quem nihil sit admissum. c. Marcion, l. IV. c. 10.



correlate of moral evil, implies that more general notion of justice.\* He insists on the necessity of anthropopathic representation, as grounded in the very nature of the human mind itself, and as deriving its truth from the fact that man was created in the image of God. Therefore man has, in common with God, all the attributes and faculties pertaining to the essence of spirit,—with this difference only, that everything which in man is imperfect must in God be conceived as perfect. And this applied not less to those attributes which alone Marcion would ascribe to God—goodness and love—than to those which he wholly rejected.† Proceeding on the assumption that, from the restoration of God's image in man, Christianity aimed at a refined, spiritualized anthropopathism, he required that, instead of transferring every quality to the Divine Being in the same imperfection in which it exists in man, an endeavour should rather be made to exalt everything in man to the true image of God, to make man truly godlike.‡ He sees in the entire revelation of God a continual condescension and humanization—of which the end and goal is the incarnation of God. “Whatever expressions you may bring together as low, weak, and unworthy of God, and derogatory to the Creator, to all this I shall give you one simple and certain answer. God cannot enter into any sort of communication with man, except by ascribing to Himself human passions and affections, whereby He lets Himself down and moderates the transcendent excellence of his majesty, which human weakness could not endure;—an act, in itself, indeed, not worthy of God, but necessary for man, and for this reason still worthy of God; since nothing is so worthy of Him as that which conduces to man's salvation.§ God has dealt with man as with his equal, that so

\* *Ne justitiam de causa mali obfuses.—Omnia ut bonitas concepit, ita justitia distinxit. L. c. I. II. c. 12 et 13.*

† *Et hæc ergo imago censenda est Dei in homine, quod eisdem motus et sensus habeat humanus animus, quos et Deus, licet non tales, quales Deus; pro substantia enim et status eorum et exitus distant. Denique contrarios eorum sensus, lenitatem dico, patientiam, misericordiam ipsamque matricem earum bonitatem, cur divina præsumitis? Nec tamen perfecte ea obtinemus, quæ solus Deus perfectus. c. Marcion, I. II. c. 16.*

‡ *Satis perversum est, ut in Deo potius humana constituas, quam in homine divina, et hominis imagine Deum imbuas potius, quam Dei hominem. L. c.*

§ *Conversabatur Deus, ut homo divina agere doceretur; ex æquo*



man might on his part deal with God as with his equal. God appeared in lowliness, that man might thus be exalted to the highest point of dignity. If thou art ashamed of *such* a God, I do not see how thou canst honestly believe in a crucified God." To be sure, this last charge of inconsistency did not touch Marcion's case, because the same principle which made him opposed to the anthropopathic God of the Old Testament made him also oppose the doctrine of Christ crucified. Tertullian argues further, from the nature of a graduated progress in revelation, that God's justice must predominate before his love could prevail—that the legal principle of the Old Testament must necessarily distinguish itself in this way from the New Testament principle of redeeming love.\*

As to the teachers in the Alexandrian church, their philosophical education created a desire to exclude all gross anthropopathism from the Christian creed; but in so doing they inclined (as was likely to happen) too strongly to the opposite extreme, and gave a dead and merely subjective turn to the doctrine of the divine attributes. An apt illustration of this is furnished by the following words of Origen, which, notwithstanding all that they so truly and beautifully say of the divine education of mankind, betray nevertheless an inclination to give too subjective a turn to the notion of the divine anger, and prove that he failed in understanding its objective truth and reality as clearly as Tertullian did. Availing himself of Philo's doctrine of the humanizing and dishumanizing of divine things,† he says,‡ "Whenever the holy scriptures speak of God, as God, in His divine majesty, and when they do not treat of His providence as mixing with human affairs, they say, He is not like man, for there is no end of His greatness, Ps. cxlv. 3: The Lord is a great God, a great King above all gods, Ps. xcv. 2. But when the divine providence, which is necessarily interwoven with human things, is exhibited, then God

agebat Deus cum homine, ut homo ex æquo agere cum Deo posset Deus pusillus inventus est, ut homo maximus fieret. L. c. c. 27.

\* Ut bonitatem suam voluerit offendere, in quibus præmiserat severitatem, quia nec mirum erat diversitas temporalis, si postea Deus mitior pro rebus edomitis, qui retro austerior pro indomitis. c. Marcion, l. II. c. 29.

† See vol. I. p. 76.

‡ Homil. XVIII. in Jeremiam, s. 6.

assumes the feelings, the manner, and language of men, just as we, conversing with a child two years old, accommodate ourselves to the child's language; since, if we preserved the dignity of riper years, and conversed with children without letting ourselves down to their language, they could not understand us. So should our conceptions with regard to God, when He lets Himself down to the human race, and especially to that part of it which is still at the age of childhood. Observe how, in our intercourse with children, we grown-up men alter even the names of things; how we call food by one particular name, and drink by another, employing a language which belongs not to those of mature age but to children. If any one were to hear us thus talking with children, would he say, This old man has lost his senses? And so God also speaks to us as to children. 'Behold,' says our Saviour, 'I and the children which God hath given me,' Heb. ii. 13. When thou hearest of the wrath of God, believe not that this wrath is a passion of God. It is a condescension of language, designed to convert and improve the child; for we ourselves assume an angry look to our children, not in accordance with the feelings of our heart, but while we assume such a relation towards them. If we were still to retain on our countenance an expression of friendly feeling towards the child, and let the love of our soul be seen, without altering our looks as the good of the child required, we should spoil him. So God is described to us as angry, in order to our conversion and improvement, when in truth He is not angry. But thou wilt suffer the wrath of God, if thou art punished by his so-called wrath, when thy own wickedness shall draw down upon thee sufferings hard to endure." Thus Origen expressed himself *in a sermon*; but on another occasion, in his commentary on Matthew, where he brings out the same theory, he observes \*—" *To such as would not be likely to be harmed thereby* we might say much of God's goodness, and of the overflowing fulness of his grace, which, not without good reason, he has concealed from *those who fear him.*"

Here, too, the Alexandrians took the middle ground between the Gnostic and the teachers of the church. The latter ascribed to God the attribute of absolute, retributive justice; the former rejected altogether the notion of justice

\* Ed. Huet. f. 378. T. XV. s. 1.

as incompatible with the essence of the all-perfect God, making the attribute of justice to be opposed to that of goodness. With the Alexandrians, on the other hand, the notion of justice, which they endeavoured to defend against the Gnostics, as belonging to the perfection of the Deity,\* was wholly merged in the notion of a divine love, which disciplined fallen rational beings in various ways, according to their various moral characters and requirements.† Accordingly they could say that the distinction which the Gnostics made between the just and the good God might be truly employed in a certain sense; as for example when Christ (the divine Logos)—the educator and purifier of fallen beings, whose discipline had for its aim to render all capable of participating in the divine goodness, and thereby of being blessed—is distinctively called the Just One. ‡ Thus, according to this scheme, the notion of divine justice, being merged in that of disciplinary love, or of the wisdom of love, loses its own self-subsistence. And the same is true also of the idea of punishment, which is regarded simply as a means to an outward end, as a purifying process ordained by divine love, although however there is no attempt to show from the idea of punishment, in its relation to the moral order of the universe, in what way it is to promote that end.

In our history of heresy we formerly spoke of the close connection between the doctrine of God, as the absolutely free Creator of the universe, and the whole peculiar essence of Christianity; and we also pointed out the strong contrast which this doctrine must have presented to the existing modes of thought which had been derived from antiquity. The Apostle St. Paul sums up the Christian Theism, as the belief in One God, from whom, by whom, and to whom, all things subsist; and the threefold relation, here expressed, in which all existence stands to God, denotes, at the same time,

\* See Orig. Comment. in Exod.; ed. Lommatzsch, T. VIII. p. 300.

† Α δικαιοσύνη σωτήριος.

‡ Clem. Pædagog. lib. I. f. 118: Καθ' ὃ μὲν πατὴρ νοεῖται ἀγαθὸς ὢν, αὐτό μόνον ὃ ἔστι κίκληται ἀγαθός, καθ' ὃ δὲ υἱὸς ὢν ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ ἔστι, δίκαιος προσαγορεύεται, — and Orig. in Joann. T. I. s. 40, where he treats of the Gnostic distinction between the θεὸς ἀγαθός and the δημιουργὸς δίκαιος: (τοῦτο δὲ) οἶμαι μετ' ἐξετάσεως ἀκριβοῦς βασανισθὲν δύνασθαι λήγισθαι ἐπὶ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ, τοῦ μὲν υἱοῦ τυγχάνοντος δικαιοσύνης, τοῦ δὲ πατρὸς τοῦ ἐν τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ τοῦ υἱοῦ παιδευδέντος μετὰ τὴν Χριστοῦ βασιλίαν ἐνεργετούντος.



the close connection between the Christian doctrines of creation, redemption, and sanctification, as well as between the doctrine of creation and the ethical element. For the phrase "to Him," which assigns to the Christian system of morals its province and its fundamental principle, presupposes the "from Him;" and the phrase "by Him" denotes the mediation of them both. Hence, as we saw in the history of the Gnostic sects, the corruptions of the Christian doctrine of the creation, which proceeded from the reaction of the spirit of the ancient world, necessarily superinduced corruptions also of the doctrine of redemption and of the system of morals. Accordingly, in the New Testament, we read of God as the positive first cause of all existence; of a God who has revealed himself in creation—not of a creation out of nothing. In the important passage, Hebrews xi. 3, that act of the spirit denoted by the name of faith—whereby the spirit rises above the whole chain of causal connection in the phenomenal world to an almighty creative word, as the cause of all existence—is opposed to the sensuous contemplation of the world which acknowledges nothing higher than the chain of things in the world of appearance.\*

But in opposition to the hypothesis of an original matter, as conditioning and determining the creation, the positive element of this faith was negatively defined by the doctrine that God created all things out of nothing.† This definition was a stone of stumbling, not only to the Gnostics, but to all who were still fettered by the cosmogonical theories of antiquity, or in whom the speculative interest exceeded the religious, and would acknowledge no limits. To this class belonged Hermogenes, a painter at Carthage, who lived at the close of the second and the beginning of the third century. He differed essentially from the Gnostics in the decidedly Western bias of his mind—the Greek speculative tendency predominating in his case over the Oriental intuition. And hence his system, as it did not, like those of the Gnostic systems, engage the imagination, obtained less favour; we hear of no sect called Hermogeneans. Moreover, it was not his wish to set up, like the Gnostics, a distinct system of esoteric religious

\* The negative of the proposition, *ἐκ φαινομένων τὰ βλέπομενα γιγνόμενα*

† The *κτίσις ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος*, as in Hermas.



doctrines. It was only on a *single* point—a point, however, which unquestionably was calculated to have an important influence on the whole system of religion—that he departed from the received doctrines of the church. And this was the doctrine of the Greek philosophy concerning the  $\psi\lambda\eta$  which he adopted into his system, for which a point of union was furnished by the way in which this idea had already been appropriated by the apologetic writers; although of all these it may be shown that they were far removed from Dualistic views, and, merely adopting the Platonic notion of the  $\psi\lambda\eta$  in a formal way, made of it an entirely different thing by the connection in which they placed it in their system. He was probably a zealous antagonist of Montanism, which in his day was spreading rapidly in North Africa. The artist would find in the Montanists as little to sympathize with as they would in the artist. It is a mark of the liberal artist-like turn of mind with which he opposed the stern Pietism of the Montanists, that he could see nothing which ought to give offence if he employed his art in delineating subjects of the pagan mythology.\* This indicates an objectiveness of view, which, considering the antagonism then existing between Christianity and paganism, was hardly consistent with a healthy and earnest tone of Christian feeling. We distinctly see how, in his case, at one time a speculative element, at another an artistic one, prevailed over the religious principle.

\* The obscure words of Tertullian, from which this account is derived, run as follows: *Pingit illicite, nubit assidue, legem Dei in libidinem defendit, in artem contemnit.* The first part of the sentence might be understood as implying that Tertullian regarded the art of painting itself as a pagan and sinful occupation; but even Tertullian's Montanistic hatred of art could hardly have gone to such an extreme as this, and, indeed, there is no evidence in his writings that it did. Neither do the words, "he despised the law in the case of art," favour the above sense; for we can think of no passage of scripture which Tertullian could interpret as forbidding the art of painting generally. But it is probable that Tertullian meant by *lex Dei* the Old Testament, particularly the denunciations against the makers of idols, and that the sense is—He (Hermogenes) despises the authority of the Old Testament by the way in which he employs art; while, on the other hand, he would still uphold it, for the purpose of defending repeated marriages (*nubit assidue*) against the Montanists, who on this point declared that the authority of the Old Testament had been annulled by Christianity, and by the new revelations of the Paraclete.

Hermogenes combated the emanation-theory of the Gnostics, because it transferred to the Divine Being the notions of sense, and because the idea of God's holiness could not be reconciled with the sinfulness of the beings which emanated from Him. But he also argued against the doctrine of creation out of nothing, on the ground that, if the world had no other cause than the will of the Deity, it must have corresponded to the essence of a perfect and holy God, and must therefore have been a perfect and holy world: nothing imperfect and evil would have found a place in it; for in a world having its ground only in God, how could there be aught foreign from the divine essence? Hermogenes, no less than the Gnostics themselves, was unwilling to recognise the important part which Christian Theism attributes to the free agency of the creature, in the development of the universe. In respect also to moral evil, he was no more ready than the Gnostics to be satisfied with the distinction which was drawn between positive will and simple permission on the part of God. At the same time, however, the strength of the *moral* zeal by which he was actuated is apparent when we find him rejecting the ground on which many attempted to explain the origin of evil, viz. that it was necessary as a foil to good, in order that by the contrast the latter might shine in its true light.\* He probably believed that by such a *Theodicée* the independent value of the idea of goodness would be weakened, and the existence of evil be justified, if it were once regarded as necessary for the harmony of the universe. And here, indeed, we recognise in his case the triumph of the Christian principle over that of the ancient world; but at the same time Hermogenes fell into the very error he wished to avoid, by continuing to trace the origin of evil to a natural necessity.

According to his theory the imperfection and evil which are in the world have their ground in the fact that God's creation is conditioned, by an inorganic matter which has existed from eternity. From all eternity there have existed two principles—the exclusively active, plastic principle, God; and the simply passive, in itself undetermined, formless principle,

\* Tertullian adv. Hermog. c. 15: Expugnat quorundam argumentationes, dicentium mala necessaria fuisse ad illuminationem bonorum ex contrariis intelligendorum.

matter. The latter is a boundless mass, in constant chaotic motion, in which all opposites exist undeveloped, and flow into each other—a mass full of wild impulses, without law or order, like the commotion of water in a caldron boiling over on all sides.\* It was not by a single act that this boundless chaos, involved in such endless confusion, could be seized at any one point, brought to a pause, and compelled to receive both form and order. It was only through the relation of His own essence to the essence of matter that God could and must exert an influence over it. In the same way that the magnet attracts the iron by an inherent necessity—as beauty exerts a natural power of attraction on whatever comes near it †—so God, by his mere appearance, by the transcendent power of his divine essence, works on matter to give it a shape. ‡ According to these principles, he could not, if logically consistent, fix the beginning of creation; and in fact he does not seem to have supposed any, as, in truth, is implied in the argument which he brings in support of his doctrine, namely, that, if sovereignty belongs to the number of the divine attributes, then God must always have had matter over which to exercise this sovereignty. Accordingly he asserted an eternal exercise of God's sovereignty over matter, which, according to his system, consists principally in this irresistible power of formation. From what has been said it follows that, according to this system, we are not to think of the chaos as ever having an independent subsistence by itself, or of the operation of this divine formative power as beginning at a determinate moment. The view at the bottom of his theory seems rather to have been, that matter always existed as the subject for the divine formative energy, and that form and matter may be separated only in the notion, although the former accrues from without and the latter exists fundamentally. This endless matter, which can only by degrees be reduced in all its several parts to form, offers a continual resistance to the formative power of God; and from this opposition Hermo-

\* *Inconditus et confusus et turbulentus fuit motus, sicut ollæ undique ebullientis.*

† We here perceive the painter.

‡ *Non pertransiens materiam facit Deus mundum, sed solummodo adparens et adpropinquans ei, sicut facit qui decor, solummodo adparens (vulnerans animum) et magnes lapis solummodo adpropinquans.*

genes derived all imperfection and evil. Thus the ancient chaos reveals itself in whatever is hateful in nature, and whatever is morally evil in the spiritual world.

In holding the doctrine of a progressive formation of matter at the same time with the doctrine of an eternal creation, Hermogenes was inconsistent; for a progressive development which has no beginning is inconceivable. Still stranger was his inconsistency if the statement of Theodoret is correct, that he supposed the development tended to a final end. For, according to this father, he, like the Manicheans, held that all evil would finally resolve itself again into the matter from which it had proceeded, and consequently that there would be a separation of that part of matter which was susceptible of organization from that other part which obstinately resisted it.\* Here the *teleological* and *moral* element which he had derived from Christianity — an element not easily combining with the heathen notion of sin as a natural evil — rendered him inconsistent with himself.†

Irenæus and Tertullian maintained — the one in opposition to the Gnostics, the other to Hermogenes — the simple Christian doctrine of the creation, without indulging in speculation on the subject.

From these fathers Origen differed on this point as on many others, having a peculiar system of his own, the main features of which we must here present, so far as they are connected with the doctrine of the creation. In conformity with the general character of his Gnosis, he built on the foundation of the faith generally received in the whole church, and supposed

\* Theodoret, to be sure, does not say this expressly; but such a doctrine seems to be necessarily implied in that which, according to his account, Hermogenes maintained. The passage from Theodoret (in *Hæret. fab.* I. 19) is as follows: Τὸν δὲ διάβολον καὶ τοὺς δαίμονας εἰς τὴν ὕλην ἀναχθῆσεσθαι.

† Theodoret also ascribes to Hermogenes the doctrine that Christ put off his body in the sun. It may be doubted, however, whether Theodoret has not here confounded his doctrine with some other that resembled it; at any rate, it is doubtful how his words are to be understood. Perhaps Hermogenes taught that Christ, in ascending to heaven, left behind him in the sun the outward garb he had assumed in the material world. Yet so fantastic an opinion can hardly be ascribed to Hermogenes; and, in default of authentic documents, we must leave the matter in the dark. Some interpretation of Ps. xix. 4, which was understood to apply to the Messiah, may have given rise to this opinion.



that his speculative inquiries, although extending beyond the limits of its system, might still be in perfect consistency with it. From sincere conviction, and not with any view to mere accommodation, he advocated the doctrine of a creation from nothing, so far as it implied the principle that the free act of God's almighty power was not conditioned by a preëxistent matter.\* He moreover acknowledged that the existing world had a specific beginning, but the question as to what had preceded it seemed to him to be left, both by scripture and the church, open to speculation. Here, therefore, there occurred to him those reasons against a beginning of creation generally which must ever suggest themselves to the reflecting mind, which cannot rest satisfied with simple faith in that which to itself is incomprehensible. Supposing that to create is agreeable to the divine essence, how is it conceivable that what is thus conformable to God's nature should at any time have been wanting? Why should not those attributes which belong to the very essence of the Deity, His almighty power and goodness, be always active? A transition from the state of not-creating to the act of creation is inconceivable without a change, which is incompatible with the being of God.

Origen was also an opponent of the doctrine of emanation, so far as this theory annihilated the distance between the Creator and the creature; and, supposing a unity of essence between the two,† merely transferred sensuous notions to the Almighty, and made Him subject to a kind of natural necessity.‡ Origen regarded every communication of life from God, not as the result of any natural process of development, but as an act of the divine will. But for reasons which have been mentioned already, he believed it necessary to suppose, in connection with the glory of God, an emanation of it in a world of spiritual beings akin to Himself, and subsisting in absolute dependence on Him.§ He maintained a continual

\* See Præfat. libb. *περὶ ἀρχῶν*, f. 4; *ibid.* l. II. c. 1, s. 4; l. III. c. 5. *Commentar. Genes. init.*

† Where Origen has reference to the Gnostic doctrine of the *ὑποστάσεις* between the spiritual natures and the *ἀγέννητος φύσις*. In Joann. T. XIII. s. 25.

‡ *Δόγματα ἀνθρώπων, μηδ' ὅναρ φύσιν ἀόρατον καὶ ἀσώματον πεφαντασμένων οὐσαν κυρίως οὐσίαν*. In Joann. T. XX. s. 16. Π. *ἀρχ.* lib. I. c. 2, s. 6.

§ *Τὰ μερικὰ ἀπαντάσματα τῆς δόξης τοῦ Θεοῦ* in the *λογικὴ κτίσις*. In Joann. T. XXXII. s. 18.

*becoming* of this spiritual creation \* — a relation of cause and effect without beginning in time — the Platonic idea of an endless becoming, which copied the eternity of the divine existence.† What Origen says in another connection of an operation of God not to be conceived under the dimensions of time, and of an eternal becoming, we may also apply in his own sense to the relation to God as the original source of the spiritual world — akin to God and deriving its essence from Him.‡ In his doctrine he had respect only to the difficulties which from one particular aspect present themselves to the mind hampered by the limits of time, when it tries to conceive to itself a beginning of creation; but he altogether overlooked those on the other side which arise from the attempt to carry out the idea of a creation without a beginning of existence.

The bishop Methodius, who, in his work "On the Creatures," attacked this doctrine of Origen, was vastly his inferior in speculative genius.§ He had not even power enough of speculative comprehension to seize Origen's ideas, and what he could not understand he represents as being senseless and atheistic. Comparing the relation of God to created things with the relation of a human architect to his work, he brings against the system of Origen objections which are altogether irrelevant. How incompetent he was to understand the great man whom in his blind zeal he calls a centaur, is shown by his objection to the argument of Origen, that, if the transition from the state of not-creating to the act of creation supposes a change in God, so also the transition from the act of creation to the cessation of that act would imply a similar change. Now God must have ceased from creating when the world was finished, and then there would consequently be a change in Him. But Origen, arguing from his own principles, might reply that we ought not to conceive of God's activity in creation as completed at a certain point of time, or as an act beginning at a specific time and then brought to an end. He

\* According to Methodius, a γενητόν αὐτὸ γενέσεως ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔχον, ἀνάρχως κρατὶν τοῦ τεχνήματος.

† Plato, in the *Timæus*, εἰκὼν κινητὴ αἰώνας, μένοντος αἰώνας ἐν ἐνὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἰούσα αἰώνιος εἰκὼν. Comp. Plotin. III. *Ennead*. 7.

‡ "Ὅσον ἐστὶ τὸ φῶς ποιητικὸν τοῦ ἀπαυγασματος, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον γεννᾶται τὸ ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης. In Jerem. Hom. IX. s. 3.

§ Extracts from the work of Methodius in Photius. Cod. 235.

might retort on Methodius the objection that, by the comparison which the latter had introduced, self-subsistence is unduly attributed to the creature, so that it would neither be every moment dependent on God for its existence, nor derive its ground from the same creative power. More to the point (though aimed against an inappropriate mode of expression rather than against the idea of Origen) was the objection that the idea of God's perfection necessarily implies that it has its cause and ground in itself, is dependent on nothing else, and conditioned by nothing else.\*

With Origen's doctrine of the creation was connected his peculiar view of the *doctrine of God's omnipotence*. When he says, We ought not, if we would apprehend the almighty power of God in its true glory, to conceive of it as infinite without any further modification,† this proposition, if taken in one particular sense, is quite true. The conception of the divine Omnipotence, as contradistinguished from the principle of natural religion, according to which the gods themselves were conceived as subject to a higher necessity, was in fact something entirely new, and as such it derived a greater importance in the Christian consciousness from its opposition to the earlier views. The usual answer given by uneducated Christians, and those who were unable to give a more precise reason for the faith that was in them, when urged with objections, was, that with God all things are possible, even those which to men seem impossible. By this opposition, however, of a supernatural Theism to the ancient Naturalism, many were led into the error of at least *expressing themselves* in such a manner as to convey an impression that under the idea of Omnipotence they understood an infinite, arbitrary will, and thereby they laid open many weak points to those who attacked Christianity on the principles of the heathen philosophy. And of such Celsus was not slow to take advantage.‡ Now, in opposition to the notion of such an unlimited arbitrary will, Origen advanced an idea of Omnipotence which made it to be by no means thus indeterminate, but standing

\* Τὸ αὐτὸ δι' ἑαυτὸ ἑαυτοῦ πλήρωμα ὃν καὶ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ μένον, τέλειον εἶναι τοῦτο μόνον δοξαστίον.

† Πεπρασμένην γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ Θεοῦ λεκτίον καὶ μὴ προφάσει εὐφημίας τὴν περιγραφὴν αὐτῆς περιαιρετίον. Π. ἀρχ. I. II. c. 9.

‡ See Orig. c. Cels. I. V. c. 14.



connected with the essence of God as God, and properly to be qualified by the other divine attributes. "God can do anything," he says, "which does not contradict His essence as God, His goodness and His wisdom—nothing by which He would contradict Himself as God, as the infinitely good and wise."\* If by that which is contrary to nature† is meant what is bad, irrational, self-contradictory, the notion of the divine Omnipotence cannot be extended to such things. But the case becomes different when nature is understood according to its ordinary meaning as the common course of nature.‡ The laws of nature, thus understood, are valid only for one particular point of view; and there may be something, therefore, considered from this particular point of view, *above nature*, which, in the other sense of the word, is not *contrary to nature*. In its relation to a higher, divine life, which is in its essence supernatural, miracles regarded as individual operations of this higher power introduced into humanity may be something in harmony with nature.§ Many things may take place in accordance with the divine reason and the divine will, which, on this very account, although they may be miraculous, or may seem to be so to many, are still not contrary to nature.||

But the position of Origen, that the divine Omnipotence must not be thought of as an undefined unlimited power, has also another meaning, in which, as in many other instances, we recognise a mixture of the elements of Platonism with Christianity. The doctrine of the Neo-Platonic school,¶ that no mind can grasp an infinite series, passed with him for a demonstrated truth; and therefore he inferred that God could not create an infinite, but only a determinate, number of rational beings; because otherwise they could not have been comprehended by any mind, and a particular providence could

\* Δύναται πάντα ὁ Θεός, ἅπερ δυνάμενος τοῦ Θεοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι καὶ σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ἐξίσταται. c. Cels. l. III. c. 70, and l. V. c. 23.

† Τὰ παρὰ φύσιν.

‡ Ἡ κοινοτέρα νοουμένη φύσις.

§ "Ἐστὶ τινὰ ὑπὲρ τὴν φύσιν (τὴν κοινοτέραν) νοουμένην, ἃ ποιῆσαι ἂν ποτε Θεός, ὑπὲρ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ἀναβιβάζων τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ποιῶν αὐτὸν μεταβάλλειν ἐπὶ φύσιν κρείττονα καὶ θειοτέραν.

|| c. Cels. l. V. c. 23.

¶ See, e. g., Plutarch. de defectu oraculor. c. 24.



have no existence.\* I shall presently show how important this single point was in its bearing on the whole system of Origen. With it was connected the peculiar shape which in his mind was taken by the doctrine of an eternal creation, namely, that there is no such thing as a multiplication of the number of created spirits; that all multiplicity is to be derived, not from the production of new beings, but only from a change of those already brought into existence by the eternal creation; that there have been no new creations, but only metamorphoses of original ones.

Although, moreover, Origen agrees, in many of his results, with those who teach that everything possible must also become actual, and who represent the divine Omnipotence as being wholly exhausted in what actually comes to pass, yet this principle was never expressed by him, and it is one foreign to his general philosophical and dogmatical tendency;† as indeed it is usually found united with a certain doctrine of predestination, to which Origen's views were directly opposed.

Even in his errors we perceive the religious zeal which predominated in the feelings of this great teacher. Without this doctrine he supposes it impossible to defend a belief in a personal God, embracing in his consciousness everything that exists, and also in a special Providence—a truth which he considered it of vital importance to maintain in opposition to the Neo-Platonic theory, which assumed an impersonal *ὄν*, pure entity without consciousness, as the highest and absolute being, while it recognised none but an immanent and inoperative *πρόνοια*.‡

We now proceed to the doctrine in which Theism, taken in its connection with the proper and fundamental essence of Christianity, or with the doctrine of redemption, finds its ultimate completion, the *doctrine of the Trinity*. This doc-

\* Τῇ γὰρ φύσει τὸ ἄπειρον ἀπερίληπτον· πεποίηκε τοίνυν τοσαῦτα, ὥν ἐδύνατο περιδράσασθαι καὶ συγγρατεῖν ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτοῦ πρόνοιαν. Π. ἀρχ. l. II. c. 9. "Ἀπειρα τῇ φύσει οὐχ οἶόντι περιλαμβάνεσθαι τῇ περατοῦν πεφυκυῖα τὰ γνωσκόμενα γνώσει. In Matth. T. XIII. s. 1; ed. Lommatzsch, T. III. p. 210.

† The opposite is expressed in the words of Origen: Οὐκ ἐμποδίζεται, τὸ εἶναι τὰ πολλὰ δυνατόν, ἐνὸς ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν ὄντος τοῦ ἰσομήνου. In ep. ad Rom. lib. I.; ed. Lommatzsch, T. V. p. 251.

‡ The true opposite of the Neo-Platonic *ὄν* is expressed in what he says of God the Father: Αὐτὸν ἐν ἑαυτῷ δοξαζόμενον, ὅτε ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ γινόμενῃ περιωπῇ ἐπὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ γνώσει καὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ θεωρίᾳ εὐφραίνεται ἄφρατον τινα χαράν. In Joann. T. XXII. s. 18; ed. Lommatzsch, T. II. p. 470. §

trine does not, it appears to me, belong strictly to the fundamental articles of the Christian faith; as appears from the fact that it is explicitly set forth in no one particular passage of the New Testament;\* for the only one in which this is done, the passage relating to the three that bear record (1 John v.), is undoubtedly spurious, and in its unguine shape testifies to the fact how foreign such a collocation is from the style of the New Testament writings. We find in the New Testament no other fundamental article besides that of which the Apostle Paul says that other foundation can no man lay than that is laid, the preaching of Jesus as the Messiah; and the foundation of His religion is designated by Christ Himself the faith in the only true God, and in Jesus Christ whom he hath sent (John xvii. 3). What St. Paul preëminently styles the mystery is by no means any information with regard to the hidden depths of the divine essence, but the divine purpose of salvation which found its accomplishment in a fact. But that doctrine, in order to its being understood in its real significance for the Christian consciousness, implies this fundamental article of the Christian faith; and we recognise therein a brief sum of the essential contents of Christianity, as may be gathered from the determinate form which is given to Theism by its connection with this fundamental article. It is this doctrine by which God becomes known as the original Fountain of all existence; as He by whom the rational creation, that had become estranged from Him, is brought back to the fellowship with Him; and as He, in the fellowship with whom it from henceforth is to subsist: the threefold relation † in which God stands to mankind, as primal ground, mediator, and end,—Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier,—in which threefold relation the whole Christian knowledge of God is completely designated. Accordingly all is embraced by the Apostle Paul when he names the one God and Father of all, who is above all, and works through all and in all (Ephes. iv. 6); or Him from whom are all things, through whom are all things, and to whom are all things;—when, in the benediction, he sums up all in the formula, The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, the

\* [Is it not so set forth in Matth. xxviii. 19? See Moberley's Discourses on the Great Forty Days. Disc. IV. "On the Sacred Name."—*Eng. Ed.*]

† In the *παλαιός λόγος*: 'Ο Θεὸς ἀρχὴν τε καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μεσὰ τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων ἔχων. Plato legg. IV. ed. Bip. vol. VIII. p. 185.

love of God, and the communion of the Holy Spirit. God, as the living God, the God of mankind, and the God of the church, can be truly known in this way only. This shape of Theism presents the perfect mean between the absolutely extra-mundane God of Deism and the God of Pantheism brought down to, and confounded with, the world. As this mode of the knowledge of God belongs to the peculiar essence of Theism and the Theocracy, it follows that *its* foundation must, together with the foundation of both these, be given in the Old Testament; and that foundation is the doctrine of God, whose agency is in the world through his Word and with his Spirit. It was, therefore, no accident, to be explained by the supervision of outward influences merely, that such a shaping of the consciousness in its conceptions of the godhead should have grown out of the germs already contained in the Old Testament—a truth which has not been duly attended to by those who, in their account of the progressive development of doctrines, have been inclined to ascribe too much to the influence of outward causes.

We must take care not to be deceived by false analogies when the attempt is made to compare this doctrine with apparently kindred dogmas of other religions, or with merely speculative theories. Its connection, already pointed out, with the fundamental consciousness of Christianity, must furnish, in this case, the right standard of comparison. Apart from this, the threefold designation of the Supreme Essence, or the hypothesis of a threefold gradation in the principles of existence, can furnish only a delusive analogy, which perhaps may be founded all the while on some theory most directly opposed to the Christian view of the world. For this is the case, indeed, with regard to the Indian Trimurti, which is connected with a thoroughly pantheistic scheme, wholly at issue with the theistic and theological principle of Christianity—the doctrine, namely, of a divine essence, which manifests itself in a constant repetition of the same process of new-made and decaying worlds. And even within the Christian church itself, systems in which reason and the world are pantheistically deified have, by wresting this doctrine from its original connection, made it bear a sense at variance with its true import, for the sake of giving currency to some scheme under a Christian garb, which in its essence was wholly opposed to Christianity.

The doctrine of the Trinity, however, in its practical or economical import, does not preclude the reference to an inner and objective relation within the essence of the divine nature itself. For in the revelation which God makes of Himself in His works, His essence is indeed presented to us, but at first we are only able to apprehend it as it were in a glass, darkly, as an enigma to be solved, since, from the contemplation of God's self-manifestation in the creation, we are constrained to form our conception of the divine attributes in accordance with the analogy of our own minds. However, the practical or economical view of the Trinity, which starts from God revealed in Christ, or from the position of the Apostle St. Paul, that God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself, must ever be considered as the groundwork of the whole,—the original element from which the speculative or ontological view is derived. And this view we shall find substantiated in tracing, as we now propose to do, the historical development of this doctrine through the first centuries. This economico-practical doctrine of the Trinity constituted from the beginning the fundamental conviction of the Catholic church, while forming itself in conflict with the opposite theories of the heretical sects. It is that which constitutes the basis of the true unity of the church and the identity of the Christian mind in all ages. But the notional process of development, by means of which the economico-practical doctrine of the Trinity was reduced to an ontological one, was a gradual one, and must necessarily run through manifold opposite forms, until it issued at last in some mode of apprehension, satisfying the demand for unity which spoke in the Christian consciousness, and in the activity of the dialectical reason.

It must be evident, from what has been already said, that the development of this doctrine must start from a reference to the person of Christ. Consequently, the original principle, which must have formed the preliminary basis of all speculation, is the image which Christ himself left on the minds of those on whom His life made an immediate impression and who were chosen to be witnesses of it. The doctrine of the divine essence dwelling in Christ first grew out of the intuition of the divine glory manifested in His life, as it was expressed by the Apostle John,—“We beheld his glory, the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father;” and out of the discourses which, from His own mind, without any accommodation what-



ever to the existing ideas of the period, but rather in opposition to them, he delivered on the subject of His relation to his heavenly Father. This is the *intuitive view* of his person which lies at the basis even of that imperfectly developed representation of it which is given in the three first gospels, which beams forth with peculiar lustre in many separate passages, such as Matth. xi. 27; xii. 6, 42; xvi. 16 (see the way in which Christ approves what was, here said), and in the use made by Christ himself of the 110th Psalm for the purpose of leading those whom he addressed to the recognition of One who was greater than the Son of David. The doctrine concerning Christ, as taught by the Apostle St. Paul, is also a proof that the view of Christ's person which pervades all the writings of St. John was not one of later origin. Moreover, even if we leave out of consideration the minor epistles of St. Paul, the genuineness of which some writers in modern times have, without sufficient grounds, chosen to call in doubt, and which form, notwithstanding, the necessary close of the development of the Pauline theology—if, I say, we even put these aside, the same truth is implied in the designation, "Him by whom are all things" (1 Corinth. viii. 6).

In the Jewish theology, which prepared the way for Christianity, we may distinguish two different tendencies. First, we see an attempt to concentrate all that is divine in the idea of a theocratic king, who should realize the idea of the Theocracy. And this necessarily led to a conception of a person transcending the finiteness of man's nature—the image of the Son of God, as it beamed forth ennobled before the minds of inspired prophets. The second was a tendency which, connected with that narrow view of the Messiah's office ordinarily prevailing in the Jewish mind, took also a limited view of His person. We have observed in the history of the Judaizing and Gnostic sects how both these modes of apprehension proceeded to develop themselves into opposite theories, to the reciprocal exclusion of the other. As to the prophetic element, we find it taken up, and still further prosecuted, in St. Paul's and St. John's doctrine of Christ. That being by whom man, estranged from God, was to be restored to fellowship with Him, is set forth as the One through whom the procession of all existence from God had been mediated from the beginning,—as the One who, being the original self-mani-

festation of the hidden divine Essence, always formed the link between God and the creation. He, too, was the first-born of every creature, and the first-born of the new creation of humanity, now restored to the image of God in that glorified human nature which He exhibited after His resurrection. The same was the image of God before all existence, and the image of God in humanity; the divine fountain of light and of life, from whom all spirits from the beginning were to derive their being, and who as such appeared in humanity, for the purpose of revealing in it, and of imparting to it, a divine life. He was the original Word of God, the first act of the divine self-manifestation (of God's self-affirmation), which became incarnate, in order that everything pertaining to humanity might become godlike.

The title "Word of God," employed to designate this idea, the Apostle John may have arrived at from within and independently of any outward tradition. At any rate he would not have adopted this title because it had been previously current in certain circles, had it not suggested itself as the fitting form of expression for that which filled his own soul. And the term itself is certainly not, any more than the idea originally expressed by it, derived from the Platonic philosophy, which assuredly could have furnished no occasion whatever for the choice of this particular expression.\* It is simply the translation of the Old Testament term דְּבָרָא; and it was this Old Testament conception, moreover, which led to the New Testament idea of the Logos. An intermediate step † is formed by what is said in the epistle to the Hebrews concerning a divine Word; and thus we find in the latest epistles of St. Paul, from the first epistle to the Corinthians, in the epistle to the Hebrews, and in the gospel of St. John, a connected series in the progressive development of the apostolic doctrine.

If this idea of the Logos had not a connection with Christianity resting on the authority of an apostolical type of doctrine, and ought rather to be considered as merely the product of a fusion [of Platonism, or of the Alexandrian-Jewish

\* The Platonic philosophy led rather to the employment of the term *νοῦς* as a designation of the mediating principle.

† Respecting which, Bleek, in his masterly Commentary, has made some excellent remarks.

theology, with Christian doctrines, then its wide diffusion, as testified by its reception by church-fathers of otherwise the most opposite tendencies, could hardly be accounted for. If in such a case it might have commended itself to teachers in whom the Platonic element predominated, still those who looked with suspicion upon everything that came from that quarter must, for this very reason, have been prejudiced against it. As in the beginning of the second century\* the defenders of the doctrine of Christ's divinity, when proving that such was the ancient doctrine of the church, could appeal to the oldest church-teachers and to ancient Christian hymns, so this evidence is further confirmed by the report of the heathen Pliny.†

But while, in the tradition of the church, the idea of the Logos was taught and transmitted in the form which most perfectly harmonized with the habits of thought that had resulted from the previous stage of spiritual culture, namely, as the idea of a Spirit, the first-begotten of God and subordinate to Him, there was, besides this, another view of the doctrine concerning the Trinity, which may be designated, after the customary language of this period, as that of the *Monarchians*. Although opposite views were to be found among them, and they were involved in still more violent disputes *with each other* than they ever were with the church on account of its subordination theory, yet they were all agreed with regard to that which was conveyed by this term of Monarchianism—a zeal, viz., to preserve the unity of the consciousness of God, which made them unwilling to acknowledge any other divine being than the one God, the Father. Either they absolutely rejected the doctrine of the Logos, or they understood by the Logos simply a divine energy, the divine wisdom or reason, which illuminates the souls of the pious—in this respect falling in with a certain modification of the idea which had been adopted by one class of Jewish theologians.‡ Now it may appear singular that precisely at this period—when the Christian mind and character were struggling into existence in the midst of paganism and its influences—such a strictly monotheistic interest should have arisen, and taken exception to the doctrine of the hypo-

\* Euseb. l. V. c. 28. † See vol. I. p. 134. ‡ Already mentioned.

statical Logos.\* But when we consider how the case really stood with Christians of this age, when we call to mind that their Christian convictions had been developed in direct opposition to their previous heathen principles, so that the doctrine of the divine unity had been deeply impressed on their minds by their first catechetical instruction, while the idea of the Logos did not occur among the articles of the first simple baptismal creeds (as in fact it does not occur in the so-called Apostolic Creed), it may easily be explained how, when afterwards this doctrine came to be set before them, they fancied it to contain something in contradiction to the principle of the *μοναρχία*, which they had been originally taught.†

Among these Monarchians, who agreed in combating the doctrine of a hypostatical Logos, two classes are to be distinguished, according as the Monarchian interest of the common religious faith, or reason, predominated, while that of a characteristic Christian piety, which related to the person of Christ, was quite subordinate; or as both these interests were combined, and coöperated with equal power. And in close connection with this difference was another. While with the one class the dialectical, critical faculty of the understanding was supreme, with the other the practical element and Christian feeling predominated.‡ The former were of the opinion that in the system of the church the distance was not sufficiently marked between Christ and the only true God. They denied that Christ was divine in every sense, and would only admit a divinity of Him in a certain sense. They taught,

\* Orig. in Joann. T. II. s. 2: τὸ πολλοὺς φιλοθεοὺς εἶναι εὐχομένους παράσσειν, εὐλαβουμένους δύο ἀναγορεύσαι θεοὺς.

† This is confirmed by Tertullian, adv. Praxeam, c. 3: *Simplices quique, ne dixerim imprudentes et idiotæ, quæ major semper credentium pars est, quoniam et ipsa regula fidei a pluribus Diis seculi ad unicum et verum Deum transfert, expavescunt ad οἰκονομίαν* (the trinity to be connected with the unity). Monarchiam, inquit, tenemus.

‡ Origen clearly distinguishes these two classes; in Joann. T. II. s. 2: Ἦτοι ἀρνούμενους ιδιότητα υἱοῦ ἑτέραν παρὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς, ὁμολογούντας θεὸν εἶναι τὸν μέχρι ὀνόματος παρ' αὐτοῖς υἱὸν προσαγορευόμενον (they acknowledge the divinity of Christ, but deny him a personality distinct from the Father, and call him the Son in name only—they do not consider him as such in truth, inasmuch as they identify him with the Father; these are the Patripassians), ἢ ἀρνούμενους τὴν θεότητα τοῦ υἱοῦ, τιθέντας δὲ αὐτοῦ τὴν ιδιότητα καὶ οὐσίαν κατὰ περιγραφὴν (an individual existencè, *natura certis finibus circumscripta*), *τυγχάνουσαν ἑτέραν τοῦ πατρὸς* (the other class). T. II. s. 18; T. X. s. 21; c. Cels. l. VIII. c. 12.



namely, that Jesus was a man like all other men, but that from the first he was animated and guided by that power of God, the divine reason or wisdom, which had been bestowed on him in larger measure than on any other prophet or messenger of God, and that it was precisely on this account he was to be called the Son of God. They differed from the Ebionites, properly so called, in this respect, that they did not hold that such union of Christ with God first took place at a determinate moment of his life, but regarded it as lying at the basis of his entire development, since in fact they acknowledged his miraculous conception.

The second class consisted of those whom not merely a zeal for Monotheism or Monarchianism (in which a Jew also might participate), but whom a zeal also for the faith in the true deity of Christ made opponents of the doctrine of the hypostatical Logos, in the form in which it was then understood. Since the Logos, who in Christ had become man, was ordinarily looked upon as a being personally distinct from, and subordinate to, God the Father, although most intimately related to Him, they condemned this representation of Christ as inadequate. Such a distinction between Him and the Supreme God was a stumbling-block to their faith in Christ: for them He was the only true and supreme God Himself, who had now revealed Himself to mankind in such a way as He had never before done, having appeared in a human body. They regarded the names Father and Son as only two different designations of the same subject, the one God, who, with reference to the relations in which He had previously stood to the world, is called by the name of the Father, but by that of the Son in reference to *His appearance in humanity*.<sup>\*</sup> They recognised in Christ only the one, undivided God; the feeling which was uppermost with them would admit of no distinction or division. While the first class of Monarchians saw nothing in Christ but His human nature, and kept the divine element entirely out of sight, the others could see nothing but the Godhead, and wholly suppressed or overlooked the human element. The tendency of their views was to make of the human appearance simply a transient, removable veil, adopted for the manifestation of God in humanity. Yet we are ignorant as to the *particular way* in which

<sup>\*</sup> Τὼ ἐπίνειαι ἐνὸς ὑποκειμένου.

they developed their thoughts on this point. The more profoundly pious feeling among the uneducated laity seems to have inclined them to favour the last-mentioned view; and if, as appears from the passages cited from Tertullian and Origen, it had many adherents even as late as the third century, this fact cannot nevertheless be regarded as any evidence whatever against the antiquity of the doctrine of the Logos. It is no proof that the latter first made its appearance in conflict with some older mode of view. On the contrary, it might easily happen that, while the doctrine of the Logos was being clearly set forth in theology, the view we are speaking of would spring up out of the popular mind. It was the reaction of the intellect among the Christian laity, against the doctrine of the Logos, when it became more precisely defined in a subordination-system.\* This is the class of whom Origen says that, under the show of *aiming to honour Christ*, they teach what is untrue of him.† It is such whom he has in mind when he describes, as belonging to an inferior position, those whose God is the Logos,—who imagine that in him they possessed the whole essence of God, and who held him to be the Father himself.‡ And it is the same class, perhaps, of whom he says that they knew nothing but Jesus the crucified; that they imagined they possessed in the Incarnate the entire Logos; that they knew Christ only according to the flesh; and as such he describes the mass of believers to whom he was accustomed to oppose the genuine Gnostics.§ Just as Philo

\* Instead of being able, with Dr. Baur (whose positions we have not neglected to consider in the above statement), to regard the Logos doctrine as an attempt to strike the mean between the two classes of the Monarchians, and so accounting for its spread, we must, on the contrary, maintain that it was precisely an antithesis to the Logos doctrine in the form of subordination which called forth Patripassianism. In this last tendency we discern the same interest, expressing itself in a purely practical way, without that dialectical reasoning by means of which it afterwards sought its satisfaction in the matured notion of the Homoïasion.

† In Matth. T. XVII. s. 14: Οὐ νομιστίον εἶναι ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τοὺς τὰ ψεῦδη φρονοῦντας περὶ αὐτοῦ, φαντασίᾳ τοῦ δοξάζειν αὐτὸν, ὅποιοί εἰσιν οἱ συγχύοντες πατὴρ, καὶ υἱοῦ ἔννοιαν καὶ τῇ ὑποστάσει ἵνα δίδόντες εἶναι τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱόν, τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ μόνῃ καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι διαιροῦντες τὸ ἐν ὑποκειμένον. He distinguishes such from heretics.

‡ Ὁ λόγος τάχα τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἰσtάντων τὸ πᾶν καὶ τῶν πατέρα αὐτὸν νομιζόντων ἐστὶ θεός. In Joann. T. II. s. 3.

§ L. c.: Οἱ μὴδὲν εἰδότες, εἰ μὴ Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν καὶ τοῦτον ἐσταυρωμένον,

distinguishes those who elevate themselves to the Absolute, and those who imagine they have all in the Logos, considering the latter as the Supreme God himself; and as the Gnostics distinguish those who elevate themselves to the Supreme God, and those who hold the Demiurge to be the Supreme God himself; so Origen distinguishes those who elevate themselves to God the Father Himself, and those who never went beyond the Son, and held Him to be the Father himself.\* These latter were usually denominated Patripassians,†—a name which would be applied to them, however, only by those who maintained the subordination-theory of the church;‡ since they held that it would detract from the superior dignity of the Father, if that was transferred to Him which could only be predicated of the Logos,§ who came into all manner of contact with the creature.

We shall now proceed to consider more in detail the several phases of Monarchianism.

As regards the first-named class, we find the earliest traces of it in the Roman church. And since it has been found that Monarchians of the third century appeal to the agreement of the older Roman bishops with their views, modern inquirers have been led to infer from this circumstance that the Monarchian tenet was originally the prevailing one in this church,

τὸν γενόμενον σάρκα λόγον τὸ πᾶν νομίσαντες εἶναι τοῦ λόγου, Χριστὸν κατὰ σάρκα μόνον γινώσκουσι· τοιοῦτον δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πεπιστευκέναι νομιζομένων. Yet we should not omit to notice, that in the passage cited above, Matth. T. XVII. s. 14, Origen distinguishes those who out of a mistaken wish to honour Christ identify Him with the Father, from the great mass of orthodox believers, who, though they do not consider Christ as a mere prophet, yet, far from having a sufficiently high conception of Him, are unable to form to themselves any clear conception of His character. Οἱ ὅχλοι, καὶ μὴ τῇ λήξει ὡς προφήτην αὐτὸν ἔχουσι, ὃ, τι ποτ' ἂν ἔχουσιν αὐτὸν, πολλὰ ἑλαττον ἔχουσιν αὐτὸν οὗ ἐστίν, οὐδὲν τρανοῦντες περὶ αὐτοῦ.

\* Οἱ μὲν Θεὸν ἔχουσι τὸν τῶν ὅλων Θεόν, οἱ δὲ παρὰ τούτους δεύτεροι ἰστάμενοι ἐπὶ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, τὸν Χριστὸν αὐτοῦ. L. c.

† Qui unam eandemque subsistentiam Patris ac Filii asseverant, unam personam duobus nominibus subiacentem, qui latine Patripassiani appellantur. Orig. fragment. Commentar. in ep. ad Titum.

‡ In a different sense from that in which, at a later period, those who were accused of not duly distinguishing the divine and the human natures in Christ were denominated Theopaschites.

§ See the words of Tertullian, cited above: Pater philosophorum Deus.

and that the doctrine of the Logos was unknown to it ; and that this supposed fact was connected with another, that namely the Roman church had its origin in a Jewish element. But if the latter hypothesis is erroneous, and we must rather regard the Pauline, Gentile-Christian element as the original one in this church\* (as we think we have elsewhere succeeded in showing), then one of the principal arguments for such a supposition falls at once to the ground. Moreover, on such a supposition, it would be almost impossible to account for the favourable reception which the Patripassians met with at Rome ; for it is evident that there was nothing which so contradicted the fundamental principle of the *Jewish Christians*, nothing so alien from Ebionism, as *this* theory concerning the person of Christ. We have seen, in fact, that the two classes of the Monarchians stand in well-defined opposition to each other. Both, therefore, cannot at one and the same time have been dominant in the Roman church, nor have sprung out of its original element ; although doubtless one might by its extravagance have called forth the other. Now, if Patripassianism was the predominant doctrine, this was of all the least likely to show any sympathy for the other classes of the Monarchians. The latter in that case could expect nothing but the warmest resistance. But if that tendency of Monarchianism which was more nearly akin to Ebionism had existed in the original doctrine of this church, then the favourable reception which a Patripassian here found cannot be accounted for. The intimate connection, moreover, of Irenæus with the Roman church,† who appeals especially to its doctrinal tradition, testifies against the existence in this church of any such Monarchian tendency as was opposed to the doctrine of the Logos. And it is by no means clear that those Monarchians were natives of Rome ; they perhaps came from some other quarter to the capital of the world, whither the most heterogeneous elements flowed together in all directions. The Monarchians of the first class, in fact, did from the first meet here with a very unfavourable reception. And as to their appealing to their agreement with the more ancient doctrine of the Roman church, this is no more a proof that the ori-

\* See my *Apostol. Zeitalter*, vol. I. p. 384.

† See vol. I. p. 284.



ginal doctrine of this church really favoured them than their appeal which they also made to the scriptures of the New Testament proves it in the case of the latter.\* The truth probably is then, that they simply took advantage of the fact that in the Roman church this doctrine had not as yet been evolved to the same dialectical precision as elsewhere.

The founder of this Monarchian party in Rome appears to have been a certain Theodotus, a leather-dresser (σκυτεύς) from Byzantium.† It is evident, from the way in which he interpreted the language of the angel (Luke i. 31),‡ that, although he did not acknowledge an *indwelling* divinity in Christ, he yet supposed that he had from the beginning grown up under the special influence of the divine Spirit. He appealed to the language of the Annunciation, which said, The Spirit of God shall enter into thee; therefore the fact here denoted was not an incarnation of the divine Spirit,§ but only a descent of the divine Spirit upon Mary. From this it appears that he by no means denied the supernatural character of Christ's nativity; of which however he is unjustly accused by Epiphanius. The Roman bishop, Victor, is said to have excommunicated Theodotus either at the end of the second or at the beginning of the third century; his party, however, continued to propagate itself in separation from the dominant church, and endeavoured to gain respect and influence by contriving to elect for its bishop Natalis, a venerated confessor. The latter seems, however, to have become a prey to conflicting feelings in his own breast, by departing from a conviction which had once given him strength for trials and suffering. The disquiet of his heart manifested itself in frightful dreams and

\* Although we may be inclined to suppose that the Artemonites did not receive the gospel of St. John, yet we must admit that they acknowledged the epistles of St. Paul.

† The latter is reported by Epiphanius and Theodoretus.

‡ His words, cited by Epiphanius hæres. 54, are: Καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ἔφη τῇ Μαρίας· πνεῦμα κυρίου ἐπιλεύσεται ἐπὶ σέ, καὶ οὐκ εἴπῃ· πνεῦμα κυρίου γενήσεται ἐν σοί.

§ Whether it was, that by this divine Spirit he understood the Logos, or whether he disclaimed all knowledge of such a being. We should not forget here that these words were in fact referred, at that time, to the incarnation of the Logos. See Justin M. Apolog. II. ed. Colon. f. 75: Τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν παρὰ Θεοῦ οὐδὲν ἄλλο νοῆσαι θέμις ἢ τὸν λόγον.

visions; and in the end he penitently returned to the Catholic church.\*

Independently of this Theodotus, there arose another Monarchian sect in Rome, whose founder is called *Artemon*. It is certain that the party which derived its origin from this man did not acknowledge Theodotus as belonging to them; and if they supposed they could appeal to their agreement in doctrine with the Roman bishop Victor, who had excommunicated Theodotus, they must have believed either that their doctrine was different from that of Theodotus, or that the latter had been excommunicated for other reasons than his doctrinal errors. The latter may be assumed, if the somewhat extravagant and insufficiently attested statement,† that Theodotus was first excommunicated for denying the faith during a persecution, has any foundation of truth. The Artemonites continued to propagate themselves in Rome till late into the third century. About the middle of this century the Roman presbyter Novatianus considered it necessary, in his exposition of the doctrine of Christ's divinity, to notice particularly the objections of that party; and, during the disputes excited at a later period by Paul of Samosata, it was spoken of as a party still in existence.

If the Artemonites pretended that what *they* called the truth had been preserved in the Roman church down to the time of the Roman bishop Zephyrinus, this, as we have already remarked, amounts to nothing more than the other circumstance of their citing the older church teachers generally, and the apostles themselves, as witnesses to their so-called truth. It is easy for any one, from some special dogmatic interest, to explain everything in conformity with his own views, and to find everywhere a reflection of *himself*. But when they asserted that, from the time of Victor's successor, Zephyrinus, the true doctrine in this church became obscured,‡ some fact must have seemed to them to furnish a foundation for this assertion, which unhappily, in the absence of historical data, it is impossible at

\* If we may trust to the report of an opponent. Euseb. lib. V. c. 28.

† Besides being cited in Epiphanius, it may be found in the appendices to Tertullian's *Præscriptions*, c. 53.

‡ Ἀπὸ τῆ τοῦ διαδόχου αὐτοῦ Ζεφυρίνου παραπικραῖναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Euseb. l. V. c. 28.

present accurately to ascertain. Perhaps by these very disputes the Roman church was led to adopt some exposition of the doctrine which, as it was more clearly defined, was unfavourable to the interests of this party. The Roman bishops, who, even at this early period, held tenaciously to traditional forms, even in unimportant matters, would hardly have been induced to exchange, at once, the Monarchianism received from their predecessors for a doctrine of the Logos which came to them from abroad; and such a change, moreover, did not admit of being easily effected.

As it regards the mental tendency in which the doctrine of these Artemonites may have originated, we are furnished with a very instructive hint in an objection which was urged against them. They busied themselves a good deal with mathematics, dialectics, and criticism; with the philosophy of Aristotle, and with Theophrastus. It therefore was a predominantly reflective, critical, and dialectical bent of mind, which, in their case, came into collision with the fervency and depth of Christian feeling. They were for a Christianity of the understanding, without any mystical element. Everything of a transcendental character, that did not adapt itself to their dialectical categories, was to be expurged from the creed. It is worthy of notice that they devoted particular attention to the Aristotelian philosophy. We perceive here the different influence exerted by different systems of philosophy, when we compare the way in which the Platonic was employed to defend the doctrine of Christ's divinity with the opposite direction of mind derived from the Aristotelian, which tended to combat that doctrine.

It was alleged against those Artemonites, that, under the pretence of emending "the text of the holy scriptures, they indulged in the most arbitrary criticism. An accusation of this sort from the mouth of opponents is not, it must be admitted, of itself entitled to much credit. There has always been a strong disposition, whenever those who deviated from the doctrine of the church cited other readings than those which were customarily received, to charge them with corrupting the holy scriptures in favour of their peculiar opinions.\* Still the peculiar intellectual tendency of these people renders

\* Tertullian's *Præscriptions*: *Ubi veritas disciplinæ et fidei Christianæ, illic erit veritas scripturarum et expositionum. De præscript. c. 19.*

it not improbable that they did indulge in a licentious criticism in furtherance of their own peculiar dogmas. Their antagonists appeal to the variations which were to be found among the several recensions of the text by theologians of this party, which differed in proportion as each wished to acquire importance by his criticisms.\*

Many of the Artemonites were also led, it would appear, by this critical bent of mind, to oppose the confounding together the fundamental positions of the Old and New Testament; and the way in which, by means of allegorical interpretation, every Christian truth was intercalated into the Old Testament. They were for holding the two positions distinctly apart; and for distinguishing clearly the new specifically Christian element from that of the Old-Testament scriptures. Possibly, also, they may have discriminated between the peculiar agency of the Holy Spirit in reference to the New Testament, and that in the case of the Old-Testament scriptures. To the latter they did not perhaps ascribe the same authority as to the former.†

\* There were many copies of the New Testament, inscribed with the names of the critics of the several sects from which the revision of the text proceeded. Πολλῶν (ἀντιγραφῶν) ἴσθιν εὐπορεῖσθαι, διὰ τὸ φιλοτίμως ἐγγεγράφθαι τοὺς μαθητὰς αὐτῶν, τὰ ὅφ' ἐκάστου αὐτῶν, ὡς αὐτοὶ καλοῦσι, καταρθευμένα. Euseb. l. V. c. 28.

† We infer this from the remarkable words in the controversial notice just cited, Euseb. l. V. c. 28: "Ἐνιοὶ δ' αὐτῶν οὐδὲ ταράσσειν ἠξίωσαν αὐτὰς (τὰς γραφὰς) ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς ἀρνησάμενοι τὸν τε νόμον καὶ τοὺς προφῆτας, ἀνόμους καὶ ἀθεοῦ διδασκαλίας (here a word must have slipped out, for I do not feel at liberty to supply *ἔνεκα*, nor do I believe that this is the word missing. Neither can I, with Stroth, take these words as in apposition with *χάριτος*), προφάσει χάριτος (under the pretext that they would glorify the grace bestowed by the gospel) εἰς ἔσχατον ἀπωλείας ὄλεθρον καταλίσθησαν. We may here compare what Origen says of the same class: Qui Spiritum Sanctum alium quidem dicant esse, qui fuit prophetis, alium autem, qui fuit in apostolis. Fragment. Commentar. in epist. ad Titum. As to Dr. Baur's endeavour to establish a connection between the tendency here described and the sect of Marcion, I must be allowed to say that I see no ground whatever for such an hypothesis. If these people agreed with the school of Marcion in opposing the practice of confounding together the fundamental positions of the Old and the New Testament (and yet they were certainly very far from proceeding to the same length in this respect] as Marcion did), this cannot possibly be regarded as sufficient evidence of their relationship in any way with the sect of Marcion. They came to this result from an entirely different starting-point, by an intellectual tendency directly



We recognise the same tendency in the oldest opponents of St. John's gospel, who in their views at least were connected with this party,—the so-called *Alogi*, whom we have already spoken of as a sect that pushed the opposition to Montanism to its extreme limits.\*

As to the second class of Monarchians, the *Patripassians*, the first of the party who comes to our knowledge is the confessor *Praxeas*. He came from Asia Minor, the birthplace of Monarchianism, where he had come forward as an antagonist of Montanism. From this circumstance, however, it is by no means clear that his peculiar dogmatical direction with regard to the Trinity had any connection whatever with this opposition; especially when we consider that the prophetic spirit of the Montanists itself, as we formerly pointed out, assumed in the first place an Old-Testament form, and spoke in the name of God the Father only. Praxeas afterwards travelled to Rome,† and by his influence induced the Roman bishop, either Eleutherus or Victor, to pronounce sentence of excommunication against the Montanists in Asia Minor. He was not at that time attacked for his Patripassianism: whether it was that men were less disposed to examine rigidly into the creed of a confessor, or that, amidst the negotiations on many other matters of interest and importance to the church, this doctrinal difference did not happen to be touched upon; or that Praxeas found in the doctrine of the Roman church, which as yet was not very precisely defined, nothing directly repugnant to his own views, and by his zeal in behalf of the faith of Christ, as the God-man, and perhaps by his hostility to the other party of the Monarchians, gained the public opinion in his favour. He next went to Carthage, where too he may have relied for support on the before-described pious

opposed to that of the Marcionites. Had they stood in any sort of connection with the sect of Marcion, other Christians certainly would never have had so much to do with them, but would have repelled them, without ceremony, from their society, as notorious heretics. But neither can we believe that this was the party to which the opponents belonged whom Tertullian combats as a Montanist (see above, p. 222, note \*); for had it been in his power to charge his opponents with such errors as those above described, he would assuredly not have omitted to avail himself of such an opportunity.

\* See above, p. 223.

† For the precise time, see above, p. 205, note ‡, and p. 221.

zeal of simple faith in the laity, which had not yet passed through any process of theological development.\* Yet here an opponent of this doctrine presented himself, and a controversy arose. If we may believe the testimony of the hostile Tertullian, Praxeas was induced to recant.† Yet here probably we ought to distinguish between the real matter of fact, and the interpretation of that fact by an antagonist. It may be doubted whether the explanation of Praxeas, to which Tertullian alludes, may not have been simply a vindication of his doctrine against some falsely charged conclusions. Somewhat later, when Tertullian had gone over to the Montanistic party, the controversy broke out afresh; and he had now a double motive for writing against Praxeas.

According to his representations, there are two possible ways of construing the doctrine of Praxeas: either he denied the existence of any distinction in the being of God Himself—denied the existence of any duality in God, as it is implied indeed, but only in a modal sense, by Christ's appearance—and therefore he applied the name Son of God to Christ simply to his bodily manifestation on earth;‡ or in a certain sense he admitted the doctrine of a divine Logos. In the latter case he would have applied the name Son of God to Christ, not only with reference to his human appearance, but also he would have acknowledged a distinction, from the creation of the world, between the hidden, invisible God, and him who revealed himself in the work of creation, in the Theophanies of the Old Testament, and finally in a human body, in Christ. In this last relation God would be called the Logos or the Son. By extending, in some sense, his activity beyond himself, and so generating the Logos, he thus made himself a Son.§ Now Tertullian, when he expresses himself in this last way, has either failed to enter fully into the whole connection

\* Tertullian's words, where he is speaking of the spread of this doctrine in Carthage, are, *Dormientibus multis in simplicitate doctrinæ*. c. Praxeam, c. 1.

† His language is, *Caverat pristinum doctor de emendatione sua et manet chirographum apud psychicos*. L. c.

‡ See Tertullian, c. Praxeam, c. 27.

§ L. c. c. 10, 14, and 26. The objections of Baur do not move me. The passage marked c. 14, especially, where the writer is speaking of the application of the doctrine to the Old Testament, leads necessarily to this result.

of his opponent's mode of thinking, and transferred to Praxeas what was nothing really but his own way of construing his opponent's meaning, or else different views must have existed among the followers of Praxeas, according to the degree of their intellectual culture, and according as they adhered more or less closely to the terminology of the church.

To *this* class of Monarchians belongs, moreover, *Noetus*, who appeared in the first half of the third century at Smyrna.\* It is a characteristic fact, and serves to confirm what we have before said of the import of Patripassianism, that when Noetus was cited before an assembly of presbyters, to answer for the erroneous doctrine of which he was accused, he alleged in his defence that his doctrine tended only to honour Christ. "What evil do I," he asked, "when I glorify Christ?"† The unity of God and Christ—this only God—was his motto. In proof of his doctrine he appealed to Rom. ix. 5, where Christ is called God over all;—to the words of Christ, John x. 30, "I and my Father are one;"—perhaps also ‡ to the words, John xiv. 9, "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father." It appears, from these examples, that Patripassianism appealed to St. John's gospel, as well as to the others. How far therefore are they from being justified who from the spread of such doctrines would argue that this gospel was either not known to exist, or not received! If, in the case of Praxeas, we were uncertain whether he himself made the distinction between God hidden within himself and God in his self-manifestation, it is, on the other hand, clearly evident, from the report of Theodoret, that Noetus set out from such a doctrine. There is one God, the Father, who is invisible when he pleases, and who appears (manifests himself) when he pleases; but who is the same, whether visible or invisible, begotten or unbegotten. Theodoret refers this last expression to the birth of Christ;

\* Theodoret, together with Hippolytus, furnishes the most characteristic description of this doctrine (vid. Hæret. fab. III. c. 2). He correctly remarks that Noetus set forth no new doctrine invented by himself, but that others before him had already broached one of the same kind, among whom he names two individuals unknown to us, Epigonius and Cleomenes.

† Vid. Hippolyt. c. Noët. s. 1: Τὸ οὖν κατὰ ποιῶ, δοξάζων τὸν Χριστόν;

‡ I say "*perhaps*," because it is not absolutely certain, from the words of Hippolytus, whether he is answering an objection *actually made*, or only one which he conceived possible.

but it may be doubted whether he has in this instance rightly caught the sense of his author; whether the latter had not in his mind the *γέννησις τοῦ λόγου*; and in that case he could have understood by it nothing else than God's activity out of Himself. At all events, he must have so appropriated St. John's doctrine of the Logos as to understand by the Logos only a designation of God when He proceeds forth from his hidden essence—God revealing himself;—the same God who, in different relations, is denominated *ὢν* and *λόγος*.

In conflict with these two classes of the Monarchians, and in two different quarters, in the Western and in the Eastern church, the church doctrine of the Trinity unfolded itself. In the latter the doctrine of subordination became firmly established in connection with the hypostatical view of the Logos, since, in the controversy with the Monarchians, who denied the distinction of hypostases, that distinction was naturally still more prominently set forth. On the other hand, we see how the Western mind, starting from the doctrine of subordination received along with the distinction of hypostases, continually strove, while maintaining this distinction, to insist upon the unity of the divine essence. The designation of Christ as the Logos might have been known from the gospel of John, without, however, any use being made of it for a speculative exposition of the doctrine concerning Christ. This was first done when Christianity came into contact with a species of intellectual culture which had been formed in the philosophical schools, particularly the Platonic, though after a superficial manner and more under the impulse of a religious than of a philosophical interest. The first of the authors whose writings are still extant in whom this character may be discerned is Justin Martyr.\* In his speculations he (like

\* Justin describes the doctrine of Christ's divinity as one taught by Christ himself. *Πείθισθαι τοῖς δι' αὐτοῦ διδασχθεῖσι*. Dial. Tryph. f. 267. The doctrine concerning Christ as the Son of God in that higher sense which he thought he found in the *ἀπομνημονεύματα τῶν ἀποστόλων*, by which phrase he means the gospels, as being memorials of Christ's life. See f. 327. And when all the scattered allusions to the gospel of St. John in his writings are compared together, it is impossible to doubt that he had read this gospel, and comprised it among his apostolic commentaries; for, indeed, he describes these commentaries as having been composed partly by the apostles themselves (St. Matthew and St. John), and partly by their disciples (St. Luke and St. Mark). *Τοῖς ἀπομνημονεύμασι,*



Philo, whose ideas seem to have been known to him and to have influenced him, had already done) availed himself of the ambiguity of the Greek term Logos, which denotes both reason and word. Hence the comparison of the reason which dwells in God (the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος) and the revelation of this reason appearing creatively without—the self-subsistent Word (λόγος προφορικός, the word as it stands related to the thought), by which the ideas of the divine reason are revealed and become actualized. Accordingly, before all creation this Word, so Justin taught, emanated from God (being His self-manifestation), as a personality derived from God's essence, and ever intimately united with Him by this community of essence—a distinction which does not arise out of any necessity of nature, but is brought about by an act of the divine will. The idea of this Logos, as the invisible teacher of the spiritual world, from whom all goodness and truth proceed, Justin employs for the purpose of setting forth Christianity as the central point, where all the hitherto scattered rays of the godlike in humanity converge—the absolute religion, in which all that has been till now fragmentary and disconnected is brought together in a higher unity, and for the purpose of comparing the full and unalloyed revelation of the absolute divine Logos in Christ with the partial and fragmentary revelations—involving opposite aspects of the truth—of truth in the human consciousness, growing from the implanted seed of the Logos, which is of one nature with that eternal, divine reason.\* The same fundamental view we find in others of the apologetical writers; † but in the case of Athenagoras we may notice how, in endeavouring to get rid of everything that savours of Anthropopathism, and in contrasting the spiritually conceived idea of the Son of God with the pagan myths con-

ἃ φημι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀποστόλων καὶ τῶν ἐκείνοις παρακολουθησάντων συντετάχθαι.  
Dial. Tryph. f. 331.

\* Which proceeds from the ἔμφυτον παντὶ γίνεαι ἀνθρώπων σπέρμα τοῦ λόγου, the κατὰ λόγου μέρος, compared with the λογικὸν τὸ ὅλον, πάντα τὰ τοῦ λόγου ὅς ἐστι Χριστός. Apolog. I. f. 48.

† In Athenagoras after the following form: The Logos, as God's indwelling reason, projects the ideas; the Logos, as Word, emanated into self-subsistence, carries them into realization, λόγος ἐν ἰδίᾳ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ—as προελθὼν ἐνεργείᾳ, it is that by which the organized world was formed out of chaos.

cerning sons of deities,\* he is led to express himself on the unity of the divine essence in a way which strikes a middle course between the Monarchian theory and the doctrine of the church in its later and more matured form. It is easy to see how the above-named Monarchians might avail themselves of the authority of such passages to maintain the higher antiquity of their own form of doctrine.

Thus developed this doctrine passed over to the Alexandrian school, where philosophically cultivated minds strove from the first to clear it of all relations of time and analogies of sense, like that drawn from the expression of thoughts in words.† Clement, even at his early date, describes the Logos as the ground-principle of all existence, which is without beginning and timeless.‡ What was taught in the Neo-Platonic school concerning the relation of the second principle, the *νοῦς* living in self-contemplation, the hypostatized ideal world, to the absolute, the *ὄν*, is by him transferred and applied to the relation of the Logos to the Father, although, with his Christian Theistic view of the universe, which was based on the acknowledgment of a living, personal, active God, it was still impossible for him to appropriate to his own purpose the sense which all this possessed in the coherence of that philosophical system.§ The speculative ideas of Neo-Platonism were, in his case, mixed up with Christian notions. As we formerly saw that Clement had introduced into certain philosophical propositions a religious meaning which was foreign from them, so here too we see him striving to find, in the speculative maxims of the Neo-Platonic school upon the

\* The *πρῶτον γέννημα, οὐχ' ὡς γεγόμενον*; for the Father had from all eternity His Logos in Himself.

† In the *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* and *προφορικός*.

‡ "*Ἀχρονος καὶ ἀναρχος ἀρχή, ἀπαρχὴ τῶν ὄντων*. Strom. l. VIII. f. 700. 'H τῶν ὄλων ἀρχὴ ἐπικρίνισται ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου πρώτη καὶ πρὸ αἰώνων. L. c. l. V. f. 565. *Λόγος αἰώνιος*. L. c. l. VII. f. 708.

§ We see this by comparing Clement, Strom. l. IV. f. 537, with Plotinus, Ennead. III. c. 7, seqq. It is true Clement may not have taken anything from Plotinus, who wrote some years later, but we must suppose doctrines of the Neo-Platonic school still older than Plotinus. Clement says, '*Ὁ θεὸς ἀναποδεικτος ὢν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστημονικός*. This answers to the Neo-Platonic maxim concerning a suprarational, intellectual intuition, by which the *νοῦς*, rising above itself, soars to the *ὄν*. So Plotinus says of the *ὄν*, '*Ὑπερβιβηκὸς τοῦτο πῇ τοῦ νοῦ φύσιν, τίνι ἀλίσκοιτο ἐπιβολῇ ἀθεοῦ*'; What Plotinus says of the *νοῦς* as the *ἐνέργεια πρώτη ἐν διεξόδῳ τῶν πάντων*, as the *ἐν πᾶν*, Clement transfers to the Logos.

νοῦς,\* that idea, which growing out of his own Christian consciousness and thought, regarded the unity of the divine life as the foundation of faith, and the negation and schism as the very essence of unbelief. But the Alexandrian school, which sprang out of the germ thus furnished by Clement, was carried out and perfected by Origen, and the influence of his development was long felt in the Eastern church. The leading ideas in it were the following.

There is an original source of all existence, who is to be called God in the absolute sense †—the fountain of divine life and blessedness to a world of spirits, who, as they are allied to him by nature, are also by their communion with him deified and raised above the limits of finite existence. In virtue of this divine life, which flows to them through their communion with the original divine essence, the more exalted spirits may, in a certain sense, be denominated divine beings, gods.‡ But as the αὐτόθεος is the original source of all existence and of all divine life, so the Logos is the necessary intermediate link through which all communication of life from him proceeds. The latter is the focus of all the manifestations of God's glory, its universal, all-embracing irradiation, by whom the partial rays of the divine glory are diffused abroad through the whole world of spirits.§

As there is one original divine essence,|| so there is one

\* Because the λόγος is the πάντα ἐν—τὸ εἰς αὐτὸν καὶ τὸ δι' αὐτοῦ πιστεῦσαι, μοναδικόν ἐστι γίνεσθαι, ἀπερισπάστως ἐνούμενον ἐν αὐτῷ, τὸ δι' ἀπιστήσαι, διστάσαι ἐστὶ καὶ διαστῆναι καὶ μερισθῆναι.

† The ἀπλῶς θεός, αὐτόθεος.

‡ Μετοχῇ τῆς ἐκείνου θεότητος θεοποιούμενοι. Intimately connected with this distinction is Origen's theory of the process of the development of Theism. They occupy the highest position, who have soared to the αὐτόθεος himself; the second, those who believe that they possess in Christ the Supreme God himself (see above); the third, those who are conducted first to some notion of God, by recognising those higher divine essences, the divine intelligences which animate the planets. Origen argues, as Philo had already done, from Deut. iv. 19, a certain necessity of Polytheism, and in particular of Sabeism, in the process of the religious development of mankind, ordained by God: Τῷ τοὺς μὴ δυναμένους ἐπὶ τὴν νοητὴν ἀναδραμεῖν φύσιν, δι' αἰσθητῶν θεῶν κινουμένους περὶ θεότητος, ἀγαπητῶς καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἵστασθαι καὶ μὴ πίπτειν ἐπὶ εἰδωλα καὶ δαιμόνια. See in Joann. T. XII. s. 3.

§ In Joann. T. II. c. 2; T. XXXII. c. 18.

|| The αὐτόθεος.

original divine reason, the absolute reason,\* through which alone the eternal Supreme Being reveals himself to all other existences, to whom He is the source of all truth, the objective, self-subsistent truth itself. Origen considers it highly important to maintain the position that each several rank of reasonable beings, or each several intelligence, has not its own subjective Logos, but that there is but one absolute objective Logos as well as one absolute objective truth for all; the one truth of the consciousness of God, which unites man to all the different orders of the spiritual world. "Every one will at any rate admit," he says, "that truth is one. In regard to this matter none surely will venture to affirm that there is one truth of God, another of angels, and another of men, since, in the nature of the case, there can be but one truth in regard to each one thing. Now, if truth is one, then, in justice, the evolution of truth, which is wisdom, must be conceived as one, inasmuch as all false wisdom comes short of the truth, and cannot properly be called wisdom. But if there is one truth and one wisdom, then the Logos also is one, who reveals truth and wisdom to all such as are capable of receiving it." Although the Logos, however, is by his own nature the absolute one, yet he puts himself into manifold forms and modes of activity, according to the different positions and the different wants of reasonable beings, to whom he becomes whatsoever is necessary for their wellbeing. While the Gnostics made different hypostases out of these different modes of operation of one and the same Redeeming Spirit, Origen reduced these different hypostases to merely different ideas and relations (*ἐπινοίας*); but while he combated these Gnostics, so disposed to give an hypostatic existence to everything, he also opposed the Monarchians, who reduced the Trinity itself simply to so many different relations of one and the same divine essence. He who denied the independent existence of the divine Logos seemed to him to reduce everything to the subjective—to deny the existence of an absolute *objective* truth, to make of this a mere abstraction. There is no truth for created spirits apart from the revelation of the Logos as of Him by whom the consciousness of the world of spirits retains its connection with God. "No one of us," says Origen,† "is possessed of so mean an intellect as

\* The *αὐτόλογος*.

† c. Cels. l. VIII. c. 12.



to suppose that the *essence of truth* \* did not exist before the earthly appearance of Christ."

As Origen explained the several *designations* of the Logos to be symbolical, so he considered it to be also with the name Logos itself. He therefore spoke against those who, availing themselves of the comparison with the λόγος προφορικός, which appeared inadequate to the Alexandrians, argued from the name Logos alone, and thought they might refer to this all passages of the Old Testament where a λόγος was spoken of.† The notion which was associated with this view of an emanation of the Logos to self-subsistent existence before the creation of the world, was, like every other transfer of temporal relations to the Eternal, which Origen combated. One, like Origen, who fixed no beginning to the creation, but supposed it to be eternal, would far less fix any beginning here. He strove to banish all notions of time from the conception of the generation of the Logos. It was necessary here, as he thought, to conceive of a timeless present, an eternal now; and this he supposed to be intimated by the expression "to-day" in the second Psalm.‡

In excluding all notions of time it is also implied, in his opinion, that the generation of the Logos should not be conceived as something which happened once and was then over. Not only the conception of a beginning, but that also of an end, must be carefully excluded—it must be conceived of as a timeless, eternal act. Origen endeavours to render this theogonic process clear by analogy, and with this view compares it with the process according to which the divine life develops itself in believers—the just man not being made by God at once by virtue of the divine life imparted to him, but is continually being generated of God, so that all the good he does proceeds from this generation of the divine life in him.§ With

\* Ἡ τῆς ἀληθείας οὐσία.

† Ἐπὶ συνεχῶς χωρῶνται τῷ ἐξηρεύζατο ἡ καρδιά μου λόγον ἀγαθόν, ψ. xliv. 1, οἰόμενοι προφορὰν πατρικὴν οἰοῦν ἐν συλλαβαῖς κειμένην εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ.

‡ In Joann. I. 32; II. 1.

§ Concerning Christ: "ὅτι οὐχὶ ἐγέννησεν ὁ πατὴρ τὸν υἱὸν καὶ ἀπέλυσεν αὐτὸν ὁ πατὴρ ἀπὸ τῆς γενίσεως αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' αἰὶ γεννᾷ αὐτόν. Concerning the just man: Οὐ γὰρ ἀπαξ ἐρῶ τὸν δίκαιον γεγενῆσθαι, ἀλλ' αἰὶ γεννᾶσθαι καὶ ἐκάστην πρᾶξιν ἀγαθὴν, ἐν ᾗ γεννᾷ τὸν δίκαιον ὁ Θεός. In Jerem. Hom. IX. s. 4.

the glory of God exists also its radiation in the Son; from the light ever goes forth the radiation.\* We should not here forget that Origen was led into this view by his philosophical education in the Platonic school, for he only needed to apply to the relation of the Father to the Logos all that had been taught in this school concerning the relation of the *ὄν* to the *νοῦς*. But here, owing to the difference between his own position and the Neo-Platonic, a question might occur to him. On the latter principle there could be no room for teleological considerations, or of a willing and acting of the absolute; nothing properly had any place here but the necessity of the conception. But it was otherwise with Origen's idea of God the Father: hence the question arises, whether, in reference to the generation of the Logos, he assumed a necessity grounded in the divine essence, or an act perpetrated of free-will. Had he been possessed of the later developed notion of the unity of essence in the Trinity, it would have naturally resulted from this that he would be led to distinguish the eternal generation of the Son, as an immanent act grounded in the divine essence, from a fiat of the divine will as the mediating cause of the creation. But the matter presented itself in a different aspect to Origen in consequence of his principle of subordination, which, strictly taken, excluded such a mode of conception. And this result, to which Origen's principle led, he is said actually to have expressed in his disputation with the Valentinian Candidus, in which he attacked the Gnostic doctrine of emanation. He affirmed that we are not to conceive of a natural necessity in the generation of the Son of God, but, precisely as in the case of creation, we must suppose an act flowing from the divine will; but, in asserting this view, he must at the same time have excluded all *temporal* succession of the different momenta.† From this view of the subject

\* "Ὅσον ἐστὶ τὸ φῶς ποιητικὸν τοῦ ἀπαυγάσματος, ἐπὶ τοσαῦτον γεννᾶται τὸ ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης τοῦ Θεοῦ.

† Jerome says, Habetur Dialogus apud Græcos Origenis et Candidi, Valentiniani hæresis defensoris, in quo repugnat, Dei Filium vel prolatum esse vel natum (the latter he surely could not have denied except so far as it was too sensuously conceived), ne Deus Pater dividatur in partes, sed dicit sublimem et excellentissimam creaturam *voluntate* exstistisse Patris, sicut et cæteras creaturas Hieronym. T. II. contra Rufin. ed. Vallarsi, T. II. p. I. p. 512. Venet. 1767, or ed. Martianay, T. IV. f. 413. We confess the source from which we obtain this is not to be

Origen was also strongly averse to the notion of a generation of the Son of God from the essence of the Father (*γέννησις ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας*), inasmuch as such a theory seemed to him to lead to the supposition of a natural necessity to which the divine essence was subjected — a sensuously conceived emanation, a division of the divine essence.\*

In conformity with the ideas which we have thus set forth, Origen held it to be absolutely necessary to insist on the absolute exaltation and superiority of God the Father, so far as his essence is concerned, above every other existence; as indeed, even as a Platonist, he was accustomed to consider the highest *ὄν* as admitting of comparison with nothing that exists, and exalted in its essence even above the *νοῦς* itself. It appeared to him, therefore, a derogation from the dignity of the first and supreme essence to suppose an equality of essence or unity between him and any other being whatever, not excepting even the Son of God. As the Son of God and the Holy Spirit are incomparably exalted above all other existences, even in the highest ranks of the spiritual world, so high and yet higher is the Father exalted even above them.† This distinction between the essence of the Son of God and that of the Father ‡ was still more strongly insisted on in his opposition to Origen and the Monarchians. As the latter, together with the distinction of substance, denied also that of the person, so it was with Origen a matter of practical moment, on account of the systematic connection of ideas in his philo-

relied on implicitly; for it is uncertain with what degree of care the notes of this disputation were taken down. Many expressions which are here ascribed to Origen do not agree with his mode of thinking or style of language. The definition *above given*, however, as must be evident, is well supported by Origen's system; and it is easy to see that he would have been led to state this in so express terms only when driven to it in opposing the doctrines of a sensuous emanation-theory, or of natural necessity.

\* Against those who erroneously explained the passage, John viii. 44, as referring to the generation of the Logos, he says, in Joann. T. XX. s. 16: "Ἄλλοι δὲ τὸ ἐξῆλθον ἀπὸ Θεοῦ, διηγήσαντο ἀντὶ τοῦ γεγεννημαὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ, οἷς ἀκολουθεῖ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας φάσκειν τοῦ πατρὸς γεγεννησθαι τὸν υἱόν, οἷον μισοῦμένου καὶ λείποντος τῆς οὐσίας, ἢ πρότερον εἶχε, δόγματα ἀνθρώπων, μὴδ' ὅναρ φύσιν ἀόρατον καὶ ἀσώματον πεφαντασμένων.

† In Joann. T. XIII. s. 25.

‡ The doctrine of a *εἰτερότης* τῆς οὐσίας, in the dispute against the *μοούσιον*.

sophical system of Christianity, to maintain in opposition to them the personal independence of the Logos. Sometimes, in this controversy, he distinguishes between *unity of substance* and personal unity, or unity of subject, so that it only concerned him to controvert the latter.\* And this certainly was the point of greatest practical moment to him; and he must have been well aware that many of the fathers who contended for a *personal* distinction held firmly at the same time to a *unity of substance*. But, according to the internal connection of his own system, both fell together; wherever he spoke, therefore, from the position of that system, he affirmed at one and the same time the *ἐτερότης τῆς οὐσίας* and the *ἐτερότης τῆς ὑποστάσεως* or τοῦ ὑποκειμένου.†

From this doctrine he drew the practical inference, that we are bound to pray to the Father alone, and not to the Son. And from this we are able to see what a strong practical interest the Patripassians (whom Origen accused of knowing only the Son, without being able to elevate themselves to the Father) must have had to controvert such a system. But still, even on the grounds of his own philosophical system of Christian ideas, Christ was to Origen the way, the truth, and the life, as he expressed it with full conviction. He knew of no other way to the Father; no other source of truth; no other spring of divine life for all creatures but Him: He was the mirror, through which St. Paul and St. Peter, and all who were like them, saw God.‡ He says that the Gnostics may be allowed to be right in a certain sense, when they affirm that the Father was first revealed by Christ. Until then men had no other knowledge of God than as the Creator and Lord of the world, since it was first through the Son they came to the knowledge of Him as their Father; and it was by the spirit of adoption which they received from Him they were first enabled to address God as their Father.§ Christ was to Him the Mediator from whom alone Christians derive their

\* In Joann. T. X. against those who said "Εν, οὐ μόνον οὐσία, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑποκειμένῳ τυγχάνειν ἀμφοτέρους.

† In Joann. T. II. s. 2. De orat. c. 15: Κατ' οὐσίαν καὶ κατ' ὑποκείμενον ἔστιν ὁ υἱὸς ἕτερος τοῦ πατρός.

‡ In Joann. T. XIII. s. 25.

§ In Joann. T. XIX. s. 1. vol. VI. f. 286, ed. de la Rue; T. II. p. 146, ed. Lommatzsch.



communion with God; to whom they should constantly refer their Christian consciousness, and in whose name and through whom they should always pray to God the Father. He says,

Why may we not, in the sense of Him who said, 'Wherefore callest thou me good? there is none good but one, that is God,' also say, 'Why prayest thou to me? Thou shouldst pray to the Father alone, to whom I also pray. As you learn from the holy scriptures, you are not to pray *to* the High Priest ordained for you by the Father, *to* him who has received it from the Father to be your Advocate and Intercessor; but you must pray *through* the High Priest and the Intercessor, through Him who can be touched with your infirmities, having been tempted in all points like as ye are, yet, by the gift of God, without sin. Learn, then, what a gift you have received from my Father, when, by your new birth in me, ye have received the spirit of adoption, that ye might be called sons of God, and my own brethren.'\*

We have already remarked that Origen unfolded and matured his doctrine of the Logos in the controversy with the two classes of the Monarchians; and the systematic foundation which he gave to this doctrine could not fail to call forth on the other hand a reaction from the Monarchian party; for his views, as must appear evident from the exhibition of his system, were hardly suited to remove the scruples they entertained against the doctrine of the hypostatical Logos, in a way which would be satisfactory to *them*. But Monarchianism, in order to maintain itself, now assumed a new shape. Amid the strifes of the two classes there arose a conciliatory tendency.† It proceeded from those who agreed with the Monarchians in contending against the doctrine of a hypostatical, subordinate Logos, but whose *Christian* zeal was dissatisfied with the way

\* De orat. c. 15.

† In opposition to Dr. Baur, who denies the existence of any such third class of Monarchians, I must once more affirm that the phenomena presented in this portion of history could not possibly be understood without the supposition of such a conciliatory tendency; and that Beryllus of Bostra, as its forerunner, must take the place which belongs to him, between the above-named two classes of the Monarchians and Sabellius. I add, that neither the strictures of Dr. Ullmann, in his *Hallischen Weihnachtsprogramm*, v. J. 1835, in the *Studien und Kritiken*, J. 1836, 4tes Stück, S. 1073, nor those of Dr. Baur, in his *History of the Doctrine of the Trinity*, are of such force as to induce me to abandon the views which I have long held.

in which the first class of the Monarchians contemplated Christ relatively to other enlightened teachers, and who also felt constrained to ascribe to Him a specific divine nature, but who at the same time, as their reason was not content to put aside all difficulties by appealing to the incomprehensibility of the subject, must have felt themselves repelled by the Patripassian hypothesis of an incarnation of God the Father himself. Accordingly a new theory was started concerning the person of Christ intermediate between that which ascribed to Him too much and that which conceded to Him too little. It was not the whole infinite essence of God the Father which dwelt in Him, but a certain efflux from the divine essence; and a certain influx of the same into human nature was what constituted the personality of Christ. It was not before his temporal appearance, but only subsequently thereto, that he first subsisted as a distinct person beside the Father. This personality resulted from the hypostatizing of a divine power. And here we must not suppose, as the first class of Monarchians taught, a distinct human person, like one of the prophets, placed from the beginning under a special divine influence; but this personality was itself something specifically divine, produced by a new creative communication of God to human nature, by a sinking as it were of the divine essence into the limits of the latter. Hence in Christ the divine and the human are united together; hence He is the Son of God in a sense in which no other being is. As notions derived from the theory of emanation were in this period still widely diffused; as, even in the church's way of apprehending the incarnation of the Logos, the doctrine of a reasonable human soul in Christ was still but imperfectly unfolded (it being by Origen, as we shall presently see, that this doctrine was first distinctly developed in the general theology of the Eastern church): under these circumstances, therefore, a theory which thus substituted the divine, which the Father communicated from His own essence, in the place of the human soul in Christ, could gain the easier admittance. If we transport ourselves back into the midst of the process whereby the doctrines of Christianity became unfolded before the consciousness and into the very midst of the conflict of opposite opinions in this period, we shall find it very easy to understand how a modified theory of this sort came to be formed.

It belongs also to the peculiarity of this new modification of Monarchianism, that it spoke of an ideal being of Christ, a being in the divine idea, or predestination, before his temporal appearance. Certainly they who expressed themselves *thus* did not wish to deny that the same could be said of the relation of God's universal plan to everything that appears in the succession of time. On the contrary, when they prominently insisted on this point in reference to Christ's manifestation in particular, they must have connected therewith some peculiar meaning. Without doubt they meant to mark thereby the importance which the manifestation of Christ held in the accomplishment of the divine plan of the universe, as being the end and central point of all; and also to mark the necessity of such manifestation, in order to the realization of the divine ideas. And by virtue of their peculiar mode of apprehending the essence and the origin of Christ's personality, they might certainly ascribe to it this significancy. To this, then, they would also refer those passages of the New Testament which speak of Christ's being with the Father before his temporal appearance.

The first who took a conciliatory position of this sort was Beryllus, bishop of Bostra, in Arabia, a man well known in his times as one of the more learned teachers of the church.\*

\* See Euseb. l. VI. c. 20. His doctrine is described by Eusebius in the somewhat obscure passage in l. VI. c. 33: *Τὸν κύριον μὴ προϋφιστάναι κατ' ἰδίαν οὐσίας περιγραφὴν πρὸ τῆς εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἐπιδημίας*. In the interpretation of these words I must agree, on one point, with Baur, and differ from Schleiermacher, in his well-known dissertation on the Monarchians, and also from Ullmann, and maintain that *περιγραφὴ* certainly does not denote a circumscription of the divine essence; but (as I have already explained, and, also, as I believe, proved, in the first edition of this work) it means, in the scientific language of Origen, nothing else than a personal, individual existence, as contradistinguished from a barely ideal existence, or a mere distinction of the understanding. Compare, *e. g.*, in Joann. T. I. s. 42, where the *εἶναι κατ' ἰδίαν περιγραφὴν* is opposed to the *εἶναι* barely *κατ' ἐπίνοιαν ἔτερον*, the *ἀνυπόστατον*. The words then imply that Christ, before his appearance in humanity, had no self-subsistent, personal existence. Thus, then, at this time he could be different from the Father only *κατ' ἐπίνοιαν*, or have only an ideal being. This marks the opposition to the doctrine of the hypostatical Logos, and also to the doctrine of the Patripassians; for, according to the latter, there was not in Christ, even when he appeared on the earth, any *οὐσία κατ' ἰδίαν περιγραφὴν ἑτέρα*, in relation to the essence of the Father. But we must now bring in also the second part of the description:



The peculiar modification of the Monarchian doctrine which he presented having excited controversy, in the year 244 *μηδὲ μὴν θεότητα ἰδίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἐμπολιτευομένην αὐτῷ μόνην τὴν πατρικὴν.* Baur's explanation of this passage, in which he professes to adhere to the etymological and original meaning of the word *πολιτεύειν*, I cannot but regard as arbitrary and artificial. According to the use of language in that period, and according to the context, the word denotes certainly, to me, the notion of *indwelling*. Now such an expression would assert too much, if it was meant to denote simply a certain *inworking* of God upon a human being under His special influence. These words would rather characterize the Patripassian view, which, however, we cannot suppose to be here meant, on account of the preceding proposition. We must, then, seek for some hypothesis which may hold the middle place between the two views above mentioned. And this is the case with that which is presented in the text. Why should Eusebius waste so many words, if he meant simply to attribute to Beryllus a theory akin to that of the Artemonites? He would doubtless in this case, as in that of the doctrine of Paul of Samosata, have expressed himself with much more heat and acrimony. I must therefore decidedly object to Baur's view, according to which, moreover, it would be impossible to point out any difference between the doctrine of Beryllus and that of the Artemonites. We must next compare what, in his Commentary on the Epistle of Titus, Origen says concerning the Monarchians, which had a striking resemblance to the above-quoted language of Eusebius; it has, however, unhappily, come down to us only in the Latin version of Rufinus: *Qui hominem dicunt Dominum Jesum præcognitum et prædestinatum, qui ante adventum carnalem substantialiter et proprie non exstiterit, sed quod homo natus Patris solam in se habuerit Deitatem.* True, one might suppose, since the others whom he describes in the second member of the sentence are Patripassians, (see the passages cited above, p. 295, note †,) that the same class of Monarchians are here meant as in the passages quoted above (p. 292, note ‡, beginning at line 7); but, on the other hand, it is to be considered that Origen's words denote higher views of the divine element in Christ than we can attribute to the first class of Monarchians, and that Origen would doubtless have expressed himself more strongly against these, and also that he had already spoken before of those who held Christ to be a *mere man*, and therefore would not have repeated it. We find in these words, then, a confirmation of our views. And, if it may be presumed that Beryll did not admit a human soul in Christ, distinct from the indwelling of the divine nature, I do not see why we are not warranted in connecting here with the report of Socrates (III. c. 7) that the synod convened against Beryll settled the doctrine concerning a human soul in Christ. A doctrine so determined always leads us to infer its opposite as the means by which it was distinctly brought out. And since, in the case of Origen, his doctrine of the Logos was so closely connected with his doctrine concerning the human soul of Christ, it becomes so much the more probable that both were united also in his polemical labours. Thus we must reckon Beryll with those who held Christ to be a *ἐν πάντ' ἁσύνθετον.* Orig. in Matth. T. XVI. s. 8.



a synod convened for the purpose of settling the matter in dispute. The great Origen, then residing at Cæsarea Stratonis, in Palestine, was invited to be present as the most important advocate of the opposite doctrine of the Logos. He disputed with Beryll at great length, and, probably by his intellectual superiority, argumentative skill, and moderation, succeeded in convincing the latter of his error. True we here follow the account of Eusebius, one of Origen's enthusiastic friends; and, as we have not access to the documents from which Eusebius drew his account, we are unable to form an unbiassed and independent judgment of our own. Yet we should give due weight to the fact that at this period, when as yet there was no *religion nor church of the state*, there existed no earthly power which *could force* Beryllus to recant; though the authority of the episcopal body had great—indeed too great—power over the churches. But had it been the purpose of the bishops to crush their colleague by the weight of numbers, they needed not to have called to their aid a presbyter who was not only an exile, but also labouring under the charge of heresy, and whose only power was in his knowledge. Nor was Origen a man who would be disposed to overwhelm another by the weight of his name or the superiority of his intellect.

Indeed it is men of the Alexandrian school alone who furnish us the rare example of theological conferences which, instead of resulting in still greater divisions, lead to a union of feelings. Such was the influence of men who were not slaves to the mere letter, and who knew how to unite with zeal for truth the spirit of love and moderation.

According to Jerome's account,\* Beryllus addressed a letter of thanks to Origen for the instruction he had received from him. We have no reasons for doubting this; yet the account of Jerome is not so much to be relied on as that of Eusebius.

If the intermediate tendency of Beryllus was thus obliged to yield under the preponderance of the other system, yet we soon observe a similar attempt, conceived and carried out in a still more systematic form. Sabellius of Ptolemais, in Pentapolis of Africa, who proceeded still farther in the path opened out by Beryllus, appears to have been the most original and pro-

\* De vir. illustr. c. 60.

found thinker among the Monarchians. Unhappily we have only a few fragments of his system, from which when we seek to reconstruct the whole, not a little will ever remain doubtful or obscure. Since Schleiermacher's profound dissertation on this subject, the opinion has gained ground that Sabellius, in one respect especially, indicates an important advance in the development of the Monarchian theory. While, for instance, the early Monarchian tendencies agreed with the doctrinal system of the Logos in this respect, that they considered the name of God the Father to be a designation of the primal divine essence, but all besides to be derivative, Sabellius, on the other hand, referred all the three names of the Trinity to relations wholly coördinate. The names Father, Logos,\* and Holy Ghost, would, according to him, be in like manner designations of three different phases, under which the one divine essence reveals itself. All the three were joined together in order to designate, in a manner which exhausted the whole truth, the relation of God to the world. There would thus be a general antithesis between the Absolute, the essence of God in himself, the *μονάς*, which must be regarded as the pure designation of the Absolute, of the *ὄν*; and the Trinity, by which would be denoted the different relations of the self-evolving *μονάς* to the creation. We have, it is true, several sayings of Sabellius, from which one might infer that he distinguished God the Father, as well as the Logos and the Holy Ghost, from the *μονάς* in itself; as, for instance, when he taught that the Monad unfolded became the Trinity.† But in other places he clearly identified the Father with the *μονάς*, and considered him as the fundamental divine subject, which, when hidden within himself, was the pure Monas (the *ὄν*), and, when revealing himself, unfolded his essence to a Trinity, as he expressly says, "The Father remains the

\* Or, according to Baur's view, "Son."

† Ἡ μονὰς πλατυνθεῖσα γίνεται τριάς. Athanas. orat. IV. c. Arian. s. 13. We may especially advert to the fact, that the question occurred even to Athanasius, whether Sabellius did not distinguish the *μονάς* from the Father. Ἐκτὸς εἰ μὴ ἡ λεγομένη παρ' αὐτῷ μονὰς ἄλλο τί ἐστι παρὰ τὸν πατέρα.—'Ὅστι εἶναι μονάδα, εἴτα καὶ πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν καὶ πνεῦμα. But as Athanasius, in this place, is only aiming to show Sabellius that, conceive of the matter as he might, he must still find that he fell into absurdities, we ought not to lay too much stress on this imputation of consequences, in order to determine the doctrine really taught by him.]

same, but evolves himself in the Son and Spirit.”\* It is this only that distinguishes Sabellius from the other Monarchians—he received the whole Trinity, and, with the rest, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, into his Monarchian theory.

Sabellius endeavoured to illustrate, by various comparisons, the way in which the one divine essence comes to be called by different names, according to the different relations or modes of activity into which it enters. What the Apostle St. Paul says of the relation of the many operations and gifts to the one Spirit, who, abiding in his oneness, exhibits himself notwithstanding in these manifold forms, was by Sabellius transferred to the self-evolution of the Monad into the Triad.† That which is in itself, and continues to be, one in its manifestation, presents itself as threefold. He seems to have made use of an illustration drawn from the sun in these words:—“As in the sun we may distinguish its proper substance,‡ its round shape, and its power of communicating warmth and light, so may we distinguish in God his proper self-subsistent essence, the illuminating power of the Logos, and the power of the Holy Spirit, in diffusing the warmth and glow of life through the hearts of believers.”§ Adopting the language of the church as to “three persons” (*tres personæ*, *τρία πρόσωπα*), he took it in quite a different sense—to denote different parts or personifications, which the one divine essence

\* ‘Ο πατήρ ὁ αὐτός μὲν ἐστὶ, πλατύνεται δὲ εἰς υἱὸν καὶ πνεῦμα. Athanas. orat. IV. s. 25. I do not see with what propriety it can be asserted that here Athanasius has not allowed Sabellius to use his own language, but has imputed to him a mode of expression to which he was a stranger. Even when Sabellius designates the Father as one of the *πρόσωπα*, it by no means follows, as some have asserted, that he could not have employed this name also to designate the *μονάς*. The same name which designates the *ὢν* in itself serves also to distinguish it from the different phases of its self-manifestation and self-communication. In its relation to the other *ἐπινοίαι* under which God is conceived, the one which designates originally God’s essence in itself is also the name of a particular *ἐπίνοια*, different from the others. When God speaks as the *ὢν*, this too is a *πρόσωπον*, in which he presents himself.

† “Ὅσπερ διαιρέσεις χαρισμάτων εἰσὶ, τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα, οὕτω καὶ ὁ πατήρ ὁ αὐτός ἐστι, πλατύνεται δὲ εἰς υἱὸν καὶ πνεῦμα. Athanas. orat. IV. s. 25.

‡ The *ὢν*, the *μονάς*.

§ Epiphan. hæres. 62. I leave it undetermined whether Sabellius made use of the illustration of the *trichotomy* of man’s nature—body, soul, and spirit. It seems to me unlike his usual subtle manner.

assumed according to varying circumstances and occasions. According as God was to be represented as acting in this or that particular way, so, he argued, would the same one subject be introduced in the sacred scriptures, under different personifications,\* as Father, Son, or Spirit.†

According to this theory, the self-development of the divine Essence, proceeding forth from the unity of its solitary, absolute being, is the ground and principle of the whole creation. The self-declaring of the Supreme Being—the ὢν becoming Logos ‡—is the ground of all existence. Hence, says Sabel-

\* It is plain from Sabellius's language that this was the only sense that he attached to the term *πρόσωπον*. The word, however, has sometimes been taken in the signification of "countenance," and in this sense applied to explain the ideas of Sabellius; but I must object to this as arbitrary and unwarranted.

† 'Ενα μὲν εἶναι τῇ ὑποστάσει τὸν Θεόν, προσωποῦνται δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς γραφῆς, διαφόρως, κατὰ τὸ ἰδίωμα τῆς ὑποκειμένης ἐκάστοτε χρείας, καὶ νῦν μὲν τὰς πατρικὰς αὐτῶ, περιτιθεῖναι φανᾶς, ὅταν τούτου καιρὸς ᾗ τοῦ πορώπου, νῦν δὲ τὰς, υἱᾶς προεποῦσας, νῦν δὲ τὸ τοῦ πνεύματος ὑποδύεσθαι προσωπεῖον. Basil. ep. 214, s. 3. Τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόστασιν πρὸς τὴν ἐκάστοτε παρεμπιπτούσαν χρείαν μετασχηματίζεσθαι. Ep. 235, s. 6. Τὸν αὐτὸν Θεὸν ἓνα τῶ ὑποκειμένῳ ὄντι, πρὸς τὰς ἐκάστοτε παραπιπτούσας χρείας μεταμορφούμενον, νῦν μὲν ὡς πατέρα, νῦν δὲ ὡς υἱόν, νῦν ὡς τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα διαλέγεσθαι. Ep. 210.

‡ We may here notice the theory of Dr. Baur. He maintains that Sabellius did not consider the Logos to constitute one of the *πρόσωπα* of the Triad, but conceived this notion as holding an altogether different relation to the Godhead. The Logos, according to Baur, would only denote what stood opposed to the pure being of deity in itself—the principle which supported and maintained this being in the form of an actual, concrete existence. It is first of all and only in this divine being, when become an actual, concrete existence, that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost constitute three coördinate designations, exhausting the whole sphere of this being, and corresponding to the three momenta, or periods of the universe, in its historical development. Hence, again, they would not subsist simultaneously, but follow one after the other; so that, when the *πρόσωπον* of the Son made its appearance in Christ, the *πρόσωπον* of the Father, which belonged to the Old-Testament period, would disappear; and, in like manner, the Holy Spirit would take the place of the Son when the latter disappeared. But I cannot possibly admit that this ingenious combination correctly represents the theory. On the contrary, it would be quite contrary to the whole analogy of the opinions and modes of thinking in this period to suppose that the notion of the Logos was thought to be independent of that of the Father, and even prior to it. And in the language of Sabellius himself all those expressions relating to a *γενῆναι*, a *προβάλλειν* of the Logos, refer, without doubt, to the presupposed notion of the Father. Baur appeals, it is true, to the words of Sabellius already cited (in note †), where a



lius, "God silent, is inactive—but speaking, is active."\* But especially in the human soul did he recognise a symbol of the divine Logos. So Philo maintained that no created existence can resemble the *ὄν*, but that the soul was created after the image of the Logos. The condition, then, of the soul's existence was, that God broke silence—the *ὄν* became Logos, or that he caused the Logos to proceed from him—begat the Logos from himself. Hence Sabellius could say, in reference to mankind, "To the end that we might be created, the Logos came forth from God (or was begotten); and, because he came forth from God, we exist."†

But when these souls, by sinning, swerved from their true destination, which was to represent the image of the divine Logos, it became necessary for the archetypal Logos himself to descend into human nature in order to realize and perfect the image of God in humanity, and to redeem the souls which are akin to him. In his views as to the person of Christ Sabellius coincides with Beryllus. The remarks we made on the doctrine of the latter apply also to that of the former. It is in Christ that the Logos was first hypostatized, but only in

*διαλέγισθαι* is attributed as well to the Father, as such, as to the other *πρόσωπα*, and is represented as common to all the three *πρόσωπα*. But manifestly this *διαλέγισθαι* has no reference to the proper notion of the Logos. The author in that passage is treating simply of the different parts or personifications under which the same divine subject is introduced in the sacred scriptures, speaking sometimes as the Father, sometimes as the Son (which here indeed is not, in the sense of Sabellius, identified with the Logos absolutely), and sometimes as the Holy Spirit. The Logos, therefore, may well be regarded as one of the three *πρόσωπα*. Again, according to the scheme of Sabellius, the transition from the Monad to the Triad begins with the *πλατύνισθαι* of the *ὄν*. But the *πλατύνισθαι* is necessarily connected with the generation of the Logos. At this point, then, a separation into the several *πρόσωπα* must be already supposed. And if the notion of the Logos was intended to designate the universal sphere to which all the three *πρόσωπα* belong, there would be an incongruity in conceiving the Logos and the Son as correlative notions, and in ascribing the incarnation to the Logos in particular.

\* *Τὸν Θεὸν σιωπῶντα μὲν ἀνενέργητον, λαλοῦντα δὲ ἰσχύειν.* Athanas. orat. IV. s. 11.

† *ἵνα ἡμεῖς κτισθῶμεν, προῆλθεν ὁ λόγος, καὶ προελθόντος αὐτοῦ ἴσμεν.* Athanas. orat. IV. s. 25; or, *Δι' ἡμᾶς γιγίννηται, προεβλήθη.* L. c. s. 11. The words would give another sense, if we chose to understand them as referring to the *καινὴ κτίσις*, and to the incarnation of the Logos. But taking them as they read, and as they are cited by Athanasius, the meaning ascribed to them above must be regarded as the most natural.

a transient form of manifestation. The divine power of the Logos appropriated to itself a human body, and begat by this appropriation the person of Christ. We may compare this theory of Sabellius with the doctrine taught by a class of Jewish theologians, who held that, like the sun with his rays, so God caused to proceed from himself and then withdrew again his power of manifestation, or the Logos; in other words, that the Angelophanies and Theophanies of the Old Testament are nothing else than different transitory forms of manifestation of this one power of God.\* In a similar manner Sabellius conceived of the Theophany in the manifestation of Christ. He made use of the same image: God caused the power of the Logos to go forth from him as a ray from the sun, and then withdrew it again into himself.†

When Sabellius expressed himself in strict accordance with his system he applied the name Son of God to the personality resulting from the hypostatizing of the Logos.‡ The Logos in himself was only Logos; it was upon his humanization that he first became the Son of God.§ But though it was the original doctrine of Sabellius that the term Son of God was not to be applied to the Logos in himself, but only to Christ, yet the adherents of this system (as appears from the quotations of Athanasius), explained themselves differently on this point. Either, they said, the man into whom the Logos entered, but not the Logos, was the Son of God; || or, both taken together, that which resulted from the union of the human nature with the Logos was the Son of God; ¶ or, again, the Logos itself, so far as it was hypostatized in the manner described, was

\* Dial. c. Tryph. Jud. f. 358. As the light issues from and returns back to the sun, οὕτως ὁ πατήρ, ὅταν βούληται, δύναμιν αὐτοῦ προκηδῶν ποιεῖ, καὶ ὅταν βούληται, πάλιν ἀναστέλλει εἰς ἑαυτόν.

† Ὡς ὑπὸ ἡλίου περιφθεῖσθαι ἀκτῖνα, καὶ πάλιν εἰς τὸν ἥλιον ἀναδραμοῦσαν. Epiphan. hæres. 62.

‡ It was somewhat different, when (perhaps by way of accommodation to the church terminology), speaking of a generation of the Logos, he styled him the Son in a certain figurative and improper sense.

§ Ἐν ἀρχῇ μὲν εἶναι λόγον ἀπλῶς· ὅτε δὲ ἐνηνδρώπησιν, τότε ὠνομάσθαι υἱόν· πρὸ γὰρ τῆς ἐπιφανείας μὴ εἶναι υἱόν, ἀλλὰ λόγον μόνον· καὶ ὥσπερ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ, ἐγένετο, οὐκ ἂν πρότερον σὰρξ, οὕτως ὁ λόγος υἱὸς γέγονε, οὐκ ἂν πρότερον υἱός. Athanas. orat. IV. s. 22.

|| Τὸν ἀνθρώπον, ὃν ἐφόρησεν ὁ λόγος, αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ — τὸν μονογενῆ, καὶ μὴ λόγον, υἱόν. L. c. s. 20.

¶ Συνεμμένα ἀμφότερα υἱός. L. c. s. 21.

styled the Son of God. All these three modes of expression might doubtless flow out of one system. Again: by reason of this connection of ideas, it might too be said, the Logos is called the Son of God, not in respect to essence, but only in reference to a certain relation.\*

It follows from the whole context of this system that in it the personality of Christ could not be regarded as possessed of an eternal subsistence, but only as a transitory manifestation. The ultimate end of all is thus fixed by Sabellius: the Logos, after having conducted to perfection the souls created in his image, was to return to his original being, into oneness with the Father † — the *τρίας* would again resolve itself into the *μονάς*.‡ Whence it necessarily follows, that, when everything has reached this ultimate end, God once more resumes into Himself the power of the Logos, which had been hypostatized into a self-subsistent, personal existence, and thereupon this personal existence is itself annihilated.

The question, however, now arises, whether it was not the opinion of Sabellius that, after Christ had accomplished his work on the earth, God, upon His ascension to heaven, forthwith reabsorbed this ray which had flowed from Himself to constitute the personality of Christ. The manner in which Epiphanius represents the doctrine seems to favour this view. For he says that, according to this theory, after the Son had accomplished all that was necessary for the salvation of mankind, he was carried up again to heaven, like a ray of light flowing from the sun and returning to it again.§ The comparison of this statement with the above-mentioned doctrine of the Jewish sect respecting the Theophanies, where a similar image is employed, would seem to confirm this view. And we may suppose some such connection of ideas as this: after God had resumed into Himself the personifying power of the Logos, then the quickening of believers distinctly and individually by the divine power in the form of the Holy

\* Κατ' ἐπίνοιαν υἱὸν λέγεσθαι τὸν λόγον. Athanas. orat. IV. s. 8.

† Δι' ἡμᾶς γηγένηται, καὶ μεθ' ἡμᾶς ἀνατρέχει, ἵνα ᾗ, ὥσπερ ἦν. L. c. s. 12.

‡ L. c. s. 25.

§ Περμφθίντα τὸν υἱὸν καιρῷ ποτε, ὥσπερ ἀκτῖνα, καὶ ἐργασάμενον τὰ πάντα ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τὰ τῆς οἰκονομίας τῆς εὐαγγελικῆς καὶ σωτηρίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀναληφθέντα δὲ αὐθις εἰς οὐρανὸν, ὡς ὑπὸ ἡλίου πεμφθεῖσαν ἀκτῖνα, καὶ πάλιν εἰς τὸν ἥλιον ἀναδραμοῦσαν.



Spirit was to take the place of the former. When, however, we consider that Sabellius appears to describe the *ἐπίνοια* of the Son of God, which the Logos had assumed, as something permanent, something which was to end only when this entire *πλατυσμός*, whereby the Monad had become Triad, should cease—when, *i. e.*, the purpose which the whole was to subserve had been attained\*—we are disposed rather to conclude that his opinion was, that the person of Christ would only cease to exist with this final consummation. Although Epiphanius entertained a different opinion, yet this may have arisen from his not understanding exactly the true sense of what Sabellius had said respecting the ultimate purpose of the redemption.† This will explain, too, how Sabellius could join in the anathema pronounced on such as believed not in the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost,‡ for he considered all the three *πρόσωπα* as continuing until that final consummation. But the question still arises, how, if Sabellius defined the evolution of the Monad to the Triad to be something which preceded the appearance of Christianity, he could apply this to the Holy Spirit, since, according to his opinion, the communication of the Holy Spirit is only a consequence of the redemption accomplished by the hypostatized Logos. But we may perhaps assume that he supposed a certain operation of the Holy Spirit even in the ante-Christian period, and particularly under the Old Testament dispensation; and then we may perhaps ascribe to him some such connection of ideas as this: The ante-Christian operation of the divine Spirit holds the same relation to the operation of the same Spirit which is owing to the personal manifestation of the Son of God, or to that which is to be entitled the Holy Spirit in the stricter

\* *Τῆς χρείας πληρωθείσης.* Athanas. orat. IV. s. 25.

† After this statement we may understand why Dionysius of Alexandria (Euseb. l. VII. c. 6) accused Sabellius of many blasphemies against God the Father (for in this light such an expression as the *expansion* of the divine Monad into the Triad must have appeared to the Origenists), of great unbelief with regard to the incarnation of the Logos (inasmuch as he looked upon it only in the light of a transitory manifestation of the divine power), and of great insensibility (*ἀναισθησία*) in respect to the Holy Spirit (because he denied his reality and objectivity, and had represented him as nothing more than single transitory emanations of divine power).

‡ According to Arnobii conflictus cum Serapione. Bibl. patr. Lugd. T. VIII.



sense, as the operation of the Logos in itself,\* under the Old Testament dispensation, holds to the operation of the Son of God under the New Testament dispensation. We may here refer to the remarks we lately made† concerning those who are said to have distinguished the Holy Spirit by which the apostles were inspired from the Spirit of God in the prophets. And thus the Triad of Sabellius would possess also an historical significancy, having some reference to the succession of events. At the legal stage, where a wide gulf divides God and mankind, God reveals Himself as the Father. In the Old Testament, therefore, there is found along with this the preparatory agency of the Logos and the Spirit, which operated until the Logos hypostatized himself in Christ and became the Son of God; and by virtue of this intimate union of God with humanity, the Spirit of God also becomes a real, individual, animating principle in the human personalities which it takes possession of.‡

The ultimate end, then, was considered by Sabellius to be the restoration of the original unity—that God, as the absolutely one, should be all in all; in which sense, probably, he interpreted the words in 1 Corinth. xv. 28. But, in this case, what were his views respecting the continued duration of the separate created existences? Did he suppose that at length all existence, as it had been begotten from God through the mediation of the Logos, would at the close of this mediation return back into God, and that then no existence would any longer subsist beside Him? Since the Christian belief of a personal and eternal life rests on the belief in the eternal duration of the personality of Christ, we might conclude that, as Sabellius made Christ's personality to be a mere transitory appearance, he must have held similar views also of all personal existence. And, in general, he who has not felt that all personal existence, by its very nature, can only be something subsisting for eternity—he who can make up his mind to

\* "In the Old Testament," said Sabellius, "no mention is made of the Son of God, but only of the Logos" (*μὴ εἰρῆσθαι ἐν τῇ παλαιᾷ περι τοῦ υἱοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ λόγου*). Athanas. orat. IV. s. 23, which perhaps would lead us also to presume a peculiarity in his mode of explaining passages in the Old Testament.

† P. 300, note †, and the passage there quoted from Origen's Commentary on the Epistle to Titus.

‡ See Theodoret. fab. hæret. II. c. 9.

regard *any* personal existence, and especially the most perfect of all, as nothing more than an ephemeral appearance, will soon come to conclude the same of *all* personal existence. The pantheistic element which lies under such a mode of apprehension may easily push him further. Athanasius\* saw that these consequences would follow from the system of Sabellius. But as Athanasius himself, though the warm opponent of this system, only signalizes this as a consequence flowing from it, and does not by any means charge it upon Sabellius as a position actually maintained by him, we should be far less warranted in ascribing to him such a pantheistic denial of immortality, which assuredly would have been severely reprov'd by his Christian contemporaries. However, this, the first shaping of Monarchianism, which was at least in some degree akin to the pantheistic tendency, remains at all events a noticeable historical phenomenon.

It is true we need no outward cause to account for the origin of such a system, springing as it did from a mind so speculative as we must suppose that of Sabellius to have been. But since this system presents so many points of resemblance to the Alexandrian-Jewish theology, the statement of Epiphanius that Sabellius borrowed his system from an apocryphal gospel derived from the same locality (the εὐαγγέλιον κατ' Αἰγυπτίους†) deserves examination.

In this gospel Christ is said to have communicated to his disciples, as a doctrine of esoteric wisdom, some similar notions on the relation of the Monad to the Triad:—"If the multitude, who cannot rise to the conception of the highest, simple unity, hold God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost to be different divine beings, *they* should be taught, on the other hand, that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are but *one*, being only three different forms of manifestation of the same divine essence."‡ Moreover, the doctrine akin to the pantheistic

\* Εἰ ἵνα ἡμῖς κτισθῶμεν, προῆλθεν ὁ λόγος, καὶ προελθόντος αὐτοῦ ἴσμεν, δῆλον ὅτι ἀναχωροῦντος αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸν πατέρα, οὐκ ἐστὶ ἰσόμοιθα. Athanas. orat. IV. s. 25. Παλινδρομοῦντος τοῦ λόγου, οὐχ' ὑπάρξει ἡ κτίσις. L. c. s. 25.

† Exhibition of the gospel history according to the Egyptian (the Alexandrian) tradition.

‡ Epiphanius, hæres. 62. Concerning this gospel: 'Εν αὐτῷ γὰρ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα ὡς ἐν παραβύστῃ μυστηριωδῶς ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ σωτῆρος ἀναφίεσθαι, ὡς αὐτοῦ δηλοῦντος τοῖς μαθηταῖς, τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι πατέρα, τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι υἱόν, τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι ἅγιον πνεῦμα. For explanation we may refer to the

element of Sabellianism, viz. that all contrarieties will be finally resolved into unity, seems to have been set forth in this gospel; for to the question of Salome, when his kingdom should come, Christ replies, "When two shall be one, and the outer as the inner, and the male with the female; when there shall be no male and no female."

Soon after Sabellius we see Monarchianism revived in an opposite form by *Paul of Samosata*, bishop of Antioch. With the single exception that he admitted the doctrine of the Logos, though modified in accordance with his own system, he had little or nothing peculiar to distinguish him from the Artemonites, with whom indeed he was usually compared by ancient writers.\* But it is worth while to notice the contrast which these two forms of Monarchianism (resulting out of the evolution of the doctrine of the Trinity in this period) present to each other, not only in respect to their peculiar mode of apprehending the doctrine concerning Christ, but also to the whole intellectual tendency on which they were severally founded. While in Sabellianism the human and personal element in Christ was made simply a transitory form of the manifestation of the Divine, the theory of Paul of Samosata, on the other hand, insists chiefly on the *human personality* of Christ, while it regards the Divine only as something which supervenes from without. Sabellianism indeed

passage in Philo, de Abrahamo, f. 367, where it is said that the *ὄν*, from which proceed the two highest *δυνάμεις*, the *ποιητική*, and the *βασιλική*, appears as *one* or as *threefold* according to the different positions at which the souls that are more or less purified stand. If the soul has risen above the revelation of God in the creation, to the intellectual intuition of the *ὄν*, then for that soul the Trinity rises to Unity—the soul beholds *one* light, from which proceed, as it were, two shadows; it sees God's essence, and also those two modes of operation (merely shadows) which fall off from his transcendent light. Τριτὴν φαντασίαν ἐνὸς ὑποκειμένου καταλαμβάνει, τοῦ μὲν ὡς ὄντος, τοῖν δ' ἄλλοις δυοῖν, ὡς ἂν ἀπαυγαζομένων ἀπὸ τούτου σκιῶν. Next: Παρέχει τῇ ὁρατικῇ διανοίᾳ τότε μὲν ἐνὸς, τότε δὲ τριῶν φαντασίαν; ἐνὸς μὲν, ὅταν ἄκρως καθαρθεῖσα ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ μὴ μόνον τὰ πλήθη τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν γείτονα μονάδος δυάδα ὑπερβᾷσα κτλ. There is also a striking resemblance between Sabellius' mode of expression and that which belongs to the Clementines, a work which proceeded from some Jewish-Christian Theosophist. Clementin. II. 16. c. 12: Κατὰ γὰρ ἕκτασιν καὶ συστολῇν ἡ μονὰς δυὰς εἶναι νομίζεται.

\* Baur, who attacks me on account of this assertion, contributes, however, by his own representation of the matter, which he interposes apart from his own remarks, to confirm the same view.



tended towards a Pantheism which confounded God with the world, but in the theory of Paul we discern a deistic tendency which fixes an impassable gulf betwixt God and the creation—which admits of no community of essence and of life between God and humanity.

The Logos—so Paul of Samosata taught—is in God nothing else than reason in man,\*—the Spirit in relation to God is simply what the spirit is in relation to men. As he controverted the doctrine of a personal Logos, so too he declared himself opposed to the theory of an incarnation of the Logos, of an indwelling of its essence in human nature. He would only concede that the divine reason or wisdom dwelt and operated in Christ in such manner as it did in no one else.† To the way in which Christ developed himself, as man, under the divine influence,‡ is to be attributed the fact that he outshone in wisdom all other messengers of God that preceded him. He is to be styled the Son of God simply because he was, in a sense in which no other prophet before him had been, an organ of the divine wisdom which revealed itself through him. Paul of Samosata is said to have employed the expression, “Jesus Christ, who comes from below” (Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς κάτωθεν), in order to indicate that the *Logos* did not assume a human body, but that Christ, as man, had been deemed worthy of being exalted to this peculiar union with God by means of such an illumination from the divine reason; § as, indeed, for the same reason, Paul affirmed that the divine Logos, having come down and imparted his influence to Christ, rose again to the Father. || Although by this theory Christ was regarded as a mere man, yet Paul, adopting the phraseology of scripture

\* “Ὡσπερ ἐν ἀνθρώπου καρδίᾳ ὁ ἴδιος λόγος. Epiphanius, hæres. 67.

† “Ἐνοικῆσαι ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν σοφίαν, ὡς ἐν οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ. He taught οὐ συγγενῆσθαι τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ τὴν σοφίαν οὐσιωθῶς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ ποιότητα. Paul’s words, as cited in Leontius Byzantin. c. Nest. et Eutychen; which work, till lately, had been known only in the Latin translation; but the fragment of Paul, in the original Greek, has been published from the manuscript in the Bodleian library at Oxford, in Erlich’s Dissertation, de erroribus Pauli Samosat. Lips. 1745, p. 23.

‡ I agree with Baur on this point, viz. that there is no satisfactory evidence for supposing that Paul of Samosata denied the supernatural birth of Christ.

§ See the synodal letter in Euseb. l. VII. c. 30.

|| “Ἐλθὼν ὁ λόγος ἐνέργησε καὶ μόνον καὶ ἀνῆλθε πρὸς τὸν πατέρα, η Epiphanius.



and the church, seems to have called him God in some improper sense, not exactly defined. However, he here employed the antithesis that Christ was not God by his nature, but became so by progressive development.\* If his language was strictly consistent with his system, he certainly referred the name Son of God to Christ alone—the man thus preëminently distinguished by God; and he therefore invariably and strongly maintained that Christ, as such, did not exist before His nativity; that, when a being with God before all time is ascribed to Him, this must be understood as relating only to an ideal existence in the divine reason—in the divine predestination.† Hence, when his opponents, judging from the connection of ideas in their own mind rather than in his, accused him of supposing two Sons of God, he could confidently reply that he knew only of one Son of God.‡ It is possible, however, that, when it was for his interest to accommodate himself to the terminology of the

\* So Athanasius (de Synodis, c. 4) represents the doctrine of the Samosatians concerning Christ: "Ἰστέρον αὐτὸν μετὰ τὴν ἐνανθρώπησιν ἐκ προκοπῆς τεθειοποιῆσθαι αὐτόν. These words might, indeed, be understood to mean that Christ first raised himself to the divine dignity through the moral perfection which he had attained by his own human efforts. But if this were his opinion, he would doubtless have said, as the Socinians afterwards did, that Christ raised himself, by what he had accomplished in his life on earth, to such divine dignity, in virtue of his glorification. But, in all the other citations from him, we find no evidence of such a separation made by Paul between that which Christ was originally and that which he became by his own efforts and his own doings. In the system of Sabellius, what Christ was, over and above all other men, is, in fact, traced to the very circumstance that he stood from the beginning under the special influence of the divine reason or wisdom. The προκοπή forms here simply the antithesis to the κατὰ φύσιν—to the ἀνωθεν answers the κάτωθεν—and so, accommodating himself to the church phraseology, he is reported to have said, Θεὸς ἐκ τῆς παρδίνου, Θεὸς ἐκ Ναζαρεθ ὄφθεις. Athanas. c. Apollinar. l. II. s. 3.

† In the synodal letter to Paul of Samosata, published by Turrian (cited in Mansi, Concil. I. f. 1034)—the only credible document among those made known by him relating to these transactions—this opposite thesis is set up, viz. that the Son of God existed πρὸ αἰώνων οὐ προγνώσει ἀλλ' οὐσία καὶ ὑποστάσει: from this we may infer, then, that Paul taught the contrary: Τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐχ' ὑποστάσει ἀλλὰ προγνώσει κατλ. This is confirmed also by the representation of Athanasius, who says of Paul's doctrine concerning Christ, Λόγον ἐνεργὸν ἐκ οὐρανοῦ καὶ σοφίαν ἐν αὐτῷ ὁμολογεῖ, τῷ μὲν προορισμῷ πρὸ αἰώνων ὄντα, τῇ δὲ ὑπάρξει ἐκ ἀναζαρεθ ἀναδειχθέντα. c. Apollinar. l. II. s. 3.

‡ Μὴ δύο ἐπίσταςθαι υἱούς. Leont. Byzant.

church, he also employed the expression of a generation of the Logos, but in a sense of his own, and understanding by it nothing but the procession of the Logos to a certain outward activity—the beginning of its creative agency—what was usually designated by the phrase λόγος προφορικός.\*

Of this man's character, the bishops and clergy, who composed the synod that condemned his doctrines, give a very unfavourable account.† They describe him as haughty, vain-glorious, and self-seeking—a man that eagerly entered into secular matters. It is true the accusations of polemical opponents, especially opponents so passionate as these were, are entitled to little confidence; but in the present case they contain too much of a specific character to be supposed to have been wholly without foundation; and unhappily the picture accords but too well with what we otherwise learn respecting the bishops of the large towns (Antioch, for instance, the great capital of Roman Asia in the East).‡ These districts were at this time governed by *Zenobia*, § Queen of Palmyra, who is said to have been friendly to Judaism. || Paul is accused of having sought to present the doctrine concerning

\* This is made probable by the opposite thesis in the before-cited synodal letter: Διὰ τοῦ λόγου ὁ πατήρ πάντα πεποιήκεν, οὐχ' ὡς δι' ὀργάνου, οὐδ' ὡς δι' ἐπιστήμης ἀνυπόστατου, γενήσαντος μὲν τοῦ πατρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ὡς ᾤσαν ἐνεργείαν καὶ ἠνυπόστατον. From this it may be inferred that Paul had spoken of a σοφία, ἐπιστήμη ἀνυπόστατος, and by the γέννησις of the λόγος understood nothing else than an ἐνεργεία ἀνυπόστατος of God as the Creator. From this, however, it does not certainly follow that he himself made use of the expression γέννησις.

† Euseb. l. VII. c. 30.

‡ See what Origen says in Matth. f. 420, ed. Huet., or vol. IV. T. XVI. s. 8, p. 24, ed. Lomm.: "We, who either do not understand what the teaching of Jesus here means, or who despise these express admonitions of our Saviour himself—we proceed so far in the affectation of pomp and state as to outdo even bad rulers among the pagans, and, like the emperors, surround ourselves with a guard, that we may be feared and made difficult of approach, especially by the poor. And in many of our so-called churches, particularly in the larger towns, may be found rulers of the church of God who would refuse to own as their equals even the best among the disciples of Jesus while on earth. Μηδεμίαν ἰσολογίαν ἐπιτρέποντας ἔσθ' ὅτι καὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις τῶν Ἰησοῦ μαθητῶν, εἶναι πρὸς αὐτούς.

§ Married to the Roman commander Odenatus, who had made himself independent of the Roman empire.

|| Ἰουδαία ἦν Ζηνόβια, καὶ Παύλου πρόιστη τοῦ Σαμοσατίως. Athanas. hist. Arianor. ad Monachos. s. 71.

Christ in a dress acceptable to Jewish modes of thinking, expressly with a view to gain favour with this princess. But there is no evidence in support of this charge; the fact requires no such explanation; and the constancy with which Paul adhered to his convictions, even after political circumstances were changed, suffices to vindicate him from such an imputation. It is more probable that his intercourse with Jews about the person of the queen, with whom, as one of her court, Paul stood in high consideration, may have had some influence in giving this turn to his doctrinal opinions—though we are under no *necessity* of supposing even this. His peculiar doctrinal opinions may, too, have contributed to procure him the favour of the queen. He did, however, employ his connection with this powerful patroness to his secular advancement, and to surround himself with the affairs and honours of the state. In direct opposition to ecclesiastical rules which had already been publicly expressed, at least in the Western church (see above), he held a secular office highly incompatible with the vocation of a bishop.\* At Antioch the profane custom of showing approval of popular preachers, by the waving of handkerchiefs, exclamations of applause, and the clapping of hands, seems already to have passed from the theatre and rhetorical schools to the church—a practice which put church-teachers on the same level with actors and declaimers. The vain-minded Paul was delighted with all this; but the bishops, his accusers, saw clearly how contrary it was to the decency and order becoming the house of God. The church hymns, which had been in use ever since the second century, he banished as an innovation; proceeding probably on the principle, which at a later period was also advanced by others, that nothing ought to be sung in the church but pieces taken from Holy Scripture. In all probability he ordered that, in place of those church hymns, *Psalms only* should be used. There is no good reason for the conjecture that Paul did this merely with the view of flattering his Jewish patroness,

\* The office of *Ducenarius procurator* (not to be confounded with the *Ducenarius judex*), so called because the pay amounted to 200 sester tia. See Sueton. Claudius, c. 24; Cyprian. ep. 68. It is possible that he was already in possession of this office when elected bishop; in this case the bishops would accuse themselves for tolerating such an infraction of the ecclesiastical laws.

Zenobia. It is more probable that, well knowing how deep an impression those hymns of the church made on the minds of the hearers, he hoped, together with those ancient songs of praise to Christ, to expel also from the hearts of men the sentiments they enforced. When we are told that the man who so carefully weighed every expression which was applied to Christ delighted in the incense of extravagant flattery, which, under the form of odes and declamations, even in holy places, was heaped on himself, and in being called, in the swollen, rhetorical language of the times, an angel come down from heaven, we are not indeed to give implicit faith to such stories from the mouths of heated opponents; still we have no reason whatever to reject them as wholly false.

It seems to have been the design of Paul of Samosata gradually to insinuate his peculiar views of Christ into the minds of his flock. To this end the change which he introduced with regard to the use of church hymns was intended to contribute; and, as we have seen, he contrived in some instances to give his own meaning to the terminology of the church. This may have made it difficult to convict him of erroneous doctrine; and it was not till after many unsuccessful disputations that, at a synod convened in 269, the presbyter *Malchion*, an expert dialectician, at last succeeded in bringing him to an open avowal of his opinions.\* He was thereupon deposed, and his bishopric conferred on another; but as he still had a party in his favour, and was moreover patronized by Zenobia, it was impossible to carry the decree into execution until the year 272, when Zenobia was conquered by the emperor Aurelian. The latter referred the matter to the decision of the Roman bishop.†

But while, in the Eastern church, the struggle with this Monarchian tendency, which gave an undue prominence to the *unity* in the Trinity, had the effect of causing the distinctions and gradations within it to be more precisely marked, and the system of subordination, which had been reduced by

\* From Eusebius' expressions, although Theodoret, to whom perhaps they appeared offensive, explained them otherwise, we must infer that this ecclesiastic, too, exercised a profession not wholly befitting his spiritual calling, that of a *rhetorician*.

† See vol. I. p. 196.



Origen into a settled form, was more decidedly pronounced, a very different relation was gradually working itself into shape in the Western church, which we will now more closely consider.

How differently the same Christian truth may shape itself to the apprehension of minds which have been differently trained, is seen by comparing Origen with Tertullian. To Tertullian, accustomed and familiarized to material notions of the divine essence, the same difficulties would not present themselves on this head as those which worked on the philosophical mind of Origen. He, by the aid of his material notions of emanation, could clearly conceive how the Godhead might cause to proceed from its own essence a being possessed of the same substance, only in an inferior degree, and standing in the same relation to the former as a ray of light to the sun. He asserted, therefore, the doctrine of *one* divine Essence, shared in a certain gradation by three persons most intimately connected.\*

The Son, so far as it concerns the divine essence, is not numerically distinct from the Father; the same essence of God being also in the Son; but he differs in degree, being a smaller portion of the common mass of the divine essence.† Thus the prevailing view in the Western church came to be this: one divine essence in the Father and Son; but, at the same time, a subordination in the relation of the Son to the Father. Here were conflicting elements. The process of development must decide which of the two should gain the preponderance. This, then, constituted the difference between the two churches:—that while, in the Eastern church, the prominence given to the distinctions in the Trinity did not leave room for the consciousness of the unity, in the Western church, on the other hand, the unity of essence, once decidedly expressed, caused the element of subordination to retire more and more into the background.

Thus, from a difference in the process of the development of doctrine in the two churches, an opposition of views naturally arose on this subject; as we see in the case of the above-mentioned council at Antioch, in 269, which, in the heat of the polemical opposition to Monarchianism, was led to condemn the expression “ὁμοούσιον,” answering to the doctrinal

\* Una substantia in tribus cohærentibus.

† Deus de deo, modulo alter, non numero. Adv. Praxeam.

formula of the West, “una substantia.”\* And we also see, in another noticeable phenomenon, a premonitory symptom of those doctrinal controversies which, in the fourth century, sprang out of the opposition thus prepared between the two churches.†

The doctrine of Sabellius, and his mode of interpreting the phraseology of the church, in accordance with his own system, having crept in among the bishops of his province, Dionysius, bishop of Alexandria, felt it incumbent on him, since the whole of that diocese fell under his supervision, to issue a pastoral letter in condemnation of these spreading tenets.‡ The opposition into which he was thus brought with the Sabellian denial of the hypostases led him to express the distinction of hypostases, and consequently also the doctrine of subordination, in a more unqualified manner than he would otherwise have done. He made use of several expressions which afterwards Arianism was able to fall back upon. He strongly insisted on the position that the Son of God had His existence by the will of the Father; he styled the Son, in relation to the latter, a *ποίημα*, and employed many striking comparisons with a view to mark His subordinate relation to the Father. He is reported to have made use of expressions, for the purpose of affirming with emphasis that the Son received His existence from the Father, which afterwards became favourite mottos of Arianism; as, for example, that He did not exist before He was begotten; there was a moment when He did not as yet exist.§ He also declared himself opposed to the Homousion.

\* See, e. g., Athanas. de Synod. s. 43; Hilar. de Synod. s. 86.

† As this admits of a natural explanation from the system of doctrines held in the Alexandrian school, and as moreover the reasons urged by the council against this expression of the church's answer perfectly to this system, the account is for these reasons, if there were no other, rendered probable. The Arians, from whom we receive the account, are, it is true, suspicious witnesses on such a point, but the fact that their warm opponents, Athanasius, Hilarius of Poitiers, and Basilius of Cæsarea, quote the same account from their mouth, without contradicting it, may be considered as a confirmation of its truth.

‡ The letter to Ammonius and Euphranor, of which fragments have been preserved in Athanasius' work on the doctrines of Dionysius.

§ Athanas. de sententia Dionysii, s. 14. For the purpose of giving strong emphasis to the *οὐκ ἔστι ἦν*, he is reported to have said, *Οὐκ ἦν πρὶν γεννηθῆναι, ἀλλ' ἦν ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν*. Being a disciple of Origen, he may have expressed himself in the latter way, to mark perhaps a beginning

Certain individuals, to whom these expressions of Dionysius appeared a disparagement of the divine dignity of Christ, laid their complaints before Dionysius, bishop of Rome; and the latter was thereby led to compose a work,\* wherein he opposed to the different tendencies of the Eastern church that system of the unity of essence which had become already matured in the Western church, and from which every trace of subordination had been almost obliterated.† Besides the Sabellian, he attacks two other tendencies. He says that he had heard that many among their teachers ‡ had fallen into an error directly opposed to that of Sabellianism, viz. Tritheism; § that they had separated the holy unity into three hypostases, totally alien and totally separated from one another. Yet we can hardly reconcile it with the general shape of Christian thought and speculation among the Orientals to suppose that those teachers did really assume the existence of three essences, equally without beginning, and standing in no relation of dependence on each other. Here assuredly the Roman bishop has but followed the reports of others, who so interpreted the explanations of those teachers. It is probable that, while in their conflict with Sabellianism they only cared to mark broadly and strongly the distinction of the hypostases, they may have so expressed themselves as to furnish some colour for those complaints. The third among the erroneous views censured by the Roman Dionysius was precisely that very one which regarded the Son of God as a creature, and assigned a beginning to his existence—the error which some were disposed to ascribe to Diony-

of existence, but no beginning in time. But, in truth, it is impossible, since Dionysius' work has not been preserved entire, to determine with any degree of certainty what his language really was, so as to distinguish what he actually did say from the conclusions which men thought proper to draw from his words.

\* 'Ανατροπή, fragments of which work have been preserved in Athanasius' book on the decrees of the Council of Nice.

† We still perceive, however, some remains of the old system of subordination, when the Father, as the *ἀρχή*, the God of the universe, is styled absolutely the Almighty. *Τὴν τριάδα εἰς ἓνα, ὥσπερ εἰς κορυφὴν τινὰ, τὸν θεὸν τῶν ὅλων τὸν παντοκράτορα λέγω, συγκεισθαι καὶ συνάγεσθαι πάντα ἀνάγκη.* Athanas. de decretis synodi Nicenæ, s. 26.

‡ His words are, l. c.: *Πέπυσμαι εἶναι τινὰς τῶν παρ' ὑμῶν κατηχούντων καὶ διδασκόντων τὸν θεῖον λόγον ταύτης ὑψηλότητος τῆς φρονήσεως.*

§ *Οἱ κατὰ διάμετρον ἀντίκεινται τῇ Σαβελλίου γνώμῃ.*

sus of Alexandria. Now, had the latter clung pertinaciously to the opposite views which on this subject really did exist between himself and the Roman Dionysius, had he given still greater distinctness and prominence to the differences between his own and the Roman form of doctrine, and set himself to defend them, the signal would have been given for a controversy which might have terminated in a separation of the two churches.

But Dionysius demeaned himself according to that spirit, so superior to dogmatic narrowness, which had descended to him from his great master Origen. The common groundwork of the Christian faith was with him of more value than any subordinate differences of opinion; he was more anxious to preserve alive a consciousness of unity than to give prominence to the dividing points of opposition. Without manifesting any resentment to his accusers, who had resorted to a foreign bishop, and one so eager to obtrude himself as a judge in the concerns of other churches; without being ruffled even by that bishop himself, who seems to have spoken in the tone of a judge rather than of a colleague, he endeavoured, with calmness and prudence, and without denying his own convictions, so to explain the offensive propositions (by pointing out their connection with his whole system) as to remove all scruples against them, even from those who adopted the principles of the Roman church. He expounded, in the manner of Origen, the notion of the eternal generation of the Logos. He was even willing to tolerate the term *ὁμοούσιον*, so far as it was employed to denote simply the relationship of essence between the Son of God and the Father, and to distinguish him from all created beings; though he had to object to it, that it was a term not hitherto sanctioned by ecclesiastical use, and nowhere to be found in the holy scriptures—objections of little weight, we must allow, against a dogmatic term, since the changes arising from the progressive development of the dogmatic spirit generally, and the new errors which would impede it, may render necessary new expressions; and since, in such cases, all that is really important is to see that the notion which the dogmatic term is to convey is itself clearly deducible from the scripture doctrine. By this self-denying moderation of Dionysius the dispute was brought to an end, and a schism avoided which might have rent the bonds of Christian fellow-



ship.\* It is true this merely practical union had no power of enduring influence. The oppositions which had once made their appearance in the process of doctrinal development must assert again their rights within the sphere of thought, and continually strive towards their reconciliation in a higher unity.

In the doctrine concerning the *Holy Spirit*, the want of correspondence between *what was contained* in the Christian consciousness and its *notional expression* strongly manifested itself. In the first youthful age of the church, when the power of the Holy Spirit made itself to be so mightily felt as a new, creative, transforming principle of life, it was still very far from being the case that the consciousness of this Spirit, as one identical with the essence of God, had been thoroughly and distinctly impressed on the understanding.

If we except the Monarchians and *Lactantius*,† men were generally agreed in holding the personality of the Holy Ghost. The conception of his reality and objective essentiality coincided in the Christian thought with the conception of his personal, self-subsistent existence. But the logical consistency of their system of subordination in the doctrine of the Logos compelled the church fathers to conceive of the Holy Spirit as subordinate to the Father and the Son; the first of the beings produced by the Father through the Son;—and we shall recognise the influence of this tendency of thought subsisting in the Eastern church as late as towards the end of the fourth century. When, on the one hand, men felt themselves constrained, by the demands of the Christian consciousness and of Scripture, to recognise in the Holy Spirit something beyond a created existence, to bring him into nearer relation to the Son of God, and assign him a place in the Trinity—and were driven, on the other hand, by the logical consistency of the theory of subordination, to represent him as the first being created by the Logos, through whom God

\* See the fragments of the second letter to the bishop Dionysius, under the title, "Ελεγχος καὶ ἀπολογία, in Athanasius de sententia Dionysii.

† Who is supposed to have explained the Holy Spirit as the sanctifying energy of the Father and of the Son, eum vel ad Patrem referri ve ad Filium; et sanctificationem utriusque personæ sub ejus nomine demonstrari. Vid. Hieronym. ep. 41. ad Pamach. et Oceanum.

called all things into existence—many contradictions arose in the theory proceeding from such different assumptions, and led to further efforts to place the doctrine in its right shape. Thus, in Justin Martyr especially, we observe a wavering of this sort, between the idea of the Holy Ghost, as one of the members of the Trinity, and a spirit standing in some relationship with the angels.\* In Origen, also, we observe

\* The reasons which have been urged by Roman Catholic and Protestant theologians against my exposition of Justin's expressions respecting the Holy Spirit are insufficient to make me abandon it. See the literature on this dispute in a monography on Justin, by Semisch, II. p. 318, which is remarkable for its completeness and solidity. The attempt has been made to show that Justin's notions of the essence of the angels and of creatures generally were irreconcilable with that view; this objection, however, is met by our remarks in the text. Contradictory assertions ought not to be considered anything strange at this stage of the development of doctrine: unless we are willing to go back to old doctrinal prejudices, and to overlook once more the essential character of the process of historical development (the besetting sin of a certain narrow and narrowing church tendency, of which, however, I cannot accuse many of my opponents), they must appear rather as a matter of course. On the same grounds I must protest against what Herr Diaconus Semisch alleges as evidence against the truth of my view of the matter, where he says, "No representation certainly clashes so much as this with the scriptural position and the common feeling of the ancient church." But as concerns the scriptural position, we have nothing to do with that question here. The unevolved elements of the divine Word must, in its process of development for the human mind, go through manifold intermediate forms. The position taken by Justin constitutes one among these historically conditioned, intermediate forms. And as respects the common Christian feeling, we do, in truth, recognise such a common feeling, by which the church in all ages is knit together; but this common feeling did not at once find its corresponding expression in the forms evolved by the understanding. Of the two passages from Justin which we are concerned with at present, one is where Justin, in confronting the charge of *ἀθεϊσμός*, enumerates the objects of religious worship among the Christians; *Apol. II. f. 56*: 'Εκείνόν τε καὶ τὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ υἱὸν ἐλθόντα καὶ διδάξαντα ἡμᾶς ταῦτα καὶ τὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπομένων καὶ ἔξομοιουμένων ἀγαθῶν ἀγγέλων στρατὸν, πνεῦμά τε τὸ προφητικὸν σιβόμιθα καὶ προσκυνούμεν. Now Semisch affirms that it is contrary to the laws of language and of logic to refer the word *ἄλλων* to that which follows after. But the simple question is, whether, in a writer like Justin, such an instance of negligence in style may not well be supposed. Even if, with Semisch, we take the passage in this way, and suppose that under the term *ἄλλων* Justin had in mind Christ, and understood the word *ἄγγελος*; at one and the same time in the more general sense (of a messenger of God) and the more limited one (of angel)—this assuredly would be as harsh a construction as the former,

the two elements coming together,—the sound *Christian* view, producing itself out of the immediate unevolved elements of the Christian consciousness, and the speculative view, standing in no sort of relation to it. On the one hand, he considers the Holy Spirit as the substance of all the gracious gifts proceeding from God, communicated through Christ,\* the source of sanctification to believers; and then he describes him, notwithstanding, as only the first-begotten of the Father through the Son, to whom not only being, but also wisdom and holiness, is first communicated by the Son; dependent on him in all these relations.†

It is besides worthy of notice that, in the dispute with the Monarchians, the doctrine concerning the Holy Spirit was not touched upon at all—a proof how little men had busied themselves as yet with the more accurate determination of this doctrine—how very unimportant it appeared, compared with the doctrine concerning the Logos. It was quite in keeping with the mental bent of the Patripassianists to refer everything to the undivided God, the Father in Christ; and to consider the Holy Spirit simply as His operation. But when the doctrine of the Holy Spirit assumed the important place which it did in the matured system of Montanism, the disputes with its adherents led naturally to more accurate investigations of this doctrine. Thus we know that Clement

and one not admissible in the case of any other writer. However, in whatever way the word *ἄλλων* may be explained—a circumstance by no means decisive as to the whole meaning of the passage—it still remains the easiest and best way to account for what we find here associated together, by looking to the connection which existed between the writer's notions of the Holy Spirit and of the angels. But in no case can I concede to Hr. Semisch that by the angel of God, the power sent by Christ for our assistance (Dial. c. Tryph. f. 344), Justin could have understood anything else than the Holy Spirit. The reference to the passage in the 3rd of Zechariah has nothing to do with the question here; but if it had, it would be rather in favour of, than against, this interpretation. If we pay any regard to Justin's peculiar style of doctrinal language, it is quite impossible to understand this term as referring merely to the moral power bestowed by Christ.

\* Ὅλη τῶν χαρισμάτων, ἐνεργουμένη ἀπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ, διακονουμένη ὑπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ. In Joann. T. II. s. 6.

† Οὐ χреζέειν ἔοικε τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα, διακονοῦντος αὐτοῦ τῇ ὑποστάσει, οὐ μόνον εἰς τὸ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ σοφὸν εἶναι καὶ λογικὸν καὶ δίκκιον καὶ πᾶν ὁτιοῦσιν χρὴ αὐτὸ νοεῖν τυγχάνειν κατὰ μετοχὴν τῶν προειρημένων Χριστοῦ ἐπινοιών. L. c.

of Alexandria (in whose extant writings, however, no speculative determination of this point is to be found) intended, in a work on prophecy (*περὶ προφητείας*) which was connected with his dispute with the Montanists, to enter into a fuller development of the doctrine concerning the Holy Spirit.\* Thus Sabellius was the first who received into his Monarchian scheme the notion also of the Holy Spirit. In this dogma, too, we see the element of the subordination theory more and more overcome by the conception of the *one* substance which was matured in the Western church, as we especially see in the letter of Dionysius bishop of Rome to Dionysius bishop of Alexandria already given.†

From the doctrine concerning God (theology in the stricter sense of the word) we pass to the *doctrine concerning human nature* (Anthropology)—the two doctrines being in their peculiar Christian acceptation, most intimately connected; both deriving their peculiar Christian significance from their particular relation to the doctrine of redemption—the central fact of Christianity. From the doctrine of God's holiness proceeded a conception of sin entirely different from that presented in the mode of thinking of the ancient world; and this of itself had the greatest influence on Anthropology.

Again, the redemption, in which all mankind is destined to participate, on the one hand presupposes in all men a *need for it*—the feeling of their own moral insufficiency, of the inner discord in their own hearts, the sin and guilt which separate them from God; and, on the other hand, the consciousness of a recipiency for the redemption, as a quality possessed by human nature in general, by virtue of which the redemption may find a point of union in the soul's free act of self-determination. Both are intimately connected; for it is out of the recipiency that the want develops itself, and the want without the recipiency would be a lie in nature. The very consciousness of sin and guilt, which answers to the need of redemption, too, presupposes a something akin to God, ele-

\* The Holy Spirit, as something above nature, supervening to the original faculties of the soul: Ἡμεῖς μὲν τῷ πεπιστευκότι προσεπιπνεῖσθαι τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα φαμέν,—ἀλλ' οὐχ' ὡς μέρος Θεοῦ ἐν ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν τὸ πνεῦμα· ὅλων δὲ ἡ διανομὴ αὐτῇ καὶ ὅτι ποτὲ ἔστι τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα, ἐν τοῖς περὶ προφητείας καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ἐπιδειχθήσεται ἡμῖν. Strom. I. V. f. 591; I. IV. f. 511.

† Ἐμφιλοχερεῖν τῷ Θεῷ καὶ ἐνδαιτυῖσθαι τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα. De decretis Synodi Nicenæ, s. 25.



vated above natural necessity, something of the essence of a free self-determination of the spirit, without which sin and guilt can have no existence. On both these sides the general ideas of the ancient world were opposed to Christianity. On the one side was a moral self-sufficiency,\* which exhibits itself in its extreme phase in Stoicism—the self-feeling from which proceeded the ethical notion of a μεγαλοψυχία, magnanimity, and to which the Christian virtue of humility appeared to be a sort of self-degradation: on the other side, that point of view which made man dependent on natural necessity, and caused moral evil to be regarded as something having its ground therein—a view which, while it admitted the notion of moral imperfection, excluded altogether that of sin. In the stoical doctrine both these are combined; we have there as well the Autonomy and *Autarchy* of the Wise man, as the necessity of evil in order to the harmony of the universe. And though, in regard to the first of these, the opposition which the fundamental principle of the ancient world presents to Christianity is tempered by the Platonic philosophy,† yet it is thrown forth in still stronger light on the other side, while all evil is there regarded as something involuntary, being derived from a deficiency of knowledge, a preponderance of the natural (of the ψλη) over the rational element in man, by virtue of which preponderance the rational element cannot as yet attain to a free development. It is true that, in this respect, different stages in the development of Platonism require to be distinguished, according as a tendency predominated (as in the case of Plotinus) to apply and carry out its speculative principles with logical consistency, or as a prevailing interest in behalf of religion and morality operated independently of those principles, as in the case of Plutarch, who so earnestly defends moral freedom against the stoical doctrine of necessity. But even where this notion of freedom was most strongly insisted on, as, for instance, in Aristotle, who combated the Platonic principle that evil implied the absence of freedom,‡ it must

\* The Horatian maxim, bonam mentem mihi ipse parabo.

† See, on this relation, vol. I., Introduction.

‡ Thus he understands that even the determinate character of a man, by which he is determined in his judgments and actions, is itself a work of freedom. 'Εξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἔξῃν, τοιούτοις μὴ γινέσθαι, διὰ ἑκόντας εἰσίν. Nicom. III. 7.

necessarily have been beset by great difficulties in endeavouring to apply the notion of freedom to actual life ; while they thought they perceived an unconquerable natural character in certain tribes, certain classes in the human family, who had no power of elevating themselves above a very inferior grade of moral culture. But even these restrictions could not overcome the idea of freedom in such men as Aristotle. Yet they could not be wholly got rid of until the power of evil in humanity was generally understood to be something not original, but to be itself traceable in the first instance to an original act of freedom ; and when a power was introduced into humanity whereby those differences of nature were to be equalized, and the same divine life imparted alike to all. It was only with the victory over the nature-principle, and over the aristocratic leaning of antiquity, that the idea of moral freedom could be completely established in all its rights, as a power belonging to human nature.

Christianity, then, brought about an important revolution in the ethical and anthropological views of mankind, by the doctrine of a primitive condition, and of man's loss of it by an act of his own free will. But to its influence belongs also another fact, that it placed Anthropology in connection with the doctrine concerning spirits (Pneumatology), inasmuch as it caused the essence of spirit, as the image of God, to be recognised as the common element in man and all ranks of the spiritual world, and as a common destination having its ground therein ; inasmuch as it presented, on the one hand, the fellowship of one divine life uniting together all spirits in the kingdom of God, and, on the other, referred the origin also of the ungodly life back to the first act of the self-will of a higher intelligence. This latter fact was particularly important as opposed to the heathen view of sin as founded in nature, and to all the tendencies which led men to regard it as something necessarily rooted in the natural organisation of man, in the union of a reason with a sense.

Now, while the true interest of the Christian faith requires the union of the momenta here unfolded,—the combination of all that has reference to the need of redemption, and of all that refers to the capacity for redemption ; and the separation of these correlative momenta engenders the heretical element ; still the greater or less degree of prominence given

to the one or the other of these momenta depended partly on the oppositions, and partly on the peculiar character of the different tendencies of the theological spirit, which we have previously described. As respects the former, the opposition to Gnosticism is here especially to be noticed. Against it there was no need (as is clear from an exposition of the Gnostic doctrines) to prove in the first place the existence of a schism in man's nature, and of a need of redemption grounded therein. On the contrary, as the Gnostics asserted an original threefold difference of human natures, but acknowledged a capacity for the divine life only in one of these classes, it was necessary to demonstrate that capacity for the redemption and the power of moral freedom belonged in common to all. The zeal of controversy in the dispute with the Gnostics served to repress many extremely one-sided theories, to which men were afterwards led by separating momenta of the Christian consciousness which belong together. The hypothesis of a predestination of natures endangering moral freedom was thereby kept in check. Those passages of the Old Testament (such for instance, as speak of the hardening of Pharaoh) which subsequently furnished a support for such doctrines, but which the Gnostics made use of to justify their accusations against the God of the Old Testament, required to be defended against them, by showing that they contained a meaning capable of being reconciled with God's love and justice and man's indestructible freedom. Thus it belongs to the characteristics of the position which this period held in the evolution of the doctrines of the Christian faith, that, on the whole, men were far from framing to themselves, out of a few dark and difficult passages of scripture,—from which, exclusively considered, the dogma of absolute predestination was in after times derived,—a doctrinal system to which they sacrificed all other religious interests and the whole analogy of Bible faith.\* They went rather on the principle of holding fast to that which by

\* Opposed hereto were the hermeneutical canons which Irenæus set up against the Gnostics; as, for example, that men should not seek to explain *ænigmata per aliud majus ænigma*, sed ea, quæ sunt talia, ex manifestis et consonantibus et claris accipiunt absolutiones. Lib. II. c. 10, s. 1. Τὰ φανερώς ἐξηγούμενα ἐπιλύσει τὰς παραβολὰς, καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν λείψαν πολυφωνίας ἐν σύμφωνον μέλος ἐν ἡμῖν αἰσθήσεται. Lib. II. c. 28, s. 3.

a comparison of the different passages of scripture they found to be the collective doctrine which lies at the bottom of the whole. On this point those who took the lead in the guidance of the church were uniformly agreed; and it was only ignorant, uneducated, and at the same time arrogant individuals among the laity, who were inclined to fix on such insulated passages, and run into downright extravagances of doctrine.\*

It belongs further to the common ground assumed by all Christians in opposing Gnosticism, that, while the Gnostics regarded Dualism as an original and absolute truth, and the schism as something necessary in the evolution of existence, necessary to appear at some period in order to be overcome, something of which the foundation existed in the world of *Æons*—the church-fathers, on the other hand, in opposition to the Gnostics, agreed in tracing everything here to the freedom of the creature. The Gnostics were accustomed to advance the dilemma—If the first man was created perfect, how could he then sin? If he was created imperfect, then we suppose God Himself to be the author of sin. To this the church-fathers (if we overlook what was peculiar in Origen's system) were wont to reply—that a distinction should be made between what the first man was in respect to his original capacity, and what he was to become by that development of this capacity which depended on his own free will. Here we find widely recognised a distinction which, in the subsequent evolution of the doctrines of faith, was the subject of important differences of opinion—the distinction between that which is denominated *εἰκών* and that which is denominated *ὁμοίωσις τοῦ Θεοῦ* in Genesis, the *εἰκών* and the *ὁμοίωσις τοῦ Θεοῦ* (the image, and the likeness of God): the first being what was laid in the original capacities of human nature, and what, inasmuch

\* In his exposition of the passage in Ex. x. 27, Origen, after noticing the Gnostics, who made use of such texts as arguments against the God of the Old Testament, and those who sought to remove the difficulty by correct interpretation, mentions two classes among the Christians: *Οἱ μὲν φρονοῦσιν, ὡς ἄρα κατὰ ἀποκλήρωσιν ὁ Θεὸς ὃν θέλει ἐλεεῖ, ὃν δὲ θέλει σκληρύνει· ἔτεροι δὲ βέλτιον παρὰ τούτους φερόμενοί φασι πολλὰ καὶ ἄλλα κεκοῦφθαι τῆς γραφῆς αὐτοῖς νοήματα, καὶ οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο τῆς ὑγιоῦς πίστεως κρίπεισθαι.* T. VIII. ed. Lomm. p. 299. The principle contained in these last words of Origen is the same with one which is laid down also by Irenæus: *Εἰ ἔνια τῶν ζητημάτων ἀναδήσομεν τῷ Θεῷ, καὶ τὴν πίστιν ἡμῶν διαφυλάξομεν καὶ ἀκίνδυνοι διαμενοῦμεν.* Lib. II. c. 28, s. 3.



as it was grounded in its essence, was indestructible ; to which were usually reckoned reason and the power of moral freedom ; —the second, the likeness to God actually realized by the right employment of these capacities, in which consists the image of God ; but in order to the realization of which, another principle (besides what is given in man's natural capacities) must supervene,—a principle partaking of the supernatural, —fellowship with God, without which human nature is inadequate to attain to its completion. The important element in this view is, the recognition of an indestructible image of God in human nature, and of an original destination of man for the supernatural, the deep-founded consciousness of the essence of human nature as one which can only attain to the perfection of its true essence and its ultimate end through the fellowship with God ; consequently the recognition of the correlation which existed from the first between the human and the divine. This, however, was at the same time a distinction which might be so apprehended as to lead to a false separation of the human and the divine.\*

In the next place, the fundamental differences of the theological tendencies which have been already described would have a special influence on Anthropology. Those church-teachers whom we have described as representative of a predominantly supranaturalist tendency were led by this their prevailing line of thought to set in a strong light the corruption of man's nature and his need of redemption, the power of renewing grace, and especially the contrariety between grace and nature. Montanism, which we have already described as the extreme of this tendency, was in truth inclined to glorify the divine grace in such sense as entirely to overlook the human element, instead of seeking to establish the harmonious union and coöperation of both. Those teachers of the church, on the other hand, who, as the antagonists of an extravagant supernaturalism, strove to identify the interest of faith and that of reason, were by this wish led to give, in their Anthropological system, special prominence to human freedom and self-activity ; and thus, in the case of those church-teachers who otherwise took up a conciliatory position towards the

\* In the doctrine concerning the relation of the *dona gratuita* to the *dona naturalia*.

Gnostics, in the treatment of this doctrine could not fail to exhibit a decided opposition to them.

It becomes very important, therefore, on this point also, to compare the doctrine of the *North-African church* and that of the *Alexandrian school*.

The doctrine of the *North African church* took its rise from Tertullian. From the existing doctrine of the church he adopted the idea that the first man, as he was created by God, possessed all the faculties necessary to reveal the image of God through his moral nature, but that these faculties lay still in a dormant, undeveloped state. Their development depended on man's free will. To the working of God on human nature there was, by virtue of its purity, as yet no obstacle; by fellowship with God human nature would have become more and more ennobled and glorified, and was made capable of attaining to a participation in a divine, imperishable life, so as to be placed beyond the dominion of death. But by the first sin, which consisted in man's refusing to subject his own will to the will of God, but rather opposing it,\* man departed from this fellowship with God, and became thereby subject to sin and mortality. By the church-teachers of this period both these points are combined in the notion expressed by *φθορά*, while the opposite term *ἀφθαρσία* denotes with them at once a divine, imperishable, and holy life—a connection of ideas which had an important influence on the systems of faith and morals. As the harmony between the divine and the human will resulted in a harmony through all the parts of man's nature, so the schism between the divine and the human will resulted in a schism which pervades the whole of human nature. In place of that union with the divine Spirit, came the union with an ungodly spirit. The first father entailed the spirit of the world on all his posterity.†

Peculiar, however, to Tertullian was the theory by which he explained *the propagation of this original corruption* of human nature,—being connected with his theory respecting the propagation of souls. Thus it was his opinion that our first parent bore within him the undeveloped germ of all mankind; that the soul of the first man was the fountain-head of all human souls; and that all the varieties of indi-

\* *Electio suæ potius quam divinæ sententiæ.*

† *Spiritum mundi universo generi suo tradidit.*

vidual human nature are but different modifications of that one spiritual substance.\* Therefore the whole of nature became corrupt in the original father of the race; and sinfulness is propagated together with souls.†

Although this mode of apprehending the matter in Tertullian is connected with his sensuous habits of conception, yet this is by no means a necessary connection. For there lies at the root of this mode of apprehension a higher truth and necessity, of which Tertullian bore witness as the author of the so-called Traducianism, or the doctrine of the propagation of souls.

It is worthy of notice that the same Tertullian, who first brought forward in this explicit form the doctrine of inherited sin, should yet exclaim — though in a somewhat earlier work, where he takes ground against the practice of infant baptism ‡ — “Wherefore should the age of innocence be in such haste to obtain the forgiveness of sin?”§

Tertullian was deeply penetrated with the consciousness alike of a sinfulness cleaving to man's nature, and of an undeniable godlike nature in man, in contrast with which it is that sin reveals itself as sin. This great father, who in many respects must be considered as the forerunner of Augustin, is also in this particular to be compared with him,—since, without any doubt, he had had occasion to learn from his own experience the resistance of a fiery, violent, rude nature to the godlike spirit, and so the opposition between nature and grace. Though we know less of his early development than we do of Augustin's, yet we may infer from his wholly peculiar character, as it exhibits itself to us in his writings, that it was only after many an inward struggle he could attain to peace; and the reaction of those deep elements of his natural character doubtless furnished occasion for many an internal conflict.||

\* De anima, c. 10 and c. 19.

† Tradux animæ tradux peccati.

‡ See vol. I. p. 432.

§ Quid festinat innocens ætas ad remissionem peccatorum. De bapt. c. 18.

|| Thus, in his work in praise of the Christian virtue *patience*, we hear him speaking out of the fulness of his inner experience. He says, c. 1, “Ita miserrimus ego semper æger caloribus impatientiæ, quam non obtineo patientiæ sanitatem, et suspirem et invocem et perorem necesse est, cum recordeor et in meæ imbecillitatis contemplatione digero, bonam fidei valetudinem et dominicæ disciplinæ sanitatem, non facile cuiquam, nisi patientia adsideat, provenire.”

But equally mighty was the immediate feeling of the godlike which formed the basis of his sturdy, inartificial nature. "The corruption of nature," he says,\* "is a second nature, which has its own God and father, even the author of corruption himself; so that goodness, however, still resides also in the soul—that original, that godlike and genuine thing, which is its proper nature. For that which is from God is not so much extinguished as obscured; for it *can* be obscured, since it is not God; but it cannot be extinguished, since it is of God. As the light, when some object is interposed, continues to exist, though it shines not through in consequence of the density of the intervening object; so goodness in the soul, when suppressed by evil, as it brings with it its peculiar nature, either remains wholly inactive, its light being hid, or else, finding freedom, bursts through where it is given it to do so. Thus it is that some are very good and others very bad; and yet all souls are of the same stock: thus, too, there is something good in the very worst, and something bad in the very best; for God alone is without sin, and, as man, Christ alone without sin, since Christ is also God. Thus it is that the divinity of the soul, by virtue of its original goodness, breaks out in obscure presentiments, and the consciousness of God comes forth as its witness. For this reason no soul is without guilt, for none is without the seeds of goodness."

It is a characteristic trait of Tertullian, that while, as a Montanist, he laid peculiar stress on the unusual psychological phenomena presented in the effects of the new divine life, and on the miraculous element in the charismata;† so too, where he speaks of man's natural condition, he is fond of bringing up such eccentric phenomena as those of a natural forecasting and presentiment, and of appealing to the indications of an indestructible, godlike element in human nature.‡

He was led to unfold and to defend these views still further, not only in his controversy with Marcion, who, as we have observed, refused to acknowledge anything originally godlike in the soul, but also in his dispute with Hermogenes. On

\* De anima, c. 41.

† See above, p. 215.

‡ The distinction between that natural faculty of divination and prophecy as a charisma is stated, de anima, c. 22: Divinatio interdum, seposita, quæ per Dei gratiam obvenit ex prophetia.



this latter occasion he wrote a work which has not come down to us, on the descent of souls.\* Hermogenes had opposed the theory of a heavenly descent of the soul, of the inbreathing into it of a divine particle, and had urged that it made the Divine subject to pollution, since, on this hypothesis, it was impossible to avoid ascribing to this soul the origin of evil.† Tertullian supposes in matter,—in that inorganic stuff which is the basis of the creation,—not only something akin to the corporeal world which is produced out of it, but also something akin to the soul, which was likewise formed out of it. The wild motion in it is that which it has akin to the soul, and which lies at the ground of the soul.‡ As God, by his organizing influences, produced the corporeal world out of the chaotic mass, so he formed the soul out of the chaotic principle of motion.§ Taking his position on this ground of materialism, he agreed with Marcion in denying that any point of union was presented for Christianity in an original element of affinity between the human soul and the Divine. Evil he derived from this wild chaotic principle of motion, not overcome; just as he regarded whatever was hateful in the corporeal world as a remnant of the ancient chaos. Also in Satan and evil spirits he believed probably that he saw the reaction of that untamed chaotic power of motion. Souls needed the communication of a divine life really related to God, which is imparted to them by the redemption and by regeneration, in order to enable them to overcome the evil derived from their origin. Tertullian, as he himself tells us,|| defended, against Hermogenes, free will, as an original property of the soul and indestructible. We might infer from

\* *De censu animæ.* We learn what were the contents of this book from his work *de anima*.

† *Dum incredibile est, spiritum Dei in delictum et mox in iudicium devenire, ex materia potius anima credatur quam ex Dei spiritu.* *De anima*, c. 11. Tertullian contends, on the contrary, that the soul is derived, not from the *spiritus Dei*, but from the *flatus Dei*; that it was not the essence of God, but only something imparted immediately by the Spirit of God—something in affinity with that spirit—which resided in the soul.

‡ *The incorporale inconditus motus materiæ.* *Adv. Hermogenem*, c. 36.

§ Comp. the passage from Plutarch, cited p. 16, relative to a soul united originally with the chaos.

|| *Inesse nobis τὸ αὐτεξούσιον naturaliter, jam et Marcioni ostendimus et Hermogeni.* *De anima*, c. 21.

this that Hermogenes regarded the participation in the redemption, and in the divine life originally foreign to the soul, as not dependent on the self-determination of the free will; that he did not make faith to proceed *from that source*, but derived everything in this matter alike from the unconditional divine influence and election; and he would thus belong to the earliest advocates of the doctrine of an unconditioned predestination, and of an absolute, irresistible grace. The consistent development of his principles might certainly lead to such results; for if the soul, by virtue of its material origin and essence, presents no point of union for grace, then from such premises, no less than from the theory of an absolute corruption of human nature, such a result seems necessarily to follow. We know, however, too little of the system of Hermogenes to be able to affirm with certainty that such was the connection of his ideas. From the thesis we cannot argue with perfect safety to the antithesis; for it is possible that Tertullian may have been led, from Hermogenes having simply denied the original affinity of the soul to God, to maintain this doctrine against him, together with all its essential marks and characters, among which he reckoned the free will, although Hermogenes may not have wholly denied the freedom of the will; just as, in fact, Tertullian maintains the doctrine of the free will against Marcion, although we are not told anywhere that Marcion ever denied it.\* At all events, Hermogenes denied the natural immortality of the soul, and regarded immortality as a consequence simply of the new divine life imparted by Christ: he considered *believers alone* to be immortal. All evil—evil spirits, and men who have not become partakers of the divine life—were, in his opinion, finally to be resolved into the matter from whence they originally sprang.†

\* We must here remark, by way of supplement, that, in Marcion's system, this point still remains undecided. For the same reasons as in the case of Hermogenes such an hypothesis would perfectly accord with his system also, and it would moreover harmonize well with his ultra-Paulinism. But the prominent place which he gives to God's paternal love, and the manner in which he speaks of the arbitrary conduct of the God of the Old Testament, accusing him of having compassion on some, and hardening the hearts of others, make it quite improbable that Marcion ought to be considered as an advocate of the doctrine of absolute predestination.

† Vid. Theodoret. fab. hæret. I. c. 19.

Against this doctrine, therefore, of Hermogenes, Tertullian maintained "that the souls, sprung from that first soul which arose immediately from the breath of God, are immortal, endowed with free will, in possession of a faculty of divination—evident signs of their heavenly origin."\*

He considered all the parts and faculties of human nature as a work of God in itself good; and, therefore, everything contrary to reason in it was to his mind a consequence of that original schism which grew out of the first sin. The division which Plato makes of the soul into the λογικόν and ἄλογον he was willing to admit; though not in respect to the original, but only in respect to the corrupted, human nature.†

While the Gnostics, according to their doctrine of the different fundamental principles of human nature, maintained that a hylic or material nature could never be converted into a pneumatic or spiritual one, and that a spiritual nature could never be converted into a material one, Tertullian insisted, in opposition to them, on the almighty power of grace and the mutability of the human will. When they appealed to the declaration of Christ that an evil tree cannot bring forth good fruit, nor a good tree evil fruit, he replies, "If this is to be understood in your way, then God cannot raise up from the stones children to Abraham; then the generation of vipers cannot bring forth fruits to repentance; and the apostle was mistaken when he wrote, 'Ye also were sometimes darkness,' and 'We also were once by nature the children of wrath,' and 'such were some of you; but now are ye washed.' But do the declarations of the holy scripture contradict one another? No; for the evil tree will not bring forth good fruit, *unless it be grafted*; and the good tree will bring forth evil fruit, unless it be cultivated; and the stones will become children of Abraham, if they be formed to the faith of Abraham; and the generation of vipers will bring forth the fruits of repentance when they have thrown off the venom of wick-

\* Animam Dei flatu natam, immortalem, liberam arbitrii dominatricem, divinatricem. De anima, c. 22.

† De anima, 16. Naturale enim *rationale* credendum est, quod animæ a primordio sit ingenitum a *rationali* videlicet auctore; *irrationale* autem posterius intelligendum, ipsum illud transgressionis admissum atque (quod) exinde inoleverit in anima, ad instar jam naturalitatis, quia statim in naturæ primordio accedit.

edness. This the divine grace is able to do ; which, of a truth, is mightier than nature, to which the free will within us is subjected. As this last, too, is a natural thing and susceptible of change, so nature turns as this turns.”\* One might understand this remarkable passage as implying that even at this early period Tertullian attributed to grace an irresistibly attractive power over the corrupt will of man ; one might say that he asserted the freedom of the will merely in opposition to the doctrine of a natural necessity, to the affirmation of a complete moral insensibility in the case of *certain* natures, but not in respect to the soul-transforming principle of grace. Montanism might easily lead to insisting upon the overwhelming influence of the divine power, and to reducing the free will to a blind passive instrument. But the connection by no means authorizes us to give this language such an interpretation. For, according to the context, Tertullian is only intending to prove that grace, through its working on corrupt nature, can, by virtue of the free will, impart to it a higher power than dwells in itself, and thus transform it to something else ; and we are bound in justice to adopt that interpretation which best accords with Tertullian’s other explanations of free will. It is true, as we formerly remarked, that the peculiar and fundamental tendency of Montanism must have gone far towards causing its adherents to magnify the power of grace ; but even Montanism cannot be accused of rending asunder momenta which, in Christianity, belong closely together, and of giving predominance to one at the expense of the other. Even Montanism was far from ascribing to grace a constraining power, operating with irresistible might on the conversion of man. That it did not consider the agency of grace generally to be of this kind, may be gathered from the fact that it regarded such an operation of grace as implied a bare passivity on the part of man as an exception to the general rule,—as an extraordinary thing ;—supposed it to be confined to the prophets. Accordingly we find, even in Tertullian, a passage in which he speaks of such influences of grace, where everything depends solely on the divine influence, nothing on human

\* *Hæc erit vis divinæ gratiæ, potentior utique natura, habens in nobis subjacentem sibi liberam arbitrii potestatem, quæ cum sit et ipsa naturalis atque mutabilis, quoquo vertitur, natura convertitur. De anima, c. 21.*



concurrence—such extraordinary virtues as could be regarded only in the light of free gifts of divine grace, which God imparts to each individual as He pleases.\* But the very fact that it is only in such extraordinary cases that he ascribes the whole to the action of grace may serve as a proof that he did not consider such to be the general law which governs the evolution of the Christian life. And we are by no means warranted to conclude from such an expression that Tertullian when he so spoke was already a Montanist; for, in this particular case, our general remark find its application, that Montanism is to be regarded merely as the extreme result of tendencies and modes of thinking previously in existence.

But a directly opposite view spontaneously resulted from the process of development in the Alexandrian church. Thus Clement, unconsciously, combated the doctrine of the North-African church, while he intended simply to controvert the Gnostic dualism, which represented generation to be a work of the evil principle. “How then,” he asks, “could the children have sinned, or fallen under the curse of Adam, when they are chargeable with no actions of their own?”† The question here related to the explanation of those passages of the Old Testament which in the North-African church were adduced in proof of the doctrine of inherited sin. Job xiv. 4; Ps. li. 7.‡ Clement referred such and similar passages to man’s natural ignorance of God and divine things, to the power of sinful habits.§ Still it by no means follows from this that Clement did not believe in the doctrine of a fall from a state of moral purity. To the Gnostic dilemma|| above quoted he opposed the assertion that the first man was not created perfect, but with a capacity for virtue;¶ so that its cultivation and application depended on himself. To the

\* Quod bonorum quorundam sicuti et malorum intolerabilis magnitudo est, ut ad capienda et præstanda ea sola gratia divinæ inspirationis operetur. Nam quod maxime bonum, id maxime penes Deum; nec alius id quam qui possidet, dispensat, ut cuique dignetur. De patientia, c. 1.

† Strom. l. III. f. 453 et 469.

‡ See Cyprian’s collection of proofs from the scriptures of the doctrines of faith and morals, Testimonior. l. III. c. 54.

§ Συνηθεία ἡ ἀμαρτωλός. Τὰς πρώτας ἐκ γένεως ὁρμάς, καὶ αἱ θεὸν οὐ γινώσκουσιν, ἀσεβείας λέγει. Strom. l. III. f. 469.

|| See above, p. 344.

¶ Ἐπιτήδειος πρὸς τὴν κτῆσιν ἀρετῆς. Strom. l. VI. f. 662.

enticements of sensual pleasure he yielded in that childhood of his being when it was for him to decide according to his own free choice.\* While many Gnostics made the fall to consist in this, that the first man, yielding to sensuous appetite, gave himself up to the indulgence of the sexual propensity, whereby both himself and his entire prosperity came under the dominion of the *ὕλη*; Clement, on the other hand, regarded man's guilt to consist simply in his not having waited for the suitable period appointed by God for the satisfaction of that impulse.† Perhaps, therefore, he regarded the power of the sensuous appetites over the spirit as a consequence of the first disobedience—he probably supposed that by the guilt of man the sway of sense became continually stronger, in such sort, however, that it still depends on man's will to resist its enticements. Here, in the inclination he evinces to refer evil to the power of sense, we trace the influence of the ideas which, through his philosophical education, had found their way into his mind; and accordingly redemption and regeneration must in his view be referred mainly to the end of providing a way for the soul to partake of the divine life, by being delivered from these foreign elements. “It is not without special grace,” he says, “that the soul attains to this power of soaring aloft on wings, after having laid aside every weight, so as to be able to unite itself with its kindred element.”‡ The important point in Clement's view was, therefore, to recognise both the need of assistance which the free will stood in, and also the fact that grace was conditioned by its efforts, and was designed to meet its deficiencies. On this point he thus expresses himself:§ “When man seeks by his own endeavours and habits to emancipate himself from the slavery of his passions, he effects nothing. But when he manifests a true zeal and earnestness, then he gains the victory, by the accession of God's power; for God bestows his Spirit on willing souls. But when they remit their desire, the Spirit, which God bestows, is also with-

\* Παρήγετο ἐπιθυμίαις ὁ παῖς. Clement, like Philo, regarded the serpent as a symbol of ἡδονή. Protrept. f. 69.

† Τάχα που προλαβόντος τὸν καιρὸν τοῦ πρωτοπλάστου. Strom. l. III. f. 466. Ἐκινήθησαν θάττον ἢ προσῆκον ἦν ἔτι νέοι πεφυκότες, ἀπάτη παραχθέντες. L. c. f. 470.

‡ Οὐ χάριτος ἀνευ τῆς ἐξαιρέτου πτεροῦται τε καὶ ἀνίσταται καὶ ἀνω τῶν ὑπερκεκλιμένων αἴρεται ἡ ψυχὴ, πᾶν τὸ βερίδον ἀποτιθεμένη καὶ ἀποδιδούσα τῷ συγγενεῖ. L. c. l. V. f. 588.

§ Quis dives salv. c. 21.

drawn. The kingdom of heaven belongs not to the sleeping and indolent, but the violent take it by force." He was too strongly enchained by this dogmatical theory, too little capable of moving out of the circle of his subjective notions, rightly to understand, out of its own words, the Pauline type of doctrine—as appears, for instance, from his remarkably tortuous interpretation of 1 Corinth. i. 21. For in this passage, according to Clement, the last words are not to be taken as a question, but thus: it was not God who made the wisdom of this world foolishness, but it became foolishness through the guilt of man.\*

On this subject the system of Origen is quite peculiar; and in considering it, it will be necessary to bear in mind his theory, already explained, of an eternal creation. While the Gnostics sought to account for the difference among rational creatures, partly by a natural law regulating the graduated evolution of life proceeding from God, partly by their derivation from different fundamental principles, Origen referred all such differences to *moral freedom*. God, as the absolute unity, he taught, can only be a source of unity. So far as all existence springs from Him, the unity of his own essence must reveal itself therein. No difference, no manifoldness, can spring from Him. It would, moreover, be inconsistent with his love and justice not to bestow on all his creatures the same measure of perfection and blessedness.† God there-

\* Strom. lib. I. f. 313.

† Ritter, in his *Christlichen Philosophie*, Bd. I. S. 317, maintains that Origen's doctrine is based upon the thought "that created spirits in the outset did not actually partake of the good and of the perfect, but had simply received a faculty for all good. Their connate perfection consisted in this." But such a thought would certainly imply the notion of a development from a lower stage,—a progressive and graduated movement from the imperfect to the perfect; and it is evident that this view utterly clashes with the system of Origen. Origen does in truth conceive the perfect as the original state; he refers all imperfection to a fall, involving guilt because it was an act of freedom; and regards as the final consummation the restoration of the original state, and not the complete development of the capacities bestowed at the creation. This simply is the thought lying at the basis of his system,—that the rational spirit should maintain, by freedom as its property, the perfection bestowed on it already by the creation; and, having lost it, should recover it again by freedom;—that the fellowship with God, the source of all good in the rational creature, is not coercive, but can be preserved only by virtue of a free appropriation, and can be acquired

fore is to be originally contemplated as the fountain of a world of spirits, allied to his own nature, blessed by communion with him, the members of which were perfectly homogeneous. In the second book of his work *περὶ ἀρχῶν* he so expresses himself as if he considered not only all difference in the measure of powers and of blessedness, but, generally, all differences in individual existence, as not being original, but as having resulted in the first instance from the difference in the moral tendency of the will. According to this, Origen must have held the differences of the original creation to be that of beings perfectly equal and only numerically different; and all individual peculiarities to be consequences of estrangement from God. A very narrow conception, we must allow, of the creation, as ministering to the revelation and glory of God. Most characteristically, however (in spite of the Gnosticism and Platonism by which Origen was at other times governed), does it become manifest here that the Christian point of view (though but partially and narrowly apprehended) predominated in his way of thinking, and how a moral and teleological element gained the ascendancy so as to make all else depend upon it.\*

In Origen's predecessor, Clement, we already perceive how the exaggeration of one Christian principle, the doctrine of freedom—its exclusive consideration in opposition to the Gnostic distinction of natures—could lead to such a result as the ascription of whatever distinguished the apostles from other men, not to a peculiar nature bestowed on them by God, but entirely to the merit of the right direction of their own will. According to his opinion, they did not become such because they were chosen to be such by God, but they were chosen to their office by God because He foreknew what they would become by the guidance of their own will. In proof of this position Clement adduces the again only by the same means. This too is among the points which essentially distinguish the doctrine of Origen from that of Clement.

\* The importance of the free will, as connected with all spiritual development, is described by Origen in the following words: *Ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν σαμάρταν οὐ παρὰ τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοῦς σπειματικούς λόγους, ὁ μὲν τις ἐστὶ βραχὺς καὶ μικρὸς, ὁ δὲ μέγας, ὁ δὲ μεταξὺ· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ψυχῶν καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ αἱ τοιαίδε πράξεις καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἦθος τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχει τοῦ μέγαν τινὰ εἶναι ἢ μικρὸν ἢ ἐν τοῖς μεταξὺ τυγχάνειν.* In Matt. T. XIII. s. 26.



fact that even Judas Iscariot was one of the apostles; that Matthias, in consideration of his worthiness, was afterwards received into the number of the apostles in place of Judas.\* It was only necessary to work out this one-sided view,—so diametrically opposed to the doctrine of absolute predestination and divine decrees, and so totally subversive of any distinction of nature given by creation itself, while it ascribed everything solely to moral worth, and to carry it on to its legitimate consequences, in order to advance from the position of Clement to the system which Origen completed.

However, it may have been the case that at some later period Origen retracted this hypothesis, as he did many other immature ideas which he had brought forward in that work of speculative dogmatism. At least, in a passage of a later work,† he says that the Son of God is the universal brightness of God's glory, but that scattered beams of His glory were spread over the rest of the rational creation, since no created being could contain the whole of the glory of God. And in this it would seem to be implied that what in the Logos is one and the same unfolds itself in the rest of the world of spirits into a manifoldness of individual natures, of which each in his own peculiar way reflects and represents the glory of God, so that it is only the collective sum of all these individuals would correspond to the condensed manifestation of the glory of God in the Logos. This must doubtless have been the case if Origen had clearly developed to his own mind all that is involved in the thought which he expressed; but it may be questioned whether he ever did so. In a passage of the same commentary on John from which the one just alluded to is taken, he seems to consider it as the final end of this evolution that all the rational beings restored by the Logos to a perfect communion with God would have but one common employment—that of the intuition of God; and that, fashioned through the knowledge of the Father, they would know as completely what the Son is, as at present the Son (and the Son alone) knows the Father.‡ But since, according to the system

\* Οὐχ ὅτι ἦσαν ἐκλεκτοὶ γινόμενοι ἀποστολοὶ κατὰ τι φύσεων ἰδίωμα, ἐπεὶ ὁ Ἰουδᾶς ἐξελέγη σὺν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' οἷοί τε ἦσαν ἀποστολοὶ γινέσθαι ἐκλεγέντες πρὸς τοῦ καὶ τὰ τέλη προορωμένου. Strom. l. VI. f. 667.

† In Joann. T. XXXII. s. 18.

‡ In Joann. T. I. s. 16. See also the passage in Matth. T. X. s. 2, f.

of Origen, all things are, by that final consummation,\* to be restored to their original condition, it seems to follow that such a state of equality and unity was the one which *originally* existed.

Origen argued still further: God alone is by his own nature good; all created beings, on the contrary, are, and continue to be, good only by virtue of their fellowship with the original fountain of all good, the Logos. As soon as the desire arises in any rational being to be something for himself, evil exists. "What has become good," says Origen,† "cannot be in like manner good as that which is goodness by its own essence. It can never be wanting, however, to him who, for its preservation, receives into himself the so-called living bread. Whoever fails to obtain it fails by his own fault; since he neglects to partake of the living bread and of the true water, wherewith, nourished and refreshed, the wings grow."‡ Evil is the only thing which has the ground of its existence in itself, and not in God; which, therefore, generally, is grounded in no being, but is nothing else than an estrangement from the true being. It is that which has only a subjective and not an objective existence,—that which is in itself nothing.§

207: "Then the righteous will no longer shine in different ways, as at the beginning; but all will shine like one sun in the kingdom of their Father." Matth. xiii. 43. (Τότε μάλιστα οἱ δίκαιοι λάμπουσιν οὐκέτι διαφόρως, ὡς κατὰ τὰς ἀρχάς, ἀλλὰ πάντες εἰς ἕλιος.) Yet this passage of Origen could be understood as referring barely to an equality of moral condition and blessedness.

\* The ἀποκατάστασις.

† c. Cels. l. VI. c. 44.

‡ An allusion to the myth in Plato's Phædrus respecting the wings of the soul.

§ To Plato's metaphysical idea of the μὴ ὄν (according to which, if we have got a clear notion of it, evil is necessary as a limit to the evolution of life; and, consequently, the idea of evil, as to its moral import, is virtually annulled) Origen gave more of a moral significance. The μὴ ὄν here is, according to his view, rather privative than negative. See in Joann. T. II. s. 7: Οἱ μετέχοντες τοῦ ὄντος, μετέχουσι δὲ οἱ ἄγιοι, ἐν λόγῳ ἂν ὄντες χρηματίζοιεν οἱ δὲ ἀποστραφέντες τὴν τοῦ ὄντος μετοχὴν, τῷ ἑστέρῳ τοῦ ὄντος, γεγόνασιν οὐκ ὄντες. Hence I cannot at all admit the correctness of what Ritter says in his Geschichte der Christlichen Philosophie, Bd. I. s. 524, concerning Origen's theory: "A limitation of this sort, in which created spirits originally exist, might perhaps be regarded by Origen as an element in them of evil or impurity, since he considered evil generally to be simply a defect of goodness." Such a view is wholly at variance with the theory of Origen, who thought it of so much importance to define evil as a thing which has its ground in no natural necessity, but which is derivable only from an act of the free

Hence he says, "The assertion of the Gnostics, that Satan is no creature of God,\* has some foundation in truth; namely, to this extent, that, while Satan is indeed a creature of God in respect to his nature; yet as Satan he is not so."†

When the will of the spirits, who were blessed in a divine life, became estranged from God, the original unity was dissolved; a disharmony arose, which could only be restored to unison by a long process of purification and culture. The soul of the world is nothing but the power and wisdom of God, which is able to combine these great moral differences into one living whole, and which pervades and animates the universe, subjecting all dissonances to a higher law.‡

The corporeal world was brought into existence and constituted with a view to this end, that the spirits which had become incapable of the purely spiritual, divine life, might be brought to a consciousness of their estrangement from God, and of their culpable misery; that a craving after a restoration of their fellowship with the divine Fountain of Good might be awakened in them; that they might become more and more purified by conflict. The matter lying at the ground of the corporeal world is the indeterminate element, destitute of all properties, which first receives from the plastic hand of Omnipotence a certain form and pressure, which varied according as bodies of a higher or a lower order, ethereal or gross, were, in manifold gradations, to be formed out of it.§ Thus arise numerous grades of existence, from the spiritual to the sensuous, corresponding to the different stages of fallen beings.|| There exist intelligences which are united with,

will. The notions of imperfection and of moral evil are, according to his doctrine, to be carefully distinguished. God, it is true, is the holy, good being, in a sense in which no creature can be so called (see T. II. in Matth. s. 10); but moral evil is not an original element, but is to be traced only to a voluntary apostasy from God. The *μὴ ὄν* is not to be considered as a defect cleaving to created existence, but as a voluntary alienation from the *ὄν*.

\* See Part II.

† In Joann. T. II. s. 7.

‡ *Περὶ ἀρχῶν*, l. II. c. 1.

§ In the *ἐνυλος κόσμος* is to be distinguished *ἔλν* lying at the ground, and the *λόγος ὁ κοσμοῦν τὴν ἔλν*. In Joann. T. XIX. s. 5.

|| We here encounter a difficult question; viz. whether Origen supposed that from the beginning the *ἔλν* also was brought into existence, together with the world of spirits, as a necessary limit for the creature, so that the creaturely spirit must of necessity be always provided with a material organization, which, corresponding only to the stage of moral

though not so completely constrained by, a more exalted organization, designed to minister to and assist the other fallen

perfection, would be of a higher or lower order; or whether he traced to the fall the first origin of matter, and of the material world itself. If we were to confine ourselves to a passage in the work *περὶ ἀρχῶν*, we should be under the necessity of considering the former position as the doctrine of Origen. The remarkable passage (l. II. c. 2, s. 2) runs as follows: "Principaliter quidem creatas esse rationales naturas, materialem vero substantiam opinione quidem et intellectu solum separari ab eis et pro ipsis vel post ipsas effectam videri, sed nunquam sine ipsa eos vel vixisse vel vivere." From this we should be led to represent the subject as Ritter understands it; namely, that the conception of matter arises simply from an abstraction of the sum total constituting the creaturely existence; that it is nothing else than the objective conception of the limit of creaturely existence, of that which forms the boundary of individual existence,—just as the Platonists taught that the conception of matter could be apprehended only by the *λόγος νόθος*. And it is quite certain that the antithesis between body and spirit vanishes, to our apprehension, if we think of the manifold gradations in the attributes or properties stamped on the *ἕλη*, and by abstraction go back to the undetermined somewhat which lies at the ground of all these; *μένειν τὸ ὑλικόν, τῶν ποιότητων μεταβαλλουσῶν εἰς ἀφάρασίαν*. In Joann. T. XIII. s. 59. This too would harmonize with his doctrine concerning the glorious organization after the resurrection, which rests doubtless on the same general foundation, and with his doctrine concerning the transfigured, ethereal bodies of the angels; *τὰ τῶν ἀγγέλων σώματα αἰθέρια καὶ αὐγοειδὲς φῶς*. In Matth. T. XVII. s. 30. And to the souls of the planets he ascribes a *σῶμα αἰθέριον καὶ καθαρώτατον*. De orat. c. 7. In this case we must, with Ritter, consider this mode of expression as a strictly scientific one, to which everything else should, in Origen's sense, be referred. Where, on the other hand, he speaks of a production of matter which ensued at some later period, it must be understood to be a case in which, descending from the strictly scientific position, and accommodating himself to a more popular mode of thinking, he leaves the position of the *γνώσις* for that of the *πίστις*. But we greatly doubt whether we are warranted to ascribe to Origen a speculative theory of this sort, so rigidly carried out and uniformly adhered to. We do not believe that there is any good reason for explaining all his assertions belonging to a later period, which seem to contradict what is here affirmed, according to the theory set forth in the work *περὶ ἀρχῶν*; for, in the case of a man whose mode of thinking combined speculative elements, borrowed from other quarters, with others derived from Christianity, it is obvious how easily he might be led to retract, at some later period, many things which he had put forth in his first attempt at a speculative system of doctrine. In this work itself he rather puts down the matter as problematical, than decides on it with confidence. In Joann. T. I. s. 17—where, indeed, he expresses himself, not in a positive manner, but in the form, *ἀναγκαῖον ἐπιστῆσαι εἰ*—he distinguishes an *ἄυλος πάντη καὶ ἀσώματος ζῶν*, as the original, from al



spirits. These dwell in the planets,\* and perform a painful service of love, yearning for the time of universal restoration, when, relieved from this burden, they shall be raised once more to a pure state of existence, emancipated from all that is sensuous (the earnest expectation of the creature spoken of in Rom. viii. 19).† According to Origen's doctrine, these higher intelligences owe it to their own free will alone, to their own merit, that they occupy this elevated rank in creation; and that, being united in this free manner to the corporeal world, they have received such an organization of a higher, glorious, and more ethereal kind. The question may now arise: Did Origen regard these beings as having taken no share in the first fall, but as having, by their unalterable fidelity to the Creator, entitled themselves to this place in the universe? In this case he must have supposed that, by virtue of the free direction of their own will, some among the rational existences had persevered in goodness, while others swerved from it; but that those even who had remained steadfast must enter into a connection with the corporeal world,—not as a due punishment of their guilt, but of their own free choice, submitting thereto in order to promote the good of their fallen fellows. The more therefore do they long for that period when, the end of the universal purification having been attained, they too shall be released from this burdensome service. Or perhaps—and the doctrine set forth in the work *περὶ ἀρχῶν* is certainly more favourable to this view of the matter—Origen did not consider these intelligences to be those who had remained wholly unaffected by the general defection of the created existence, but simply those who had taken the least share in it, and who consequently, by virtue of this determination of their will, whereby they at least distinguished themselves from the rest, obtained this position in the universe. But if this was his train of thought, then Origen took away from free will with

corporeal existence, even from every free connection with an organization of transfigured mould. And, in Joann. T. XIX. s. 5, he opposes this later formed corporeal world to the *κόσμος νοητός*, subsisting alone: Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ δεικνύμενος κόσμος ὑλικὸς γενόμενος διὰ τοὺς δεηθέντας τῆς ἐνύλου ζωῆς τόπους μὲν ἔχει διαφόρους, οἵτινες δὴ πάντες, ὡς μὲν πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ τὰ ἁσώματα, κάτω εἰσὶν, οὐ τόσον τῷ τόπῳ ὅσον τῇ πρὸς τὰ ἄρατα συγκρίσει. And he says that the formation of the *κόσμος ἐνυλος* is not without reason described as a *καταβολή*.

\* See above, p. 37

† See, *e. g.*, de Martyr. s. 7.

one hand what he gave to it with the other; for, in this case, free will no longer makes a difference between the beings who persevered in goodness and those who fell from it, but only between those who deviated to a greater or to a less extent; and therefore moral evil appears to be a something necessary to created existence,—at least in a certain degree, or as a necessary point of transition.

We see before us only a fragment of that great course of the world which alone embraces all moral diversities, together with all the consequences, which, up to their entire removal at the general consummation, flow out of them; and hence our defective, limited Theodicée.\*

From Origen's doctrine it necessarily followed that human souls were originally the same in kind with all higher spirits; that the difference between the former and the latter, and between the former compared with each other, proceeded only from a diversity in the moral bent of the will of the several individuals; that accordingly all souls are fallen heavenly beings. All consciousness in time, which moves between opposites, and the understanding, which is directed to things finite, resulted simply from the estrangement from that unity of the divine life of immediate intuition; and the true destination of the soul is to be purified, and to return once more to that life which consists in the pure, immediate intuition of God; or, since the life of the spirit was changed to a life of the soul by the quenching of the heavenly fire, the soul is to be again transfigured into spirit.†

His theory of the soul's preëxistence is opposed to the doctrine of the *Creationists*, who taught that each individual soul is formed by an immediate creative act of God (a doctrine which seemed to him irreconcilable with the love and the justice of God, which extend equally to all his creatures), and also to Tertullian's Traducianism (or the doctrine of the generation of souls)—which he regarded as gross and sensual. In order to be able to maintain his own peculiar and speculative theory of the origin of souls, without clashing with the teaching

\* Homil. IV. in Jes. s. 1.

† Παρὰ τὴν ἀπόπτωσιν καὶ τὴν ψύξιν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ ζῆν τοῦ πνεύματος γέγονεν ἡ νῦν γενομένη ψυχὴ· νοῦς πῶς οὖν γέγονε ψυχὴ, καὶ ψυχὴ καταθ-  
θωθῆσα γίνεται νοῦς. Π. ἀρχ. l. II. c. 8. Compare the similar view of the Gnostics above.

of the church, he insisted (as he had before done in defending his theory of a creation antecedent to the creation of this temporal world) that these points had been left undecided by the church.

But on the doctrine concerning an adherent corruption of human nature he expressed himself precisely in the same manner as the teachers of the North-African church. He could speak of a mystery of the birth,\* through which every individual that comes into the world needs purification; and in defence of this view appealed to the same texts of scripture which others adduced to support the doctrine of original sin. Only he traced this condition of human nature to another source; namely, to the personal guilt of each fallen heavenly spirit in an earlier state of existence. Now, according to Origen's theory, this corruption was not the same in all; but its degree depended on the degree of the previous guilt. Although he considered Adam to be a true, historical person, yet he regarded him in no other light than as the first incarnate soul which had fallen from the heavenly state of existence. Like the Gnostics, he too gave a symbolical explanation of the narrative of Paradise; representing it as the symbol of a higher spiritual world, Adam being the type of mankind at large, of all fallen souls.†

In his work *περὶ ἀρχῶν*, Origen—here too agreeing with the Platonists and with many of the Gnostics—had admitted the doctrine (as one which at least could not be directly disproved) that fallen souls might, through total degeneracy, sink as low as the bodies of brutes.‡ But as his system differed essentially from the Neo-Platonic, by insisting on the moral, teleological principle peculiar to Christianity, his principles, as they became more clearly fixed in his mind, must have ultimately led him to reject altogether the doctrine of *such* a transmigration of souls, as inconsistent with that end of purification which pre-

\* Μυστήριον τῆς γενέσεως.

† c. Cels. l. 4, s. 40: Οὐχ οὕτως περὶ ενός τινος, ὡς περὶ ὅλου τοῦ γένους ταῦτα φάσκοντος τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου. It is reconcilable with this that Origen, in speaking of Adam on other occasions, expressed himself wholly *after the manner of the church*, as in Joann. T. I. s. 22; T. XIII. s. 34. He might understand the language in his own sense, especially in *homilies*, to which the *gnosis* did not properly belong. Hom. XIV. in Jerem.

‡ See the Greek fragment π. ἀρχ. l. I. Orig. ed. de la Rue, T. I. f. 76.

supposes the continuance of consciousness.\* The doctrine which, in agreement with the *ethico-teleological* point of view, he held of the soul's purification being carried on by a continual process up to *its final restoration*, forms rather the direct opposite to that hypothesis of a *cycle of metempsychoses*, which grew out of the predominant habit of contemplating the course of nature.

Origen, like the Gnostics, placed in man's fallen nature three principles, the *σαρκικόν*, the *ψυχικόν*, and the *πνευματικόν*; and also supposed three different stages or positions of human nature corresponding to these principles. But he differed from them in one essential point. As he acknowledged all human souls to be the same in kind, so he held that the original principle of all was the same, and consequently he represented the different stages as resulting, not from any original difference of natures, but from the predominance of some one or other of those principles determined by the different tendencies of the will. The spirit (*πνεῦμα*) is the highest element in man's nature; it is that which is immediately divine, that whereby man is connected with a higher order of things—the organ through which alone he is capable of understanding divine things. It is not liable to be affected by evil, or to be corrupted or alloyed by anything foreign. Nothing evil, nothing but what is divine, can proceed from it.† At most it can only retire wholly out of view and become dormant through man's guilt,—being hindered from revealing itself and from acting by the predominance of sense, of the lower faculties of the soul, of a worldly temper. In the words of the Apostle St. Paul, concerning an opposition between the works of the flesh and the works of the spirit, Origen finds a confirmation of his opinion, since he refers the latter to the spirit in man, as contradistinguished from the flesh,—the active principle in all that is good.‡ The reaction of the inward presentiment of God and of conscience against ungodliness he derives from this *πνεῦμα*. Herein is revealed a commanding, judging,

\* See c. Cels. l. III. c. 76; II. 16, in Jerem., where he speaks of metempsychosis in a parabolical sense, carefully guarding against the misconception which would arise from taking his language literally.

† Ἀνεπίδεκτον τῶν χειρόνων τὸ πνεῦμα. In Joann. T. XXXII. s. 11.

‡ Τὰ κάλλιστα καρποὶ λέγονται εἶναι τοῦ πνεύματος, οὐχ ὡς ἂν οἰηθεῖν τις, τοῦ ἁγίου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.



punishing power, superior to the soul itself.\* Those men in whom the soul surrenders itself entirely to the guidance of this πνεῦμα, in whom this faculty is predominant, are on this account denominated spiritual men, πνευματικοί.† In the case of those who are the true saints, the unity of the whole life is grounded on the fact of its being determined by this πνεῦμα,—this is the governing principle of their whole life. Living in the spirit, all they do and suffer proceeds from it—it is that which gives their conduct its true import and significancy.‡ From this point of view Origen ought to have been led to see (what seems to lie at the basis of all that is here said) that it is by this unity grounded in the godlike alone (the essence) that the destination of human nature can find its completion, its fulfilment,—that the true end of man consists in this very thing. Yet he says that, where St. Paul opposes the πνευματικός to the ψυχικός (1 Cor. ii. 14, 16), he describes the *latter* only, and not the former, as men; since man consists of body and soul, but the πνευματικός is more than man.§ And this form of expression is not a mere isolated exaggeration, possessing no farther meaning or bearing on the fundamental principles of his theology, but it stands closely connected with that leading tendency, already described, which inclined Origen, both in theory and in practice, to regard the godlike not as the *truly* human element, but as something super-human,—a tendency in which we recognised the reaction of a

\* In his commentary on Romans, l. II. where Origen refers what St. Paul says concerning conscience to the workings of this πνεῦμα, he expresses himself, according to Jerome's translation, as follows: Quia ergo tantam ejus video libertatem, quæ in bonis quidem gestis gaudeat semper et exsultet, in malis vero non arguatur, sed ipsam animam, cui cohæret, reprehendat et arguat, arbitror, quod ipse sit spiritus, qui ab apostolo esse cum animo dicitur, velut pædagogus et quidam sociatus et rector, ut eam de melioribus moneat vel de culpis castiget et arguat. Ed. Lomm. T. VI. p. 107.

† Οὐ κατὰ μετοχὴν ἐπικρατοῦσαν χρηματίζει ὁ πνευματικός. In Joann. T. II. s. 15.

‡ Ὡς γὰρ ὁ ἅγιος ζῇ πνεύματι, προκατάρχοντι τῶν ἐν τῷ ζῆν καὶ πάσης πράξεως καὶ εὐχῆς καὶ τοῦ πρὸς Θεὸν ὕμνου, οὕτως πᾶν ὃ, τι ποτ' ἂν ποιῇ, ποιεῖ πνεύματι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάσχει, πάσχει πνεύματι. In Joann. T. XXXII. s. 11.

§ Ἡμεῖς γὰρ οὐ μάτην αὐτόν [the Apostle Paul] φαμὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ πνευματικοῦ μὴ προστεθεικέναι τὸ ἄνθρωπος, κρείττον γὰρ ἢ ἄνθρωπος ὁ πνευματικός, τοῦ ἥτοι ἐν ψυχῇ ἢ ἐν σώματι ἢ ἐν συναμφοτέροις χαρακτηριζομένου· οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ τούτων θειοτέρῳ, πνεύματι; L. c. T. II. s. 15.

principle which, belonging to the old world,\* still remained to be vanquished by Christianity. And connected with this distinction of the *πνεῦμα* from the *ψυχή*, as the purely human element, is his doctrine that those in whom the *ψυχή* surrendered itself to the guidance of the *πνεῦμα* would persevere in the unity of the existence thus animated by the *πνεῦμα*, and in the perfected state of their essence, as soon as they should be thoroughly penetrated by the *πνεῦμα*, would rise to a higher life after death. On the other hand those, in whom the *ψυχή* always resists the *πνεῦμα*, would after death be forsaken by the latter, which would return to God from whom it came, while they themselves, separated from the *πνεῦμα*, would be given up to woe; †—a doctrine which it is very difficult to reconcile with Origen's idea of a purifying process going on after death, and of an universal restoration as the final end of all things. Moreover he ascribed to this *πνεῦμα*—as follows from his idea, which we have already unfolded, of the relation subsisting between the rational being and God—no self-government, no independent self-subsistence, but regarded it as the organ destined to receive into itself and to represent the workings of the Divine Spirit. According to his doctrine the *πνεῦμα* in man can be active only by its connection with the Divine Spirit. ‡

As Origen then supposed a threefold division of human nature, so he distinguished three different stages of moral development; according as the *πνεῦμα*, the *ψυχή*, or the *σάρξ* predominated. The second stage, where the personal *I*, estranged from God, is uppermost (though there may coëxist

\* Thus by Aristotle (Ethic. Nicomach. X. 7) the contemplative life, as the divine, which answers to the godlike in man, to the *νοῦς*, is placed above the practical, which he considers to be the purely human: *εἰ θεῖον δὲ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον*; and yet he says of the *νοῦς*—*τοῦτο μάλιστα ἀνθρώπος*.

† The passages which we here cite are taken from works which have only been preserved to us in Latin translations; the fidelity of which, however, on these points, we have no reason to suspect. Commentar. ep. ad Rom. l. II. c. 9, p. 108, ed. Lomm. Hic ipse spiritus est, qui coheret animabus iustorum. Si vero inobediens ei anima et contumax fuerit, dividetur ab ea post excessum. Commentar. series in Matth. c. 62, T. IV. p. 352, ed. Lomm.

‡ In Matth. T. XIII. s. 2: "Ἐτερον εἶναι τὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ πνεῦμα, καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν ἢ, παρὰ τὸ πνεῦμα ἑκάστου ἀνθρώπου τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ; which latter he here also distinguishes from the *ψυχή*.

with it a certain dominion over sense), where the soul follows its egoistic inclinations, is the stage of a certain merely worldly cultivation, of an intelligent Egoism, where, though no enthusiasm for moral goodness impels the man, still moral evil does not break out into any violent excesses,—where, in short, as Origen expresses it, the man is neither cold nor hot. This stage, considered in itself, holds the middle place between the two others; yet it may be asked from which point is it easiest to attain the divine life? Origen proposes the question whether the *σαρκικός* (the carnal man) might not be led more easily than the *ψυχικός* (the spiritual man) to a conviction of sin, and thereby to true conversion.\* Connected herewith is Origen's idea that, in the same way as a wise physician will sometimes call forth the elements of disease lurking in the body, and by means of his art cause other disorders to arise from them, with the view of expelling by this expedient the elements of disease which threatened to destroy the entire organism; so God places men in situations where the evil lurking in their nature is stimulated to violent outbreaks, in order to bring them thereby to a consciousness of their moral disorder, and of its pernicious effects, and so to heal them the more easily and radically.† In this sense he explains the scriptural expression, God hardens the heart, and the like.

As Origen regarded the self-determination of the free will in the creature as the original ground of all the diversities existing among rational beings, so he also supposed it was likewise this which conditions the whole subsequent process of purification and development, including all its stadia up to the final goal of restoration.‡ Accordingly, it is with him an important point to define the notions of God's foreknowledge and of predestination as contradistinguished from the doctrine of an

\* *Περὶ ἀρχῶν*, l. III. c. 4.

† See de orat. c. 29, and the fragment of the commentary on Exod. c. x. 27; in the 26th chapter of the *φιλοκαλία*, and in the 2nd vol. ed. de la Rue, f. 111. "Ὅσπερ ἐπὶ τινῶν σωματικῶν παθήματων, εἰς βάθος τοῦ, ἢ οὕτως εἶπω, κηχωρηκότος κακοῦ, ὁ ἰατρός εἰς τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν διὰ τινῶν φαρμάκων ἔλκει καὶ ἐπισπᾶται τὴν ὕλην, φλεγμονὰς χαλεπὰς ἐμποιοῦν καὶ διαιρήσεις καὶ πόνους πλείονας ὧν εἶχε τις, οὕτως οἶμαι καὶ τὸν θεὸν οἰκονομεῖν τὴν κρύβιον πακίαν εἰς τὸ βάθος κηχωρηκυῖαν τῆς ψυχῆς. T. VIII. p. 305, ed. Lomm.

‡ Τὸν θεὸν ἐκάστην οἰκονομεῖν ψυχὴν, ἀφορῶντα εἰς τὴν αἰδίον αὐτῆς ζωὴν αἰὶ ἔχουσιν τὸ αὐτεξούσιον. De orat. s. 29.

εἰμαρμένη, or of an unconditional necessity. He teaches that God, having taken into view all the different bents of will, and all the possibilities of which they were the condition,\* arranged accordingly the plan of the universe. He distinguishes, in moral evil, an objective and a subjective necessity. Even though an existing moral evil must exhibit itself in this or that determinate form, still it is not therefore necessary that this or that determinate evil should be brought about by this or that particular individual.†

From the exposition already given of Origen's doctrine respecting the relation of the spiritual world to God, and of the spirit (πνεῦμα) in man to the Holy Spirit (πνεῦμα ἅγιον), little doubt can remain as to the way in which grace and free will are, in his system, made to harmonize with each other. In this view he says, "As the good thrift of husbandry requires the coming together of two factors, the husbandman's own activity and the blessing of God; so, in order to goodness in rational beings, there must be their own free will and the power of God to uphold the good purpose.‡ But man's free will and God's assistance are both necessary, not only to *becoming* good, but also to perseverance in virtue when once attained; since even the perfect man would fall, if he became proud of his goodness, and ascribed it to himself—if he failed to give the honour which is due to Him who bestowed on him all chiefly by which he was enabled both to attain to virtue and to persevere in it.§

From what then in the Anthropology of this period we have found to have been held in common by all, it is evident that, not only—as was the case even among the Gnostics—the doctrine of a Redeemer found a sympathy in the need of redemption universally felt, but also—and this constituted the difference between the Anthropology of the church and that of the Gnostics—that none supposed human nature to be so beset with moral evil as to exclude the possibility of a complete appro-

\* See the commentary on Genesis.

† Ἀνάγκη ἐστὶ, ταῦτα ἐλθεῖν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη δὲ διὰ τοῦδ' ἑνός. In Matth. T. XIII. s. 22.

‡ Τὸ τοῦ λογικοῦ ἀγαθὸν μικτόν ἐστιν ἐκ τε τῆς προαιρέσεως αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς συμπενοῦσης θείας δυνάμεως τῇ τὰ κάλλιστα προσιλομένῃ.

§ From the commentary on ψ. IV. Philocal. c. 24, ed. Lomm. T. XI. p. 450.



priation of it by the Redeemer. Hence, from the very first, the mind of the church was gradually developed in antagonism with Docetism under all its forms and degrees. This opposition to Docetism is strongly marked in such passages of the epistles ascribed to Ignatius as by their stamp of antiquity form a decided contrast to the *prevailing* tone of these letters. It is here said of the Docetæ, in an original way, "They, who would make nothing but a spectre of Christ, are themselves like spectres—spectral men."\* And Tertullian says to the Docetæ, "How is it that *you* make the half of Christ a lie? He was all truth."† "You are offended," he says in another place,‡ "when the child is nourished and fondled in its swaddling clothes. This reverence shown to nature you despise—and how were you born yourself? *Christ*, at least, loved man in this condition. For his sake he came down from above; for his sake he submitted to every sort of degradation, to death itself. In loving man he loved even his birth, even his flesh."

In opposition no less to Docetism, which, taking offence at a Christ in the form of a servant, would acknowledge none but a glorified Christ, than to the æsthetic Paganism which idolized the beautiful, § the person of our Saviour was represented as being without form or comeliness, as that of one whose outward appearance contradicted the glory within—a notion which was based partly on a passage in the 53rd chapter of Isaiah, too literally understood, and partly on misinterpreted passages in the gospels. Tertullian says, || "This was the very thing which excited men's wonder as to everything else in Him when they said, Whence hath this man this wisdom and these mighty works? The exclamation comes from men who even thought they might despise his form."¶

If we here compare Tertullian with the Alexandrians, we see at once the great advantage which the former, from deriving everything solely from his own Christian consciousness, possessed over the latter, whose notions had been blended with other elements of a foreign culture—in short, by his

\* Αὐτοὶ τὸ δοκεῖν ὄντες ἀσώματοι καὶ δαιμονικοί. Ep. ad Smyrn. s. 2.

† Quid imitidias mendacio Christum? Totus veritas fuit. De carne Christi, c. 5.

‡ L. c. c. 14.

§ See vol. I., the Introduction.

|| De carne Christi, c. 9.

¶ Nec humanæ honestatis corpus fuit, nedum cœlestis claritatis.

decided tendency to view Christianity in a real light. We have already, in our exposition of Gnosticism, remarked how close a connection subsisted between the peculiar essence of the Christian system of morals and the views entertained concerning the person and life of Christ. The contemplation of Christ's life was destined to give birth to a new ethical standard, and from it was to proceed the peculiar principle of the Christian system of morals. But in those cases where the ethical principle itself was adulterated by the influence of other principles which had been conjoined with the Christian, this corruption reacted also on the views entertained of the person and life of Christ. An instance of this kind has been already noticed in the case of the Gnostics; and the same result may be observed in the writings of Clement of Alexandria. Founding his judgment on that moral system which demanded an absolute estrangement from all human feelings, and which made the Neo-Platonic philosophers, and other ascetics of that period, ashamed of their own bodies, he was incapable of understanding such a revelation of the divine life in the pure human form as was presented in the person of Christ. Instead of the pure human character, he was for the superhuman. Christ was to represent the Ideal of the renunciation of sense—of a life wholly independent of the sensible; unaffected by sensuous impressions, by any wants, such as hunger or thirst, by feelings of pain, by agreeable or disagreeable sensations: He was, in short, the ideal of a perfect ἀπάθεια. The incarnate Logos must in his essence have been superior to such things; and so the genuine Gnostic, in imitation of him, should strive to attain, by the efforts of his will, to a similar apathy. He says characteristically, "It would be absurd to suppose that in the case of our Saviour the body, as such, required for its support the care necessary to us; he ate, not for the body's sake, for this was preserved by a divine power."\* Now this principle might have led him to a Docetism of his own. The contemplation of Christ, as He is presented in the gospel history, exercised, however, too great a power over him,—the historical truth was a thing of too much weight with him to allow him

\* Ἐπὶ τοῦ σωτῆρος τὸ σῶμα ἀπαιτεῖν ὡς σῶμα τὰς ἀναγκαίαις ὑπηρεσίαις εἰς διαμονὴν γέλωτος ἂν εἴη, ἔφαγεν γὰρ οὐ διὰ τὸ σῶμα, δυνάμει συνεχόμενον ἀγία. Strom. l. VI. f. 649.

to come to such a conclusion. He would go no further than to say that Christ was not subject by any necessity of nature to those various wants and affections; but that of his own free choice He became subject to them, out of voluntary condescension and for the welfare of man, and in order to give such a proof of the reality of His humanity as should leave no room or pretext for Docetism.\* We must, however, do Clement the justice to acknowledge that, along with this distempered element, there was in his ethical tendencies (so far as they were influenced by his contemplation of the life of Christ†) much which was sound and healthy—as, for instance, when in another passage he is speaking against the ascetical contempt of the body, he says, Christ would not with the health of the soul have restored that of the body also, if there were really any enmity between the body and the soul. ‡

With the line of thought which caused Clement to overlook the purely human element in Christ, the other, which led him, from exaggerated notions of the servant-form, to imagine that Christ possessed an uncomely person, would seem to stand in direct contradiction. And of himself undoubtedly he never would have arrived at any such view. Having however received it by tradition from the church, he contrived to make it harmonize with his own peculiar habits of thought, by adopting the following application of it. Since, he observes, the Godlike presents itself in this mean, uncomely shape, men should be led thereby to despise sensuous beauty, and to soar by spiritual contemplation from the sensuous to the Godlike, which is exalted above all that partakes of sense. § No one, for instance, should, by admiring the beauty of their form, be

\* Accordingly he says of Christ, "Ἀπαξ ἀπλῶς ἀπαθὴς ἦν, εἰς ὃν οὐδὲν παρεσδύεσθαι κίνημα παθητικόν, οὔτε ἡδονὴ οὔτε λύπη.

† Compare the remarks in Vol. I. p. 386, on the reaction of the Christian spirit in Clement, against a one-sided ascetic tendency.

‡ Οὐκ ἂν δὲ, εἰ ἔχθρα ἢ σάρεξ ἦν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐπιτείχιζεν αὐτῇ τὴν ἐχθρὰν δι' ὑγιείας ἐπισκιάζων (probably it should read, according to Hervet's emendation, σκιυιάζων); he would not have taken the hostile σάρεξ under his protection. Strom. I. III. f. 460.

§ The words of Clement respecting Christ are, Ἐν σαρκὶ μὲν αἰδὴς (as, beyond all doubt, the reading should be), as may be gathered from the following context, and from the allusion to Isa. liii. 2: διελήλυθεν καὶ ἄμορφος, εἰς τὸ αἰδὴς καὶ ἀσώματον τῆς θείας αἰτίας ἀποβλέπειν ἡμᾶς διδάσκων. Strom. I. III. f. 470.

thereby misled into giving less heed to the substance of Christ's discourses.\*

This view of Christ's person, as one who appeared in the form of a servant, in Origen's mind took a different shape, more in harmony with the whole spirit of his system. We explained formerly the connection between his doctrine of the different stages in Christianity and his idea of the different forms of manifestation of the divine Logos. The Logos becomes all things to all, in a far higher sense than that in which St. Paul would say it of himself. Now Origen applied this view to Christ's temporal appearance. He becomes all things to all men, appears to them in different forms, suited to their reciprocity. To some he reveals Himself in his glory, in a celestial light which spreads from Himself to His word; so that, having come in this higher way to the knowledge of Christ himself, they can now, for the first time, understand it in the plenitude of its meaning—nay, in a light which reflects itself even on the Old Testament, which thereupon becomes transfigured by its relation to Christ, now at length known in his glory. To others he appears only in the form of a servant, as one without form and comeliness—namely, to those who are unable to rise beyond the temporal appearance, to the contemplation of the Logos who reveals himself in it.† According to this view the Christ of the transfiguration, and the Christ without form or comeliness, as men ordinarily represented him, would be nothing less than the designations of two different ways—dependent on the reciprocity of the subject—of contemplating one and the same Christ, whom in his divine exaltation all were not in a condition to know. Thus to Origen it must have appeared indispensable that the mass of believers should frame to themselves the conception of Christ as of one who

\* Οὐ μάτην ἠθέλησεν εὐτελεῖ χρήσασθαι σώματος μορφῇ, ἵνα μή τις τὸ ὥραϊον ἱπαινῶν καὶ τὸ κάλλος θαυμάζων, ἀφίστηται τῶν λεγομένων καὶ τοῖς καταμειπομένοις (this latter word offers here no good sense. It can neither mean,—*what should be left behind*, nor *what has been left behind*. I have scarcely a doubt that the correct reading is *καταβλεπομένοις*. Moreover, the composition with *κατα* has a force in this connection—the looking downward to the object of sense, instead of upward—*ἀνω βλέπειν πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ*) προσανέχων, ἀποτέμνηται τῶν νοητῶν. Strom. l. VI. f. 690.

† Ὁ σωτὴρ μᾶλλον Παύλου τοῖς πᾶσι πάντα γινόμενος, ἵνα τοὺς πάντας κερδήσῃ. In Joann. T. XX. s. 28; and in respect to the *two-fold μορφή* in which Christ appeared, in Matt. T. XII. s. 37.



appeared without form or comeliness. Their whole view of Christ and Christianity (which, at the position they occupied, could take no other shape) reflected itself under this particular form. And accordingly he must have considered the transfiguration simply as a symbol of that higher form of beholding in which Christ presented himself to his more advanced disciples.\* Yet, while Origen regarded particular facts as symbols of universal ideas, or of a general stadium in the evolution of the spiritual life, he by no means denied, in so doing, the objective reality of such facts, which at the same time answered to a more universal idea; and accordingly, in his mind, this more general view of the transfiguration of Christ in no wise precluded its historical reality. If Origen was prone to explain away the objective into the subjective, so, on the other hand, he was inclined to represent the subjective as something objective, of which we have already seen many examples. And thus it happened that the profound idea of the necessarily manifold gradations in men's views of Christ assumed an objective shape to his mind, as so many different forms which Christ assumed relatively to the different positions held by the men with whom he had intercourse. As the number of the forms of revelation (*μορφαί*) in which the Logos presents Himself to the spiritual world belongs to his essential character, so in this respect also Christ in his own temporal appearance mirrored forth the activity of the Logos himself. It pertains to his peculiar and essential character that he had no unchangeable, determinate form, but appeared, according to the different characters of men, to some in the lower form of a servant—to others divested of this form, and in a shape of light in affinity with his godlike nature. In this way did Origen explain to himself the fact of the transfiguration, and several other phenomena in the gospel history.† The whole

\* See c. Cels. l. IV. c. 16, where he says of those who received the account of Christ's transfiguration too literally and sensuously, *Μη νοήσαντες τὰς ὡς ἐν ἱστορίαις λεγόμενας μεταβολὰς ἢ μεταμορφώσεις τοῦ Ἰησοῦ.*

† C. Cels. l. VI. c. 77: *Τὸ παραλλάττον τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ πρὸς τοῖς ὁρᾶσι δυνατὸν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο χρήσιμον, τοιοῦτο φαινόμενον, ὅπῃ ἔδει ἐκαστῷ βλέπεισθαι.* This is applied to the transfiguration, of which he at the same time says, *Ἐχει τι καὶ μυστικὸν ὁ λόγος, ἀπαγγέλλων τὰς τοῦ Ἰησοῦ διαφόρους μορφὰς ἀναφίρεσθαι ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου φύσιν,* in the sense already expounded. In perfect harmony herewith is the passage which has been preserved to us only in the Latin translation: *Quoniam non solum duæ formæ in eo*

view was closely connected with his notions of the fundamental matter of the corporeal world, as something indeterminate, and which was to run through various metamorphoses from the higher to the lower.\*

The complete victory over Docetism implied the complete recognition of the pure human nature in Christ; and the latter was impossible apart from the supposition that he possessed a human soul. Yet this particular point did not at first stand forth clearly and fully developed before the dogmatic consciousness. At most the two conceptions, the λόγος in his essential divinity, and the σάρξ, from which all the human characteristics proceeded, were clearly separated and distinguished from the very first. True, if men were disposed to carry through the identity of Christ's person with the human nature, they must necessarily have been driven to ascribe to him a soul with human feelings; but still all this, as we see from the example of Irenæus, was referred simply to the σάρξ, the flesh taken from the earth.† Although this same father says that Christ gave his own body for our body, and his own ψυχή for our ψυχή; and we are constrained, in this distinction, to understand by the term ψυχή, not life, but the soul;‡ yet, at least, he makes no further use of this distinction, in other cases, where he speaks of Christ as man. Justin seems to have applied the common trichotomy of man's nature to Christ, with the following modification: Christ, as the God-man, consisted, like every other man, of three parts—the body, the

fuerunt, una quidem, secundum quam omnes eum videbant, altera autem secundum quam transfiguratus est coram discipulis in monte, sed etiam unicuique apparebat secundum quod fuerat dignus. Commentar. Series in Matth. s. 100. Ed. Lomm. T. IV. p. 446.

\* Οὐ θαυμαστὸν τὴν φύσει τρεπτὴν καὶ ἀλλοιωτὴν καὶ πάσης ποιότητος ἢ οὐ τεχνίτης βούλεται δεκτικὴν ὅτε μὲν ἔχειν ποιότῃτα, καθ' ἣν λείγεται τὸ οὐκ εἶχεν εἶδος οὐδὲ κάλλος, ὅτε δὲ οὕτως ἐνδοξον καὶ καταπληκτικὴν καὶ θαυμαστὴν, ὡς ἐπὶ πρόσωπον πισεῖν τοὺς θεατάς. c. Cels. l. VI. s. 77.

† The emotions excited at the approach of death are classed under the σύμβολα σαρκὸς τῆς ἀπὸ γῆς εἰλημμένης. Lib. III. c. 22.

‡ See the words of Irenæus, l. V. c. l. s. 1: Τῷ ἰδίῳ αἵματι λυτρωσαμένον ἡμᾶς τοῦ κυρίου καὶ δόντος τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἡμετέρων ψυχῶν καὶ τὴν σάρκα τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀντὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων σαρκῶν. As the thought here is, that Christ surrendered to Satan—who claimed a power over man's soul and body—his own body, as a ransom for the men whom he held captive, the word here can hardly be understood otherwise than of the human soul.

animal soul (the lower principle of life), and the thinking reason; but with this difference, that in Christ the place of the fallible human reason, which is but a ray of the divine reason, of the λόγος,\* was held by the universal divine reason,† by the λόγος itself:‡ and therefore it was in Christianity alone that the universal revelation of religious truth, a revelation not disturbed by partial, one-sided representation, would be given.§

Tertullian was the first to express distinctly and clearly the doctrine that Christ possessed a proper human soul; having been led to this by the views which he entertained in general concerning the relation of the soul to the body, and by the direction of his controversy mainly to the doctrine of the person of Christ in particular. He did not, like others, hold that human nature consisted of three parts, but only of two. He affirmed that the animating principle of the body was not a mere animal soul, distinct from the reasonable soul, but that in all living things there is but one animating essence, although in man the latter is endued with superior powers, that the thinking soul itself, therefore, is the animating principle of the human body. || If, then, Tertullian acknowledged but *one* soul as the medium between the divine Logos and the body of Christ, he must necessarily have ascribed to Him a reasonable human soul. Again, he was engaged in controversy with a Valentinian sect, who taught that Christ, instead of veiling his soul in a gross material body, so modified the ψυχή itself that, like a body, it could be visible to men under the dominion of sense. Against these he maintained, that it was necessary to distinguish, in the person of Christ, as in the case of every man, soul and body, and what belongs to both; that Christ, in order to redeem men, was under the necessity of uniting to himself a soul of the same kind as belongs pecu-

\* The σπέρμα λογικόν, the λόγος σπερματικός, the λόγος κατὰ μέρος.

† Λογικὸν τὸ ὅλον.

‡ Apolog. II. s. 10. One might, however, be led to suspect that the words, καὶ σῶμα καὶ λόγον καὶ ψυχήν, are the interpolation of a somewhat later hand, who wished to make Justin orthodox on this article, since this precise definition occurs nowhere else in Justin's writings, and does not come in here quite consistently. Still we must admit that the first reason is of little force, and the second of none at all, in the case of a writer like Justin.

§ Justin is, in time, before Apollinaris.

|| De anima, c. 12.

liarly to man; and so much the more as the soul constitutes man's proper essence.\*

But still greater influence than Tertullian ever possessed was that which the systematizing intellect, and the conciliatory, apologetic bent of Origen, exercised in unfolding and establishing this doctrine in the church's system of faith. In this matter, however, he did not proceed upon speculative principles, but upon an analogy drawn from the Christian consciousness. As the divine life in believers leads them back to Christ as its original source, it was, therefore, by the analogy of this union between Christ and believers, that he endeavoured to illustrate the union of the Logos with the human nature in Christ. If, as St. Paul says, believers become of one spirit with the Lord, this is true in a far higher degree with *that* soul which the Logos had taken into indissoluble union with himself. According to the theory of Origen, it is in truth the soul's original destination to surrender itself wholly to the Logos, and, by virtue of its communion with him, to live wholly in the divine element. Now that which in the case of other souls is found to be true only in the highest moments of the inner life—namely, that they pass wholly into union with the divine Logos, lose themselves completely in the contemplation of God—was, in the case of that soul, a continuous and uninterrupted act, so that its entire life rose to the communion with the Logos: it became altogether deified.†

As, moreover, Origen distinguished in every man‡ the spirit (πνεῦμα) from the soul (ψυχή) in the more limited sense of the word, so too he applied here also this distinction. § As human nature in general attains to moral perfection in proportion as everything in it is determined by the spiritual principle (the πνεῦμα), so this has been completely and perfectly realized only by Christ. “If this is so in the case of holy men, how much more must we affirm it of Jesus, the forerunner of all saints, in whose case, as He assumed the entire human nature, the πνεῦμα was the moving spring of all else that was human in Him!” ||

\* De carne Christi, c. 11, and onwards.

† Οὐ μόνον κοινωνία ἀλλ' ἔνωσις καὶ ἀνάκρασις, τῆς ἐκείνου θεότητος κοινωνηκέναι, εἰς θεὸν μεταβιβηκέναι.

‡ See above.

§ See above.

|| In Joann. T. XXXII. s. 11 Οὐ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐν τῷ ἀνεληφέναι



But, as we have often remarked, a leading point in Origen's system was that in the spiritual world everything depends on the moral bent of the will. To this general law in the divine order of the world he could not allow that the highest dignity to which any soul had attained formed any exception. That soul had merited, by the true bent of its will, by the love whereby it had remained constantly united with the divine Logos, to become, in the manner above described, wholly one with him, wholly divine.\* He explained the words in Ps. xlv. 5, as referring to such a fusion of this soul with the Logos, as they had deserved by the direction of their will.

But here arises a question of some importance in its bearing on the system of Origen. Had the intelligence which was taken into such indissoluble fellowship with the Logos been affected by the general defection and fall of the creature, and did it differ from all other intelligences which had in some way or other departed from that original unity, only by the circumstance that, in surrendering itself to the divine Logos, the universal Redeemer, it had become not only freed from all the consequences of that defection, but also elevated to a higher community with God than it ever possessed, and thereby precluded from the possibility of any future separation? Or did this intelligence take no part whatever in the defection of the others? Was it secured against this defection by the steadfast perseverance of its fellowship with the Logos; and by the same means did the divine life, which it first received into itself by the bent of its will, pass wholly into its essence? If we assume the latter to be agreeable to the general ideas of Origen, an important consequence would follow in relation to

ναὶ αὐτὸν ὅλον ἀνθρώπον τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ διέσεισε τὰ λοιπὰ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀνθρώπινον. A dogmatico-ethical remark: but which Origen—as he often did, in introducing his own doctrinal and speculative distinctions into the scriptures—would base upon a text, from which, however, in its literal sense, the remark is altogether foreign, viz.—the “ἐταράχθη τῷ πνεύματι.” John xiii. 21.

\* Π. ἀρχ. l. II. c. 6. c. Cels. l. II. c. 9; l. III. c. 41. In Joann. T. I. s. 30; T. XIX. s. 5, where he says, quite in the Platonic manner, Ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἱμπολιτευομένη τῷ ὅλῳ κόσμῳ ἐκείνῳ—the κόσμος νοητός, τῶν ἰδίων, synonymous with the νοῦς or the λόγος itself—καὶ πάντα αὐτὸν ἱμπεριερχομένη καὶ χειραγωγούσα ἐπ’ αὐτὸν τοὺς μαθητευομένους. In Joann. T. XX. s. 17; T. III. opp. ed. de la Rue, f. 226. In Matth. f. 344 et 423; T. XIII. s. 26; T. XVI. s. 8. Commentar. ep. ad Rom. lib. I. T. V. p. 250, ed. Lomm. In Jerem. Hom. XV. s. 6.

his principle of change in the creature. It would appear from this that he did not hold the defection from the original unity to be an absolutely necessary transition in the development of every creature; for at least the example of this *one* intelligence would be evidence to the contrary.

Now, when we reflect that, according to Origen's theory, the *νοῦς* first became *ψυχή* by the fall, there seems good reason (especially as he carefully distinguishes, even in Christ, between the *πνεῦμα* and the *ψυχή*) why, in the spirit of his theory, we should apply this principle also to the soul which, by the steadfast determination of its will, had attained to that indissoluble union with the Logos. We must therefore suppose that, as the spirit first became soul by its defection from the original unity, and as it is the end of restoration that the souls, returning to the original unity, should divest themselves of their psychical being and penetrate again to the pure life of the spirit,\* — so, before all others, and in a still higher manner, this particular soul had attained to this end, and therefore became the mediatory instrument of conducting all other fallen souls to the same end. But it is nevertheless impossible to retain this view of the matter consistently with Origen's general ideas. For in this case it would be implied throughout, that what in Christ is denominated a soul is not properly such; we must all along assume that the soul in Christ, which had returned to the pure being of the *νοῦς*, had merely made itself like to the fallen souls, in order to their recovery,—had taken to itself an outward veil of psychical being, and entered into the contracted sphere and divided being of the psychical life, for the purpose of conducting it back again to that higher unity. And in truth we might find some confirmation of this view in the language of Origen.† But when we have once assumed the necessity of such a procedure in the case of the soul of Christ, which had returned to the pure life of the spirit, then the reason (derived from the gene-

\* Οὐκ ἐτι μένει *ψυχή* ἢ σωθεῖσα *ψυχή*.—ἔσται, ὅτε οὐκ ἔσται *ψυχή*. De princip. l. II. c. 8, s. 3. So he says, as an encouragement to martyrdom, Εἰ θελομεν ἡμῶν σῶσαι τὴν *ψυχήν*, ἵνα αὐτὴν ἀπελάβωμεν κρείττονα *ψυχῆς*, μαρτυρίῳ ἀπολέσωμεν αὐτήν. Ad Martyr. s. 12.

† Τάχα γὰρ ἡ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ *ψυχή* ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῆς τυγχάνουσα τελειότητι ἐν θεῷ καὶ τῷ πληρώματι ἦν ἐκείθεν ἐξεληλυθυῖα, τῷ ἀπειστάλλθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς, ἀνέλαβε τὸ ἐκ τῆς Μαρίας σῶμα. In Joann. T. XX. s. 18.

ral bearing of Origen's ideas) at once disappears, which compelled us to suppose that the intelligence which the Logos had taken into such a fellowship with himself must also have shared in the general defection of the creature. It now becomes evident that Origen may have so conceived the matter as to suppose this intelligence to be one which from the beginning had not become a soul by falling, but which had only assimilated itself to the fallen souls by a voluntary humiliation. We shall thus be forced to the other view, which in many respects harmonizes better with Origen's general system. It would now be quite consistent that this intelligence, which had always persevered in the original unity, should, on this very account, deserve to be appropriated by the Logos, as an organ indissolubly united with himself, for the purpose of extending that redemption, which it did not need for itself, to other beings who were in want of it. This view becomes strengthened when we find Origen distinguishing this intelligence above all others, as one which, from the beginning of the creation, had ever continued inseparably united with the Logos,\*—where, however, we must understand by the creation the original one, and not that which was first occasioned by the fall. Accordingly he could designate this spirit as one which, free from all contact with the corporeal world, ever lived in the contemplation of the intelligible world (the *κόσμος νοητός*), the latter being identical with the Logos; † for the defection from the original unity invariably implies, according to Origen's doctrine, some contact or other with the corporeal world. Thus Christ might be said to be without sin, in a sense in which no other creature could, since that intelligence had never been touched by evil.‡ Although, by virtue of the mutable will which is characteristic of the creature, it was, like all others, subject to be tempted to evil, yet, since it stood this test where the others fell, therefore, by its unalterable submission to the Logos, it attained to a divine life exalted above all temptation to evil; and what was originally the work of its free will now became a second nature.§ Yet, in

\* Ab initio creaturæ et deinceps inseparabiliter ei inhærens. De princip. l. II. c. 5. s. 3.

† In Joann. T. XIX. s. 5; ed. Lomm. T. II. p. 188.

‡ In Joann. T. XX. s. 25.

§ Quod in arbitrio erat positum, longi usus affectu jam versum in

so saying, Origen meant by no means to assert that the soul, when arrived at such an immutable state of the divine life, dispensed with the free will belonging to its own essence; for in that case indeed, on his own principles, he certainly must have believed that such an essence would itself be annihilated. He ascribed to this soul, even after the incarnation of Christ, a self-determining power,\* though persisting in union with the *πνεῦμα*, and thereby with the Logos. But here, if we examine into the connection of his ideas, the question will arise, how, supposing he thought of this soul as having already attained to such perfection, he could still ascribe any human development to Christ in his earthly existence—how, in his case, this could be anything else than a mere appearance. And yet he believed he could fully receive all that is said in St. Luke ii. 40, of the progressive development of the child Jesus; and this progress he considered to have its ground in the free will of Christ.† But, according to Origen's doctrine, a similar difficulty attaches itself to the earlier, conscious, personal existence of the soul generally, in the case of *every human* development.

We have to mention one other particular point, in which the connection between Origen's anthropology and christology is very clearly exhibited. Holding it as a general principle

naturam. De principiis, l. II. c. 5, s. 5. We may now refer also to those words of Origen in which he expressly guards against a conclusion which possibly might be drawn from his doctrine; viz. that every rational creature *must necessarily*, at some time or other, yield to the temptation to sin. Sed non continuo, quia dicimus, nullam esse creaturam, quæ non possit recipere malum, idcirco confirmamur, omnem naturam recepisse malum, id est malam effectam. L. c. l. I. c. 8, s. 3. As the translation of Rufinus cannot be perfectly relied on, we should not venture to make use of these words to determine what was Origen's opinion, unless what we would prove from them might be gathered also from the general train and connection of his thought, as it has been shown in the text that it may. But in order to bring all Origen's positions into harmony, we must suppose that he did not always use the *ψυχή* in the same sense, but took it sometimes in a more general sense, to denote the spirit or intelligence generally, and sometimes in a more limited one, in contradistinction to *νοῦς* or *πνεῦμα*.

\* By the *ἰφ'* ἡμῖν τῆς *ψυχῆς*. In Matth. T. XIII. s. 26; ed. Lomm. p. 257.

† L. c.: 'Ὡς γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ *ἰφ'* ἡμῖν τῆς *ψυχῆς* αὐτοῦ ἦν ἡ ἐν σοφίᾳ προκοπὴ καὶ χάριτι, οὕτως καὶ ἐν ἡλικίᾳ. By the last term Origen means the ἡλικία πνευματική.



that to the worthiness of each soul corresponds the character of the instrument or organ given it as a body, in which its peculiar essence might stamp itself, he applied the same principle to the relation between the body and soul of Christ. The most exalted of all souls was veiled in the most glorious of all bodies;—only, during its earthly existence, this glory was still hidden; breaking forth, only at individual moments, on such individuals as were capable of receiving it, as a foretoken of what should one day come to pass. By virtue of Christ's exaltation to heaven, this body (a thought which, as we have already seen, perfectly harmonizes with Origen's doctrine of matter, as an element in itself undetermined and capable of endless modifications of form), this body is now freed from all the defects and limitations of the earthly existence transfigured to an ethereal character, more nearly akin to the essence of the Spirit and of the divine life.\*

By the way in which Origen developed this doctrine, *one* difficulty which must have struck reflecting minds in considering the doctrine of the incarnation of the Logos, though the many may never become conscious of it, was removed. The difficulty concerned the way in which the divine Logos could become united with a human body, and the purely human nature be transferred to him. This difficulty now vanished as soon as it was assumed that the Logos did not appropriate to himself the body immediately, but that he appropriated to himself the soul as his natural organ. Thus, also, it became possible to conceive of everything that belongs to human nature existing, unalloyed, in Christ. However, in place of the former difficulty, another now arose;—how, in this combination with a human soul, persevering in its own individuality, could the unity of Christ's person and life be maintained. We have already seen how Origen supposed that this difficulty also might be surmounted. But this view seems to have given offence to many, who brought against him the accusation that, like many of the Gnostics, he distinguished from each other a superior and an inferior Christ, or *a Jesus* and *a Christ*; or that he represented Jesus as a mere man, who differed from other holy men in nothing but the possession

\* See c. Cels. l. I. c. 32; l. II. c. 23; l. III. c. 42; l. IV. c. 15; l. VI. c. 75 et seq. On the ubiquity of the glorified body of Christ, see in Matth. T. IV. f. 887, ed. de la Rue.

of a higher degree of fellowship with the Logos, and therefore only in degree.\* Thus we see here, also, the germ of a controversy which sprang up in the following period.

As regards the work of Christ as the Redeemer of mankind, we already find at this period, in the language employed by the Fathers on the point under consideration, all the elements which form the basis of the doctrine as it was afterwards defined by the church; the elements which, grounded in the Christian consciousness itself, indicate how Christ manifested himself to the religious feelings and to the convictions thence resulting, as a deliverer from sin and its consequences, a restorer of harmony in the moral order of the universe, a bestower of divine life to human nature. But on this point no opposition had as yet arisen, such as would be likely to constrain men to distinguish and accurately to analyze what was involved in their conceptions. In this period we hear, for the most part, only the language of immediate religious feeling and intuition; and hence, in comparing the expressions of these fathers with the later doctrines of the church, men were liable to err both in ascribing to them more, and in finding in them less, than they really contained.

The doctrine of redemption has a negative and a positive moment. The former relates to the removal of the disturbance which had been introduced into the moral order of the universe, by delivering man from its enmity with God;—the second, to the glorifying of mankind when delivered therefrom, or to making it a partaker of the divine nature. As respects the first, a certain peculiarity in the mode of thinking on this point presents itself to our notice, which, as we meet with it under different modifications in men of the most diverse principles and tendencies,—in a Marcion, an Irenæus, and an Origen,—we may consider as a general expression of the Christian consciousness of this period. The idea is this: Satan hitherto had ruled mankind, over whom he had acquired a certain right, because, under the temptation to sin, the first

\* See the Apology of Pamphilus in behalf of Origen, T. IV. f. 35, and several of the passages above cited, in reference to his doctrine on the union of the Logos with the soul in Christ,—in which passages he considers it necessary to guard against any such misinterpretation of his doctrine; as, for instance, in Matth. T. XVI. s. 8, towards the end, where he adds, Πλὴν σήμερον οὐ λύω τὸν Ἰησοῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ.

man fell, and was thereby brought under servitude to the evil one. God did not deprive him of this right by force, but caused him to lose it in a way strictly conformable to law. Satan attempted to exercise the same power which he had thus far exercised over mankind, on Christ, a perfectly holy being, whom he meant to treat like the rest, as a man in all respects the same with them; but here his power was baffled, for he found himself overmatched. Christ, being perfectly holy, could not remain subject to the death which Satan, by means of sin, had brought on mankind. By Him, as the representative of man, the human race has been delivered, on grounds of reason and justice, from the dominion of Satan—he has no more claims upon it.\* Marcion, as we formerly saw, simply transferred to the Demiurge that which in the view of the church was true of Satan. The basis of the whole theory is the idea of a real objective power, which the ungodly principle had acquired over humanity, which had made itself its slave, and of a real objective triumph over that power, by the redemption, as a legal process in the history of the world, corresponding to the requisitions of the moral order of the universe. All that is necessary here is to distinguish the inadequate form, in which the fundamental idea has enveloped itself, from this idea itself.

In Irenæus we find combined with this negative moment a positive one, in which the original state of humanity is represented as a perfectly holy life, enjoying the communication of a divine life, which should sanctify and refine it in all the stages of its development. His ideas on this subject, which are scattered through his writings, amount, when put together, nearly to what follows:—"The Word only of the Father Himself could declare to us the Father; and we could not learn from Him, unless the teacher himself had appeared among us.

\*† This is what Irenæus refers to when he says (I. V. c. 1), *Rationaliter redimens nos, redemptionem semetipsum dedit pro his, qui in captivitatem ducti sunt. Et, quoniam injuste dominabatur nobis apostasia, et, cum natura essemus Dei omnipotentis, alienavit nos contra naturam, suos proprios faciens discipulos, potens in omnibus Dei verbum et non deficiens in sua justitia, juste etiam adversus ipsam conversus est apostasiam; non cum vi, sed secundum suadellam, quemadmodum illa initio dominabatur nostri; sed secundum suadellam, quemadmodum decebat Deum suadentem, et non vim inferentem, accipere quæ vellet, ut neque quod justum est confringeretur, neque antiqua plasmatio Dei deprimeret.*

Man must become accustomed to receive God into himself, and God, on his part, to dwell in humanity. The Mediator betwixt both must once more restore the union between them by His relationship to both; He must pass through every age, in order to sanctify every age—in order to restore the perfect likeness with God, who is perfect holiness.\* In a human nature which was like to that burdened with sin, he condemned sin, and then banished it, as a thing condemned, out of human nature, Rom. viii. 3; but he required men to become like him. Men were the prisoners of the evil one, of Satan; Christ gave himself a ransom for the prisoners. Sin reigned over us, who belonged to God; God delivered us, not by force, but in a way of justice, inasmuch as He redeemed those who were His own. If He had not, as man, overcome the adversary of man—if the enemy had not been overcome in the way of justice—and, on the other hand, if He had not, as God, bestowed the gift of salvation, we should not have that gift in a way which is secure. And if man had not been united with God, he could have had no share in an imperishable life.† It was through the obedience of one man that many must become justified and obtain salvation, for eternal life is the fruit of justice. The import of the declaration that man is created in the image of God had hitherto not been clear,‡ for the Logos was as yet invisible. Hence man too easily lost his likeness with God. But when the Logos became man, He set the seal to both. He truly revealed that image by becoming, Himself, that which was His image; and He exhibited incontestably the likeness of man to God, by making man like to God, who is invisible.” §

In Irenæus the sufferings of Christ are represented as having a necessary connection with the righteous deliverance

\* See the remarks on a former page respecting the relation of the *εικὼν* to the *ὁμοίωσις τοῦ Θεοῦ*.

† The communication of a divine life to mankind through Christ, the *ἔνωσις πρὸς ἀφθαρσίαν*.

‡ Two ideas are here to be taken together; one (which may be found even in Philo), that man, as the image of God, was created after the image of the Logos; the other, that in the person of the God-man, as the original type of humanity, God designed to represent the ideal of the whole human nature. *Limus ille jam tum imaginem induens Christi futuri in carne, non tantum Dei opus, sed et pignus filii, qui homo futurus certior et verior.* Tertull. de carne Christi, c. 6; adv. Praxeam, c. 12.

§ Vid. Iren. l. III. c. 20, Massuet (according to others, 22); l. III. c. 18 (20), 31; l. V. c. 16.



of man from the power of Satan. The divine justice displays itself in allowing even Satan to have his due. Of a satisfaction paid by the sufferings of Christ to the divine justice not the slightest mention is as yet to be found; but doubtless there is lying at bottom of all his views the idea of a perfect fulfilment of the law by Christ—of His perfect obedience to the holiness of God in its claims to satisfaction due to it from mankind. In Justin Martyr, however, we may recognise the idea of a satisfaction rendered by Christ through suffering; such at least is the foundation of all his reflections, though perhaps it is not clearly unfolded nor held fast in the form of a conscious thought; for Justin says,\* “The law pronounced a curse on all men, because no man could fulfil it in its whole extent (Deut. xxvii. 26). Christ by bearing it for us delivered us from this curse.” His train of thought here can be no other than this:—Crucifixion denotes curse, condemnation; nothing of that sort could touch Christ, the Son of God, the Holy One: in reference to himself, this was only in appearance.† The import of this curse concerned mankind, who were guilty of violating the law, and were therefore involved in condemnation. In order to free mankind from this condemnation, which rested on them, Christ took it upon Himself. The *for*, in this case, passes naturally over to the *instead*. The author of the *letter to Diognetus* thus brings together the active and the passive satisfaction, yet with predominant reference to the former, when he reduces the whole to the love of God, which in itself required no reconciliation, and was itself the author of the reconciliation—“God, the Lord and Creator of the universe, is not only full of love to man, but full of long-suffering. Such He is, and ever was, and such He will ever continue to be—supremely kind, without anger, true, the alone good. He conceived a vast and ineffable counsel, which he communicated to none but his Son. So long as He reserved this as a hidden counsel in his own mind, he seemed to have no concern for us. He left us, during the ages past, to follow our lusts at will, not as though He could have any pleasure at all in our sins, but in order that we, having in the course of that time, by our own works, proved ourselves unworthy of life, might be made worthy by the grace of God; and that we, having

\* Dial. c. Tryph. Jud. c. 30, f. 322, ed. Col.

† Δολοῦσα κατὰρα. f. 317.

shown our own inability to enter into the kingdom of God, might be enabled to do so by the power of God. But when the measure of our sins had become full, and it had been made perfectly manifest that punishment and death were ready to be our reward, he neither hated us nor spurned us, but showed us his long-suffering. He even took upon Himself our sins, He even gave his own Son a ransom for us, the Holy One for sin; for what else could cover our sins but his righteousness?"

According to the connection of ideas which has just been exhibited as peculiar to Origen, the highest end of Christ's earthly manifestation and ministry is to *represent* that divine activity of the Logos, which, without being confined to any limits of time or space, aims at purifying and restoring fallen beings. Accordingly, all his actions possess a higher symbolical import, to master which is the great problem of the Gnosis; but thereby, as is shown in the case of his miracles, the saving effect which they are calculated of themselves to produce is by no means excluded; and in this way, alongside of his own views, Origen still maintains whatever was held by the general consciousness of all Christians relative to the redeeming sufferings of Christ. Under this head we find much that the general ideas of his system could never have led him to adopt, but to which he must have been carried by some other way quite independent of them. To speak of a feeling of sin, a sense of being forsaken of God, in the case of the soul of Christ, which he regarded as perfectly holy, exalted above all contact with evil—for all this there was neither ground nor occasion in his own speculative ideas. But many of the facts of the gospel history led him to recognise such a connection between Christ and the whole spiritual life of humanity that had estranged itself from God, as in virtue of it Christ felt the trespass of the latter as if it were His own—and what no conception could grasp he was enabled to construe to himself by an intuition springing out of the inmost depth of his being. Thus he could affirm of Christ that which is intelligible only to him who is at home in the world of Christian consciousness: "He bore in himself our infirmities, and carried our sorrows; the infirmities of the soul, and the sorrows of the inner man; on account of which sorrows and infirmities, which he bore away from us, he says that his soul is troubled and full of an-

guish.”\* And in another place—“This man, the purest among all creatures, died for mankind: He who took on Himself our sins and infirmities, because He could take on Himself, and so destroy, the sins of the whole world.”†

Origen believed that by a hidden law, pertaining to the moral order of the universe, the self-sacrifice of a perfectly holy being must serve to cripple the power of evil, and to emancipate the beings held by it in bondage. He saw a proof of this in the wide-spread opinion that innocent individuals had, by a voluntary sacrifice of themselves, saved whole populations and cities from impending calamities.‡ In agreement with the prevailing views of this period (already explained) Origen also held that it was not to God, but to Satan, that the ransom for those whom the latter held in captivity was paid. By this holy soul, which it was impossible for him to hold in the bonds of death, the power of Satan must necessarily be broken.§

The peculiar manner of Christ's death serves to satisfy Origen that it resulted from a perfectly voluntary act. He died at the precise point of time when he chose to die, not succumbing to an outward force, like those whose limbs were broken. From this circumstance he endeavours to explain the unusual quickness of his death. ||

A necessary connection between redemption and sanctification was involved throughout by the Christian view of the work of redemption and of the union with Christ. A clear apprehension of the relation subsisting between the conceptions which on this matter grew out of the Christian consciousness will of itself enable us to perceive that this was so.

\* With reference to Isa. liii. 4, 5. Αὐτὸς ἐβάστασι ἀσθενίας τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ νόσους τὰς τοῦ κρυπτοῦ τῆς καρδίας ἡμῶν ἀνθρώπου, δι' αὐτὸς ἀσθενίας καὶ νόσους βασιτάσας αὐτὰς ἀφ' ἡμῶν περίλυπον ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν ὁμολογεῖ καὶ τεταραγμένην. In Joann. T. II. s. 21.

† L. c. T. XXVIII. s. 14.

‡ L. c. T. VI. s. 34; T. XXVIII. s. 14.

§ Τίτι ἔδωκε τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ λύτρον ἀντι πολλῶν; οὐ δὴ τῷ Θεῷ μήτι οὖν τῷ πονηρῷ; οὗτος γὰρ ἐκράτει ἡμῶν, ἵως δοθῇ τὸ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν αὐτῷ λύτρον, ἢ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ψυχὴν, ἀπατηθῇ, ὥς δυναμίσῃ αὐτῆς κυριῦσαι, καὶ οὐχ ὁρῶντι ὅτι οὐ φέρει τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ κατέχειν αὐτὴν βάσανον. In Matth. T. XVI. s. 8.

|| Ὅς βασιλείῳ καταλιπόντος τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἐνεργήσαντος μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ ἔξουσίας. In Joann. T. XIX. s. 4; ed. Lomm. T. II. p. 172. In Matth. Lat. ed. Lomm. T. IV. p. 73 et seqq.

Godlike life and a holy life—these were inseparable notions in the Christian mind ; both were comprehended in the single notion of ἀφθαρσία—incorruption. Now the Logos was regarded as the source of this life ; Christ as the appearance of the Logos in humanity—as the Mediator of this higher life to human nature—as the one through whom, in every stage of its development, it became pervaded and rendered holy by such a divine life. By faith in Christ, in baptism, each individual became incorporated into the fellowship with Christ, and consequently penetrated by this divine life the principle of holiness. Christ was understood to be the destroyer of Satan’s kingdom, and to this kingdom was ascribed whatever partook of the nature of sin. It was by becoming united to Christ through faith that each was bound to make this triumph of Christ over Satan’s kingdom his own. Hence the Christian was converted from a miles Satanæ into a miles Christi.\* Moreover, the idea of the universal priesthood of all Christians had its root in this conviction.

We will here introduce a few examples to illustrate the way in which this connection between redemption and sanctification, faith and life, was conceived by some fathers of the church. Clement, bishop of Rome, after having emphatically borne his testimony to the truth that no man can be justified by his own righteousness and his own works, but that every man must be justified by the grace of God and by faith alone, goes on to say, “What are we to do, then, my brethren? Shall we be weary in well-doing, and leave off charity? The Lord forbid that this should ever be done by us; but let us, with unremitted zeal, strive to accomplish all the good we can; for the Creator and Lord of all takes pleasure in his own works.”† The author of the letter to Diognetus, immediately after the beautiful passage already quoted, on the redemption, thus continues:—“With what joy wilt thou be filled when thou hast come to the knowledge of this; and how wilt thou love Him who so long before loved thee! But if thou lovest Him, thou wilt be an imitator of his goodness.” Irenæus thus draws the contrast between that voluntary obedience which flows from faith, and the slavish obedience under the law:—“The law, which was given to bondmen, disciplined the soul by means of outward and sensible things, dragging it, as it were, in chains

\* See Vol. I. p. 428.

† Vid. ep. I. ad Corinth. s. 32, 33.



to obedience to its commands ; but the Word, which sets us free, urges us to a voluntary cleansing of the soul, and thereby of the body. When this has been done, the chains of bondage, to which man has become inured, must indeed be removed, and he must follow God without chains. But the requisitions of freedom extend all the farther ; and obedience to the King must become a fuller obedience if we would not turn back again and prove ourselves unworthy of our Deliverer ; for He has not therefore freed us that we might go away from Him ; since no one that forsakes the fountain of all good, which is with the Lord, can by himself find the food of salvation ; but He has freed us for this, that, the more we have obtained, the more we might love Him. To follow the Saviour is the same as to partake of salvation, and to follow the light is the same as to partake of the light." \*

But as we have seen that a confounding of the Jewish with the Christian point of view, and the giving an outward objectivity to spiritual things, was the main cause of the corruption of the Christian consciousness generally, so in this particular of the notion of faith the same disturbing element is discernible. By degrees that view of it which the Apostle St. Paul had set forth in opposition to the Judaizing principle became more and more obscured, and instead thereof appeared the Jewish notion of a certain faith on outward authority ; not one which was suited to produce out of itself, through a necessary inner connection, all the fruits of the Christian life, but one which was only to draw after it, in an outward way, by means of new moral precepts and new motives addressed to the understanding, the new habits of Christian living. We have already noticed how this notion of faith led to the depreciation of mere faith (*πίστις*) among the Gnostics, and in part among the Alexandrian fathers also, and how the reaction of Marcion tended to the reëstablishment of the Pauline view. But to the material and outward conception of faith on this side was united also a material and outward conception of the system of morals, which was rent from its inner connection with the system of faith. And from this there followed, side by side with an outward system of faith, a legal system of duties and good works, in which the ascetic element had greatly the ascendancy over the assimilating principle. And in connection with

\* Lib. IV. c. 13, 14.

this might arise the notion of a supererogatory righteousness, a perfection surpassing the requisitions of the law, which strove to fulfil the so-called councils of Christ (*concilia evangelica*) by the renunciation of all earthly goods.\*

A great influence in confirming this outward and material view of faith must have been especially exerted by the way in which the fellowship of life with Christ, instead of being considered to flow from the inner appropriation of Christ, was made to depend on the outward mediation of the church — a point on which we have already spoken. To this outward mediation of the church belonged the *sacraments*. As the essential character of the invisible and that of the visible church were not carefully discriminated, a little confusion of the divine thing with its outward sign must, from the same cause, affect the doctrine of the sacraments. In the case of *baptism* this is shown in the prevailing notion of a divine power being imparted to the water, and of its bringing about a sensible union with the whole nature of Christ for the deliverance of the spiritual and material nature of man. “As the dry wheat,” says Irenæus, “cannot become dough and a loaf without moisture, so neither can we all become one in Christ without the water which is from heaven. And as the parched earth cannot yield fruit unless it receive moisture, so neither can we, who at first are but sapless wood, ever produce living fruit without the rain which is freely poured out from above; for *our bodies through baptism, but our souls through the Spirit*, have obtained that communion with the imperishable essence.”† Tertullian finely remarks concerning the effects of baptism,‡ “When the soul attains to faith, and is transformed by the regeneration of water and the power from above, the veil of the old corruption being removed, she beholds her whole light. She is received into the fellowship of the Holy Spirit; and the soul which unites itself with the Holy Spirit is followed by the body, which is no longer the servant of the soul, but becomes the servant of the Spirit.” But even Tertullian did not understand here how to distinguish rightly

\* See vol. I. p. 379.

† Lib. III. c. 17. The divine principle of life for soul and body in Christ, the *ἑνωσις πρὸς ἀφθαρσίαν*.

‡ De anima, c. 41. Compare above the passage concerning the corruption of human nature.

between the inward grace and the outward sign. In maintaining against a sect of the Cainites (see the second section) the necessity of outward baptism, he ascribes to water a supernatural, sanctifying power. Yet we see, even in Tertullian's case, the pure evangelical idea breaking through this confusion of the inward with the outward, and directly contradicting it; as when he says it is *faith* which in baptism obtains the forgiveness of sin, and when, in dissuading men against being in a haste to be baptized, he remarks that true faith, wherever present, is sure of salvation.\* Even in the spiritual Clement of Alexandria we discern the influence of that outward and material conception of spiritual matters, for he agrees with Hermas † in thinking that the apostles performed in Hades the rite of baptism ‡ on the pious souls of the Old Testament who had not been baptized.

We have already, in our history of the forms of worship, taken notice of the injurious practical consequences which resulted from this confusion of the inward grace and the outward sign in the case of baptism. It was by confounding regeneration with baptism, and thus looking upon regeneration as a sort of charm completed at a stroke, by supposing a certain magical purification and removal of all sin in the act of baptism, that men were led to refer the forgiveness of sins obtained through Christ *only to those particular sins which had been committed previous to baptism*; instead of regarding all this as something which, with the appropriation of it by faith, must go on developing itself through the whole of life. After this was presupposed, the question must have arisen, How are we to obtain forgiveness for the sins committed after baptism? And the answer was—Although we have obtained once for all, by the merits of Christ, the means of satisfaction for the sins committed before baptism, yet, in order to make satisfaction for the sins after baptism, it is necessary that, in addition to this, we should have recourse to voluntary exercises of penitence and to good works.§ This conception is

\* Fides integra segura de salute. [Because true faith will lead the believer to obey all Christ's commands and be baptized as He ordered.—*Eng. Ed.*]

† Lib. III. S. IX. Fabric. Cod. apocryph. III. p. 1009.

‡ Strom. lib. II. f. 379.

§ See Tertullian's work de pœnitentia. This writer, it is true, brought



clearly exhibited in the following words of Cyprian : \* “ When our Lord came, and had healed the wounds of Adam, he gave to the restored a law, bidding him to sin no more lest a worse evil should befall him. By the injunction of innocence we were circumscribed to a narrow circle; and the frailty of human weakness would have been at a loss what to do unless divine grace had once more come to its aid, and, pointing out to it the works of mercy, paved the way for it to secure salvation, so that we might cleanse ourselves from all the lingering remains of impurity by the practice of alms. The forgiveness of sin having been once obtained at baptism, by constant exercise in well-doing, which is as it were a repetition of baptism, we earn the divine forgiveness anew.” Here, if we only add what was remarked on an earlier page on the subject of the sacerdotal absolution, we have the germ of the Roman catholic doctrine of the sacrament of penance.

To the *doctrine of the Lord's Supper* may be applied, in general, the remarks which have been made in relation to that of baptism, but with this difference, that we may observe three different grades in the outward and material conception of this ordinance. The most common representation was that which we find in Ignatius of Antioch,† in Justin Martyr, and in Irenæus. It is a conception of it most nearly related to the view of baptism just noticed, as the means of spiritual-corporeal communion with Christ. It was supposed, for instance, that, as the Logos in Christ became man, so here also he immediately appropriated to himself a body; this body, by virtue of the consecration, became united with the bread and wine, and thus entered into the corporeal substance of the partakers of it, who thereby received into themselves a principle of imperish-

with him from his legal studies the expression *satisfactio* into the doctrine of repentance; yet we should not be warranted, on this account, to ascribe to his legal habits of thinking—nay, we should not be warranted to ascribe to the ideas of any individual—so great an influence on the progress of error in the doctrinal notions of the church on this point; for, the *πρώτον ψεῦδος* having been once established, all the consequences involved in it must of necessity unfold themselves, especially as these consequences find so many points of attachment in human nature.

\* De opere et eleemosynis.

† Hence, in Ignatius, ep. ad Ephes, c. 20, the holy supper is called, *φάρμακον ἀθανασίας, ἀντίδοτον τοῦ μὴ ἀποθανεῖν, ἀλλὰ ζῆν ἐν Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ διὰ παντός.*



able life.\* In the North African church, on the other hand, neither Tertullian nor Cyprian seems to have entertained any notion of such a penetration. The bread and wine were rather represented as symbols of the body and blood of Christ, though not as symbols without efficacy. Spiritual communion with Christ at the holy supper was made the prominent point; yet, at the same time, those that partook were supposed to come into a certain sanctifying contact with Christ's body.† The practice of the North African church shows, moreover, that, according to the prevailing belief, a supernatural, sanctifying power resided in the outward signs of the supper; hence the daily communion‡ — hence also the communion of infants in connection with infant baptism.§ The passage in St. John, vi. 53, being understood to refer to the outward *sensible participation* of the supper, the inference was drawn, that without this outward and sensible participation none could be saved,|| just as it had been inferred from the passage in St. John, iii. 5, that none could be saved without outward baptism.

By the Alexandrians the distinction was clearly drawn in the doctrine of the sacraments between the inner divine thing, the invisible spiritual agency of the Logos,¶ and the sensible objects by which it is represented.\*\* This was the case especially with Origen, whose whole system is pervaded by such a distinction. "Outward baptism," says he, "considered as to its highest end, is a symbol of the inward cleansing of the soul

\* That which distinguishes this mode of conceiving the matter from a later one is, that the Christ who has ascended to heaven is not considered to be here present; but the Logos, in this case, directly produces for himself a body. This we find more distinctly expressed, it is true, in the next following period; but it lies at the basis of the following language of Justin: Τὴν δι' εὐχῆς λόγου τοῦ πατρ' αὐτοῦ εὐχαριστήσας τροφήν, ἐξ ἧς αἷμα καὶ σάρκες κατὰ μεταβολὴν τρέφονται ἡμῶν, ἐκείνου τοῦ σαρκοποιηθέντος Ἰησοῦ καὶ σάρκα καὶ αἷμα ἐκιδάχθηναι εἶναι. Apolog. I. s. 66.

† Tertull. c. Marc. l. IV. c. 40: corpus meum, i. e. figura corporis mei. De res. carn. c. 8: anima de Deo saginatur. De orat. c. 6: The perpetuitas in Christo, constant, spiritual fellowship with him, and individualitas a corpore ejus.

‡ See vol. I. p. 450.

§ See Cyprian. sermo de lapsis.

|| See Cyprian. Testimonior. l. III. c. 25.

¶ Comp. above what is said of the ἐπιδημία αἰσθητή and the ἐπιδημία νοητή Χριστοῦ.

\*\* The νοητόν or πνευματικόν and the αἰσθητόν.

through the divine power of the Logos, which is preparatory to the universal recovery — that, commencing in the enigma and in the glass darkly, which shall afterwards be perfected in the open vision face to face ; but at the same time, by virtue of the consecration pronounced over it, there is connected with the whole act of baptism a supernatural sanctifying power ; it is the commencing point of gracious influences bestowed on the faithful, although it is so only for such as are fitted, by the disposition of their hearts, for the reception of those influences.” \*

He makes the same distinction also in regard to the holy supper, separating what is called, in a figurative sense, the body of Christ,† from the true spiritual manducation of the Logos,‡ *the more divine promise from the common understanding* of the holy supper, adapted to the capacities of the simple.§ The former refers to the spiritual communication of the Word made flesh, which is the true heavenly bread of the soul. Of the outward supper the worthy and the unworthy may alike partake, but not of that true heavenly bread, since otherwise it could not have been said that whoever eats this bread shall live for ever. Origen says, therefore, that Christ in the true sense called his flesh and blood *the word*, which proceeds from the word, and the bread which proceeds from the heavenly bread, the living word of truth, by which he communicates himself to the souls of men, as the breaking of the bread and the distribution of the wine symbolize the multiplication of the word by which the Logos communicates himself to many souls. He supposed, moreover, that with the outward supper, as with outward baptism, there was connected a higher sanctifying influence by virtue of the consecrating words, but yet so that nothing divine was united with the earthly material signs in themselves considered, and that, as in the case of baptism, none could participate in the higher influence unless made susceptible of it by the inward disposition of the heart. As it is not that which enters into the

\* See in Joann. T. VI. s. 17 ; in Matth. T. XV. s. 23.

† Τὸ σῶμα Χριστοῦ τυπικὸν καὶ συμβολικόν.

‡ The ἀληθινὴ βρώσις τοῦ λόγου.

§ The κοινότηρα περὶ τῆς εὐχαριστίας ἐκδοχὴ τοῖς ἀπλουστέροις and κατὰ τὴν Διοτίραν ἱπαγγελίαν, corresponding to the two positions of the γνώσις and of the πίστις.

mouth that defiles the man, even though it be something which by the Jews is considered unclean, so nothing which enters into the mouth *sanctifies* the man, though the so-called bread of the Lord is by the simple supposed to possess a sanctifying power. We neither lose anything by failing to partake of the consecrated bread simply and by itself, nor do we gain anything by the bare partaking of that bread; but the reason why one man has less and another more is the good or bad disposition of each individual. The earthly bread is by itself in no respect different from any other food. It was no doubt Origen's design in these words to controvert merely the erroneous notions which attached to the partaking of the Lord's supper, independently of the disposition of the heart, a sort of magical benefit — a notion which the other fathers of the church were also far from entertaining; but yet, at the same time, his objections also apply to every representation which attaches to the outward signs any high importance or efficacy whatever, and even to such views as those which were entertained by the North African church.\*

It now remains for us to speak of the ideas prevalent in this period as to the ultimate end of the whole earthly development of humanity. The teleological point of view was in every respect inseparable from the Christian mode of contemplation. The kingdom of God, and each individual life thereto pertaining, must be carried onward to perfection. It was this certain prospect which formed the contrast between the Christian view of life and the pagan notion of a circle aimlessly repeating itself by a blind law of necessity. But the intermediate links of the chain up to that ultimate end were still hidden from the eye of contemplation. This belonged to the prophetic element, which must ever remain obscure till its fulfilment. To the earnest expectation of the pilgrim, as he casts a glance over the windings of the way, the end appears at first near at hand, which, the farther he advances, retreats to a greater distance. The signs in the course of history alone will first shed light on the darkness, which the Lord himself was unwilling to clear up by his prophetic intimations.

Strong and certain was the conviction of the Christians that

\* Vid. Origen, Matth. T. XI. s. 14; in Joann. T. XXXII. s. 16; in Matth. f. 898, V. III. opp.



the church would come forth triumphant out of its conflicts, and, as it was its destination to be a world-transforming principle, would attain to the dominion of the world. But they were at first very far from understanding the prophetic words of Christ, intimating that the church, in its gradual evolution under natural conditions, was to be a salt and a leaven for all the relations of human life. At first, as we have previously remarked, they could not believe but that the struggle between the church and the pagan state would endure till the final triumph which should be brought about from without by the return of Christ to judgment. And here it was that many seized hold of an image which had passed over from the Jews, and which seemed to adapt itself to their own present situation — the *idea of a millennial reign*, which the Messiah would set up on earth at the end of the terrestrial development, where all the righteous of all times should live together in a holy community. As the world had been created in six days, and, according to Psalm xc. 4, a thousand years in the sight of God is as one day, so the world was to continue in its existing condition for six thousand years, and end with a thousand years of blessed rest corresponding to the sabbath. In the midst of persecutions it was a solace and a support to the Christians to anticipate that even upon this earth, the scene of their sufferings, the church in its perfected and glorified state was destined to triumph. In the way that the idea was held by many, it contained nothing in it which was unchristian. They framed to themselves a spiritual idea of the happiness of this period perfectly corresponding with the essence of the gospel, since they understood by it nothing else than the universal dominion of the divine will, the undisturbed and blissful reunion of the whole communion of the saints, and the restoration of harmony between a sanctified humanity and all nature raised to the glorious state of its primitive innocence.\* But the gross and sensuous images under which the carnal Jewish mind had depicted to itself the blessings of the millennial reign had in part passed over to the Christians. Phrygia, the seat of a sensual, enthusiastic religious spirit, was inclined to adopt and to spread the gross conceptions of Chiliasm. There, in the first half of the second century, lived Papias, bishop of the church in Hierapolis — a man, it is true, of sincere piety,

\* So Barnabas, c. 15.



but, as appears from the fragments of his writings and from the accounts which we have of him, of a very narrow mind and easy credulity. He collected from oral tradition narratives of the life and sayings of Christ and of the apostles,\* and among these he received much that was misconceived and untrue. And thus by his means were diffused many strange and fantastic images of the enjoyments of the millennial reign. The injurious consequence of this was, that it fostered among Christians the longing for a gross sensual happiness incompatible with the spirit of the gospel, and so among the educated heathens gave birth to many a prejudice against Christianity.†

But he who knows anything of the hidden depth of the spiritual life in which religion has its seat and its laboratory will be cautious how, from such superficial phenomena, he passes condemnation upon the whole religion of the period in which these corrupt admixtures of a sensuous element were to be found, especially when we find in men like Irenæus vital Christianity, and an exalted idea of the blessedness of fellowship with God, still combined with these strange subordinate notions. The millennium was regarded by him only as a preparatory step for the righteous, who were there to be trained for a more exalted heavenly existence, for the full manifestation of the divine glory.‡

What we have just said, however, is not to be so understood as if Chiliasm had ever formed a part of the general creed of the church. Our sources of information from the different branches of the church in these early times are too scanty to enable us to make any positive assertion on this point. Wherever we meet with Chiliasm—as in Papias, Irenæus, Justin Martyr—everything seems to indicate that it was diffused from one country and from a single fountain head. Somewhat different was it with those churches where originally an anti-

\* In his book, *λόγων κυριακῶν ἱζηγήσεις*, from which a fragment on Judas Iscariot, which serves to illustrate his propensity to receive tales of the marvellous, has been published in J. A. Cramer Catena in *Acta Apostolorum*. Oxon. 1838, pag. 12.

† Vid. Orig. Select. in *Ψ*. f. 570. T. II.

‡ Iren. l. V. c. 35: *Crescentes ex visione Domini et per ipsum asuescent capere gloriam Dei et cum sanctis angelis conversationem.*—*Paullatim asuescent capere Deum.* c. 32.

Jewish tendency prevailed, as in the church at Rome. We find at a later date in Rome an anti-Chiliastic tendency ; might not this have existed from the first, and only have been called out more openly by the opposition to Montanism ? The same may be said also of an anti-Chiliastic tendency which Irenæus combats, and which he expressly distinguishes from the common anti-Chiliastic tendency of Gnosticism. And yet it was natural that the zealots for Chiliasm should in the outset be disposed to represent all opposition to it as savouring of Gnosticism.\*

Two causes coöperated to bring about the general suppression of Chiliasm ; on the one hand the opposition to Montanism, on the other the influence of *the spirit* proceeding from the Alexandrian school. As the Montanists laid great stress upon the expectations connected with the millennium, and although their conception of it was by no means grossly sensual,† yet, as they contributed by their enthusiastic visions to spread many fantastic pictures of the things which were then to happen,‡ the whole doctrine of Chiliasm fell into disrepute. An anti-Chiliast party, which doubtless had existed long before, were thus presented with an opportunity of attacking it more vehemently ; and the more zealous opponents of Montanism seem to have combated this error in connection with the other Montanistic doctrines. Caius, a presbyter of Rome, in his tract against the Montanist Proclus, endeavoured to stigmatize Chiliasm as a heresy set afloat by the detested Gnostic Cerinthus ; and it is not improbable, though not wholly certain, that he considered the Apocalypse as a book which had been interpolated by the latter for the express purpose of giving currency to this doctrine.

In the next place, the more intellectual and scientific direction of the Alexandrian school, which exercised so great an influence generally in spiritualizing the doctrine of the faith, must have extended its influence also to the doctrine of the last things. Origen, in particular, was a zealous opponent

\* Iren. l. V. c. 32 : *Transferuntur quorundam sententiæ ab hæreticis sermonibus.*

† Tertullian, at least, places the happiness of the millennial reign in the enjoyment of all manner of spiritual blessings, *spiritalia bona.*

‡ As, for instance, in Tertullian, of the wonderful city, the heavenly Jerusalem, which should come down from above.

of these sensual notions of the millennium, and gave a different explanation of those passages in the Old and New Testament on which the Chiliasts depended, and all of which they took in the most literal sense. Add to this, that the allegorical method of interpretation peculiar to the Alexandrian school was decidedly adverse to the grossly literal interpretations of the Chiliasts. The moderate Alexandrians, who were no friends to expurgatory criticism, did not at once reject the Apocalypse as an unchristian book with a view to deprive the Chiliasts of this important support; they were satisfied with combating the literal interpretation of it. It was natural, however, that the spirit of the Alexandrian school should not rapidly spread from Alexandria into the other districts of Egypt, since, in point of intellectual culture, they were far behind that flourishing seat of science. Nepos, a pious bishop, belonging to the nome of Arsene in Egypt, was a devoted friend of this sensual Chiliasm, and in defence of it wrote a book against the Alexandrian school, entitled, a Refutation of the Allegorists,\* in which probably he set forth a theory of Chiliasm in accordance with his own anti-allegorical method of interpreting the Apocalypse. In the above district the book seems to have found great favour with the clergy and laity. Great mysteries and disclosures of future events were supposed to be found in it, and many engaged with more zeal in the study of the book and theory of Nepos than in that of the Bible and its doctrines. By their zeal for these favourite opinions, which had no connection whatever with the essence of the gospel, men were led astray, as usually happens, from what constitutes the main element of practical Christianity, the spirit of love. They affixed the charge of heresy on those who would not embrace these opinions; and matters went so far that whole churches separated themselves on this account from the communion of the mother church at Alexandria. After the death of Nepos a country priest named Coracion was the head of this party. Had now the bishop Dionysius of Alexandria been disposed to exercise his ecclesiastical authority, had he condemned the erroneous dogma by an absolute decree, such a proceeding would have laid the foundation of a lasting schism, and Chiliasm, which it was intended to crush by authority, would in all probability have become only the more fanatical. But

\* "Ελεγχος τῶν ἀλληγοριστῶν.



Dionysius, that worthy disciple of the great Origen, showed in this case how charity, moderation, and the true spirit of liberty, which dwells only with love, can accomplish what no force and no law can effect. Not forgetting, like too many others, the Christian in the bishop, he was moved by the love of souls to repair in person to those churches. He called together those of the parochial clergy who supported the opinions of Nepos, and, moreover, allowed all laymen of the churches, who were longing after instruction on these points, to be present at the conference. The book of Nepos was produced; for three days the bishop, from morning to evening, disputed with those pastors on the contents of the book. He patiently heard all their objections, and endeavoured to answer them from scripture; he entered fully into the explanation of every difficulty, taking the Bible as his guide; and the issue was—a result which had seldom before attended theological disputations—the clergy thanked him for his instructions, and Coracion himself, in the presence of all, honestly retracted his former views, declaring himself convinced of the soundness of the opposite doctrine. This happened in the year 255.\*

Dionysius, having thus restored the unity of faith in his diocese, wrote his work on the Promises,† for the purpose of confirming those whom his arguments had convinced, and for the instruction of others who still adhered to the opinions of Nepos. In this instance, also, the Christian gentleness and moderation with which he speaks of Nepos is well worthy of notice. “On many accounts,” says he, “I esteemed and loved Nepos; on account of his faith, his untiring diligence, his familiar acquaintance with the holy scriptures, and on account of the great number of church hymns which he has composed, and which to this day are the delight of many of the brethren.‡ And I venerate the man the more because he has already entered into his rest. But dear to me, and precious above all things else, is the truth. Wherever, therefore, Nepos has expressed the truth, we must love him and agree with him,

\* Euseb. l. VII. c. 24.

† Περὶ ἐπαγγελιῶν.

‡ Τῆς πολλῆς ψαλμωδίας, ἣ μέχρι νῦν πολλοὶ τῶν ἀδελφῶν εὐθυμοῦνται. The passage may be understood in two ways—either in the way I have rendered it as referring to the many hymns which he had composed, which perhaps is the most natural way; or as referring to the variety of church melodies introduced by him.



but we must examine and correct him in those passages of his writings where he seems to be in the wrong."

The millennial reign was regarded by Chiliasm as forming, in the grand development of the kingdom of God, an intermediate point of transition to a higher state of perfection; and, answering to this, a similar intermediate point was also conceived to exist in the development of each individual. It was here that the doctrine concerning Hades, as the common receptacle of all the dead, found its point of attachment. Together with Chiliasm, *this* doctrine also had to be defended against the Gnostics; for by Hades the latter understood the kingdom of the Demiurge on this earth. It was to *this* kingdom that Christ descended—it was out of this he delivered those who were capable of fellowship with him, so that after death they could be received immediately to heaven. Yet, as we have seen indications of Chiliasm having other opponents to contend with besides the Gnostics, so the same may be said of this doctrine also, which was connected with a mode of thinking not essentially different. Here, too, we find indications of other antagonists than the Gnostics, in whom, however, their opponents might easily be led to believe they perceived a relationship to the Gnostics.\* They were such as taught that Christ, by his descent to Hades, delivered the faithful from the necessity of passing into the intermediate state after death,† and opened for them an immediate entrance into heaven. According, however, to the doctrine of the Montanist Tertullian, those only who had been thoroughly cleansed by the bloody baptism of martyrdom were to constitute an exception, were to be raised immediately, not indeed to heaven, but to an exalted state of blessedness, under the name of Paradise. All others were to pass through that intermediate stage in order to be freed from the still adhering defects and stains, and then, sooner or later, according to the measure of their attainments, would come to participate in the millennial reign.‡

\* As Irenæus describes them, l. V. c. 31: Quidam ex his, qui putantur recte credidisse, supergrediuntur ordinem promotionis justorum et motus meditationis ad incorruptelam ignorant, hæreticos sensus in se habentes.

† In hoc, inquit, Christus inferos adiit, ne nos adiremus. Tertullian, de anima, c. 55.

‡ Modicum quoque delictum mora resurrectionis illic luendum;

We see how this notion is connected with the opinion (the grounds of which we have already pointed out) that a particular satisfaction and penance were required for sins committed after baptism. And this notion of an intermediate state for the purpose of purification in Hades passed at a later period into the doctrine of purgatory. The latter sprang in the first place out of a mixture of Persian and Jewish elements — the idea of a fiery stream which at the end of the world should purge away everything unclean; an idea to which we may observe some allusion in the Clementines and in the pseudo-Sibylline writers. Out of this arose finally the notion of a purgatory after death \* — the ignis purgatorius of the Westerns.†

The *doctrine of the resurrection*, in so far as it relates to the persistence and exaltation of the entire being of the individual, belongs most intimately to the peculiar essence of Christianity, and, on account of the importance which it gives to the individual existence in its totality, forms a strong contrast with the ancient view of the world,‡ as we clearly see from the pagan attacks on Christianity. Since the dignity of the body as a temple for the Holy Spirit, and the requisition that it should be adapted to this end, is grounded on this doctrine, it necessarily gives rise to an opposition to that contempt of the body which was inculcated by Oriental Dualism. It was therefore no accidental thing if the Gnostics furiously assailed it; while, on the other hand, we may remark, in the zeal with which it was defended by the church fathers, an instinctively right Christian feeling, though not always accompanied with clear knowledge, of the connection of this doctrine with the essence of Christianity. But their over-anxious adherence to the letter, as well as their opposition to the Gnostics, led them not unfrequently to understand the doctrine of the resur-

where he refers to the novissimus quadrans, Matth. v. 28, afterwards understood of the ignis purgatorius. L. c. c. 58.

\* Τὴν διὰ πυρὸς κάθαρσιν τῶν κακῶς βιβιωκότων. Strom. l. V. f. 549.

† The earliest trace of it would be found in Cyprian, ep. 52, if the words "missum in carcerem non exire inde, donec solvat novissimum quadrantem, pro peccatis longo dolore cruciatum emundari et purgari diu igne" (instead of which another reading has diutine), are to be understood of the state after death (which is certainly the more probable meaning), and not of penance in the present life.

‡ See vol. I. p. 15.

rection in too gross and material a way, and to form too narrow and limited conceptions of the earthly body. Here also Origen endeavoured to strike a middle course between these opposite tendencies, making more use of what the Apostle St. Paul says (1 Corinth. xv.) concerning the relation of the terrestrial to the glorified body, and distinguishing from the mutable phenomenal form the proper essence lying at the foundation of the body, which through all the changes of the earthly life remains the same, and which, moreover, is not destroyed at death. This proper essence as the basis of the body would, by the operation of the divine power, be awakened to a nobler form, corresponding to the ennobled character of the soul; so that, as the soul had communicated its own peculiar stamp to the earthly body, it would then communicate the same to the transfigured body.\* In proof of this he alleges that the identity of the body in this life consists not in its momentarily changing phenomenal form, which had been fitly compared to a flowing stream,† but in the peculiar stamp which the soul impresses on the body, whereby it becomes the proper form of the manifestation of this or that particular personality.‡

Natural as it would have been to the Christian feelings of those who had been converted from heathenism to endeavour—by entering more deeply into the whole bearing of the work of redemption, into the spirit of the gospel, and into the sense of single passages which were too often superficially understood—to find some consolatory conclusion as to the fate of their ancestors who had died without faith in the gospel, they were

\* The εἶδος χαρακτηρίζον in the σῶμα πνευματικόν, just as in the σῶμα ψυχικόν. To illustrate this point he had recourse sometimes to his own doctrine concerning the ὕλη, in itself undetermined, but capable of receiving, through the plastic power of God, qualities of a higher or lower order; and sometimes to the doctrine of a dynamic essence lying within the body, a λόγος σπειρματικός (ratio ea quæ substantiam continet corporalem, quæ semper in substantia corporis salva est), which, however, is itself also to be reduced to his doctrine of a ὕλη as the ground of the corporeal world, and susceptible of manifold variety of properties. See π. ἀρχ. l. II. c. 10; c. Cels. l. IV. c. 57.

† Selecta in Psalmos: Οὐ κακῶς ποταμὸς ὠνόμασται τὸ σῶμα, διότι ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἀκριβὲς τάχα οὐδὲ δύο ἡμερῶν τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον ταύτον ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἡμῶν. T. XI. p. 388. ed. Lomm.

‡ Ὁπερ ἐχαρακτηρίζετο ἐν τῇ σαρκί, τοῦτο χαρκτηρισθήσεται ἐν τῷ πνευματικῷ σώματι.



nevertheless deterred from it by a mistaken adherence to the letter in their interpretation of scripture, and by a stern, uncompromising opposition to paganism. And the outward view of regeneration, which arose out of the habit of confounding it with baptism, also contributed to promote these narrow views, which afterwards, carried to their extreme consequences, issued in the notion of absolute predestination. Marcion did, on this side, enter more profoundly into the spirit of the evangelical doctrine; and here he was joined by the Alexandrians, who, to explain this matter, had recourse to the doctrine of a progressive development and course of purification after death, and moreover found, or supposed they found, an allusion to this in Christ's descent to Hades. With great zeal Clement maintained this doctrine, as one necessarily grounded in the universal love and justice of the God with whom there is no respect of persons. The beneficent power of our Saviour, he affirms, is not confined merely to the present life, but operates at all times and everywhere.\* But the Alexandrians, as might be gathered from what has already been said of their doctrine concerning the *δικαιοσύνη σωτήριος* (saving justice), went still further, and supposed, as the ultimate end of all, a universal redemption, consisting in the annihilation of all moral evil, and a universal restoration to that original unity of the divine life out of which all had proceeded (the general restitution, *ἀποκατάστασις*). Yet, in the case of Origen, this doctrine lost its full meaning by reason of the consequences which he was pleased to connect with it. His theory concerning the necessary mutability of will in created beings led him to infer that evil, ever germinating afresh, would still continue to render necessary new processes of purification and new worlds destined for the restoration of fallen beings, until all should again be brought back from manifoldness to unity, so that there was to be a constant interchange between fall and redemption, between unity and multiplicity. Into such a comfortless system was this profound thinker betrayed by carrying through with rigid consistency his one-sided notion

\* Οὐ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα μόνον ἡ δύναμις ἡ εὐεργητικὴ φθάνει, παντὶ δὲ ἔστι καὶ αἰετὶ ἐργάζεται. Strom. I. VI. f. 638 et 639. He also makes use of the legend already noticed (which legend itself, perhaps, grew out of the feeling of a want of some solution of this question), that the apostles descended, like Christ, to the place of the dead, and bestowed on them baptism.



of the creature's freedom and mutability, and thus marring the full conception of redemption. This doctrine he had expressed with great confidence in his work *περὶ ἀρχῶν*, but it may be questioned whether this also was not one of those points upon which, at a later period of his life, his views were changed. Traces of it, however, though not so certain and distinct, are still to be found in his subsequent writings.\*

#### IV. *Notices of the more eminent Church Teachers.*

The ecclesiastical writers who came next after the apostles are the so-called Apostolic Fathers (*patres apostolici*), who lived in the age of the apostles, and are supposed to have been their disciples. A phenomenon, singular in its kind, is the striking difference between the writings of the Apostles and those of the Apostolic Fathers, who were so nearly their contemporaries. In other cases transitions are wont to be gradual, but in this instance we observe a sudden change. There is no gentle gradation here, but all at once an abrupt transition from one style of language to the other; a phenomenon which should lead us to acknowledge the fact of a special agency of the Divine Spirit in the souls of the apostles, and of a new creative element in the first period. The times of the first extraordinary operations of the Holy Ghost were immediately followed by the period of the free development of human nature in Christianity; and here, as in all other cases, the beginnings must be small and feeble before the effects of Christianity could penetrate more widely, and bring fully under their influence the great powers of the human mind. It was first to be shown what the divine power could effect by the foolishness of preaching.

The writings of the so-called Apostolic Fathers have unhappily, for the most part, come down to us in a condition very little worthy of confidence. At a very early date spurious writings were palmed on the names of these men, so highly venerated in the church, for the purpose of giving authority

\* Orig. *π. ἀρχ.* l. II. c. 3; c. Cels. l. IV. c. 69, he barely says, *Εἰ μὴ τὰ τὸν ἀφανισμὸν τῆς κακίας λόγον ἔχει, τὸ πάλιν αὐτὴν ὑφίστασθαι ἢ μὴ, ἐν προηγούμενῳ λόγῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐξετασθήσεται.* There is an obscure hint in Matth. f. 402. After the *ἀποκατάστασις* has been completed in certain *Æons*, he speaks of *πάλιν ἄλλη ἀρχή*.

to particular opinions or principles. Such of their own writings as were extant were interpolated in subservience to a Jewish hierarchical interest which sought to crush the free spirit of the gospel.

In this connection we should have to notice, first, Barnabas, the well-known companion of the Apostle Paul, if a letter which in the second century was known under his name in the Alexandrian church, and which bore the title of a catholic epistle,\* really belonged to him. But we cannot possibly recognise in this production the Barnabas who was deemed worthy to share, as a companion, the apostolical labours of St. Paul, and who derived his name from the power of his animated discourses in the churches.† It breathes a spirit widely different from that of such an apostolic man. We see in it rather a Jew of the Alexandrian school who had embraced Christianity, and by his Alexandrian training was prepared for a more spiritual conception of Christianity, but who at the same time attached too much importance to the artificial Gnosis of the Alexandrian Jews; a man who, in the mystic and allegorical interpretation of the Old Testament—more consonant with the spirit of Philo than that of St. Paul, or even of the epistle to the Hebrews—sought a peculiar wisdom, in the search after which he seems to take a vain pleasure. We meet nowhere in this letter with those views of the Mosaic ceremonial law, as a religious means of culture adapted to a certain stage of human development, which we meet with in St. Paul; but such views as altogether evince a peculiar, Alexandrian turn of mind—views which do not recur in any of the following church-teachers, and which sprang from the wildest idealists among the Alexandrian Jews.‡ Moses spake everything in the spirit (*ἐν πνεύματι*); that is, he presented universal, spiritual truths, only under a symbolical form. But the carnal Jews, he taught, instead of penetrating into the meaning of these symbols, understood and believed everything in the literal sense, and supposed they must observe the law according to the letter. Thus the entire ceremonial

\* Ἐπιστολὴ καθολικὴ, i. e. a letter intended for general circulation, and containing matter of general interest,—an exhortatory writing destined for several churches,—a character which answers to the contents of this epistle.

† Τίς παρακλήσις, υἱὸς προφητείας.

‡ See above, vol. I. p. 68.

religion had sprung out of a misconception of the carnal multitude. A bad angel, it is said,\* had led them into this error; just as in the Clementines, and other writings of that stamp, it is a favourite hypothesis that the original Judaism had been adulterated by the spurious additions of wicked spirits. The author of this epistle is even unwilling to admit that circumcision was a seal or sign of the covenant; alleging, as evidence to the contrary, that circumcision was practised also among the Arabians, the Syrians, and the idolatrous priests (in Egypt). But still it is argued that Abraham's circumcising the 318 men, Gen. xvii. and xiv. 14, prefigured the crucifixion of Jesus; 'IH (18) being the initial letters of the name Jesus, and T (300) the sign of the cross. These characters and numerals, as belonging to the Greek language, could have occurred to no one but an Alexandrian Jew who had lost his knowledge of, or perhaps had never been acquainted with, the Hebrew, and who was familiar only with the Alexandrian version — certainly not to Barnabas, who assuredly could not have been such a stranger to the Hebrew, even if it were possible to suppose him guilty of such egregious trifling. Yet the trifler himself looks upon it as a remarkable discovery, which he introduces with the pompous remark (so exactly characteristic of the mystery-mongering spirit of the Alexandrian-Jewish Gnosis), "No one ever learned from me a more genuine doctrine; but I know that ye are worthy of it."†

The prevailing drift of the epistle is opposition to carnal Judaism and to the carnal Judaistic spirit in Christianity. We recognise its polemical direction against the latter, which extended its dogmatic influence to the views entertained of the person of Christ, when, in chapter xii., it is emphatically observed that Christ is not merely the Son of Man and the Son of David, but also the Son of God. The epistle is all of *a piece*, and cannot possibly be separated into two parts,‡ of which Barnabas was the author of one and somebody else of the other.

Besides, there is no trace of the author of the epistle having wished to have it supposed that he was Barnabas. But since in its spirit and style it is quite in accordance with the Alex-

\* Cap. 9.

† Οὐδείς γνησιώτερον ἔμαθεν ἀπ' ἐμοῦ λόγον· ἀλλὰ οἶδα ὅτι ἄξιοί ἐστε ἐμοῦ.

‡ As Schenkel has asserted.

andrian taste, it may have happened that, as the author's name was unknown, and there was a wish to give credit and authority to the document, the report found currency in that city that Barnabas was its author.

Next to Barnabas we place Clement—perhaps the same whom Paul mentions in Philipp. iv. 3. About the end of the first century he was bishop of the church at Rome. We have under his name *an epistle* to the church of Corinth and the *fragment of a second*. The first of these was, in the first centuries, read in many of the churches during public worship along with the scriptures of the New Testament. It contains an exhortation, interwoven with examples and general maxims, recommending concord to the Corinthian church, which was at the time rent by divisions. This epistle, although genuine in the main, is nevertheless not exempt from considerable interpolations. We detect in it a palpable contradiction, for example, when, through the whole epistle, the old and simple constitution of the Christian church shines out, and we see bishops and presbyters placed perfectly on a level,\* and yet, in one passage, s. 40 and onwards, find the whole system of the Jewish priesthood transferred to the Christian church. The epistle which passes under the name of the second is manifestly nothing but the fragment of a homily.

Under the name of this Clement two other epistles have been preserved in the Syrian church, which were published by Wetstein in an appendix to his edition of the New Testament. They are circular letters addressed particularly to those Christians of both sexes who lived in the state of celibacy. The fact that the unmarried life is in these writings highly commended is by no means sufficient to prove that Clement was not their author, since this exaggerated estimation of celibacy† became common at a very early period. There are indeed several circumstances which speak in favour of the high antiquity of these epistles: they nowhere indicate the presence of a hierarchical effort; they do not, like other writings of this kind, apply the Old Testament ideas of the priesthood to the Christian church; they make no prominent distinction between clergy and laity, nor between bishops and presbyters;

\* [This contradiction vanishes if we interpret c. 42 of Clement's epistle with most commentators, and with Röhre, *Amfänge d. Christlichen kirche u. ihrer Verfassung*, Bd. 1, s. 243, &c.—*Eng. Ed.*]

† See vol. I. p. 33.



they represent the gift of healing diseases, especially demoniacal possessions, as a free gift, not attached to any particular office. Still, however, these considerations do not amount to a *certain proof* of so high an antiquity of these writings, since the whole admits of an easy explanation, even on the supposition of their later origin, from the tendencies peculiar to certain countries of the East.

On the other hand, as these epistles must have been quite agreeable to the ascetic tendency of the Western, particularly of the North-African church; as, in similar writings of a practical character (aimed against the same abuses which are reproved in these epistles), there was frequent occasion for alluding to them, it cannot but appear the more singular that they are not quoted before the fourth century\*—a fact sufficient of itself to excite suspicion with regard to their authenticity.

These epistles bear, in short, every mark of having been forged in some Eastern church in the last times of the second or in the third century, partly with a view to exalt the merits of the unmarried life—partly to counteract the abuses which, under the show of celibacy, began to gain ground, particularly the institution of the *συνείσακτοι*.†

Under the name of this Clement various other writings were forged, subservient to some hierarchical or dogmatical interest; as, for example, *the Clementines*, which relate the history of *Clement* himself, his conversion by the Apostle St. Peter, and his meeting again with his father, whom he had lost.‡ The peculiar style of thought in these writings, resembling that of the Ebionites, we have already described. Finally, the collection of Apostolical Constitutions (*διατάξεις* or *διαταγαὶ ἀποστολικαί*) and the Apostolical Canons (*κάνονες ἀποστολικοί*).

The origin of these two collections may be explained in the same way as that of the so-called Apostles' Creed. As men originally spoke of an apostolical tradition, without ever thinking that the apostles had drawn up a confession of faith, so also they were accustomed to speak of an apostolical tradition in regard to the constitution and usages of the church,

\* The first allusions to it are in Epiphanius and Jerome.

† Which abuse had spread in the church of Antioch, as well as of North Africa. See the synodal letter against Paul of Samosata. Euseb. l. VII. c. 30.

‡ Hence the title to one of the revisions preserved to us in the version of Rufinus, *ἀναγνωρίσματα*, Recognitions.

without supposing that the apostles had given any written laws on the subject. And thus the expressions "apostolical traditions, apostolical ordinances," having once become familiar, a support was furnished for the opinion, or the pretext, that the Apostles, having prepared a written confession of faith, had also drawn up a collection of ecclesiastical laws. Hence, to subserve different interests,\* different collections of this kind may have sprung into existence, since the one which Epiphanius cites in many places is evidently not the same as the Apostolical Constitutions which have come down to us. These latter appear to have been formed gradually in the Eastern church, out of different fragments, during a period reaching from the close of the second down to the fourth century.

Hermas would follow the next in this series, were he the same with the one mentioned in St. Paul's epistle to the Romans, chap. xvi., as many among the ancients supposed. We have, under this name, a work entitled *The Shepherd* (ποιμήν); so called because in the second book an angel, the appointed guardian of Hermas, is introduced in the character of a shepherd.

It cannot be certainly determined whether the author had, or imagined he had, the visions which he describes; or whether he invented them to procure a more favourable reception for the doctrines, mostly practical, which he advances. The work was originally written in Greek, but it has been preserved to us, for the most part, only in a Latin translation. It was in high repute among the Greek writers of the second century—a distinction, perhaps, to which the name of the supposed author, and his famous visions, not a little contributed. Irenæus quotes the book under the title of *the scripture*. Yet it may be very much doubted whether the Hermas of the Apostle St. Paul was really its author. But the other tradition (given in the poem ascribed to Tertullian, against Marcion, and in the fragment on the canon of the New Testament published by Muratori †), which ascribes it to the brother of Pius bishop of Rome, about the year 156, is no less doubtful, since it is impossible to determine how much credit is due to these two

\* [Or rather collections may have been made in different places of the constitutions in use there, which, remounting to an origin beyond existing memory, may well have been deemed apostolical. These naturally may have differed in different churches.—*Eng. Ed.*]

† Antiq. ital. jud. ævi, T. III.

documents ; and the high reputation of the book in the times of Irenæus and Clement of Alexandria can hardly be reconciled with the hypothesis of so late an origin.\*

Ignatius, bishop of the church at Antioch, is said, in the reign of Trajan, to have been conveyed as a prisoner to Rome, where he was expecting to be thrown to the wild beasts. On the way he is said to have written seven epistles — six to churches of Asia Minor, and one to Polycarp bishop of Smyrna. These letters, it must be allowed, contain passages which at least bear throughout the stamp of antiquity. Such especially are the passages directed against Judaism and against Docetism ; but even the briefer revision, which is the one most entitled to confidence, has been very much interpolated. As the account of the martyrdom of Ignatius may be suspected,† so too the letters, which presuppose the correctness of this suspicious legend, do not wear at all a stamp of that distinct individuality of character, and of a man of these times addressing his last words to the churches. A hierarchical purpose is not to be mistaken.‡

The letter to Polycarp bishop of Smyrna wears very much the appearance of an idle compilation. That to the Roman church possesses more decided marks of originality than the others.

Of Polycarp bishop of Smyrna we have already spoken. To him is ascribed an epistle to the church at Philippi ; nor are there any sufficient reasons for doubting that he was the author of it.

Immediately after the apostolical fathers we place the Apologists, who follow next in the order of time. The existing scientific culture was first made subservient to the defence of Christianity under the government of Hadrian ; and the Apologists, who began to appear about this period, are therefore to be considered as the earliest representatives of such a combination.

\* It may have been that the Roman bishop Pius actually had a brother of this name ; and those who were desirous of destroying the authority of the book were led for this very purpose to fix on so late an author.

† See vol. I. p. 266, note \*.

‡ [For the opposite theory of the genuineness of these epistles, see, besides Pearson's *Vindiciæ Ignatianæ*, Jacobson's *Patres Apostolici* and Denzinger Ueber die Archtheit des bisherigen Textes d. Ignatianischen Briefe. Wurtzburg, 1849.—*Eng. Ed.*]



Among these the first to be noticed is Quadratus. He was known as an *evangelist*,\* and stood in high repute on account of his gifts as a preacher. He must not be mistaken for the same person as the Quadratus who, in the time of Marcus Aurelius, was bishop of the church at Athens, and with whom Jerome has confounded him. It is to be regretted that his Apology has not come down to us. All that remains of it is the following remarkable passage, which Eusebius has preserved:—"The works of our Saviour were always to be seen, for they were real; those that were healed, and those that were raised from the dead, were seen, not only when they were healed or raised, but they were always there; not only whilst He dwelt on the earth, but also after His departure, which they long survived; so that some of them have lived even to our own times."†

The second of the Apologists, Aristides, still retained, after he became a Christian, the philosopher's cloak (*τρίβων*, pallium), in order to be able to present Christianity to the educated heathen as the new philosophy from heaven.‡

Justin Martyr is worthy of notice as being the first among these apologists who is known to us by his own writings. He is the precursor of the Alexandrian church-teachers, since we recognise in him most distinctly the union of Platonism with Christianity. The accounts of his life and education are derived for the most part from his own writings; and it will be the safest course to confine ourselves in the first place to his two Apologies; inasmuch as these are the undoubted productions of Justin, and bear the indubitable marks of a decidedly intellectual character. As to his other writings, they must first be compared with these, before we can decide upon their genuineness.

Flavius Justinus was born in the city of Flavia Neapolis, the ancient Sichem in Samaria: it was at that time a Roman-Greek colony, in which the Greek language and culture predominated. Probably it was not a decided taste for specula-

\* This word is to be understood in the sense of the New Testament, i. e. as designating a teacher, not connected with any particular church, but travelling about as a missionary to preach the gospel.

† Euseb. l. III. c. 37; l. IV. c. 3; l. V. c. 17.

‡ Hieronym. de vir. illustr. c. 20, ep. 83, ad Magnum: *Apologeticum contextum philosophorum sententia*. The traveller De la Guilletière says that in a cloister, about twenty-four miles from Athens, they pretend to be still in possession of this Apology.



tive inquiries, which in truth we cannot discover in him, but a feeling of a religious want which the popular religion could not satisfy, that led him, with many others of his age, to the study of philosophy; and precisely for this reason the philosophy of Plato would present the most attractions for him. It was not that he ever became a systematic follower of this philosophy, so much as that he adopted certain of its ideas, such as met the spirit of an age which yearned after religion. But the spirit of this philosophy could not so preoccupy his mind as to unfit it, as it did so many others, for other spiritual impressions. He informs us himself how he came to be a Christian.\* “I also,” he says, “was once an admirer of the doctrines of Plato; and I heard the Christians abused. But when I saw them meet death, and all that is accounted terrible among men, without dismay, I knew it to be impossible that they should be living in sin and lust. I despised the opinion of the multitude. I glory in being a Christian, and take every pains to prove myself worthy of my calling.”

After becoming a Christian Justin still retained the mantle † which he had worn as a pagan philosopher and ascetic, availing himself of his former garb and mode of life as a means to facilitate the introduction of religious and philosophical subjects, and thereby to prepare the way for bringing home the gospel to their hearts. Thus he may be regarded as an itinerant missionary in the garb of a philosopher. ‡ From one of his remarks in the second Apology, where, describing the public worship of the Christians, he says, “Such as are convinced we conduct, after we have baptized them, to the assembled brethren,” it has been too hastily inferred § that he was ordained to the spiritual office. But we have already expressed our opinion that no such distinction was as yet made between clergy and laity as would render it improbable that Justin expressed himself in this way on the principle of the universal Christian priesthood. But whether he had been solemnly ordained, in the name of the church, to the office of an evangelist, or not—a question of little importance—his gifts

\* Apolog. I. pp. 50, 51.

† See vol. I. p. 381.

‡ Even if the Dialogue with Trypho were not genuine, yet on this point we might avail ourselves of the accounts it contains; since we may at least assume that the author was acquainted with the history of Justin's life.

§ By Tillemont.

as a teacher would hardly be suffered to lie idle, when they could be so usefully employed, both in spreading the gospel among the heathen, and in giving instruction to the churches themselves. If any reliance can be placed on the story of Justin's martyrdom, it would appear from it that, while he resided at Rome, a portion of the church, who understood the Greek language, were accustomed to meet and hear him discourse in his own house.

We remarked in the first section of this history \* that, soon after the death of the emperor Adrian, and at the beginning of the reign of Pius, the Christians were persecuted. It was on this occasion that Justin, who happened to be then living at Rome, felt himself called upon to present to the emperor a written defence of their cause. As in the superscription he does not give to Marcus Aurelius the title of Cæsar, it seems probable that it was written before Aurelius had been nominated to that dignity, which happened in the year 139.†

It is more difficult to determine at what time the work which goes by the name of the first Apology of Justin was written. The immediate occasion of his writing in defence of the Christians was an incident which presents a striking illustration of the working of Christianity and of the persecutions. A woman of Rome, who with her husband had led an abandoned life, became a convert. She now refused to share any longer in the vices of her husband, and used all her influ-

\* See vol. I. p. 103.

† The superscription runs as follows: *Αὐτοκράτορι Τίτῳ Αἰλίῳ Ἀδριανῷ Ἀντωνίνῳ Εὐσεβεῖ Σεβάστω Καίσαρι καὶ Οὐρητισσίμῳ υἱῷ Φιλοσόφῳ καὶ Λουκίῳ φιλοσόφῳ* (according to Eusebius, *φιλοσόφου*) *καίσαρος φύσει υἱῷ καὶ Εὐσεβοῦς εἰσποιητῇ ἑραστῇ παιδείας, ἱερᾷ τε συγκλήτῳ καὶ δήμῳ παντὶ Ῥωμαίων.* The first named is the Augustus, Antoninus Pius, who had then entered upon his reign; the second, M. Antoninus Philosophus, to whom the emperor Hadrian (at whose request Antoninus Pius adopted him) had given the name Annius Verissimus; the third, Lucius Verus Antoninus, who afterwards was coregent with M. Aurelius. He was son of Lucius Ælius Verus, whom Trajan had adopted and nominated Cæsar. After the early death of Lucius, he also, in compliance with the wish of Hadrian, was adopted by Antoninus Pius, who took the place of his father. The reading found in Eusebius is most probably the correct one; for it can hardly be supposed that Lucius Verus would have two epithets. The surname "philosopher" is quite incongruous as applied to a youth but nine years old; while he might be styled, with perfect propriety, the *ἑραστῆς παιδείας*. The surname "philosopher" would rather be given to the now deceased Ælius Verus, whom Spartianus calls "eruditus in literis."

ence to reclaim him. Being unsuccessful in this, and finding it impossible to remain connected with her husband without participating in his sins, she availed herself of the privilege allowed in such cases according to the doctrine of our Lord, and procured a divorce. In revenge, her husband accused her of being a Christian. The woman now petitioned the emperor that she might be allowed to arrange her domestic affairs, after which she would submit the matter to a judicial investigation. The husband, perceiving that his vengeance against his wife was thus likely to be delayed, turned his malice upon her Christian teacher, whose name was Ptolemæus. The latter was seized by a centurion and carried before the præfect of the city. Having boldly declared before the præfect that he was a Christian, he was condemned to death. Another Christian, by name Lucius, on hearing this decision, said to the præfect, "Why have you condemned to death this man, who is guilty neither of murder, nor theft, nor adultery, nor any other crime, merely because he has called himself a Christian? You act in a manner which does not become the pious emperor, nor the philosopher, the emperor's son." \* From these words the præfect concluded that the speaker was also a Christian, and, upon his avowing that it was so, condemned him likewise to death. A third met with the same fate.

The question now arises, whether these events agree best with the reign of Antoninus Pius or with that of Marcus Aurelius. We find nothing here which is directly against the former hypothesis; for, as we formerly said,† the law of Trajan was by no means repealed by the rescripts of Hadrian and of Antoninus Pius: the public confession of Christianity might still be punished with death, although the clemency of the emperor left it in the power of every well-disposed magistrate to exercise great indulgence. But is it *probable* that a Christian would thus address the præfect, if the reigning emperor himself had issued a severe edict against the Christians as such?‡ Moreover the Apology itself contains no

\* Οὐ γέγοντα Εὐσεβίῳ αὐτοκράτορι, οὐδὲ φιλοσόφῳ (according to Eusebius; the common reading, φιλοσόφου).

† See vol. I. p. 144.

‡ The reasons alleged by Hr. Semisch (Studien und Kritiken, J. 1835, p. 939) against believing in the existence of any such law are far from being satisfactory. The psychological problem is solved in the way I



allusion whatever to the existence of a new law against the Christians, for the repeal of which Justin was petitioning the emperor. It may be said that the language of Justin is applicable only to the times of M. Aurelius, where he speaks of confessions extorted by the rack from slaves, women, and children, in which those popular rumours about the unnatural crimes said to be committed in the Christian assemblies were acknowledged to be true. Beyond question,\* the first examples of such proceedings against the Christians that are adduced occur under the reign of M. Aurelius; but as popular fanaticism had begun as early as in the time of Nero to circulate such reports against the Christians, there may have been many a magistrate, previous to the times of the former emperor, disposed both to credit and to make use of such charges. Besides, in the *Apology*, which by universal consent is assigned to the reign of Antoninus Pius, Justin only asks that men would cease to place reliance on the blind reports of the populace against the Christians. He says, it is true, that the things which happened at Rome in the time of Urbicus were everywhere occurring; that other governors acted in the same unreasonable manner; that generally, when an individual was reformed by Christianity, one of his most intimate relations or friends would appear as his accuser,—all which apparently agrees only with the times of general persecution under M. Aurelius. But in the times of Antoninus Pius also the Christians were furiously attacked in many districts by the populace, and this fact moved the emperor to publish those edicts in order to quiet the minds of the people. It is singular too, that, in the designation of the reigning princes by Lucius, the surname “philosopher” is not given to M. Aurelius, to whom it properly belonged, but should be transferred to Verus, to whom it did not apply and is nowhere else given him; while that of Antoninus Pius should be given to M. Aurelius, who in his lifetime was never known by that title.†

have shown in my account of this persecution. It might be conceded, however, that the words may possibly have been spoken before the publication of such a law.

\* See vol. I. p. 155.

† Comp. the reasons, certainly not without weight, which Semisch has presented in favour of the common explanation of these titles, in the *Studien und Kritiken*, J. 1835, S. 921.



Even if we reject the reading in Eusebius, it would not help the matter; for, at the end of the Apology, the same predicates are once more subjoined to the names of the two emperors.\* These reasons concur to show that this Apology ought not to be placed, as it is by the common hypothesis, supported by the weighty authorities of Pagi, Tillemont, and Mosheim, in the reign of M. Aurelius; but in the times of Antoninus Pius, as is maintained by Valesius and Longuerue.

It is remarkable,† again, that Justin twice refers,‡ in this Apology, to something *he had said before*, which nevertheless does not occur in this Apology, but which is found in the first. He uses the same phrase, ὡς προέφημεν, which he also employs on other occasions, when he is referring to passages in the same document; and this hardly admits of being reconciled with the long interval of time by which, on the other hypothesis, we must suppose the two Apologies to have been separated from each other.

Undoubtedly the authority of Eusebius is against us; for he speaks of the first-cited Apology as the first, and as composed in the reign of Antoninus Pius, and places the second in that of M. Aurelius.§ It will be necessary, then, in order to retain our own view of the matter, to suppose that the true relation of the two Apologies to each other had, in the time of Eusebius, already become confused, which assuredly is not impossible. But we should not omit also to remark, that, if this Apology was written in the reign of Antoninus Pius, it is strange that Lucius did not appeal to the laws enacted by that emperor in favour of the Christians and forbidding all popular

\* Εἴη οὖν ὑμᾶς ἀξίως εὐσεβείας καὶ φιλοσοφίας τὰ δίκαια ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῶν κρῖναι. It is plain that the epithet φιλόσοφος, which occurs at the beginning of the Apology of Athenagoras, whether applied to L. Verus or to Commodus, will not help to remove this difficulty; since it may be easily shown that the predicate, belonging properly to only one of the emperors, is attributed to them both in common, as the case there stands.

† As the Benedictine editor long ago noticed.

‡ According to the Benedictine edition, s. 4, where he speaks of enmity to God; s. 6, where he speaks of the incarnation of the Logos; and s. 8, where he speaks of Heraclitus.

§ By comparing II. 13 and IV. 16 (IV. 11 is less clear), and by comparing c. 17 with what precedes, we can scarce doubt that either the reading πρότερα is corrupt, or Eusebius so wrote through a mere oversight.

attacks upon them; though we must admit that in such laws the Christians were ever disposed to find more than they really contained.\*

We have already had occasion to speak of Justin's peculiar idea with regard to the spermatic Word (λόγος σπερματικός), as related to the absolute, divine Logos, and constituting the transition betwixt Christianity and everything that was true and good in the times antecedent to Christianity—an idea which was laid hold of and carried still further by the Alexandrians. It is singular, however, that in Justin's other writings not a hint is to be found respecting this idea, so predominant in the Apologies. It might be said, indeed, that Justin had simply made use of this idea with the special view of rendering the philosophical emperor more favourable to his propositions; but the supposition is an unnatural one. Judging of Justin from his own writings, we can hardly give him credit for sufficient versatility of mind to range so freely in a foreign circle of ideas which had been merely borrowed to answer a present purpose. That more candid and liberal judgment of the Greek philosophy which leads him to state impartially and fairly opinions even which he censures, we must regard rather as the expression of his real views. But in his other writings, which aimed at the conversion of the heathens, he might beyond doubt have employed the same method with as good effect as in the Apologies. Why, then, did he not employ it? The case would appear still more singular if, according to the common view, we supposed that Justin wrote the two Apologies in times so widely different.

We have a work, under the name of Justin, entitled an *Admonition to the Gentiles* (παραίνετικός πρὸς Ἕλληνας), the design of which is to convince the heathens of the insufficiency of the popular worship, as well as of their philosophical doctrines of religion, and of the necessity of a higher instruction from God himself. It is most probably the same treatise which we find quoted by Eusebius and Photius under the

\* I cannot, however, think the difficulty so great as it is considered to be by Hr. Semisch (l. c. p. 920), who does not believe that a præfect under this reign would have acted in this manner. For Trajan's rescript was certainly still in full force, and a Christian who, before the civil magistrate, professed a religio illicita, and declared himself opposed to the state religion, had to be punished for his obstinacy (obstinatio).

title of *The Refutation* (ἐλεγχος), a designation well suited to its contents.\*

In this treatise we find no trace of that milder and more liberal way of thinking which we observe in the Apologies—no trace of that *peculiar circle of ideas* of which we have spoken, but rather the reverse. All true knowledge of God is here represented as derived solely from revelation. It is admitted, indeed, that, among the heathen, there were many feeble though misapprehended echoes of the truth. These the work derived from a misunderstood and corrupt tradition, and therein agrees with the idea prevailing among the Alexandrian Jews, that a knowledge of the doctrines communicated by divine revelation to the Hebrews had reached the Greeks through Egypt. While, in the Apologies, it is acknowledged that men existed among the heathen who, following the revelation of the λόγος σπερματικός, were, long before the appearance of Christianity, witnesses to the truth; here, on the contrary, it is asserted,† “Your own teachers have been constrained, even against their will, to say a great deal for us concerning divine providence; and particularly those of them who have resided in Egypt, and profited by the religion of Moses and his fathers.”

We cannot, therefore, possibly suppose that this treatise sprang from the same mind as that which produced Justin's Apologies. Yet, if we should be disposed to ascribe it to him, we cannot at least follow the common hypothesis, and consider it to be his first production after his conversion, but, on the contrary, one of his latest. We must then suppose that the mild and liberal way of thinking which he originally indulged became afterwards more narrow and rigid, and that those views, resulting from the peculiar direction of his mind, and originally predominant with him, concerning the relation of the revelations of the λόγος σπερματικός to the revelation of the absolute Logos, which we find pervading the Apologies, had at some later period been wholly suppressed by the notions which he had imbibed from the Alexandrian Jews concerning a source of outward tradition.‡ Such a change is indeed pos-

\* Comp. Semisch's thorough investigation of this writing in the first vol. of his “Monographie,” p. 105, where also will be found a list of the authors on this subject.

† Cohortat. p. 15.

‡ It is not to be denied that these notions also occur in the Apologies;

sible, and examples of the same kind are doubtless to be met with ; but it may be a question whether this treatise contains sufficiently decisive evidence of having proceeded from Justin to make such an hypothesis necessary.

We have next, under the name of Justin, a short address to the Gentiles (*λόγος πρὸς Ἑλλήνας*). With this title, however, no work mentioned in the indexes to the writings of Justin among the ancients corresponds. Still, if we cannot consider it a production of Justin on the ground that it differs from the general style of his writings,\* it bears at least the stamp of the same age. It is a rhetorical exhibition of the untenable-

but they are kept in the background, while the other view predominates. Apolog. II. p. 81 : "All that philosophers and poets have said about the immortality of the soul, about punishments after death, about the intuition of heavenly things, or about similar doctrines, they have been enabled to know, and to unfold, because they were furnished with a clue to them by the prophets. Hence there seems to be one and the same sun of truth for them all ; and it is plain that they have not correctly understood it, if they contradict one another." So too, p. 92, Plato's doctrine of the creation is traced to Moses.

\* Although I agree with Semisch in the result, yet I cannot concur with the reasons which he adduces (p. 166) for his decision that the writing is not Justin's. The difference between the Admonition and the Apologies is in fact greater than that which he makes so prominent between this and the other writings of Justin. What Justin says in the Apologies, respecting the motives which led him to abandon Paganism, may be easily reconciled with what he here alleges with regard to his abhorrence of the immoralities in the pagan mythology ; for although he had learned already in the philosophical schools to give another sense to the mythological narratives, yet this artificial concealment of the breach between philosophy and the traditional religion could not satisfy him. He might then justly mention this as one thing which led him to Christianity, though it was not the only one. In truth, a man is not always under the necessity of expressing in full everything that has contributed to induce a change in his convictions and conduct. The way, however, in which Christianity operated on him is not differently described in this and in his other writings. Hr. Semisch labours under a mistake when he supposes that in this treatise he finds it made a matter of boast that Christianity does not form philosophers. What is said is not this ; but that it makes men more than philosophers,—that it converts mortals into gods ; and this, too, Justin might justly have said. Nor can it be proved from this treatise that its author supposed no intermediate state after death,—no Hades as a transition stage ; for, when he speaks of the return of redeemed souls to God, he is evidently referring to the ultimate end—the final goal ; and, moreover, the expression is too general and vague to furnish any grounds for deciding what the author's views were on this point.



ness of the pagan doctrine concerning the gods, in which the finest passage is the conclusion: "The power of the Logos does not produce poets; it does not create philosophers nor able orators; but by forming us anew it makes of mortal men immortal beings, and converts mortals into gods. It transports us from the earth beyond the limits of Olympus. Come and submit yourselves to its influence. Become as I am, for I too was as you are. This has conquered me—the divinity of the doctrine, the power of the Logos; for as a master serpent-charmer lures and frightens the hideous reptile from his den, so the word expels the fearful passions of our sensual nature from the most secret recesses of the soul. And the cravings of lust having once been banished, the soul becomes calm and serene, and, delivered from the evil which had cleaved to it, returns to its Creator."\*

The largest and most important work of Justin's after the Apologies is his Dialogue with Trypho the Jew. The object of this work is to prove that Jesus is the Messiah promised in the Old Testament, and to refute the objections commonly urged against Christianity by the Jews of those days. Justin comes, probably at Ephesus, into company with one Trypho, a Jew, whom the war excited by Barcochba had driven from Palestine, and who, having travelled in Greece, had there studied, and become enamoured of, the Greek philosophy. The philosopher's cloak, which Justin wore, led Trypho to accost him as he was taking a solitary walk, and, a conversation having arisen between them about the knowledge of God, Justin finally turns it to the subject of Christianity. This conversation, we are given to suppose, is recorded in this work.

The unanimous testimony of the ancients assigns this Dialogue to Justin. The author intimates that he is the same Justin who wrote the Apologies, by citing a passage from the so-called *second* Apology as his own production.† He describes himself in the introduction as one who had abandoned Platonism for Christianity, which applies perfectly well to Justin. No unprejudiced reader can deny that the writing must have been composed by a contemporary of Justin, or at least by a

\* Respecting the treatise "on [the Unity of God," (*περὶ μοναρχίας*), incorrectly ascribed to Justin, see the remarks of Semisch, l. c. p. 167.

† Vid. Simon Magus, Dial. Tryph. f. 349.

man who lived very near to those times. Such being the case, no good reason can be imagined why any one who, as appears from this book, was by his own personal qualifications entitled to rank as high as Justin himself, should, instead of writing in his own name, cause his work to appear under that of a contemporary. Besides, the book is wholly free from those marks of studious design, so apparent in other forgeries of the same period, which were composed with the purpose of disseminating certain favourite opinions. Its prevailing aim is a polemical one against Jews and Judaizing Christians, and in it nothing was to be gained in the estimation of either party by using the name of a Samaritan pagan and quondam Platonist.\*

We are struck, it is true, at meeting in it with the same phenomena which we remarked in speaking of the "Exhortation to the Gentiles;" but here the case is altered. We have seen, in fact, Justin seeking to point out, on the one hand, the affinity of Christianity with the better sort of Greek philosophy, and, on the other, the unsatisfactory nature of that philosophy so far as it respects religion. Now, if in the Apologies, addressed to Marcus Aurelius the philosopher, particular prominence was necessarily given to the former point of view; on the contrary, in a work which is aimed against Jews, who sought in the Greek philosophy a supplement to the religious instruction of the Old Testament, this view would as consistently be kept back. At the same time there is an evident affinity of ideas between the Dialogue and the Apologies, even as regards the favourite thought of the Apologies, the *λόγος σπερματικός*. As in the first Apology Justin had said that men would have had some excuse for their sins if the Logos had first revealed himself to mankind only a hundred and fifty years ago; if his agency had not been felt at all times among men through the medium of that *λόγος*

\* The arguments brought against the genuineness of this book by Wetstein, Prolegomena in Nov. Test., and Semler, in his edition of the same, 1764, p. 174, are drawn from the mode of citation from the Alexandrian version. Comp., on the other side, Stroth, in the Repertorium für bibl. u. morgenländ. Literatur, Bd. II. S. 74; and also Roch, Justinus M. Dial. c. Tryph. secundum regulas criticas examinatus, et νοθεύσεως convictus, 1700,—a work which I have not seen; and Lange, in the first vol. of his Dogmengeschichte,—an excellent refutation of Muenschel. Vid. Commentationes theologicæ, ed. Rosenmueller, Fuldner, et Maurer. T. I. P. II.

σπερματικός; so in the present treatise he makes the same remark in reference to the moral ideas inseparable from human nature (*φυσικαὶ ἔννοιαι*), which force men everywhere to regard sin as sin, and which, by the influence of the evil spirit, by bad education, manners, and laws, were capable of being extinguished and suppressed rather than totally destroyed. What also he here says concerning that which had revealed itself as good at all times and by its own nature, and of the goodness whereby alone men could please God—in contradistinction to the ceremonial law, which was valid only as a means of discipline and culture for the Jewish hardness of heart, or as typical of the future\*—naturally leads to the idea of that λόγος σπερματικός by which a moral conscience was given to all mankind.

It is very true that in the Apologies we find no trace of Chiliasm; but still the *spiritual* ideas of eternal life and of the kingdom of Christ, which speak out so loudly in the Apologies, stand in no manner of contradiction with this doctrine; and we should not forget that the Chiliasts themselves regarded the millennium as being but a medium of transition to a higher stage of existence. It may perhaps be asserted that, in his Apologies, he did not mention this doctrine, which must have proved peculiarly offensive to the educated heathen, because, although important according to his own views, it nevertheless did not belong to the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, which latter, we must allow, he exhibited without the least disguise, even when they were offensive to the heathen. On the contrary, in a dialogue designed to vindicate the Christian doctrine against the objections of the Jews, he had special reason for giving prominence to this point, in order to show that the Christians were orthodox in this particular, even according to the Jewish notions. An antipathy to Gnosticism and to the doctrines of Marcion is strongly marked in both works; and with this feeling Chiliasm at that time readily sympathized.

With regard to the doctrine of the Logos and of the Holy Spirit, we find in the Apologies and in the Dialogue a striking coincidence. Moreover, the thoughts and expressions which

\* Τὰ φύσει καὶ αἰεὶ καὶ δι' ὅλου καλὰ καὶ δίκαια καὶ ἀγαθὰ. See vol. I. pp. 343, 365, 443.

occur in both productions exhibit still plainer marks of their having proceeded from the same author.\*

We cannot determine with certainty whether Justin actually had such a disputation with a Jew by the name of Trypho; but it is at least probable that various disputations with Jews furnished him with an occasion for writing such a Dialogue, as he would thereby have acquired an intimate knowledge of the Jewish theology of the age. He was always ready to give Jews and Gentiles the reasons of his faith. As we are not able to distinguish in this Dialogue what is mere drapery from what is fact, so neither can we find in it any sufficient marks by which to determine its exact chronology. It is, however, certain, from the quotation from the first Apology, that it was composed at a later period than the latter, and probably, when we take into consideration all that has been said, subsequently to either of the Apologies.

Justin speaks of the power of the gospel from his own experience, in the Dialogue as well as in the Apologies. "I found in the doctrine of Christ," he says, "the only sure and salutary philosophy; for it has in it a power to awe which restrains those who depart from the right way, and the sweetest peace becomes the portion of them that practise it. That this doctrine is sweeter than honey is evident from this fact, that we who have been formed by it refuse to deny the Master's name, even to death."

We have to regret the loss of a work which Justin wrote against all the heretical sects of his day, and also of his book

\* The mystical interpretation of the Messianic passage, Gen. xlix. 11. Apolog. II. p. 74: Τὸ γὰρ "πλύνων τὴν στολὴν αὐτοῦ ἐν αἵματι σταφυλῆς" προαγγελτικὸν ἦν τοῦ πάθους, οὗ πάσχειν ἔμελλε, δι' αἵματος καθαίρων τοὺς πιστεύοντας αὐτῷ· ἡ γὰρ κεκλημένη ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ πνεύματος διὰ τοῦ προφῆτου στολή, οἱ πιστεύοντες αὐτῷ εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι, ἐν οἷς οἰκεῖ τὸ παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ σπέρμα, ὁ λόγος, τὸ δὲ εἰρημένον αἷμα τῆς σταφυλῆς, σημαντικὸν τοῦ ἔχειν μὲν αἷμα τὸν φανησόμενον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔξ ἀνθρωπείου σπέρματος, ἀλλ' ἐκ Θείας δυνάμεως. Comp. with this the passage in Dial. Tryph. 273, which bespeaks the same author; only that, in the former passage, he makes use of expressions which were borrowed from the Greek philosophy, as his purpose required that he should: Τὸ τῷ αἵματι αὐτοῦ ἀποπλύνειν μέλλειν τοὺς πιστεύοντας αὐτῷ ἐδήλου. Στολὴν γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐκάλεσε τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα τοὺς δι' αὐτοῦ ἄφροισιν ἁμαρτιῶν λαβόντας, ἐν οἷς αἰὶν δυνάμεις μὲν πάρεσσι, καὶ ἐν ἐργαῷ δὲ παρέσται ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ αὐτοῦ παρουσίᾳ. Τὸ δὲ αἷμα σταφυλῆς εἰπεῖν τὸν λόγον, δεδήλωκεν, ὅτι αἷμα μὲν ἔχει ὁ Χρῆστος οὐκ ἔξ ἀνθρώπου σπέρματος· ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ δυνάμεως.



against Marcion. Whether the fragment of a work on the resurrection, which John of Damascus in the eighth century published under Justin's name, really belongs to him, is extremely doubtful: Eusebius, Jerome, and Photius, knew nothing of any such work. Their silence, however, is no proof that it was not his.\*

Among the finest remains of Christian antiquity ranks the letter to Diognetus on the characteristics of the Christian worship compared with paganism and with Judaism, which is found among the works of Justin. It contains that noble description of the Christian life from which we have already made a brief quotation. Its language, its thoughts, and the silence of ancient writers, prove that it did not come from the hand of Justin. Still the Christian simplicity which everywhere pervades it is an evidence of its high antiquity. To this may be added the fact that the author places Judaism and paganism in the same category; that he does not seem to consider the Jewish ritual as of divine origin; and yet nothing properly Gnostic is to be found in the composition. Such a phenomenon can be accounted for only on the supposition of its belonging to a very early date.

The circumstance, however, that the author speaks of the Jewish sacrificial worship as an institution still in existence would not warrant us to infer that it was written before the destruction of the temple at Jerusalem, for in a vivid description he might well represent a bygone institution as actually existing. Nor is it any certain chronological mark that he styles himself a disciple of the apostles, for so he might call himself as a follower of their writings and doctrines. There is some doubt, however, whether this passage, which occurs in the beginning of the eleventh paragraph, belongs to the genuine letter.

What follows came evidently from another hand. What is there said of the Jewish people, the divine authority of the Old Testament, and the orthodoxy attaching itself to the decisions of the fathers, is not in harmony with the mental character and mode of thinking which prevail in this letter.

Justin, as he himself informs us in the last-cited Apology, expected that a certain cynic philosopher, Crescens by name, who belonged to one of the then famous classes of pretended

\* Comp. Semisch, l. c. I. S. 146.

saints, and used his great influence with the populace to stir them up against the Christians, would be the means of his death; for he had drawn on himself the particular hatred of this man by unmasking his hypocrisy. According to Eusebius, Crescens actually accomplished what he had threatened; but the only evidence of this that Eusebius adduces is a passage from Tatian, Justin's disciple, which, however, amounts to no proof,\* for Tatian simply says that Crescens *sought* to destroy Justin, from whence certainly it does not follow that he actually accomplished his purpose.†

Eusebius may be right, however, in saying that Justin suffered martyrdom under the reign of Marcus Aurelius. This account agrees with a report of the martyrdom of Justin and his companions, which comes to us, it is true, through a suspected channel,‡ but yet possesses many internal marks which are more in favour of than against its authenticity.§

Next after Justin follows his disciple, Tatian of Assyria, of whom we have already spoken in our account of the Gnostic sects.|| The means of tracing the course of his religious development have been furnished by himself, in a work of his which we shall soon have occasion to mention, and which is the only one of his that we possess. He was brought up in heathenism, and his extensive travels in the Roman empire made him acquainted with the multifarious forms of polytheism. Not one among them all appeared to him to be a reasonable worship. In them he saw religion everywhere made the handmaid of sin. Nor could he be satisfied with the fine-spun allegorical interpretations of the ancient fables, which represented them as symbols of a speculative system of nature; and it seemed to him dishonourable for one to join in the popular worship who could not fall in with the common

\* S. 19, orat. contra Græcos.

† Θανάτῳ περιβαλεῖν πραγματεύσασθαι.

‡ In the collection of the Metaphrast Symeon.

§ The fact that no wonderful stories, nothing strained or exaggerated, occurs in it; that it contains nothing inconsistent with the simple relations existing among Christian communities in that age; that it makes no mention of Crescens, whereas we should expect, if such a tale of martyrdom had been invented by some *Græculus*, that Justin's death would be ascribed to the contrivance of Crescens, and the latter, as a principal character, be made the subject of many fables.

|| See vol. II. p. 125.

religious persuasion, and who saw in the doctrine of the gods nothing more than symbols of the elements and powers of nature. The mysteries, also, into which he had himself initiated seemed to him not to answer the expectations which they excited; while the conflicting systems of the philosophers furnished no certain ground of religious conviction. The contradiction which he often observed in pretended philosophers between the affected gravity of their costume, of their looks and discourses, and the frivolity of their conduct, filled him with distrust. While in this state of mind he happened to meet with the Old Testament, to which, as might very naturally happen to a Syrian, his attention had been drawn by what he had heard concerning the high antiquity of these writings compared with the religion of the Greeks. Of the impression which the perusal of the Old Testament made on his mind he thus speaks: "These writings won my confidence by the simplicity of their style, the unaffected plainness of the speakers, the intelligible account of the creation; by the predictions of future events, the salutary tendency of their precepts, and the prevailing doctrine of one God." \* The impression which he received from the study of the Old Testament seems accordingly to have prepared the way for his belief in the gospel.† Having, while in this state of mind, made a visit to Rome, he was there converted to Christianity through the instrumentality of Justin, of whom he speaks in terms of high veneration.

After the death of the latter he wrote his Discourse to the Gentiles, in which he vindicates the "philosophy of the barbarians" (*φιλοσοφία τῶν βαρβάρων*) against the contempt of the Greeks, who nevertheless had received the germs of all science and arts originally from the barbarians. In the view he takes of the relation of the Greek philosophy as well as religion to Christianity, we recognise the *later* much more than the *earlier* Justin. We have remarked on a former occasion ‡

\* Tatian had therefore already been convinced of the untenableness of polytheism, and indeed become satisfied that no religion but a monotheistic one could be true.

† It would be very strange, then, that Tatian should subsequently become an anti-Jewish Gnostic; but we have already observed (pp. 125-128) that we are by no means warranted in adopting this supposition.

‡ See p. 142.

that in this work the germ already appears of that speculative and ascetical way of thinking which he had probably brought along with him from Syria, as we may also perceive in it some of that obscurity of style which is peculiar to the Syrians. He says to the heathens, "Wherefore would you excite the religions of the state to a conflict with us? And why should I, merely because I am unwilling to follow your religious laws, be hated as impious and godless? The emperor commands us to pay tribute: I am ready to pay it. The Lord commands us to serve Him: I know how I am bound to serve Him; for men are to be honoured after the manner of men, but *that* God only is to be feared who can be seen by no human eye, and comprehended by no human art. Only when bidden to deny *Him* shall I refuse to obey, but I will rather die than appear both false and ungrateful."

After Tatian comes Athenagoras, who addressed his Apology (*πρεσβεία περὶ χριστιανῶν*) to the emperor Marcus Aurelius and his son Commodus.\* Of his personal history we have no definite accounts. Only two of the ancient writers name him, Methodius and Philip of Sida. This Philip of Sida, the last head of the Alexandrian catechetical school, is the only individual who gives us any account of the life of Athenagoras;† but the known incredibility of this author, the discrepancy between his statements and other more authentic reports, and the suspicious shape in which his fragment has reached us, render his statements unworthy of confidence. Neither the remarks of Athenagoras upon second marriages, nor what he says of the ecstasy of the prophets, whom he represents as blind organs of the influence of the Holy Spirit, are sufficient to prove that he was a Montanist; for, as we have already remarked, the Montanists said nothing on these points that was altogether new; they only pushed to the extreme a way of thinking on religious subjects and on ethics which was already existing.

\* See the treatise of Mosheim concerning the time when this Apology was composed, in the first vol. of his *Commentationes ad hist. eccles. pertinentes*.

† Published by Dodwell, *Dissertat. in Irenæum*. He reports that Athenagoras lived in the times of Hadrian and of Antoninus Pius; that he presented his Apology to these emperors; and that he was catechist before Clement at Alexandria.



Of this Athenagoras we have still remaining a work in *Defence of the Doctrine of the Resurrection*.

In connection with the Apologists we may notice a certain Hermias, of whom we know nothing save that he wrote a short satire against the heathen philosophers (διασυρμὸς τῶν ἔξω φιλοσόφων). In this work he does nothing more than bring together a number of absurd and contradictory opinions from the Greek philosophers, without advancing any positive doctrine of his own — a procedure which could hardly serve any useful purpose. For, to convince those who had been philosophically educated, something more was necessary than this sort of declamation, while the uneducated needed no such warnings against the errors of the philosophers, and no such negative preparation for the reception of the gospel. We see in Hermias one of those bitter enemies of the Greek philosophy whom Clement of Alexandria thought it necessary to censure, and who, following the idle Jewish legend, pretended that the Greek philosophy had been derived from fallen angels. In the title of his book he is called the philosopher: perhaps he wore the philosopher's mantle before his conversion, and, after it, passed at once from an enthusiastic admiration of the Greek philosophy to extreme abhorrence of it. For everything turns on the natural differences of disposition as well as on the modes of conversion, whether the new Christian principle will seek to discover what is akin to itself in those earlier opinions which unconsciously perhaps had prepared the way for itself, or rather take up a position of uncompromising hostility to it.

The church in Antioch, the great capital of the eastern division of Roman Asia, a flourishing seat of learning, could not fail to be supplied with teachers possessing a regular scientific education; and the contact into which these were thrown with educated heathens and with the Gnostics, whose native country was Syria, would naturally stimulate their literary activity. Under the emperor Marcus Aurelius, Theophilus became bishop of this community. After the death of this emperor, and in the reign of Commodus, this bishop wrote an apologetical work in three books, addressed to Autolycus, a heathen, whose objections against Christianity had moved him to compose this treatise, in which he displays great erudition and power of thought. From this work we

have already made some extracts. It is worthy of notice that this Theophilus, who wrote against Marcion and Hermogenes, had also composed commentaries on the sacred scriptures. We here observe the germ of the exegetical principles which distinguished the church at Antioch, of which we shall again have occasion to speak at the close of this section.\*

We observed that in Asia Minor a tendency opposed to the germinant Gnosis had grown out of the reaction of the principles which St. John had enforced by his own teaching and practice there—a tendency which sought to preserve uncorrupted and in its practical significance the historical and objective side of Christianity; but we have also seen how liable this tendency was, in its opposition to Gnosticism, to yield unduly to the influence of a sensuous Jewish element. And owing to the common interest which Christianity and the church possessed in the struggle with Gnosticism, spiritual elements, otherwise importantly different, here came to be combined. Thus, even those with whom the Jewish element more strongly predominated were able to find in this common opposition, which caused all other differences to be overlooked, a point of agreement; as we see, for example, in the case of Justin, who certainly was far from being inclined to Ebionism, and yet judged more mildly of those who bordered on this position (provided only they did not refuse to acknowledge the Gentile Christians as brethren in the faith) than he did of the Gnostics. This will serve to explain why *Hegesippus*, a church teacher, of Jewish origin and strong Jewish prepos-

\* Jerome cites, c. 25 de vir. ill. a commentary of his in evangelium (which may denote the entire corpus evangeliorum) and on the Proverbs; but adds, qui mihi cum superiorum voluminum elegantia et phrasi non videntur congruere. But, in the preface to his commentary on Matthew, he cites, very distinctly, commentaries of Theophilus; and in his letter to Algasia, tom. IV. f. 197, he cites, as it seems, an explanatory harmony or synopsis of the evangelists by the same author (qui quatuor evangelistarum in unum opus dicta compingens). It is possible, indeed, that all this refers only to one and the same work. We have nothing more of his (as the Latin fragments which go under the name of Theophilus do not belong to the present Theophilus), unless other fragments may still be found in the Catenæ. The examples which Jerome gives of his method of interpretation are remote from the spirit of the later Antiochian school; for they savour of an allegorising fancy, which, however, might be expected from his Alexandrian education,—so easy to be recognised in the first-cited work.

sessions, who lived under the reigns of the emperors Hadrian and Antoninus Pius, and who made the first attempt in the composition of a history of the church, should have been favourably disposed towards the anti-Gnostic tendency of the church. In the reign of the last-named emperor, Hegesippus, with a view perhaps of reconciling the differences existing between the communities which followed Jewish and those which followed Gentile customs, or of convincing himself by personal observation that an agreement in essentials subsisted among all the ancient churches, undertook a journey to Rome, where he continued a considerable time. The result of his inquiries and collections was embodied in five books of ecclesiastical transactions (πέντε ὑπομνήματα ἐκκλησιαστικῶν πράξεων). In such a work we may well suppose that he has adopted many corrupt traditions of Jewish origin, and has been influenced by various errors growing out of the low, sensual conception of a Jewish Christian. The sketch he gives of James, who bore the surname of the brother of the Lord, is drawn in a perfectly Ebionitic taste.\* From a quotation made by Stephanus Gobarus,† a monophysite author who lived near the close of the sixth century, we might conclude, indeed, that as a decided Ebionite he was opposed to the Apostle St. Paul; for in the fifth book of his History of the Church, after citing 1 Corinth. ii. 9, "What eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither has entered into the heart of man," he remarks, this is false, and those who use such language contradict the sacred scriptures and the Lord, who says, "Blessed are your eyes, that they see, and your ears, that they hear," Matth. xiii. 16.‡ If we refer these words of Hegesippus to the above-cited passage from St. Paul, it would seem to follow that he accused the latter of a false doctrine, or at least charged him with having quoted something as scripture which is not to be found in the scriptures. But the concurrence which Hegesippus expresses in the universal tradition of the church, and his connections with the church of Rome, are against this supposition; according to which, however, he must necessarily have been opposed to them both.

\* Euseb. 1. II. c. 23.

† In Photius, cod. 235.

‡ Μάτην μὲν εἰρησθαι ταῦτα καὶ καταψεύδισθαι τοὺς ταῦτα φαμένους τῶν τε θείων γραφῶν καὶ τοῦ κυρίου λόγοντος κτλ.

In recent times several critics of church history have represented the matter in quite an opposite light. Proceeding on the assumption that Hegesippus was given to such anti-Pauline Ebionitic views, they have thought themselves warranted in drawing from the fact of this father's acquiescence the conclusion that a kindred spirit prevailed in the greater portion of the church, and in the Roman church particularly. But in our opinion this argument proves too much, and therefore nothing at all; for, if this inference were correct, it would follow that we must do nothing less than reverse the whole church history of the first centuries, and suppose changes of which there is not the slightest indication, and by which we should gain, it is true—but nothing more than that—a satisfactory explanation of the general recognition of St. Paul's apostolical authority. That the Roman church did not take its departure from a fundamental Jewish principle has, we think, been proved by our exposition of the facts of its history. What shall we say of a method of scientific investigation which on some obscure, isolated passage erects a theory, which, however, conflicts with the more certain results which flow from the investigation of the credible, as also numerous sources of the ancient church? Moreover, as Hegesippus believed that he found the pure doctrine of Christ in the first epistle of Clement to the Corinthians,\* where the presence of the Pauline element is not to be mistaken, he cannot have been opposed to St. Paul, as he necessarily must have been, if, in the words quoted above, it were really his intention to controvert this apostle.

So far as we can judge (in our total ignorance of the context in which these words of Hegesippus occurred), we are rather disposed to conjecture that he made this remark, not in opposition to Paul,† but in his flaming zeal against the adversaries of the sensual Chiliasm, who might have employed the above passage, and others of the like character, to controvert the sensual representations of future happiness.

In addition to the disputes with the Gnostics and the Apologies against the Gentiles, the controversy *respecting the time*

\* Euseb. l. IV. c. 22.

† It may, in fact, be a question from what source he took these words, as it is still an unsettled point from whence Paul himself made the citation.



of observing Easter,\* and the prophetic claims of Montanism, furnished afterwards new materials for the literary activity of the teachers of the church. The catalogue of writings drawn up by Melito bishop of Sardis, whom we have already cited as the author of an Apology addressed to the emperor Marcus Aurelius, shows what were the matters which engaged the attention of the church-teachers of Asia Minor at that time. Among them we find the following:—Of a right conversation, and of the prophets; of prophecy; of the church; of the Revelations of St. John (treatises which, collectively, may have had reference to the great point of the Montanistic controversy); the Key—*ἡ κλεις*—(also perhaps referring to the same subject, and alluding to the Authority of the Keys as bearing on the dispute about penitence); a discourse on the Lord's day (perhaps with reference to the controversies between Jewish and Gentile Christians on the observance of the Sabbáth or of Sunday); of the *corporeity* of God; † in defence of the material and anti-Gnostic views. The following writings may also have related to the controversy with Gnosticism:—Of the Nature of Man; of the Creation; of the Soul, whether from the body or from the spirit; of the Birth of Christ; of Truth; of Faith; of the Senses in obedience to Faith. ‡ The importance of such topics, which entered so deeply into the life of the church in this period, causes the greater occasion to regret the loss of these writings. §

A contemporary of Melito was the Claudius Apollinaris, bishop of Hierapolis in Phrygia, whom we have mentioned on a former occasion. His writings, although not so voluminous, treated on many of the same topics. ||

\* See above, vol. I. p. 412.

† *Περὶ ἐνσωμάτου Θεοῦ*. These words, it is true, may be understood, —of God who appeared in the body; therefore, of God who became man; but a comparison of them with the account which the trustworthy Origen gives of the contents of this book (fragment. Commentar. in Genes. vol. II. opp. fol. 25) compels us to adopt the interpretation given above.

‡ For the catalogue of these writings see Euseb. 1. IV. c. 26.

§ Comp. on this point the learned and complete disquisition of my worthy colleague and friend Prof. Piper, in the *Studien und Kritiken*, J. 1838, 1stes Heft. Would that the author might be induced to furnish soon a more ample work on these matters, as the fruit of his zealous researches during a long series of years in this wide field of patristic learning.

|| If in the *Catenæ*—especially the *Catenæ* published at Leipsic, 1772,

From this school of church-teachers in Asia Minor proceeded Irenæus, who, after the martyrdom of Pothinus, became bishop of the churches at Lyons and Vienna.\* In his old age he still remembered what he had heard in his youth from the lips of the venerable Polycarp concerning the life and doctrines of Christ and His apostles. In a writing addressed to Florinus, a false teacher with whom, in youth, he had enjoyed the society of Polycarp, he says,—“These doctrines” (those, viz., of Florinus) “the elders who preceded us, who associated also with the apostles, did not teach thee; for while I was yet a boy I saw thee in company with Polycarp in Asia Minor; for I bear in remembrance what happened then better than what happens now. What we heard in childhood grows along with the soul and becomes one with it; so that I can describe the place in which the blessed Polycarp sat and spake; his going in and out; his manner of life, and the shape of his person; the discourses which he delivered to the congregation; how he spoke of his intercourse with St. John, and with the rest who had seen the Lord; how he reported their sayings, and what he had heard from them respecting the Lord, His miracles, and His teaching. As he had received all from the eye-witnesses of His life, he narrated it in accordance with scripture. These things, by virtue of the grace of God imparted to me, I listened to, even then, with eagerness, and wrote them down, not on paper, but in my heart; and by the grace of God I constantly recall them in fresh and vivid recollection. And I can witness before God, that, if the blessed and apostolic presbyter had heard such things, he would have cried out, stopped his ears, and, according to his custom, said, ‘O my good God! upon what times hast thou brought me, that I must endure this!’ and he would have fled away from the place where, seated or standing, he had heard such discourses.”† The spirit of Polycarp, which is thus described, passed over to Irenæus. Of his peculiarly

of Nicephorus on the Octateuchus—the fragments belonging to this Apollinaris were duly separated from those belonging to Apollinaris of Laodicea, and the fragments which are found in Eusebius, and in the *Chronicon Paschale Alexandrinum*, were compared with them, we should have better means of determining the characteristics of this church-teacher.

\* See above, vol. I. p. 116.

† Euseb. I. V. c. 20.

practical turn of mind both in conceiving and treating the doctrines of faith, of his zeal for the essentials of Christianity, and his moderation and liberality in all controversies about unessential and outward things, we have before spoken. We have also remarked that he probably came forward as a peace-maker between the Montanists and their fierce adversaries. To Montanism that image of his mind which is impressed on his writings certainly presents no resemblance. If he had been a zealous Montanist, he would hardly have refrained, when touching upon any favourite theme of Montanism, to have appealed to the new disclosures imparted by the Paraclete; but he uniformly appeals to the scriptures alone, or to the traditions of those ancient fathers of Asia Minor. We cannot, indeed, suppose that, where he speaks of the condemnation of false prophets,\* he means by these words the Montanistic prophets; for he probably cherished too high a regard for the Montanists to do that. Still, if he had been an ardent Montanist, he would hardly have omitted, in the place where he classed together all that was worthy of condemnation, to mention, in connection with the false prophets, the opponents also of the true prophets. Instead of this, however, there immediately follows a passage which rather marks the spirit of Irenæus† as being simply that of a lover of peace, who wished to prevent a schism between the Montanistic communities and the other churches, and who even hushed the disputes in the controversy about Easter. “The Lord,” he says, “will judge those also who excite divisions, who are destitute of the love of God, and seek their own profit, rather than the unity of the church; who, for slight and frivolous reasons, rend, and, so far as in them lies, destroy the great and glorious body of Christ; straining, in truth, at a gnat, and swallowing a camel. But all the good they can do can never make amends for the evil of schism.”

Indeed it is impossible to find any stamp of Montanism in Irenæus, except in those words where he combats the extreme antimontanistic tendency in those adversaries of St. John's

\* Lib. IV. c. 33, s. 6.

† From the very manner in which Tertullian, adv. Valentinian, c. 5, notices Irenæus, we may infer that he was no Montanist; otherwise Tertullian would have called him, as he does Proculus just afterwards, “noster.”

gospel who have previously been mentioned.\* When he speaks with so much heat and acrimony against those who refused to acknowledge the prophetic gift in the church, but looked on everything that pretended to be prophecy as nothing but the inspiration of fanaticism or of the evil spirit, and charged those who did so with the unpardonable sin against the Holy Ghost, he departs widely indeed from that character of moderation which, except when he is dealing with Gnostics, he uniformly displays. But this zeal simply shows the great importance which he attached to the extraordinary phenomena of Christian inspiration, as marking the continued communication of life to the church by the Holy Spirit; a remark which is confirmed, moreover, by many expressions in his writings. This, however, does not involve the essential characteristics of Montanism. For on this point, too, as is clear from what has already been said, Montanism simply exhibited the extreme result of a tendency of the religious mind which had been existing long before in the church. Moreover, if Irenæus lays stress on the fact that the prophetic spirit was poured out on women as well as men; and if he assumed and believed that he found, in 1 Corinth. xi. 4, 5, a proof that the prophetic calling, as an exception to the general rule, authorised women to speak in the church; even this would afford no conclusive evidence of his attachment to Montanism. But at the same time he says of his opponents that they reduced to nothing those spiritual gifts which, by the good pleasure of the Father, had been poured out in the last times on the human race.† And the question now is, whether, in this remark, he intended the effusion of the Holy Spirit connected with the first appearance of Christianity, or one which pretended to lay the foundation of a new special epoch in the progressive development of the church. If the latter were the case, he would then have recognised the mission of the new prophets, but at the same time have sought to prevent a schism between the communities adhering to these prophets and those of the rest of the church.

The principal work of Irenæus (which, for the most part, has come down to us only in an old verbal Latin translation,

\* See above, pp. 220, 303.

† Ut donum Spiritus frustrentur, quod in novissimis temporibus, secundum placitum Patris, effusum est in humanum genus.



accompanied, however, with several important fragments of the Greek original) is his *Refutation of the Gnostic System*, in five books; a work which presents us with the most faithful transcript of his mind.

Many of the writings of Irenæus we know only by their names. He himself quotes a work wherein he had treated *a topic* which seems to lie remote from the general direction of thought among the fathers; viz. "the peculiarities of the style of St. Paul," his frequent use of *hyperbata*.\* Probably the work did not specially relate to the peculiar style and phraseology of this apostle; but the topic might be occasionally touched upon, while attacking the arbitrary method of the Gnostic exegesis, by Irenæus. He ascribes the peculiarity of St. Paul's style to the crowd of thoughts pressing for utterance upon his ardent mind;† an important remark in its bearing on the development of the notion of inspiration. For in fact it implies a distinction of the divine and the human element—a consciousness that all is not alike to be traced to the operation of the Holy Spirit, but that some regard is to be had also to the form, which is dependent on the characteristic individuality and self-activity of the man. Such a view of inspiration, by which the informing agency of the Holy Spirit does not preclude the natural psychological development of the individual, but rather gives to it the form in which it works, is clearly implied in many also of Tertullian's statements. This is the case, for instance, when, assuming that the Apostle St. Paul did not always follow the same method in his apostolical labours, he supposes in him a progressive development of the Christian spirit, and asserts that he was at first, when the life of grace was beginning in him, stern and uncompromising, but afterwards became milder; at first, like the Neophyte, he pronounced a more unqualified opposition to former principles, which, however, he afterwards learned to moderate, so as to become all things to all men.‡ Two opposite elements, in fact,

\* Lib. III. c. 7: Quemadmodum de multis et alibi ostendimus hyperbatis eum utentem.

† Propter velocitatem sermonum suorum et propter impetum, qui in ipso est, spiritus.

‡ Paulus adhuc in gratia rudis, ferventer, ut adhuc Neophytus, adversus Judaismum; postmodum et ipse usu omnibus omnia futurus, ut omnes lucraretur. c. Marcion, lib. I. c. 20.

came here together in the case of the teachers of the church : a view of inspiration derived from the Jews, and specially applied by them to the prophetic element of the Old Testament, which, exclusively supranaturalistic, supposed an altogether passive state of the soul ; and a conception which, after the analogy of the Christian consciousness, was derived from contemplating the apostolical writings in their characteristic individuality—a conception, however, which gave utterance to itself only in single occasional remarks, but without attaining to any systematic and matured form. But on this subject we must further remark, that Montanism, by giving special prominence to the former notion, and by nevertheless applying it to the properly prophetic states, led the way to a mode of distinguishing, from the extreme state of ecstatic inspiration, lower stages in which, while the consciousness was filled with the divine Spirit, nevertheless the human self-activity operated.\*

Of the writings belonging to this Father, which we find noticed among the ancients, we shall mention, besides those already named, only two letters, which possess an historical importance on account of their object ; for they are said to have been the means of healing certain divisions in the Roman church. One of these is addressed to Blastus, who was probably a presbyter in the church of Rome. The statement given in the appendix to Tertullian's Prescriptions, that Blastus, by adhering to the custom of Asia Minor as to the time of keeping Easter, had occasioned a division in the Roman church, may not have been altogether without foundation. This event must belong to the times of the Roman bishop Victor. Perhaps with this practice Blastus also joined several other Judaizing notions.

The other letter was addressed to Florinus, a presbyter, with whom Irenæus in early youth had enjoyed the society of the venerable Polycarp, and who, as it seems, had pushed

\* Thus Tertullian distinguishes what St. Paul (1 Corinth. 7) set forth, on the ground of the common principles of Christianity, as *human counsel*, and what he taught as revelation of the divine Spirit: Cum ergo, qui se fidelem dixerat, adjecit postea, Spiritum Dei se habere, quod nemo dubitaret etiam de fidei, idcirco id dixit, ut sibi apostoli fastigium redderet: proprie enim apostoli Spiritum Sanctum habent, in operibus prophetiæ et efficacia virtutum documentisque linguarum, non ex parte, quod cæteri. Exhortat. castitatis, c. 5.

Monarchianism, or the doctrine of one only Creator of all existence, to such an extreme as to make God the author of evil.\*

Hippolytus, who held an important place among the ecclesiastical writers belonging to the first half of the third century, was one of Irenæus' disciples, according to Photius.† Of his works, however, but a few fragments still remain. No doubt the simple testimony of Photius is not of itself sufficiently to establish that he was a disciple of Irenæus. However, we may well allow the fact to have been so, since, as is evident from his quotation, he had before his eyes certain statements of Hippolytus himself with regard to his relations to Irenæus; and since in this writer's theological drift (so far as we can understand it from the fragments and titles of his works—if it be allowable to form a judgment from the mere titles of his

\* From the title of the book, as it is cited by Eusebius, l. V. c. 26, it is difficult to make out what there was peculiar in the opinions of Florinus. The title is as follows: *Περὶ μοναρχίας, ἢ περὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τὸν θεὸν ποιητὴν κακῶν*. The first part of this title may doubtless be understood to mean that Florinus, as a Gnostic Dualist, had denied the doctrine of the *μοναρχία*: but with this the second part does not agree; for the words cannot refer to any such fact as that Florinus held to an absolutely evil principle, or a Demiurge, as the author of an imperfect system of the world. In this case the title must have run thus: *Περὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι θεὸν τὸν ποιητὴν κακῶν*. Nothing else, therefore, can be understood, than that it was the design of Irenæus to show how the Monarchian doctrine ought to be maintained, so as not to make the *μία ἀρχή* the *ἀρχή* τῶν κακῶν; and that Florinus, therefore, had made God the author of evil, either by teaching a system of absolute predestination—which many uneducated Christians derived from passages of the Old Testament, too literally understood (according to Origen, Philocal. c. 1, f. 17: *Τοιαῦτα ὑπολαμβάνοντες περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅποια οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ ὁμοτάτου καὶ ἀδικωτάτου ἀνθρώπου*)—or by making God the creator of an absolutely evil being, whether a conscious or an unconscious one (a *ῥλη*). Again, if Florinus had barely entertained one of the common Gnostic doctrines concerning the origin of evil, Irenæus would not have said that no other heretic had ever as yet ventured to bring forward such views. And, moreover, when Eusebius says that Florinus had subsequently allowed himself to be carried away by the doctrines of Valentine, and Irenæus had been induced by this fact to write his book, *περὶ ὀγδοάδος*, against him (see above the account of the Gnostic systems), it seems certainly to follow from this that the previous doctrines of Florinus were *not* Gnostic. We may conceive, then, that, when Florinus perceived the untenableness of a theory which placed the cause of evil in God, he fell into the other extreme, and supposed an independent principle of evil existing out of God.

† Cod. 121

works as to the subject-matter and tendency of an author's labours) there is nothing which contradicts this supposition, but, on the contrary, much which favours it.

Hippolytus was a bishop. But as neither Eusebius nor Jerome was able to name the city in which he was bishop, we can say nothing more definite on the matter; and neither those later accounts, which transfer his bishopric to Arabia,\* nor the others, which place it in the neighbourhood of Rome,† deserve consideration. Certainly there is much in favour of the supposition that his field of labour was in the East, but, on the other hand, much also which seems to show that it was in the West. These suppositions easily admit of being reconciled with each other, by distinguishing different periods of his life; and the very circumstance that the scene of his labours was different at different times may have been the occasion of the vagueness which we observe in the ancient accounts concerning him.

The complete list of his writings is obtained by comparing the statements of Eusebius and of Jerome, the notices of his works which are found on his statue,‡ dug up in the year 1551 near Rome, on the road to Tivoli, the accounts of Photius, and the catalogue of Ebedjesu,§ a Nestorian author in the thirteenth century. From this list we see that he composed works on a variety of subjects, exegetical, dogmatic, polemical, and chronological, besides homilies.

Of his writings, however, we shall mention none but those which, on account of the topics they discuss, are worthy of notice in an historical point of view. In respect to those of an exegetical character, Jerome signifies that he anticipated Origen in giving the example of more full and copious expositions of scripture, and that Origen's friend Ambrose had

\* According to the conjecture of some authors, Portus Romanus, or Aden, in Arabia; a report which perhaps originated in a misconception of the passage in Eusebius, l. VI. c. 20.

† Portus Romanus, Ostia.

‡ He is represented sitting on his episcopal chair, *καθίστα* or *θρόνος*: under him is the Easter cycle of sixteen years, which he prepared, *κανὼν ἐκκαίδεκάετηρος*, upon which there is a critical essay in the second vol. of Ideler's *Handbuch der Chronologie*, p. 214. An engraving of the monument itself is to be found in the first vol. of Fabricius' edition of the works of Hippolytus.

§ In Assemani *Bibliotheca Orientalis*, T. III. P. I.



advised the latter to follow the same plan. He must also have met with Origen somewhere, either at Alexandria, in Palestine, or Arabia, since Jerome quotes a homily of Hippolytus in praise of the Saviour, which he had pronounced in Origen's presence.\* His exegesis, if we may judge of it from the few remaining fragments, was of an allegorizing character.

In the catalogue of his writings given on the ancient monument occurs a work, Ὑπὲρ τοῦ κατὰ Ἰωάννην εὐαγγελίου καὶ ἀποκαλύψεως. This can hardly be a commentary on these two books of scripture, though Jerome seems to cite a commentary of Hippolytus on the Apocalypse, for the title denotes rather a treatise in defence of these books. The title which Ebedjesu gives to the work also agrees with this supposition. We must suppose, then, that it was the design of this treatise to defend the genuineness of these scriptural books, and to vindicate them against the objections of the *Alogi*. If in this case it would seem that Hippolytus was an opponent of the ultra-Antimontanists, this conclusion is confirmed by the fact that he wrote a work on the *charismata*.† Moreover, it deserves consideration in this respect, that by Stephanus Gobarus the judgments of Hippolytus and of Gregory of Nyssa respecting the Montanists are set one against the other, so that we may conclude that the former belonged to the defenders of the Montanists. Whether the κεφάλαια πρὸς Γαῖον, which Ebedjesu ascribes to him, ought also to be brought into the account here (upon the supposition, namely, that this Caius was the warm opponent of Montanism), cannot be positively determined.

A work *against thirty-two heresies* is cited as belonging to Hippolytus. It ends, according to Photius, with the heresy of Noetus. According to a citation of Photius, Hippolytus stated that in his work he had availed himself of a series of discourses by Irenæus against these false teachers.‡ His

\* Perhaps much light would be thrown on the history of the Epiphany and Christmas festivals, if these homilies had been preserved to our times.

† It cannot be determined with perfect certainty whether this work bore the title Ἀποστολικὴ παράδοσις περὶ χαρισμάτων, or whether the work on the charismata and the exhibition of the apostolic tradition were two different productions.

‡ The words of Photius are, Ταύτας (τὰς αἵρέσεις) δὲ φησὶν ἐλίγχοις ὑποβληθῆναι ὁμιλοῦντος Εἰρηναίου· ὃν καὶ σύνοψιν ὁ Ἰππόλυτος ποιούμενος τοὺς τὸ βιβλίον φησι συντεταχέναι.

treatise against Noetus, which has been preserved, and probably formed the conclusion of the work, we have on a former occasion alluded to.

We have besides a treatise of his of little importance on *Antichrist*, with which also Photius was acquainted. The same compiler cites from him a commentary on Daniel, from which he adduces the noticeable fact \* that Hippolytus fixed the end of the world at five centuries after the birth of Christ. In this circumstance of his fixing on a remoter date than was commonly assumed in the early church, we discern the effect of the tranquil times which the church then enjoyed under Alexander Severus.

In the list of the writings of Hippolytus, found on the monument of which we have spoken, occurs a *προτρεπτικὸν πρὸς Σεβήρηναν*. It is scarcely to be doubted that this is the same treatise from which, under the title of a letter to a queen or empress (*πρὸς βασιλίδαν*), Theodoret, in his *ἐρανίστης*, quotes several passages, which Fabricius has collected in his edition of Hippolytus. The matter of these quotations corresponds with the title which the work bears on the monument. It is an exposition of the doctrines of the Christian faith for the use of a heathen lady. The Severina referred to must therefore have been a queen or empress. But the name Severina can hardly be quite correct—it should be Severa;—and there is every reason to suppose it was Severa, the wife of the emperor Philip the Arabian.†

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*The theological development of the North-African church* took quite a peculiar character. The theological spirit that prevailed here was continually shaping itself into a more settled form, from the time of Tertullian to that of Augustin; and afterwards, through Augustin, acquired the greatest possible influence over the whole Western church.

Tertullian presents special claims to our attention, both as the first representative of the theological tendency in the North-African church, and also as a representative of the Montanistic ideas. He was a man of an ardent and profound mind, of warm and deep feelings; inclined to surrender himself up, with his whole soul and strength, to the object of his love, and sternly to repel whatever was foreign from it. He possessed

\* Cod. 202.

† See vol. I. p. 175.

rich and various stores of knowledge ; which, however, indigested, had been accumulated without scientific arrangement. His profoundness of thought was not united with logical clearness and sobriety : an unbridled, ardent, but highly sensuous imagination governed him. His fiery and positive disposition, combined with his previous training as an advocate or rhetorician, easily impelled him, especially in controversy, to rhetorical exaggerations. When he defends a cause of whose truth he is convinced, we often see in him the advocate, who does but collect together all the arguments which can help his case, it matters not whether they are true arguments or only plausible sophisms ; and in such cases the very exuberance of his talent sometimes leads him astray from the simple feeling of truth. What renders this man a highly important phenomenon to the Christian historian is the fact that Christianity is the inspiring soul of his life and thoughts ; that out of Christianity an entirely new and rich inner world developed itself to his mind : but the leaven of Christianity had first to penetrate and completely to refine that fiery, bold, and withal rugged nature—the new wine in an old bottle. Tertullian often had more within him than he was able to express : the overflowing mind was at a loss for the suitable form. He had to *create* a language for the new spiritual matter,—and that out of the rude Punic Latin,—without the aid of a logical and grammatical education, and in the very midst of the current of thoughts and feelings by which his ardent nature was hurried along. Hence his often difficult and obscure phraseology : but hence, also, its original and striking turns. And hence this great Christian Father, who unites great gifts with great failings, has been so often misconceived by those who could form no friendship with the spirit which dwelt in so ungainly a form.

Quintus Septimius Florens Tertullianus was born, probably at Carthage, in the later times of the second century. His father was a centurion in the service of the proconsul at Carthage. He was, at first, an advocate, or perhaps a rhetorician ; and he did not embrace Christianity until he had arrived at the age of manhood. He then obtained, if Jerome's account is correct, the office of presbyter ; whether at Rome or at Carthage is, however, doubtful. The latter place is, in itself, the most probable ; since in different writings, composed

at different times, he discourses like one who was settled in Carthage; though Eusebius and Jerome speak for the former.\* Tertullian's conversion to Montanism may be satisfactorily explained from its affinity with the original bent of his mind and feelings.

His writings run through a very wide range of topics connected with Christian doctrine and conversation; and it is here particularly important to distinguish those of his works which bear the stamp of Montanism, from those in which there are no traces of that error.†

\* The words of Eusebius, I. II. c. 2, τῶν μάλιστα ἐπὶ Ῥώμης λαμπρῶν, do not directly imply that when a Christian he took an important place in the Roman church; but, according to the connection, may very well mean that before his conversion to Christianity he stood in high repute at Rome as a jurisconsult (for the arbitrary translation of Rufinus—"inter nostros scriptores admodum clarus"—must at all events be rejected): but then, to be sure, we might still infer, that, if Tertullian lived at Rome when a heathen, and enjoyed there so high a reputation, it is also probable that he was there first invested with a spiritual office. Jerome says that he was moved to embrace Montanism by the envy and calumnies of the Roman clergy. But such stories, with which the ancient fathers were so apt to impose on themselves, are always most suspicious. For there has always existed a very strong disposition to ascribe to some outward cause every defection from the Catholic church to the heretics. And Jerome, although he respected the cathedra Petri in the Roman church, was yet particularly inclined to repeat evil stories of the Roman clergy, who, during his residence in Rome, especially after the death of Damasus, had occasioned him so much annoyance. He was especially prone to accuse them of envy towards great talents.

† A more full investigation of this topic may be found in my Monograph on the character of Tertullian. I will here only add a few remarks in answer to the objections brought against my assertions by Dr. von Cölln. The passage concerning fasts and mortifications cannot by any means be considered as an evidence of the Montanism of the author; for a voluntary ἄσκησις was certainly resorted to by many who were no Montanists. The expression, "jejunia conjungere," might (although not necessarily) be understood as referring to a—not Montanistic—*superpositio* (continuation of fasting from Friday to Saturday, on which no Montanist fasted). Besides, the whole manner in which penitence is here spoken of, the spirit of gentleness which breathes through every remark, does not savour of Montanism. As to the work on the *prescriptions*, I do not find myself, upon a review of it, disposed to alter my opinion that it did not originate in Montanism. The words, "alius libellus hunc gradum sustinebit," contr. Marcion. I. I. c. 2, Tertullian might use of a work already written, no matter whether by himself or by some other person, personifying it as an advocate. From the circumstance that, in the symbol of faith, c. 13, the doctrine of creation *from nothing*



It is a question difficult to determine whether Tertullian always remained in the same connection with the Montanistic party, or whether, at some later period, he again inclined more to the Catholic church, and endeavoured to strike out a middle path between the two parties. The reports of Augustin\* and of Prædestinatus,† as well as the account given by the latter‡ of a Montanistic work of Tertullian, which has for its object to diminish the number of controverted points between the two parties, favour indeed the latter supposition; and on this hypothesis many writings of Tertullian which are moderately Montanistic, or which merely border on Montanism, might be assigned to a different period of his life. These accounts, however, are not sufficiently worthy of credit. From the character of Tertullian it may easily be conceived that he would persevere in the mode of thinking he had once shaped out for himself, and only become the more obstinate by opposition. The distinct sect of *Tertullianists*, which appears to have existed in the fifth century at Carthage, furnishes no evidence in favour of that supposition; for it is possible that this sect, holding the peculiar opinions of Tertullian, had been formed at a later period, when the correspondence with the Montanistic churches in Asia had been interrupted.

The study of Tertullian's writings had manifestly an important influence on the development of Cyprian as a doctrinal

is made particularly prominent, it by no means follows that he had already had to sustain a conflict with Hermogenes; for, even in the controversy with the Gnostics, this article was necessarily made a prominent point; and the context in which the words there stand intimates that it was the Gnostics, rather than Hermogenes, whom he had in view. Besides, it is no doubt certain, from c. 30, that, when Tertullian wrote this book, Hermogenes had already advanced his peculiar dogmas; but it cannot possibly be proved that Hermogenes might not have broached his opinions a great while before Tertullian wrote his book against him. From the cursory manner in which Tertullian speaks of him in the *Prescriptions*, we might conjecture that he was then considered by him as a person of no great importance; and that it was not until the Montanistic interest was superadded to other occasions of hostility that he was led to engage in a more detailed attack of the doctrines of Hermogenes. The way in which he speaks of the emanation of the Logos cannot be called Montanistic; for he expresses himself after the same manner in the *Apologeticus*, c. 21. And on the passage in the book *de patientia*, c. 1, compare the remarks on page 352.

\* Hæres. 86.

† H. 86.

‡ H. 26.

writer. Jerome, speaking after a tradition which was said to have come from a secretary of Cyprian, informs us that the latter was in the habit of reading something daily from the writings of Tertullian, whom he was accustomed to call emphatically the *Teacher*.\*

Concerning the character, the labours, and the most important writings of Cyprian, we have already said enough in various places. We shall only mention here a remarkable work of Cyprian's, his three books of testimonies (*testimonia*), consisting of a collection of the most important passages of the Bible, to prove that Jesus is the Messiah promised in the Old Testament, and to serve as a foundation for the scheme of Christian faith and morals. The collection was intended for the use of a certain Quirinus, who had requested the bishop to draw up for him, as a daily exercise and aid to the memory, a short abstract of this sort, which should embrace the essential points of scriptural faith and practice. As Cyprian calls him "my son," it cannot have been a bishop or presbyter for whom Cyprian had prepared a collection of this sort, to be used as a guide in imparting religious instruction.† When we compare together the introduction to the second and to the third books, it becomes very probable that the individual to whom Cyprian wrote was a layman of his own church, whom he wished to assist in gaining a familiar acquaintance with the practical truths and most important rules for all the principal relations of the Christian life.‡ This collection, then, will

\* *Da magistrum*, said he to his secretary ; Jerome *de viris illustribus*, c. 53. To see what use he makes of Tertullian's writings, compare particularly the writings of Cyprian *de oratione dominica* and *de patientia* with Tertullian's treatises on the same subjects ; and *de idolorum vanitate* with the *Apologeticus*.

† As might be inferred from the words at the beginning, "*quibus non tam tractasse, quam tractantibus materiam præbuisse videamur*." On this supposition we could only presume that he had prepared the collection as a guide or handbook for a deacon or a catechist, a *doctor audientium*. But the following words show that the collection was also designed for the purpose of impressing deeply on the memory, by frequent perusal, certain important passages and doctrines of scripture. It must have been intended, then, to serve at the same time as a guide for the religious teacher, and as a manual for the catechumens. The view expressed above, however, is the most natural one.

‡ *Quæ esse facilia et utilia legentibus possunt, dum in breviarum pauca digesta et velociter perleguntur et frequenter iterantur*.

serve to show the intimate connection subsisting between the bishop and those members of his flock who were solicitous for the welfare of their souls, and the anxiety he felt to make every individual familiarly acquainted with the divine word ; a wish which he particularly expresses in the beautiful words which conclude the preface to the first book : “ More strength will be imparted to thee, and the eyes of thy understanding will continually grow clearer, if thou searchest more carefully through the Old and New Testament, and diligently perusest all parts of the holy scriptures ; for I have only drawn a little out of the divine fountain to send thee in the mean time. Thou canst drink more copiously and satisfy thyself, when, with us, thou also approachest to the same fountain of divine fulness, in order to drink after the same manner.”

The particular rules, which Cyprian sets forth and supports with passages from scripture, evince the deep interest which he took in counteracting the erroneous notion that it is possible to satisfy the demands of the gospel and to obtain salvation by a mere outward profession and observance of Christian ceremonies ; but at the same time also show how necessary he felt it to impress the laity with the same reverence for the priestly order as the Old Testament enjoins.

Not long after Cyprian, there lived in the same country a writer known to us only by a production of some importance on account of its bearing on the history of Christian manners and of Christian worship, namely, Commodian.\* His work is written in verse, and entitled *Rules of Living* (*Instructiones*, exhortations and admonitions). He describes himself in the preface as one who, having formerly been a pagan, had by the study of the Bible been led to see the vanity of heathenism, and to embrace the Christian faith.† He intimates that, as he had believed, with the great majority, that death made an end

\* Gennadius (c. 15) has nothing more to say about him than what might be gathered by any one out of his writings.

† Ego similiter erravi tempore multo,  
Fano prosequendo, parentibus insciis ipsis,

(his parents were pagans, which class is denoted throughout this work by the term “insciis”)

Abstuli me tandem inde legendo de lege.

of man's personal existence, he was especially attracted by the promise of an eternal and divine life, which was offered him in the scriptures.\* He bewails himself as one who, by falling into sin after baptism, had subjected himself to the penance of the church: this he confesses in his address to the pœnitentes,† whom he exhorts to surrender themselves to mortification for their sins, but not to despair; to seek after the physician and the true medicine, and not to separate themselves from the church.‡ And in encouraging his Christian brethren to the conflict, he says that he does not in self-exaltation, as a just one, address them.§ Considering the extent to which the hierarchical element flourished in North Africa, it is the more remarkable to observe how he ventures, though a layman, to admonish and censure even the clergy. While avaricious teachers allowed themselves to be bribed by presents, or induced by the respect of persons, to be silent where they ought to have reproved sinful conduct, he felt constrained to rouse the misled laity out of their security.|| We discern the more free spirit, incapable of bowing the knee to sacerdotal authority which had passed to him from that study of the Bible by which he had been led to Christianity. The Christian spirit, however, in these admonitions, which otherwise evince so lively a zeal for good morals, is disturbed by a sensuous Jewish element, a gross Chiliasm; as, for example, when it is affirmed

\* *Gens et ego fui perversa mente moratus,  
Et vitam istius sæculi veram esse putabam,  
Mortemque similiter sicut vos judicabam adesse;  
Cum semel exisset, animum periisse defunctum.* N. 26.

† *Namque, fatebor enim, unum me ex vobis adesse  
Terroremque linquendum: sensi ipse ruinam.  
Idcirco commoneo vulneratos cautius ire.* N. 49.

‡ *Pœnitens es factus, noctibus diebusque precare:  
Attamen a matre noli discedere longe,  
Et tibi misericors poterit altissimus esse.  
Tu si vulnus habes, herbam medicumque require.*

§ *Justus ego non sum, fratres, de cloaca levatus:  
Nec me supertollo, sed doleo vestri.* N. 61.

|| *Si quidam doctores, dum expectant munera vestra,  
Aut timent personas, laxant singula vobis;  
Et ego [non] doleo, sed cogor dicere verum.*

And afterwards:

*Observas mandatum hominis (the clergy) et Dei devitas.  
Tu fidis muneri, quo doctores ora procludunt,  
Ut taceant, neque dicant tibi jussa divina.  
Me vera dicente, sicut teneris, prospice Summum.* N. 57.



that the lordly masters of the world should in the millennium do menial service for the saints.\*

The work was composed at a time when the church enjoyed quiet, perhaps under the reign of Gallienus, and refers to the recent persecutions, to the multitude of the lapsed, to the schisms of Felicissimus and Novatian. The author himself testifies that he wrote in the third century.†

We have still to mention, in the present section, as belonging to the same church, Arnobius, although he evinces an independent doctrinal training, and the spirit of the North African church seems not (at least at the time when he came forward as a Christian author) to have exercised any influence on him—a fact which may be accounted for if we consider the free, independent manner in which he seems to have come to Christianity, through the reading of the New Testament, especially the gospels. He was a rhetorician of Sicca, in Numidia, and lived in the reign of the emperor Diocletian.‡ His writings bear testimony to his possessing the literary acquirements considered necessary for a [rhetorician in so considerable a city. Jerome in his chronicle tells us that Arnobius, who, up to the time, had ever been an enemy to Christianity, was moved by a dream to embrace the faith, but that the bishop to whom he applied, knowing his hostility to Christianity, would not trust him, and that hence Arnobius was led to write his apologetical work (the *septem libros disputationum adversus gentes*), to prove to him the honesty of his convictions. This story has been suspected to be an interpolation, for certainly it is wholly out of place where it stands. That all this should have taken place in the twentieth year of Constantine (in the year 326) is a manifest anachronism. Arnobius, moreover, looks like one who had come to the faith after a long protracted examination, and not by a sudden impression from dreams. The work does not bespeak the novice, who was still a catechumen, but a man already mature in his convictions,

\* *Nobilesque viri, sub antichristo devicto, (Nero, who was to burn Rome,) Ex præcepto Dei rursum viventes in ævo Mille quidem annis, ut servant sanctis, et alto Sub jugo servili, ut portent victualia collo.* N. 80.

† *Et si parvulitas sic sensit, cur annis ducentis Fuistis infantes; numquid et semper eritis?* N. 6.

‡ Hieronym. de vir. illustr. c. 79.

although not altogether orthodox according to the views of the church.

Still we are not warranted on these grounds to reject the narrative entirely. We have already had occasion to remark \* how, by such impressions, many were prepared for conversion. It is not asserted in the story that his conversion was due entirely to *such* impressions; his own work, it is plain, would speak against this. But if, as it will appear from the passages about to be cited, Arnobius was devoted to blind heathen superstition, it is so much the less improbable that powerful outward impressions were requisite, in the first instance, in order to lead the zealous pagan to enter upon an examination of Christianity. But, in any case, it seems probable that he had been convinced of the truth for some time before he offered himself for baptism — a fact easily explained by the circumstances of the times. His apologetical work seems to have been written, it is true, in consequence of an impulse from within, and not by any outward occasion. But it may have been, also, that his determination to make a public profession of Christianity, and to appear as a public defender of Christianity, had been concurrently formed within his soul, and that it was with this determination he proceeded to the bishop. In later times the bishops were often too little disposed to mistrust those who became Christians from outward motives. But that a bishop, in these fearful times of the church, when he saw before him a man who had expressed himself with bitterness against Christianity, should fear that he had to do with a malicious spy, is not so improbable. And now, for the purpose of dispelling at once his doubts, Arnobius produces his Apology. He speaks of the change which had been wrought in himself by Christianity in the following manner: † “O blindness! But a short time ago I worshipped the images that had just come from the furnace of the smith; the gods that had been shaped on the anvil and by the hammer. When I saw a smooth worn stone, besmeared with oil, I addressed it as if a living power were there, and prayed to the senseless stone for benefits to myself, thus doing foul dishonour even to the gods, whom I esteemed as such, when I supposed them to be wood, stone, or bones, or imagined that they dwelt in

\* See vol. I. p. 103.

† Lib. I. c. 39.

such things. Now that I have been led by so great a Teacher in the way of truth, I know what all that is."

As to the time when Arnobius wrote his work, it is given by himself when he says\* that it was 1050 years, or not much less, since the building of Rome. This, according to the *Æra Varroniana*, then commonly adopted (which places the building of Rome in 753 B.C.), would coincide with the year 297 of the Christian era. This result however cannot stand, for the work contains evident allusions to the persecutions under Diocletian, which first broke out in the year 303.† We must therefore suppose, either that Arnobius made use of some other era, or that he made a mistake in the exact number,‡ or perhaps that he had been engaged on the work at different times. He says to the heathen,§ "If you had been animated by a pious zeal for your religion, you would have long ago rather burned those writings and demolished those theatres in which the shame of the gods is daily made public in scandalous plays. For why do our scriptures deserve to be committed to the flames, and our places of assembly to be destroyed in which the Supreme God is worshipped, peace and blessing invoked on all who are in authority, on the army and the emperor, joy and peace on the living and those who have been liberated from the bonds of the flesh—in which nothing else is heard but what is calculated to make men humane, gentle, modest, and pure; ready to communicate of their substance, and to become the kinsmen of all those who are united in the same bond of brotherhood?"

Moreover, the very objection brought by the heathens against Christianity which (as he says himself) moved Arnobius to write, indicates the point of time in which he wrote, for it was precisely the same charge as occasioned the Diocletian persecution—namely, the public calamities, which were said to have arisen because the worship of the gods had been supplanted by Christianity, and because men no longer enjoyed their protection and aid. To this Arnobius justly replies, "If men, instead of relying on their own wisdom and following their

\* Lib. II. c. 71

† See vol. I. p. 204.

‡ This is the most natural supposition; for certainly the chronology of Arnobius is not accurate. Thus, lib. I. c. 13, he says, *Trecenti sunt anni ferme, minus vel plus aliquid, ex quo cœpimus esse Christiani.*

§ Lib. IV. c. 36.

own devices, would but try to follow the salutary and peace-bringing doctrines of Christ, how soon would the face of the world be changed, and iron, instead of subserving the art of war, be converted into implements of peace ! ”

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Important as the Roman church became, through its outward ecclesiastical influence and through the influence of the political element of the Roman mental character on the development of the church, yet it was at the first comparatively barren in respect to theological science. The care for the outward being of the church, which was here predominant, seems quickly to have suppressed the interest in theology as a science. Among the Roman clergy but *two* individuals appear to have distinguished themselves as ecclesiastical authors, neither of whom, however, could be compared perhaps with a Tertullian, a Clement, or an Origen—the presbyter Caius, whom we have already noticed as an opponent of the Montanists, and the presbyter Novatian, who has also been mentioned. Of the writings of the former none have come down to us : of the latter we have some brief expositions of the more important Christian doctrines, particularly of the doctrine of Christ’s divinity and of the Trinity. According to Jerome (s. 70), this work was an abstract of a larger work by Tertullian. At all events, however, this author was something more than a mere imitator of another’s intellectual views. His work shows that he had a mind of his own. Without possessing the power and depth of Tertullian, he had a more decidedly intellectual bent.\*

Next we have from him a treatise on the *Jewish laws respecting food*, consisting of a playful allegorical exposition of them, with the design of showing that they are no longer binding on Christians.† From the production itself we learn

\* Novatian’s adversary, the Roman bishop Cornelius, seems, in Euseb. l. VI. c. 43, manifestly to allude to this writing, when he calls Novatian ὁ δογματιστῆς, ὁ τῆς ἐκκλησιαστικῆς ἐπιστήμης ὑπερασπιστής. A remark which doubtless suggests also the fact that such a phenomenon was not very common among the clergy of Rome.

† Jerome names this work as one which came from Novatian, and also two others, on the sabbath and on circumcision, cited by Novatian as two letters that had preceded this letter to his church ; in which letters he designed to show quæ sit vera circumcisio et quod verum sabbatum.



that it was written by a bishop, removed at a distance from his church by persecution, who maintained a constant correspondence with them, and sought to guard them from being led astray by pagans, Jews, and heretics; all which perfectly suits the Roman church, there being many Jews at Rome. The only difficulty is, to see how this writing could have come from a presbyter: the author speaks as no one but a bishop could at that time speak to his church. We know, moreover, from the letter of Cornelius, that during the Decian persecution Novatian had not removed from Rome. We must therefore call to mind the relation in which Novatian stood to the churches which acknowledged him as their bishop; and the most natural hypothesis is, that he wrote this work under the first persecution of Valerian,\* by which so many bishops were separated from their churches.

Lastly, we may mention, as belonging to the Roman church, a man whose felicitous and dialogical expositions, full of vivacity, replete with good sense, and pervaded by a lively Christian feeling, give him an important place among the Apologists of this period—Minucius Felix, who, according to Jerome, before his conversion to Christianity had acquired reputation at Rome as an advocate. He lived, probably, in the first half of the third century, but before Cyprian, who made use of his writings. We have already had occasion to make some extracts from this Apologetical Dialogue, which is entitled the *Octavius*.

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We pass now to the teachers of the Alexandrian school, concerning whose relation to the progressive development of the church we have spoken in a previous part of this history. Of the individual whom we find named as the first eminent teacher of this school, Pantænus (Πανταῖνος), the philosopher converted to Christianity, no written remains have reached us. Our only knowledge of him is through his disciple Clement.

*Titus Flavius Clemens* did not become a Christian till he had reached the ripe age of manhood. On this account he classed himself with those who abandoned the sinful service of paganism for faith in the Redeemer, and received from him

\* See vol. I. p. 189.

the forgiveness of their sins.\* By free inquiry he convinced himself of the truth of Christianity, after he had acquired an extensive knowledge of the systems of religion and of the philosophy of divine things known at his time in the enlightened world.† This free spirit of inquiry, which had conducted him to Christianity, led him, moreover, after he had become a Christian, to seek the society of eminent Christian teachers of different mental tendencies in different countries. He informs us‡ that he had had various distinguished men as his teachers; an Ionian in Greece, one from Cœlo-Syria, one in Magna Grecia (Lower Italy), who came originally from Egypt, an Assyrian in Eastern Asia (doubtless Syria), and one of Jewish descent in Palestine. He finally took up his abode in Egypt, where he met with a very great Gnostic, who had penetrated most profoundly into the spirit of scripture. The last was doubtless none other than Pantænus. Eusebius not only explains it so, but also refers to a passage in the *Hypotyposes* of Clement,§ where he has named him as his instructor. Perhaps when Pantænus entered on the missionary tour which has already been mentioned, Clement became his successor in the office of catechist, and at the same time, or still later, a presbyter in the Alexandrian church. The persecution under Septimius Severus, in the year 202, probably compelled him to retire from Alexandria.|| But after this juncture both the history of his life and place of his residence are involved in great obscurity. We only know that, in the beginning of the reign of the emperor Caracalla, he was at Jerusalem, whither even at this early period many Christians, especially ecclesiastics, were accustomed to travel, partly for the purpose of surveying with their own eyes the places rendered sacred by the memorials of religion, and partly for the advantages which a more familiar knowledge of these countries might furnish for elucidating the scriptures. Alexander bishop of Jerusalem, who was at that time in prison on account of the faith, recommended him to the church at Antioch, whither he was travelling, by a letter, in which he called him a virtuous and tried man, and intimated that he was already known to the Antiochians.¶

\* Pædagog. lib. II. c. 8, f. 176.

† Πάντων διὰ πίστεως ἐλθὼν ἀνὴρ. Euseb. Præparat. Evangel. lib. II. c. 2.

‡ Strom. lib. I. f. 274.

§ Lib. VI. c. 13.

|| Euseb. lib. VI. c. 3.

¶ Euseb. lib. VI. c. 11.

We have *three works* from his hand, which form, as it were, a connected series, since his starting point is the idea that the divine teacher of mankind, the Logos, first conducts the rude heathen, sunk in sin and idolatry, to the faith, then still further reforms their lives by moral precepts, and finally elevates those who have undergone this moral purification to that profounder knowledge of divine things, which he calls *Gnosis*. Thus the Logos appears first as exhorting sinners to repentance, converting the heathen to the faith (προτρεπτικός); then as forming the life and conduct of the converted by his discipline (παιδαγωγός); and, finally, as a teacher of the *Gnosis* to those who are purified.\* This fundamental idea is the connecting thread of his three works, which still remain—the *apologetical* or protreptic, the *ethical* or pedagogic, and the one containing *the elements of the Gnosis* or the *Stromata*.† Clement was not a man of systematic mind. Many heterogeneous elements and ideas, which he had received in his various intercourse with different minds, were brought together by him—a fact which we occasionally perceive in his *Stromata*, and which must have been still more clearly evinced in his *Hypotyposes* (hereafter to be noticed), if Photius has rightly understood him. By occasional flashes of intellect he without doubt gave a stimulus to the minds of his disciples and readers, as we see particularly from the example of Origen. Many fragmentary ideas, sketched with masterly power, and containing the germs of a thorough, systematic theological system, lie scattered in his works amidst a profusion of vain and hollow speculations.

As regards his *Stromata*, the design of this work, as he himself testifies more than once, was to bring together a chaotic assemblage of truth and error out of the Greek philosophers and the systems of the Christian sects, in connection with fragments of the true *Gnosis*. Each should find out for himself what suited his case: it was his aim to excite inquiry rather than to teach, and frequently he has purposely done no more than hint at the truth where he feared to give offence to *believers* (πιστικοῖς) who were as yet incapable of compre-

\* Καθαρὰν πρὸς γνώσεως ἐπιστηδιότητα εὐτρεπίζων τὴν ψυχὴν δυναμένην χωρῆσαι τὴν ἀποκάλυψιν τοῦ λόγου. *Pædagog.* l. I. c. 1.

† Like the similar word, *κιστός*, a usual designation at that time for works of miscellaneous contents.

hending these ideas. The eighth book of this work is wanting, for the fragment of dialectical investigations which at present appears under the name of the eighth book of the *Stromata* evidently does not belong to this work. As early as the times of Photius the eighth book was already lost.\*

We have to regret the loss of the ὑποτυπώσεις of Clement,† in which he probably gave samples of dogmatic investigations and expositions on the principles of the Alexandrian Gnosis. Fragments of this work, consisting of short expositions of some of the catholic epistles which have come down to us in the Latin translation,‡ perhaps also the fragment of the ἐκλογαὶ ἐκ τῶν προφητικῶν, belong to this class. From the larger work it was customary to make abstracts relating to particular parts of the sacred scriptures for common use, and several of these abstracts have been preserved to our times, which may have contributed, with other causes, to the loss of the entire work.

A somewhat enigmatical appearance is presented in the fragment of an abstract from the writings of Theodotus, and of the διδασκαλία ἀνατολική (that is, of the theosophic doctrine of Eastern Asia), which has been preserved among the works of Clement, a document of the highest value for an acquaintance with the Gnostic systems. It is perhaps the fragment of a critical collection which Clement had drawn up for his own use during his residence in Syria. Of Clement's work on the time of the passover,§ and of his dissertation, Τίς ὁ σωζόμενος πλούσιος, which is so instructive for the history of Christian ethics, we have already spoken.

*Origen*, who bore the surname Adamantios,|| was born in Alexandria in the year 185. In regard to his early education, it is important to remark that his father, Leonides, a devout

\* Vid. Cod. 111.

† Probably it should be translated, Sketches, shadings, general outlines. Rufinus translates, adumbrationes.

‡ See vol. II. of Potter's edition.

§ Of a kindred nature doubtless were also the contents of the writing which Eusebius cites : Κανὼν ἐκκλησιαστικὸς, ἢ πρὸς τοὺς Ἰουδαίζοντας.

|| In case this surname were given to him after his death, we must not follow the strained interpretation of Photius, c. 118, "because Origen's proofs resembled adamantine bonds," but rather the interpretation of Jerome, "from his iron diligence, as we commonly express it." Hence he was also called συντάκτης and χαλκέντερος. Yet Eusebius, l. VI. c. 14, seems to cite this cognomen as one which Origen bore from the first.



Christian, and, as it is conjectured, a rhetorician, was qualified to give him a good literary as well as a pious Christian education. Both had an abiding influence on the direction of his inner life. The development of his mind and his heart proceeded in his case step by step together ; an earnest pursuit of truth and of holiness never ceased to be the actuating tendency of his life. As we formerly remarked, the Bible was not at that time reserved exclusively for the study of the clergy, but was also the devotional book of families ; so we may see, from the example of Origen, that a wise use was also made of it in the business of education, and we may observe at the same time its happy effects. Leonides made his son commit daily a portion of sacred scripture to memory. The boy took great delight in his task, and already gave indications of his profoundly inquisitive mind. Not satisfied with the explanation of the literal sense which his father gave him, he required the thoughts, embodied in the passages he had committed to memory, to be fully opened out, so that Leonides frequently found himself embarrassed. The father chid, indeed, his inconsiderate curiosity, and exhorted him to be satisfied, as became his years, with the literal sense ; but he secretly rejoiced in the promising talents of the youth, and with a full heart thanked God that he had given him such a son. Often, it is said, when the boy was asleep, he would uncover his breast, kissing it as a temple where the Holy Spirit designed to prepare his dwelling, and congratulated himself in possessing such a treasure.

This trait in the early character of Origen already discloses to us a tendency of mind which, exclusively developed, and confirmed by a mistaken opposition, betrayed him into an arbitrary, allegorizing method of interpretation, but which, under more favourable circumstances, and with the helps and appliances necessary to the harmonious education of the biblical interpreter, would have made him a thorough and profound expositor of the scriptures. By his father this inclination was checked rather than encouraged. But if the intellectual and religious bent of Origen was determined at an early period by the influence of the theological school at Alexandria, then this inclination must have soon found means of nourishment, and ripened to maturity. In Origen, as we become acquainted with him from his writings, we clearly

trace the influence which Clement had exerted on his theological development; we recognise in his works the predominant ideas of the latter systematically unfolded. Now it is certain \* that he was, at least when a boy, a scholar of Clement the catechist. But a youthful indiscretion of Origen (hereafter to be noticed) proves that at the time he followed a grossly literal interpretation of sacred scripture; and he says of himself, "I, who once knew Christ the divine Logos only according to the flesh and the letter, now no longer know him so." † It is quite clear from this, that in the formation of his first religious sentiments his father's precepts had more weight than the instructions of Clement, and that the influence which the Alexandrian theological spirit exercised on his mind belongs to a later period of his mental development. We admit that much obscurity still rests on the history of his early training, which the poverty of our materials will not allow us to clear away. But at all events this is clear; the religion of the heart was at first uppermost with Origen. This great teacher, too, must be numbered with those in whom the early cultivation of the feelings by a pious training has acted as a check on the too intellectual tendency of their later studies.

The persecution which befel the Christians in Egypt under the reign of Septimius Severus gave the youth of sixteen an opportunity of displaying the ardour of his faith. The example of the martyrs fired him with such enthusiasm, that he was

\* According to Eusebius, l. VI. c. 6 (where, it must be confessed, the reading and the context render the passage suspicious). But there is still another witness who is far more credible. We refer to the words of Origen's youthful friend, Alexander bishop of Jerusalem, who was either born in Alexandria, or had come there in his youth to place himself under the instructions of his catechists. In his letter to Origen he thus writes: "We recognise as our fathers those blessed men who have gone before us, Pantænus and Clement, who was my master, and has been useful to me, and whoever besides belongs to the number of these men, *through whom I became acquainted with you.*" Euseb. l. VI. c. 14. Yet, alas! the earlier influence of these men on the education of Origen is involved in an obscurity which our deficient means of information will not enable us to dispel.

† In Matth. T. XV. s. 3, ed. Huet, f. 369: 'Ἡμεῖς δὲ, Χριστὸν Θεοῦ, τὸν λόγον τοῦ Θεοῦ, κατὰ σάρκα καὶ κατὰ τὸ γράμμα ποτὲ νοήσαντες, νῦν οὐκέτι γινώσκοντες. And T. XI. s. 17, where he speaks of an interpretation of the scriptures for the ἀπλούστεροι: 'Ἡμεῖς δὲ οἱ εὐχόμενοι ἐξ ἀληθείας λέγειν· εἰ καὶ Χριστὸν ποτε κατὰ σάρκα ἐγνώκαμεν, ἀλλὰ νῦν οὐκέτι γινώσκοντες.

ready to avow himself a Christian before the pagan authorities, and thereby expose himself to certain death.

Such was the zeal and enthusiasm of the Christian youth: quite different was the matured judgment of the prudent Christian man, who, from the study of that system itself, and from contemplating the life of Christ and of the apostles,\* had learned better to understand the nature of the Christian system of morality. He acknowledges that, on the question whether the danger ought to be evaded or met, no general rule can be laid down, but everything depends on the particular circumstances and on the call; that it requires Christian truthfulness to decide the question in each individual case. "A temptation which overtakes us without any meddling of our own," he says in this respect, "we should endure with fortitude and confidence; but it is foolhardy not to avoid it when we can."† And in another place, where he is speaking of Christ, who was not deterred by the prospect of death from making his last journey to Jerusalem, and of St. Paul, who was not hindered from visiting that city by the voices which warned him of what awaited him there, he adds, "We say it behoves us neither at all times to avoid danger, nor at all times to meet it. But it needs the wisdom of a Christian philosopher to examine and decide what time requires us to withdraw, and what to stand fast, ready for the conflict, without withdrawing, and still more without fleeing."‡

When the father of Origen was thrown into prison, the son felt impelled, still more than before, to go and meet death along with him. Remonstrance and entreaty having been tried in vain to dissuade him from his purpose, his mother could detain him no other way than by hiding his clothes. Then the love of Christ so far exceeded all other emotions, that, seeing himself prevented from sharing his father's imprisonment and death, he wrote to him, "Look to it that thou dost not change thy mind on our account."

Leonides died a martyr; and, as his property was confiscated, he left behind him a helpless widow, with six young children besides Origen. The latter was kindly received into the family of a rich and noble Christian lady of Alexandria. Here he characteristically displayed his steadfast adherence to

\* He refers to Matt. xiv. 13; x. 23.

† In Matth. T. X. s. 23.

‡ L. c. T. XVI. s. 1.

that which he had recognised as the true faith, showing how much he prized it above all things else. His patroness had become devoted to a certain Paul of Antioch, one of those Gnostics who so often resorted from Syria to Alexandria, with a view to propagate their system in a modified form to suit the Alexandrian taste. This man she had adopted ; and he was allowed to hold his lectures at her house, which were attended, not only by the friends of Gnosticism in Alexandria, but also by others of the true faith who were curious to hear something new. But the young Origen would not be restrained by any consideration for his patroness from freely expressing his abhorrence of the Gnostic doctrines ; and nothing could induce him to attend these assemblies, since he would be obliged to join in the prayers of the Gnostic, and thereby express his fellowship with him in the faith.

He was soon enabled to free himself from this condition of dependence. His knowledge of the Greek philology and literature, which he had continued to cultivate after the death of his father, qualified him at Alexandria, where such knowledge was particularly valued, to gain his own subsistence by giving instruction on these subjects.

Having, by his various attainments and intellectual gifts, by his zeal for the cause of the gospel, and by his pure, regular life, acquired credit even among the heathens, and the office of catechist at Alexandria having been vacated in the persecution, he was applied to by several heathens who were desirous of instruction in Christianity ; and, through the instrumentality of this youth, some were conducted to the faith, who afterwards became renowned as martyrs or teachers of the church. By this zeal and activity in promoting the cause of Christianity, he continually drew upon himself the bitter hatred of the fanatic multitude ; especially since, without regard to his own danger, he showed so much sympathy for those who were imprisoned on account of the faith, not only visiting them in their dungeons, but accompanying them to the place of execution, and in the very face of death refreshing them by the earnestness of his faith and the ardour of his love. Often was he rescued by Providence from threatening danger, when soldiers had surrounded the place where he resided, and he was obliged to fly secretly from house to house. At one time he was seized by a band of pagans, who dressed him in the



robes of a priest of Serapis, and conducted him, thus arrayed, to the steps of the temple. Here they placed in his hand a branch of palm, which he was bid to distribute in the customary manner to those who entered. Origen did as he was bidden, but said to those to whom he presented the branches, "Receive not the idol's palm, but the palm of Christ."\*

The successful labours of Origen, in imparting religious instruction, drew on him the attention of Demetrius bishop of Alexandria, who was induced to confer on him the office of a catechist in the Alexandrian church. To this office, however, no salary was then affixed; and as he now wished to have it in his power to devote himself wholly to the labours of his spiritual calling, and to his theological studies, without being interrupted or distracted by foreign occupations, and as he did not choose to be dependent on any one for the means of subsistence, he determined to sell a collection of beautiful copies of the ancient authors, which he had been forming at great pains for his own use, to a literary amateur, who, in compensation, allowed him for several years four oboles a day. This was enough to satisfy the very limited wants of Origen; for he led the life of the most rigid ascetic. In consequence of the views of theological interpretation he then held, he strove with busy zeal to attain to holiness, and sought rigidly to fulfil whatever he believed was ordered or recommended in the New Testament; he therefore fell into many practical errors, since, in the absence of a sober interpretation of scripture, he took literally many of the Saviour's figurative expressions, or else applied to all times and circumstances what Christ had spoken in reference only to particular cases and seasons. The most remarkable aberration of this kind, which afterwards occasioned him much vexation, was in suffering himself to be misled by a literal understanding of the passage in

\* Vid. Epiphan. h. 64. The story may in itself seem improbable, when we reflect how likely such language would be to inflame the fanatical fury of the Alexandrian populace, and when we consider what little reliance can be placed on the authority of Epiphanius. But the first of these considerations, although it may excite doubt, yet does not disprove the fact; and Epiphanius is entitled to more credit than usual where he repeats anything to the advantage of a man branded as a heretic.

Matt. xix. 12,\* to fulfil in his own case what he believed to be enjoined by these words on those who would be sure of entering the kingdom of heaven. It was a misconception which might easily arise from a one-sided asceticism, and from that method of scriptural interpretation, and which was fostered by many a tract then in circulation.† But although such errors, arising out of what is holiest in man, should always be treated

\* The correctness of this fact has, it is true, been very recently called in question by Prof. Schnitzer, "Origines ueber die Grundlehren der Glaubenswissenschaft," and by Dr. Baur in his critique on this work, *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik*, Mai 1837, Nr. 85. But still I must, with Dr. Engelhardt, in the *Studien und Kritiken*, Jahrgang 1838, 1stes Heft, S. 157, and Dr. Redepenning, in his *Monographie ueber Origenes*, adhere to the contrary opinion. Eusebius, whose notices concerning Origen are derived from the most authentic sources, is generally (l. VI. c. 8) a trustworthy witness; and his account of a matter of this sort we should not be at all warranted to put down as false without the most weighty reasons. It is not to be conceived that he would allow himself to be imposed upon by any rumour growing out of a wrong interpretation of facts, and the less so, as he could have no inclination whatever blindly to adopt such a rumour; for he did everything in his power to exalt Origen, and such a step, even in the opinion of Eusebius, although he strongly insists upon the good motive which led to it, still requires the excuse *φρενὸς ἀπειλοῦς*, as he expresses it. Origen himself says in fact (in the passage referred to, *Matth. T. XV. s. 3*) that he was once inclined to the literal interpretation, out of which that misconception arose. In the fulness of detail with which he there treats this subject,—in his manner of speaking of the mischievous consequences of such a step,—we seem to hear one who speaks from his own painful experience, and holds up his own example as a warning to others. It is nothing strange if a certain delicacy of feeling restrains him from expressly avowing that this is the case. Assuredly, therefore, from the words, "he would not have spent so much time on this subject" (*εἰ μὴ καὶ ἐωράκειμεν τοὺς τολμήσαντας*), it cannot, with any justice, be inferred that he observed this only in *others*.

† Philo, opp. f. 186: Ἐξενουχισθῆναι ἄμεινον, ἢ πρὸς συνουσίας ἐκνόμους λυτταῖν. See moreover a gnome of Σίξτος, 12, which was widely circulated among the Alexandrian Christians; according to the translation of Rufinus: *Omne membrum corporis, quod suadet te contra pudicitiam agere, abjiciendum*. These gnomes, by the way, came neither from a Roman bishop by the name of Sextus (whether the first or the second), as Rufinus supposed; nor, as was the opinion of Jerome (*V. ep. ad Ctesiphon*), from a heathen Pythagorean: but they are the work of some man who, from certain Platonic and Gnostic maxims, and sentiments of scripture wrested out of their proper connection, had drawn up for himself a system of morals, the highest aim of which was the ἀπάθεια. A moral system pervaded by the spirit of the gospel is not to be found therein, but at best many lofty maxims, along with many perverse ones.

with the greatest gentleness, yet there are at all times too many who, having but one standard for all, judge the more harshly of aberrations of this kind, the more the principle from which alone even such acts of enthusiastic extravagance can proceed lies remote from their own carnal sense and dull intellects. Origen speaks from experience when he takes notice of those who, by similar misconceptions and similar false steps, have drawn discredit upon themselves, not only with the unbelieving world, but likewise with those who will sooner pardon any other human frailty than those errors which spring out of a mistaken fear of God and an immoderate longing after holiness.\* When the bishop Demetrius first heard of the transaction, he acknowledged in the midst of the error the purity of *the motive*, though afterwards he made use of this false step to Origen's prejudice.

An important point would be gained if we could accurately determine the precise time and manner in which Origen passed—to speak in the Alexandrian style—from the *πίστις* to the *γνώσις*. After what has been said with regard to Clement's peculiar mental bias, it is impossible to doubt that, if Origen, as a theologian, was his immediate disciple, he would from the first have been stimulated by Clement to gain a thorough acquaintance with the systems of the Greek philosophy and with the different heresies, as indeed the liberal spirit of the Alexandrian theology required that he should do. But probably the original turn of Origen's mind was of a far more decided and determinate character. There was in his case no mutual interpenetration of the elements which subsisted alongside each other in his mind. The practical Christian element, the ascetical, and the literary element never kindly intermingled. He says himself that it was an outward motive that first led him to busy himself with the study of the Platonic philosophy, and to make himself better acquainted generally with the systems of those who differed from himself. The moving cause was his intercourse with heretics and pagans who had received a philosophical education. Attracted by his great reputation, such persons entered with him upon the discussion of religious topics, and so forced him both to give them a reason of his own faith, and to refute the objections which they brought against it. On this point he thus expresses

\* In Matth. s. 3, T. XV. f. 367.



himself in a letter in which he defends himself for bestowing his time on the Greek philosophy: "When I had wholly devoted myself to the promulgation of the divine doctrines, and the fame of my skill in them began to be spread abroad, so that both heretics and others, such as had been conversant with the Greek sciences, and particularly men from the philosophical schools, came to visit me, it seemed to me necessary that I should examine the doctrinal opinions of the heretics, and what the philosophers pretended to know of the truth." Accordingly he proceeds to tell us that he had attended the lectures of the *teacher* of philosophical science, with whom Heraclas, a convert of Origen's, had already spent five years. As he here particularizes an individual known at that time in Alexandria, simply as the teacher of philosophy, chronology would naturally lead us to think of the famous Ammonius Saccas, the teacher of the profound Plotinus, from whose hand the chaotic eclecticism of the Neo-Platonists, that compound of Oriental and Grecian elements, received a more definite shape. Add to this, that Porphyry, in his work against Christianity, expressly calls Origen a disciple of this Ammonius.\*

\* For there can be no doubt on this point, viz. that Porphyry, in Euseb. l. VI. c. 19, meant this Ammonius, although Eusebius confounds him with the church-teacher Ammonius, who wrote a Harmony of the Gospels, still extant, and a book on the agreement between Moses and Jesus. There were, at periods not very far remote from each other, and in Alexandria itself, a *pagan* Ammonius, highly distinguished among the learned,—a *Christian* Ammonius,—and two *Origenes*. We may here remark that, when Porphyry says of Origen, "Ἑλλην ἐν ἑλλήσι παιδευθεὶς λόγοις, πρὸς τὸ βάρβαρον ἐξώκειλε πόλμημα (he became an apostate to the religion of the barbarians), one part of the assertion has its truth; namely, that Origen, from the first, had been disciplined in the Greek literature; but it was a false insinuation of Porphyry that he had been educated in paganism. We cannot suppose that Porphyry, in this case, confounded the two persons bearing the name of Origen, for he knew them both. I agree with Dr. Redepenning, in his *Monographie ueber Origenes*, that the reasons adduced by Ritter are by no means sufficient to refute the hypothesis,—that the philosopher whose lectures Origen attended was Ammonius Saccas. Although several philosophers taught at Alexandria, still the words which Origen employs, Παρὰ τῶν διδασκάλων τῶν φιλοσόφων μαθημάτων, naturally suggest the famous one; and chronology points to the Ammonius in question. And even though Ammonius sprang from Christian parents, and again relapsed into paganism, yet this is no sufficient reason for maintaining that Origen must have had scruples about hearing him,—being, as he was, a famous teacher of the Platonic philosophy. Moreover, it is a point still open to inquiry,



From this time began the great change in the theological direction of Origen's ideas. It now became his endeavour to trace the vestiges of truth in all human systems; to examine all things, that he might everywhere separate the true from the false. His residence in Alexandria, the common resort of widely different sects; his journey to Rome (in the year 211); his travels to and within Palestine, to Achaia, to Capadocia; gave him opportunity, as he himself tells us,\* of visiting those who pretended to any extraordinary knowledge, and of becoming acquainted with and examining their doctrines. He made it a principle not to suffer himself to be governed by the traditional opinion of the multitude, but to hold fast as truth that only which he found to be true after unbiassed examination. This principle he expresses in a practical application of Math. xxii. 19, 20: "We here learn from our Saviour that we are not, under the pretext of piety, to pin our faith on that which is said by the multitude, and which therefore stands on high authority; but on that which results from examination and logical conclusion from admitted truth; for it is well to remark that, when he was asked whether men should pay tribute to Cæsar or not, he not only expressed his own opinion, but, having asked them to show him a penny, he inquired, Whose image and superscription is this? and when they said It is Cæsar's, he answered that men should give unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and not, under the pretext of religion, deprive him of what was his own."† Hence the mildness with which Origen judged of those who erred, an instance of which we possess in the following beautiful remark on John xiii. 8: "It is clear that, although Peter said this in a good and respectful disposition towards his Teacher, yet he said it to his own hurt. Life is full of this kind of sins, committed by those who in their faith mean what is right, but who out of ignorance say, or even do, what leads to the contrary. Such are those who say, Thou shalt not touch this,

whether the descent of Ammonius from Christian parents is an ascertained fact.

\* c. Cels. l. VI. c. 24: Πολλοὺς ἐκπεριελθόντες τόπους τῆς γῆς, καὶ τοὺς πανταχοῦ ἱπαργυλλομένους τι εἰδέναι ζητήσαντες.

† In Matth. T. XVII. s. 26, f. 483: Μὴ τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν λεγομένοις; καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐνδόξοις φαινομένοις, προφάσει τῆς εἰς θεὸν εὐσεβείας προσίχιν, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ τῆς ἑξέτασιως καὶ τῆς ἀκολουθίας τοῦ λόγου παρισταμένοις.

thou shalt not taste that, thou shalt not handle the other. Col. ii. 21, 22. But what shall we say of those who, in the sects, are driven about by every wind of doctrine; who set forth that which is soul-destroying as saving doctrine; and who frame to themselves false notions of the person of Jesus, under the supposition that they honour him thereby? ”\*

By this liberality of mind it was the happiness of Origen to reconcile to the simple doctrine of the gospel many heretics, particularly Gnostics, with whom he came in contact at Alexandria. One remarkable example of this sort was that Ambrosius, a wealthy man in Alexandria, who, dissatisfied with the way in which Christianity had been set forth to him in the common representations of the church-teachers, had sought, and supposed that he had found, a more spiritual conception of it among the Gnostics; until, by the influence of Origen, he was convinced of his error, and rejoiced now to find, under his teaching, the right Gnosis at the same time with the true faith.† He now became Origen's warmest friend, and endeavoured especially to promote his literary labours for the good of the church.

If Origen, after having been taught, by his own experience, the errors resulting from a grossly literal interpretation of scripture, and the hurtful consequences to which it might lead, passed to the other extreme of an arbitrary allegorising method of exposition, his conscientious and zealous endeavours to avail himself of every help which was available for restoring to its original condition, and for rightly understanding, the literal text of scripture, deserve the greater esteem. To this end he commenced the study of Hebrew after he had arrived at the age of manhood,—a task of some difficulty to a Greek. He undertook an emendation of the biblical manuscripts, by comparing them with one another. He is therefore the creator of sacred literature among the Christians. Still his arbitrary principles of interpretation prevented the full realization, in his own case, of all the good results which might otherwise have been expected from it. Many pregnant ideas were scattered abroad by him, which, to lead to fruitful results, only needed to be applied in a different way from that which

\* In Joann. T. XXXII. § 5.

† See the words to Ambrosius, T. Evang. Joann. p. 99, cited on a former occasion.

his own one-sided speculative bent and his mistaken notions of inspiration had allowed.

As the number of those who now resorted to him for religious instruction continued to increase, while his literary labours on the Scriptures, which extended over a still widening field, claimed a greater share of his attention, Origen, therefore, in order to gain the necessary leisure, shared the duties of catechist with his friend Heraclas; assigning to the latter the preparatory religious instruction, and reserving for himself the exacter teaching of the more advanced,\*—a division of labour which probably had reference to the two classes of catechumens of which we have formerly spoken.†

The division of his official labours in this department enabled him to enlarge the sphere of his activity as a teacher of the church, and to establish a sort of preliminary school to the Christian Gnosis, by a course of lectures on what the Greeks assigned to the *Encyclopedia*, or general circle of education, and on philosophy. In these lectures (as we learn from the account which his disciple, Gregory Thaumaturgus,—in a work hereafter to be noticed,—has given us of Origen's method of teaching) he expounded to his pupils all the ancient philosophers in whom a moral and religious element was to be found, and sought to train them to that mental freedom which would enable them in every case to separate the truth from its admixture of falsehood. Thus he has earned the great praise of having diffused a more liberal system of Christian and scientific education, as the school that he formed sufficiently testifies. It was also his lot to lead many, whom a mere love of science had drawn to him, by gradual steps to a faith in the gospel;—first inspiring in them a longing after divine things; then pointing out to them the inadequacy of the Greek systems of philosophy to satisfy the religious wants of human nature; and finally exhibiting to them the doctrine of Scripture concerning divine things, contrasted with the doctrines of the ancient philosophers. His course of instruction ended with his lectures on the interpretation of Scripture, which, following the principles unfolded in the earlier studies, gave him an opportunity to exhibit his whole theologico-philosophical system, or his whole Gnosis, in single investigations and remarks. Many of those whom

\* Euseb. lib. VI. c. 15.

† See vol. I. p. 423.

Origen was enabled thus gradually to bring to the knowledge and to the love of the gospel, became afterwards zealous and influential teachers in the church.

Ambrosius, whom we mentioned above as the friend of Origen, took a special interest in his scientific labours. Origen used to call him his *work-driver* (ἐργοδιώκτης). He not only excited him by his questions and exhortations to many inquiries, but also employed his great wealth in providing him with the means of pursuing expensive investigations ; such, for instance, as could not be carried on without the purchase or collation of manuscripts. He furnished him with seven ready scribes, who were to relieve each other as his amanuenses, besides others to transcribe everything in a fair copy. Of this friend, Origen says in one of his letters,\* “ He who gave me credit for great diligence, and a great thirst after the divine word, has, by his own diligence and his own love of sacred science, convinced himself how much he was mistaken. He has so far outdone me, that I am in danger of not coming up to his requisitions. The collation of manuscripts leaves me no time to eat ; and after meals I can neither go out nor enjoy a season of rest ; but even at those times I am compelled to continue my philological investigations and the correction of manuscripts. Even the night is not granted me for repose, but a great part of it is claimed for these philological inquiries. I will not mention the time from early in the morning till the ninth and sometimes the tenth hour of the day ;† for all who take pleasure in such labours employ those hours in the study of the divine word, and in reading.”

Ambrosius urged Origen to publish the results of his theological labours, in order to extend the benefit of them to the whole church, and thus to counteract the influence of the Gnostics, who had contrived to gain popularity by their pretensions to a profounder knowledge. This object is assigned by Origen himself as the motive of his labours, at the close of the fifth book of his commentary on the gospel of St. John, which was in part aimed against the Gnostic Heracleon. “As at present the heterodox,” he says, “under cover of Gnosis, set themselves against God’s holy church, and scatter abroad voluminous works, which promise to make plain the evange-

\* T. I. opp. ed. de la Rue, f. 3.

† Till three or four o’clock P.M. according to our reckoning.



lical and apostolical writings ; so, if *we* remain silent, without placing the sound and true doctrines by their side, they will succeed in beguiling the hungry souls, who, for want of wholesome nourishment, hasten to that which is forbidden."

He completed at Alexandria his commentaries on Genesis, the Psalms, the Lamentation of Jeremiah (of which writings some fragments only remain), his first five books on the gospel of St. John, his tract on the resurrection, his *Stromata*, and his work "On Principles."\* The last-mentioned work derived great importance from the struggle which it called forth between opposite tendencies of the theological mind, and from the influence which it had on the fortunes of Origen and of his school. Platonic philosophy and doctrines of the Christian faith were at this time, still more than at a later period, blended together in his mind. His arbitrary speculation was afterwards moderated by the influence of the Christian spirit. Many ideas which he had thrown out in this work (rather as problems, however, than as decisions) he afterwards retracted ; although the principles of his system always remained the same. He himself, in a letter written to Fabian bishop of Rome, to whom his doctrines had probably been spoken of as heretical, subsequently explained that he had set forth many things in that book which he no longer acknowledged as true, and that his friend Ambrosius had published it against his will.†

Yet (as frequently is the case), but for an outward occasion, and the intervention of personal and unworthy passions, the conflict between Origen and the party of the church would not have broken out so soon at least as it did ; especially as Origen constantly evinced the greatest forbearance towards those whose religious and theological principles differed from his own. The authority of his bishop, Demetrius, was to him a necessary support ; but this man, who was full of the hierarchical pride which in these times we find especially rife in the bishops of the large cities, was excited to jealousy by the great reputation of Origen, and the honour which he received on particular occasions.

But especially did the attentions paid him by two of his

\* Περὶ ἀρχῶν = τῶν κορυφασιστάτων καὶ ἀρχικῶν δογμάτων, as Origen himself expresses it in Joann. T. X. s. 13.

† Vid. Hieronym. ep. 41, T. IV. opp. ed. Martianay, f. 341.

friends, Alexander bishop of Jerusalem, the friend of his youth, and Theoctistus bishop of Cæsarea in Palestine, give the greatest umbrage. The haughty Demetrius had already taken it much amiss that they had permitted Origen, when only a layman,\* to preach in their churches.† Yet when, in obedience to the call of his bishop, he returned to Alexandria, Origen succeeded in restoring the friendly relations which had previously subsisted between them. In the year 288, however, he happened to make a journey to Greece on some ecclesiastical business of which we have no particular account.‡ While upon this journey he paid a visit to his friends in Palestine, by whom he was at Cæsarea ordained priest.

This was a step which Demetrius could forgive neither in the two bishops nor Origen. After the return of the latter, Demetrius convened a synod, composed of presbyters from his own diocese, and of other Egyptian bishops, and here objected to Origen that indiscretion of his youth, by which (we must admit) he was, according to the strict letter of the ecclesiastical canons, disqualified for holding spiritual orders.§ But it should have been considered that he had since become a

\* See vol. I. p. 274.

† There were, probably in the year 216, certain warlike demonstrations in Alexandria, which, according to Euseb. l. VI. c. 19, made it unsafe for him to reside there any longer; perhaps the circumstances which resulted from the demented Caracalla, having, on his way to the Parthian war, given up this city to the rapacious and murderous lusts of his soldiers: Æl. Spartian. l. VI. c. 6. It may be supposed that the fury of the pagan soldiers would light especially on the Christians. Origen betook himself to Palestine, for the purpose of visiting his ancient friends, and, as he says himself, (in Joann. T. VI. § 24,) for the purpose of tracing the footsteps of Jesus, of his disciples, and of the prophets (ἐπὶ ἱστορίαν τῶν ἰχνῶν Ἰησοῦ καὶ τῶν μαθητῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν προφητῶν).

‡ Perhaps he was called into these countries for the purpose of disputing with Gnostics, who had spread there,—his skill in such disputations being extensively known. His dispute with Candidus the Valentinian, the acts of which are cited by Jerome, might lead us to infer this.

§ It is very probable that the ecclesiastical law, which we find in the 17th of the *Apostolic Canons*, was already in force. However, it by no means unconditionally forbade (after the example of the Old-Testament law, Deut. xxiii.) the election of an eunuch to any spiritual order; but expressly laid it down that whoever had been subjected to such a mischance, without any fault of his own, if otherwise worthy, might become an ecclesiastic; only ὁ ἑαυτὸν ἀκρωτηριάσας μὴ γινίσθω κληρικός. It was simply designed to check such acts of ascetical fanaticism.

very different man; that he had long condemned the step into which his youthful zeal had betrayed him. Yet for this reason he was deprived of the presbyterial rank which had been bestowed on him, and forbidden to exercise the office of a public teacher in the Alexandrian church.\* Having once drawn upon himself the jealousy and hatred of the bishop, he could enjoy no further peace in Alexandria. Demetrius did not stop with the first attack. He now began to stigmatize the doctrines of Origen as heretical—a proceeding for which, perhaps, some assertions, in his disputations with the Gnostics, had given fresh occasion.†

Yet from his own internal resources Origen drew sufficient peace of mind to complete his fifth book on the gospel of St. John amid the storms at Alexandria (since, as he says,‡ Jesus commanded the winds and the waves of the sea); when he finally determined to leave that city, and to take refuge with his friends at Cæsarea in Palestine. But the persecutions of Demetrius followed him even thither. The bishop now seized on a pretext which would easily procure him allies both in Egypt and out of Egypt. While the prevailing dogmatic spirit, in many parts of the church, was violently opposed to the *idealistic* tendency of Origen's school, the work *περὶ ἀρχῶν* would furnish abundant materials for the charge of heresy. At a more numerous synod of Egyptian bishops Demetrius excluded Origen as a heretic from the communion of the church; and the synod issued against him a violent invective. To this document Origen alludes when, in commencing once more at Cæsarea the continuation of his commentary on the gospel of St. John, he says that "God, who once led his people out of Egypt, had also delivered him from that land; but his enemy, in this recent letter, truly at variance with the spirit of the gospel, had assailed him with the

\* Photius says, it is true, that this same synod not only forbade Origen to exercise the office of teacher, but also to continue to reside within the limits of the Alexandrian church. But it is difficult to see how a bishop could at that time enforce such a decree. He could, in fact, only exclude him from the communion of the church, and this was first done in the second synod. Moreover, the words of Origen do not seem to intimate that he had been forced to leave Alexandria.

† As we may infer from the disputation with Candidus the Valentinian. Hieronym. adv. Rufin. lib. II. f. 414, vol. IV.

‡ In Joann. T. VI. s. I.

utmost virulence, and roused against him all the winds of malice in Egypt.”\*

\* We are in want of connected and trustworthy accounts respecting these events, so pregnant of consequences. We can only endeavour, by a combination of particulars, to trace the facts of the case as they really occurred. It is certain, indeed, from the intimation which Eusebius gives, and from Origen's words, which have already been cited, concerning the indiscretion of his youth, that the latter was then also urged *against* him; but this could be alleged only as a ground for excluding him from the clerical office. The other steps against him must have originated in some other complaint. Photius, who had read the Apology of Pamphilus in behalf of Origen, says, it is true, Cod. 118, that Demetrius accused him of having undertaken the journey to Athens without his permission, and of having procured himself, during this journey undertaken without his permission, to be ordained a presbyter,—which certainly would have been an infraction of the laws of the church on the part of Origen, as well as of the bishops. But if Demetrius brought this charge against Origen, still it may be asked whether he had any grounds for it. We see, from the citation of Jerome, *de vir. illustr.* c. 62, that Alexander bishop of Jerusalem alleged, in answer to Demetrius, the fact that he had ordained Origen on the authority of an *epistola formata*, which Origen brought with him from his bishop. The church laws respecting these matters were at that time, perhaps, still so vague, that Alexander might suppose he had every right to ordain a man who belonged to another diocese; and yet Demetrius might look upon this as an invasion of the rights of his episcopal office. However, this, at any rate, was no sufficient reason for excommunicating Origen. The participation of other churches in this attack upon him; the brand of heresy, which Origen continued to bear even after his death; his own language in justification of himself, in the letter already cited, addressed to the Roman bishop Fabian (as he had also written to other bishops in vindication of his orthodoxy, *Euseb. l. VI. c. 36*)—all conspire to show that his *doctrines* were the cause of his excommunication. We see also, from what Jerome cites, *l. II. adv. Rufin. f. 411*, and from the letter of Origen against Demetrius, that he was accused of errors in his system of faith; since he defends himself against the charge of having asserted that Satan would one day become holy,—although we cannot well understand how he could deny this charge, which is necessarily grounded in his system. Rufinus cites passages from one of Origen's letters of vindication addressed to his friends in Alexandria, from which we learn that a forged protocol, pretending to give an account of a disputation held between him and the heretics, had excited surprise at his doctrinal positions, even among his friends in Palestine; they therefore despatched a messenger after him to Athens, and requested from him the original of the protocol. Similar protocols it seems had also been dispersed as far as Rome. *Vid. Rufin. de adulteratione librorum Origenis, in opp. Hieronym. T. V. f. 251, ed. Martianay.* Although Rufin is not a faithful translator, yet this cannot have been a story wholly invented by himself. The disputations with the Gnostics, moreover, could not fail to furnish occasions calculated to bring out distinctly the peculiar religious opinions of Origen; and every



This personal quarrel had now become a conflict between the opposite doctrinal parties. The churches in Palestine, Arabia, Phœnicia, and Achaia took the side of Origen: the church of Rome declared against him.\* How Origen judged of those who stigmatized him as a heretic appears from a remark † which he makes after citing 1 Corinth. i. 25: "If I," he observes, "had said 'the foolishness of God,' how would the lovers of censure ‡ accuse me! How should I be accused by them, even though I had said thousands of things which they themselves hold to be true, and yet had fallen into the error of saying this single thing, 'the foolishness of God'!" In his letter of vindication against the synod which had excommunicated him he quotes some of the denunciations of the prophets against wicked priests and potentates, and then adds, "But we should far rather pity than hate them, far rather pray for them than curse them; for we are made to bless, and not to curse."§

opportunity of making his orthodoxy suspected in his own church must have been eagerly welcomed by those who found in him so powerful an antagonist.

\* Hieronym. ep. 29, ad Paulum: Damnatu a Demetrio episcopo, exceptis Palæstinæ et Arabiæ et Phœniciæ atque Achaïæ sacerdotibus. In damnationem ejus consentit urbs Roma: ipsa contra hunc cogit senatum. To be sure, he adds to this, non propter dogmatum novitatem; non propter hæresin, sed quia gloriam eloquentiæ ejus et scientiæ ferre non poterant. But this is not fact; it is the subjective interpretation of motives, according to interests which Jerome at that time espoused. Compare, moreover, the remark made in the case of Tertullian.

† Hom. VIII. in Jerem. s. 8.

‡ Οἱ φιλαίτιοι.

§ See l. c. Hieronym. l. IV. f. 411. Comp. what Origen says against the weight of unjust excommunication, see vol. I. p. 305. Comp. also in Matth. T. XVI. s. 25, f. 445, in which words we discern the zealous opponent of hierarchy, who was able to discover the pious disposition even when hidden under the most unpromising shapes, and, wherever it appeared, embraced it in his love. Different from this, however, was the course of those bishops who were filled with the spirit of a sacerdotal caste and hierarchical pride, and of whom he says, applying to them the passage in Matt. xxi. 16, "As these scribes and priests were censurable according to the letter of the history, so, in the spiritual application of this passage, there may be many a blameworthy high-priest who fails to adorn his episcopal dignity by his life, and to put on the Urim and Thummim (the *Light* and *Right*, Exod. xxviii.). These, while they behold the wonderful things of God, despise the babes and sucklings in the church, who sing praises to God and his Christ. They are displeased at their spiritual progress, and complain of them to Jesus, as if they did wrong

The efforts of Origen's enemies only contributed to extend the sphere of his activity. His removal to Palestine was certainly important in its consequences, an opportunity being thus given him of labouring also from that point for the diffusion of a liberal scientific spirit in the church; and long were the traces of his activity discernible in these districts. Here, too, a circle of young men gathered around him, and under his influence were trained to fill the posts of theologians and church-teachers. To the number of these belongs that active and laborious preacher of the gospel, Gregory, of whom we shall speak more particularly hereafter. Here, too, Origen still prosecuted his literary labours. Here he composed, among other works, the treatise, already noticed, on the Utility of Prayer, and on the Exposition of the Lord's Prayer, which he addressed to his friend Ambrosius. Here he maintained an active correspondence with the most distinguished teachers of the church in Cappadocia, Palestine, and Arabia; and he was often invited to assist at deliberations on the concerns of foreign churches.

During the persecution of Maximin the Thracian, in which two of Origen's friends, the presbyter Protocletus, of Cæsarea, and Ambrosius, were great sufferers, he addressed to these confessors, who were awaiting in prison the issue of their trials, his treatise on *Martyrdom*. He exhorts them to steadfastness in confession; he fortifies their resolution by the promises of Scripture; and takes pains to refute those sophisms which might be employed to palliate a practical denial of the faith; as, for example, by the Gnostics, who, holding outward things to be indifferent, and by pagan statesmen, who were wont

when they do no wrong. They ask Jesus, 'Hearest thou what these say?' And this we shall better understand if we consider how often it happens that men of ardent minds, who hazard their liberty in bold confessions before the heathen, who despise danger, who with all constancy lead lives of the strictest continence and severest austerity,—how often such men, being rude of speech (*ἰδιῶται τῇ λήξει*), are calumniated by these blameworthy high-priests as disorganizers,—how often they are accused by them before Jesus, as if they themselves behaved better than such honest and good children. But Jesus testifies in favour of the children, and on the other hand accuses the high-priests of ignorance, saying, 'Have ye not read, Out of the mouth of babes and sucklings thou hast ordained praise?' It is just possible that Origen here had before his mind's eye Demetrius and similar bishops, who were inclined to judge with the greatest severity those errors which proceeded out of a pious zeal.

to regard everything solely from a political point of view, sought alike to persuade the Christians that, without violating their private convictions, which no one wished to deprive them of, they might join in the merely outward ceremonies of the state religion. Although that moral view which aimed at an absolute estrangement from all human passions (of the connection of which with Origen's whole mode of thinking we have already spoken) pervades this book,\* and though it is full also of those false notions of martyrdom as an *opus operatum*, which, infused into him by the prevailing spirit of the church in his time, were incorporated with several of his own peculiar ideas, yet, at the same time, it finely expresses the strength of his unwavering trust and of his zeal in behalf of the gospel faith. To the two confessors he thus writes:†—“I could wish that you, too, keeping in mind, throughout the whole conflict that awaits you, the exceeding great reward reserved in heaven for those who suffer persecution and reproach for the sake of righteousness and of the Son of man, may rejoice and be glad, as the apostles once rejoiced, when they were found worthy to suffer reproach for the name of Christ. But if anguish should ever enter your souls, may the Spirit of Christ that dwells within you, tempted though you may be on your part to dispossess it, enable you to cry, ‘Why troublest thou me, my soul? and why art thou disquieted within me? Hope in God, for I shall yet praise him, who is the health of my countenance and my God.’ Ps. xlii. 5. May it, however, never be troubled, but even before the tribunal itself, and under the naked sword aimed at your necks, may it be preserved by that peace of God which passeth all understanding.” He says to them in another place,‡ “Since the Word of God§ is quick and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and is a discernor of the thoughts and intents of the heart, Heb. iv. 12; so let this divine Word, at this time especially, cause to reign in our souls, as He did in His apostles, that peace which passeth all under-

\* This is seen particularly in Origen's artificial way of explaining the words spoken by Christ in his agony; the spirit above referred to not allowing him to take them in their natural sense.

† P. 4.

‡ P. 37

§ He understands this of the Logos.

standing; but He has cast the sword between the image of the earthly and the image of the heavenly within us, that He may for the present receive our heavenly man to himself, so that, when we have so far attained as to need no more separation,\* he may make us altogether heavenly. And he came not only to bring the sword, but also to send *fire* on the earth, concerning which he says, 'What will I, if it be already kindled?' Luke xii. 49. May this fire, then, be kindled even in you, and consume every earthly feeling within you, and cause you to be joyfully baptized with that baptism of which Jesus spake.† And thou (Ambrosius), who hast a wife and children, brothers and sisters, remember the words of the Lord—'Whoever cometh unto me, and hateth not his father, mother, wife, children, brothers, and sisters, cannot be my disciple.' But both of you be mindful of the words—'If any man come unto me, and hate not even his own life, he cannot be my disciple.'"

It was, perhaps, this same persecution which induced Origen to leave for a while the place where he had hitherto resided. The persecution at that time being merely local, it was easy to escape from it by fleeing to other districts where tranquillity happened to prevail. Origen repaired to Cæsarea in Cappadocia, where he visited his friend the bishop Firmilian, with whom he had been in the habit of corresponding on scientific and theological subjects.‡

But, perhaps, at the very time while he was there, the persecution broke out in Cappadocia,§ which was the occasion of his retiring to the house of Juliana, a Christian virgin, for the space of two years, who concealed and entertained him in her own house. It was here he made a discovery which had an important bearing on his literary undertakings. He had been employed for years on a *work* which was to contribute both to the emendation of the text of the Alexandrian version of the Old Testament,—which was the translation chiefly used in the church (being regarded as inspired by many Christians who followed the old Jewish legend), and of which the readings

\* No separation of the godlike and the ungodlike.

† Luke xii. 50.

‡ They occasionally visited each other for the purpose of conversing on theological topics. Euseb. l. VI. c. 27.

§ See vol. I. p. 174.



of the different manuscripts varied considerably from each other,—and also to the improvement of this translation itself, by comparing it with other ancient versions and with the original Hebrew text. Origen, who was in the constant habit of disputing with pagans and Jews on religious matters, had found, as he says himself, by his own experience, how necessary an acquaintance with the original text of the Old Testament was to all who did not wish to give an advantage to the Jews, for the latter were accustomed to ridicule the ignorance of the Gentile Christians who disputed with them when they cited passages from the Alexandrian version which were not to be found in the Hebrew, or when they showed that they knew nothing of passages which were to be found in the Hebrew only.\* He had therefore employed the wealth of his friend Ambrosius, and availed himself of his own frequent journeys, to collect various manuscripts of the Alexandrian version, and other ancient translations, which it was still possible to procure. Thus, for example, ransacking every corner, he had found, in a cask at Jericho, an ancient translation, not before known to exist, of some books of the Old Testament. Now it had happened that this Juliana had inherited the writings of the Ebionite *Symmachus*, who had lived perhaps in the beginning of this century; and among these writings Origen found both his commentary on the gospel according to the Hebrews (εὐαγγέλιον κατὰ Ἑβραίους †) and his version of the Old Testament.‡ He was now enabled to bring to a

\* Orig. ep. ad African. s. 5: Τοιαύτης οὔσης ἡμῶν τῆς πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσι παρασκευῆς, οὐ καταφρονήσουσιν, οὐδ' ὡς ἔθος αὐτοῖς, γελάσονται τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν ἱνῶν πιστεύοντας, ὡς τ' ἀληθῆ καὶ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἀναγεγραμμένα ἀγνοούντας.

† The words of Eusebius, l. VI. c. 17, respecting the work of Symmachus, are, Ἐν οἷς δοκεῖ πρὸς τὸ κατὰ Ματθαῖον ἀποτεινόμενος εὐαγγέλιον τὴν διδωλωμένην αἵρεσιν (τῶν Ἑβριωναίων) κρατύνειν. As he subsequently classes this work with the commentaries of Symmachus on the scriptures (ἐξηγησίας εἰς τὰς γραφάς), one might be led to suppose it was some writing of his, in which he expounded this gospel, or rather the Ebionitic gospel according to the Hebrews, which resembled it, and employed it to prove the Ebionitic doctrines; but the Greek phrase, ἀποτείνεσθαι πρὸς τι, connected with κρατύνειν, favours rather the supposition that a writing is here meant which attacked the gospel of Matthew by assuming the genuineness of the Ebionitic revision of the gospel according to the Hebrews.

‡ Palladius (in the beginning of the fifth century) relates, in his his-

completion the great work of collating the ancient versions still extant, and of comparing them with the Hebrew text.\*

After the murder of Maximin, and under the reign of the emperor Gordian, in the year 238, Origen was enabled to return once more to Cæsarea, and resume there his earlier labours.

Long before, while he was residing at Alexandria, the church of Greece, in which he enjoyed a high reputation, had sent for him to advise with them on some ecclesiastical matters: he now probably received a second invitation of the same kind. His way led him through Nicomedia in Bithynia, where he spent several days with his old friend Ambrosius, who, if the narrative of Jerome is correct, had meanwhile become deacon; whether it was that the latter had his appointment in the church of that city, or whether he had come

tory of the monks (*λαυσίανα*), c. 147, that he had found in an old manuscript, coming from Origen, the words written in his own hand, giving the account cited in the text. True, this Palladius is a witness liable to some suspicion on account of his credulity; but in this case we have no reason to disbelieve him, especially as his testimony agrees with the narrative of Eusebius, l. VI. c. 17.

\* The Hexapla: to say anything more concerning this work and kindred works of Origen would be foreign from our purpose. See on this subject any of the introductions to the Old Testament. We shall merely cite here the words of Origen himself respecting the comparison instituted by him between the Alexandrian version and the other ancient translations of the Old Testament. After having spoken (Commentar. in Matth. f. 381) of the differences in the copies of the New Testament, which had arisen partly from the negligence and partly from the arbitrary criticism of the transcribers, he adds, "As regards the differences between the copies of the Old Testament, we have, with God's help, found a means of adjusting them, by using the other translations as our criterion. Wherever in the version of the Seventy anything was doubtful on account of the differences of the manuscripts, we have retained that which coincided with the other translations; and many passages not to be found in the Hebrew text we have marked with an *obelisk* (the critical sign of omission), not daring wholly to omit them. But some passages we have noted with an *asterisk*, in order to make it clear that such passages, which are not found in the Seventy, have been added by us from the other translations coinciding with the Hebrew text; and in order that whoever *is so inclined may receive them into the text* (I suppose that the reading should be *προσῆται*); but whoever takes any offence at them may receive or not receive them, as he pleases." From these last words we see how much Origen had to fear from those who were ready forthwith to accuse any one that departed from the traditional and customary route of falsifying the sacred scriptures.

thither for the sake of meeting Origen. There he received a letter from another friend, Julius Africanus, one of the distinguished and learned Christians of that age.\* Origen, in a conversation which took place in the presence of Africanus, had, on the authority of the Septuagint, cited the story of Susanna as a part of genuine scripture, and belonging to the book of Daniel. In this letter, equally characterized by the moderate, respectful tone of literary controversy, and by the unbiassed freedom of criticism, Africanus expressed his surprise at what he had heard, and asked for further explanations. Origen replied in a long and elaborate letter from Nicomedia. Not so free from prejudice as Africanus, he laboured to defend the

\* He was then a very aged man, as is evident from the fact that he could address Origen, who was now fifty, by the title "my son." His usual place of residence was probably the ancient and ruined city of Emmaus or Nicopolis in Palestine (so called by the Romans after the Jewish war, and not to be confounded with the Emmaus of the New Testament, being more distant, namely, 176 stadia from Jerusalem). The inhabitants of this ruined place chose him as their delegate to the emperor Heliogabalus, for the purpose of obtaining from that emperor the restoration of their city, a mission in which he was successful. Hieronym. de vir. illustr. c. 63. He is known as the first author of a Christian History of the world (his *χρονογραφία* in five books, vid. Euseb. l. VI. c. 31). This work, of which our only knowledge is derived from the use made of it by other writers, and from fragments, had undoubtedly its origin in an apologetic purpose. He is known again from his letter to Aristides on the method of reconciling the differences between the genealogies in Matthew and Luke, of which Eusebius, Hist. lib. I. c. 7, has preserved to us a fragment. There is another remarkable fragment of the same letter, published by Routh, Reliquiæ sacræ, vol. II. p. 115. He here controverts those who asserted that these different genealogies had been given merely for the purpose of demonstrating in this way the truth that Christ was at once King and High Priest, being descended from the royal and priestly families. And in this connection he expresses himself very strongly against the theory of "pious fraud." "God forbid," says he, "that the opinion should ever prevail in the church of Christ that any false thing can be fabricated for Christ's glory." *Μὴ δὲ κρατοῖν τοιοῦτος λόγος ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ Χριστοῦ, ὅτι ψεῦδος σύγκειται εἰς αἶνον καὶ δόξαλογίαν Χριστοῦ.* Eusebius ascribes to him a work which contained a sort of literary *omnia*, after the fashion of the unscientific *Polyhistories* of those times, entitled *κείμενα*. A great deal, however, ascribed to him in the fragments of this work, does not accord with the views and principles which should belong to this man, according to what we otherwise know of him. The most natural hypothesis seems to be, that he wrote this work before his habits of thinking had become decidedly Christian.

authority of the Alexandrian version and collection of the sacred writings. It is well worth observing how the free inquiring mind of Origen, out of a misconceived piety, and perhaps, too, of a timidity engendered by the convulsions which, in spite of his own will, he had occasioned in the church, took refuge in the authority of a church tradition preserved pure under the guidance of a special Providence. "But ought not that Providence," he says,\* "which in the sacred writings has given the means of edification to all the churches of Christ, to have cared for those who are bought with a price, for whom Christ died—Christ, the Son of that God who is love, and who spared not his own Son, but gave him up for us all, that he might with him freely give us all things? Besides, consider whether it is not well to think of those words, 'Remove not the ancient landmark which thy fathers have set.'" Prov. xxii. 28. He then proceeds to say that, although he by no means neglected the other ancient translations, yet he had bestowed peculiar attention to the Alexandrian version, that it might not seem as if he wished to introduce into the church any falsifying innovation; and that he might give no pretext to those who sought occasion for, and took delight in, accusing and calumniating the men who were universally celebrated.† Origen's travels in Greece terminated at Athens, where he resided for some time, finished his commentary on Ezekiel, and began his commentary on the Song of Solomon.‡

To the end of his life he was occupied with theological labours. Under the reign of Philip the Arabian, with some of whose family he was on terms of correspondence, he wrote the work against Celsus which has already been mentioned, his commentary on the gospel of St. Matthew, and other treatises. When he was sixty years of age he for the first time permitted his discourses to be taken down by short-hand writers. In what high consideration he stood with the churches of these countries is evident from the fact that on every important ecclesiastical question on which it was difficult to come to a decision

\* c. 4.

† "ἵνα μή τι παραχράττειν δοκίμῃται ταῖς ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἐκκλησίαις· καὶ προφάσει δίδωμιν τοῖς ζητοῦσιν ἄφορμὰς, ἐθέλουσι τοὺς ἐν μίσῳ συκοφαντεῖν καὶ τῶν διαφαινομένων ἐν τῷ κοινῷ κατηγορεῖν.

‡ Euseb. lib. VI. c. 32.



the opinion of Origen was asked even by synods of bishops. A case of this sort, in which Beryllus, the bishop of Bostra in Arabia, submitted to be taught by him, was noticed on a former occasion. We may here mention another instance: a controversy had been excited by a party among the Arabian Christians asserting that the human soul died with the body, and that, together with the body, it was not to be revived till the resurrection,—an ancient Jewish notion. Perhaps, too, among these tribes, who by their situation were brought into frequent contact with Jews, it was no new doctrine, but one which had prevailed there from ancient times; and perhaps (if indeed the general voice was thus early pronounced against them)\* it was the influence of Origen,—in whose system the doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul, which is akin to God, held an important place,—that first gained a general reception for the latter doctrine, and caused the small party who still adhered to the old opinion to be regarded as heretical. This explains how the convention of a *great synod* came to be thought necessary for the purpose of settling these disputes. As they could not come to an agreement, Origen was sent for; and by his arguments the opponents of the soul's natural immortality were brought to confess and to renounce their error.

In the last days of a life consecrated to labour and conflict in behalf of what he considered to be the cause of Christ, Origen (who, on account of some particular opinions, was by a great part of the church stigmatized as a heretic and enemy to the evangelical scheme of faith) is said to have refuted by his conduct the accusations of his adversaries, and to have shown that he was ready to sacrifice all for the faith—that he belonged to that small number who are willing to hate even their own life for the Lord's sake.

As the fury of the enemies of Christianity, in the Decian persecution, was directed particularly against *those* men who were distinguished among the Christians by their station, their wealth, their knowledge, and their activity in promul-

\* Eusebius (l. VI. c. 37) may perhaps judge concerning the controversies of these times too much according to his own subjective views and the church orthodoxy of his age, when he represents the defenders of this opinion as men generally acknowledged to be teachers of error and propagators of a new doctrine.

gating the faith,\* it was natural that such a man as Origen should become a shining mark for fanatical cruelty. After a steadfast confession he was thrown into prison; and here, in conformity with the plan of the Decian persecution, the attempt was made to overcome the infirmity of age by exquisite and gradually increasing tortures. But the faith which he bore in his heart sustained the weakness of old age, and gave him power to withstand every trial. After having suffered so much† he wrote from his prison a letter full of consolation, of encouragement for others. The circumstances (which in their proper place have been already mentioned) which contributed first to moderate this persecution, and then to bring it wholly to an end, procured finally for Origen also freedom and repose. Yet the sufferings which he had undergone served perhaps to hasten his death, which took place about the year 254,‡ in the seventieth year of his age.

The influence of Origen on theological learning was no longer connected with his person, but continued to spread, independently of the man, by means of his writings and his scholars, but not without continual collision with minds of an opposite tendency. The friends of Chiliasm, of the grossly literal method of scriptural interpretation, and of the anthropomorphic and anthropopathic mode of representing divine things connected therewith, and the zealots for the letter of the church's traditional doctrine, were opponents to the school of Origen. The conflict between these antagonistic directions of mind presents, at the close of this period, very important phenomena con-

\* The personæ insignes.

† Euseb. l. VI. c. 39.

‡ Euseb. l. VII. c. 2. According to Photius, cod. 118, there were two different reports concerning the manner and time of Origen's death. Pamphilus, and many others who had been personally acquainted with Origen, reported that he died a martyr, at Cæsarea, during the Decian persecution. Others reported that he lived till the times of Gallus and Volusianus, and then died at Tyre, and was there buried; which account was confirmed also by the letters said to have been written by Origen after the persecution, of the genuineness of which, however, Photius was not fully convinced. But, according to what Eusebius says, in the above-cited passage of his Church History,—who undoubtedly followed the account of his friend and teacher Pamphilus,—it can hardly be supposed that Pamphilus really reported any such thing as the former account. Perhaps Photius misunderstood Pamphilus, when the latter meant simply confession under torture, or perhaps was speaking of the *indirect consequences of those sufferings* to Origen.

nected with the development of theology. We shall here, in the first place, glance at the church which was the original seat of Origen's activity, namely, the church of *Alexandria and of Egypt*.

Origen had here left behind him disciples who continued to labour in *his own* spirit, although with less of his zeal for speculation. Demetrius the bishop was (as appears from what has been already said) rather the personal enemy of Origen than the enemy of his theological views: his attack upon the latter had probably been only a pretext. Accordingly he permitted the disciples of Origen to continue their labours undisturbed; and he himself died soon after the outbreak of these controversies, in the same year, 231.

Heraclas, the disciple and friend of Origen (who has already been mentioned, and who, after the death of the latter, was placed at the head of the catechetical school), succeeded Demetrius in the episcopal office. Heraclas was succeeded, in the year 247, as catechist, and afterwards as bishop, by Dionysius, another worthy disciple of Origen, who always retained his love and respect for him, and when he was in prison, during the Decian persecution, addressed to him a letter of consolation. Dionysius, as he tells us himself, had come to the faith in the gospel by the way of *free examination*, having impartially examined all other systems. And accordingly he remained true to this principle, both as a Christian and a teacher of the church. He read and examined without prejudice all the writings of the heretics, and rejected their systems only after he had made himself accurately acquainted with them, and had it in his power to refute them by arguments. A presbyter of his church warned him of the injury which might accrue to his soul by the distracting occupation of perusing so many godless writings. But the Spirit of God gave him assurance that he had no need to be disturbed by such a fear. He believed that he had heard a voice, saying to him, "Read whatever falls into thy hands, for thou art capable of judging and proving all things; and from the first this has been to *thee* the occasion of faith." By this encouragement Dionysius was confirmed in his purpose; and he found it agreeable to the direction given by the Lord (in an apocryphal gospel) to the stronger Christians: "Be ye skilful money-changers," γίνεσθε δοκιμοὶ τραπεζίται,

*i.e.* skilful to distinguish the genuine from the counterfeit coin.\*

We have already, on several occasions, adduced examples of the liberality and moderation of this Father, and of the happy effects resulting therefrom. The same Christian moderation and gentleness appear in his letter to Basilides, an Egyptian bishop, on questions relative to matters of church discipline and worship.† The letter of Dionysius to his suffragan bishop thus concludes: "These questions you have not proposed to me as if you were ignorant of the subject, but to honour me, and to be assured that I am of the same mind with yourself, as indeed I am. I have laid open to you my own opinions, not as a teacher, but with all the frankness which we are bound to use in our communications with each other. But it is now your business to judge of what I have said, and then write me what seems to you better than this, or whether you hold that to be right which I have advanced."‡

The Fathers that next distinguished themselves as teachers in the Alexandrian church were Pierius and Theognostos, who lived in the last years of the third century. In the fragments of their writings preserved by Photius we recognise the peculiar doctrines of Origen.

We have observed before that in Egypt itself there existed two opposite parties, the Origenists and the anti-Origenists. We meet with them again in the fourth century, especially among the Egyptian monks, under the names of *Anthropomorphites* and *Origenists*. Perhaps this opposition among the Egyptian monks may be traced back to the times of which we are now speaking. In these times, it is true, there were as yet no monks; but as early as the close of the third century there existed in Egypt societies of ascetics, who lived

\* Dionysius, in his letter to the Roman presbyter Philemon, Euseb. l. VII. c. 7.

† Which letter acquired the authority of canonical law in the Greek church, as being an *ἐπιστολὴ κανονική*. The fragments of it which still remain were last edited by Routh, in his *Reliquiæ Sacræ*, vol. II.

‡ A considerable fragment of the work of this Dionysius on Nature, in which he defends the belief in a Providence against the atomistic system of the Epicureans, has been preserved to us by Eusebius, in the 14th book of the *Præparatio evangelica*, introduced by Routh, l. c. vol. IV.



secluded in the country.\* Among these Egyptian ascetics appeared, at the end of this period, a man by the name of Hieracas, who (by those who judged him by the standard of the church scheme of faith, as it had formed itself in the fourth century) was in the following times placed among the heretics, but who could hardly have been considered as a heretic during his lifetime.† So far as we are able to understand his spiritual bias and doctrines from the fragmentary accounts of them (for which we are indebted for the most part to Epiphanius‡), there was much in his peculiar views which savoured of the school of Origen. And the fact may have been, that he came from that school. Still the affinity between them is very far from being such as can only be explained in this particular way. The same tendencies may easily have sprung up in Egypt from many different quarters.

Hieracas passed the life of an ascetic in the city of Leonopolis, in Egypt,§ and, after the manner of the ascetics, earned the necessaries of life, and the means of bestowing charity, by the labour of his hands, exercising an art that was highly esteemed and much employed in Egypt, that of *calligraphy*, which he practised with equal skill both in the Greek and in the Coptic language. He is said to have lived beyond the age of ninety, and (which may be easily accounted for from his simple habits) to have retained to the last the full exercise of his powers, so that he could pursue his art to the very end of his life. He was equally familiar with the Grecian and with the Coptic literature; from which very circumstance, however, it may have resulted that he introduced many foreign elements from both these sources into Christianity. He wrote commentaries on the Bible in Greek and in Coptic, and also composed many church hymns.

He was given to the allegorical method of interpretation, which was closely connected with a certain theosophic ten-

\*. See Athanasius' life of Antonius. We shall have occasion to say more on this point in the following period.

† For this reason, as we can take the notion of heresy in the present work only in its historical sense, we have not placed Hieracas, as is usually done, among the heretics.

‡ Hæres. 67.

§ Unless he lived at the head of a community of ascetics, somewhere in the neighbourhood of that city.

dency. The account of Paradise, in particular, he, like Origen, explained as an allegory, denying that there had ever been a material Paradise. It may be conjectured that he, as well as Origen, considered Paradise to be a symbol of that higher spiritual world from which the heavenly spirit fell by an inclination to earthly matter. But as there was no general agreement of opinion as to what should be understood symbolically and what literally in that narrative of Genesis; as, moreover, nothing was yet settled, in the system of the dominant church, respecting the origin of the soul; and as the peculiar opinions of Origen had still many important advocates, particularly in the Egyptian church; he could not on this account be generally condemned as a heretic.

From his theory concerning the way in which the heavenly spirit, immersed in an union with matter, became invested with a body, we may easily understand why Hieracas should have condemned this earthly, material body, have made the mortification of it the leading aim of the Christian morals, and therefore should have opposed the doctrine that the soul, once set free, would, by the resurrection, be again incarcerated in this prison of the body. In reference, however, to the latter point, he may perhaps at the same time have supposed that the soul would be veiled in a higher organ of ethereal matter (α σωμα πνευματικόν). Even this opinion he might present under such a form as not directly to reject the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, but only to explain it according to his own sense.

In respect to the former point, he represented the abstemious and unmarried life as something essential to the proper perfection of the Christian. The recommendation of a life of celibacy he made to constitute the characteristic distinction between the great moral principle of the Old and that of the New Testament. Those false notions of the essence of morality, and of the requisitions of the moral law on human nature, by which men were led to imagine they could easily fulfil it, and even do more than it requires (*opera supererogationis*), discover themselves in Hieracas, when he asks, "What new thing has the doctrine of the Only-begotten introduced? Of what new benefit has he been the author to humanity? Of the fear of God, of envy, covetousness, and the like, the Old Testament had already treated. What new

thing is there still remaining, unless it be the introduction of the unmarried life?" This question shows, we allow, that Hieracas had no right apprehension either of the requisitions of the moral law, or, what is strictly connected therewith, of Christ as the Redeemer of mankind, and of the nature of the redemption. From the views which we here find expressed of human nature, and of the requirements which the moral law makes on the same, a doctrine might be drawn to inculcate that man needed no Redeemer. But it is without good reason that the doctrine has therefore been ascribed to Hieracas, that Christ was merely the author of a perfect system of morals, and not the Redeemer of mankind. A zealous Montanist might have said nearly the same as Hieracas has done. Indeed, the traces of these erroneous ethical and anthropological notions may be found elsewhere, in the same period, particularly among the Alexandrians.

He endeavoured to prove by wresting texts out of their proper connection (1 Cor. vii.) that St. Paul had permitted marriage only out of respect to human infirmity, and only for the sake of avoiding, in the case of the weak, a still greater evil. In the parable of the virgins, Matth. xxv., he neglected the rule that, in a simile, we should not lay any stress on each individual circumstance, but only to the particular point to be illustrated; and so, from the fact that none but *virgins* are here mentioned, he drew the conclusion that none but unmarried persons could have any portion in the kingdom of heaven. In his application of the passage, "Without holiness no man can see the Lord," Heb. xii. 14, he proceeded on his own principle, that the essence of holiness consists in a life of celibacy.

As Hieracas himself allows that St. Paul permitted marriage to the weak, it follows from this that he by no means condemned unconditionally all married Christians, and excluded them from the number of the faithful. It may have been, perhaps, that conclusions were over hastily drawn from some of his extravagant assertions in commendation of an unmarried life. Or, perhaps, when he said that none but those living in celibacy could enter into the kingdom of heaven, he may have understood by the kingdom of heaven, not the state of blessedness generally, but only the highest degree of that blessedness; a dogmatic use of language peculiar



to himself, as seems probable from what we are about to remark.

In consequence of his ascetical tendency, Hieracas was accustomed to dwell with great earnestness on the position that every man must, by his own moral conflict, his own ascetic efforts, earn for himself a portion in the kingdom of heaven. This circumstance of his laying a peculiar stress on each one's own moral conflicts was also in perfect accordance with the peculiar Alexandrian tendency. Now, inasmuch as Hieracas assumed the position that a participation in the kingdom of heaven can only be the reward of a conflict, and that he who has not fought cannot obtain the crown, he inferred that children who die before they come to the years of understanding, do not enter into the kingdom of heaven. It can, however, hardly be supposed that by this he meant to pronounce on them an unconditional sentence of condemnation, but only that he excluded them from the *highest grade* of blessedness which results from communion with God, from the glorification of human nature by its union with the Godhead in Christ; for to the participation in this it was impossible to attain, except by one's own moral efforts, and by doing more than the law demands. He assumed a middle condition for these children—an hypothesis which Pelagius and many of the Orientals afterwards adopted with regard to unbaptized children. If Hieracas asserted this of all children, including those who had been baptized, it follows that he denied the connection of any *supernatural influence* with infant baptism. Perhaps, on this principle, he combated infant baptism itself, and represented it as a practice of recent origin, at variance with the end of baptism, and with the essential character of Christianity. The remarks which we have here made tend to confirm also what was just before observed, that Hieracas by no means honoured Christ merely as a moral Teacher. On the contrary, it is clearly evident that he looked upon Him as one who had glorified human nature, and had acquired for it that highest grade of blessedness, to which men by their own unassisted powers could never have attained.)

From the position subsequently assumed by the orthodox of the church, a charge was brought against Hieracas of entertaining certain errors on the doctrine of the Trinity.



He is said to have employed the following comparison: "The Son of God emanates from the Father, as one lamp is kindled from another, or as one torch is divided into two."\* Comparisons of this sort, drawn from sensible objects, were at variance, we admit, with the spiritual tendency of Origen; but the older church-teachers, such as Justin and Tatian, had certainly been partial to them. Again, Hieracas affirmed that under the type of Melchisedec is represented the Holy Spirit, since the latter is designated, Rom. viii. 26, as an intercessor for men, consequently as a priest. *He* represents the image of the Son, being subordinate, indeed, to the Son, but bearing of all beings the nearest resemblance to Him;—a notion which is in perfect conformity with Origen's theory of subordination, which long continued to maintain a place in the Eastern church.†

From Palestine the influence of Origen was, by means of his friends and disciples, extended even to Cappadocia and to Pontus, as the three great teachers of the church in Cappadocia in the fourth century still testify. Here we have to mention particularly his great disciple *Gregory*, to whom the admiration of the Christians gave the surname of Wonder-worker (Θαυματουργός). His original name was Theodorus. He was descended from a noble and wealthy family of Neocæsarea in Pontus. His father, a devoted pagan, educated him in heathenism. At the age of fourteen, however, he lost his father, and then first he was gained to Christianity; affording another illustration of the fact that it was often through children and women that the gospel first found its way into families. As yet, however, he was acquainted with

\* 'Ος λύχνον ἀπὸ λύχνου, ἢ ὡς λάμπαδα εἰς δύο. Arius ad Alexandr. apud Epiphani. hæres. 69, s. 7. Athanas. T. I. P. II. 68.

† He appeals also to a passage in an apocryphal writing of some importance on account of its bearing on the history of the oldest doctrines,—the ἀναβατικὸν Ἰσαίου, i. e. the account of Isaiah's ascension to the several regions of heaven, and of what he there saw. After the angel attendant of Isaiah has shown him the Son of God, sitting at the right hand of God, ὁ ἀγαπητός, Isaiah asks, Καὶ τίς ἐστὶν ὁ ἄλλος, ὁ ὅμοιος αὐτῷ, ἐξ ἀριστέρων ἑλλών; καὶ εἶπε· σὺ γινώσκεις, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα τὸ λαλοῦν ἐν σοὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς προφηταῖς. Καὶ ἦν, φησι, ὅμοιον τῷ ἀγαπητῷ. This passage is found in the writing now published entire, after the old Ethiopic translation, by R. Lawrence [late Archbishop of Cashel], Oxonia, 1819, pp. 58, 59, v. 32-36.

Christianity only from oral teaching, being himself still ignorant of the Scriptures. The religious interest was with him as yet but a subordinate one, a splendid career in the world seeming to him far more important. His mother exerted herself to the utmost to have him taught everything which, under the existing circumstances, could contribute to the successful prosecution of his aims. He received, therefore, a good rhetorical education, in order to qualify him for preferment as a rhetorician or an advocate; and he learnt, moreover, the language of the established government and laws,—the Latin. His teacher in the Latin language pointed out to him how very necessary to the attainment of his end was the knowledge of the Roman law. He commenced the study of this, and had already formed the design of visiting Rome, for the purpose of improving his knowledge of the Roman jurisprudence. But Providence had chosen him to be an instrument for higher ends; and, without dreaming of it or willing it, as he observes himself, in describing the remarkable vicissitudes of his life, he was now to be formed for higher purposes.

His sister's husband, who was legal adviser to the præfect of Palestine, had been called to Cæsarea by the duties of his office. He had left his wife behind at Neocæsarea; and now she was summoned to follow him. His brother-in-law, the young Theodorus, was requested to attend her on the journey; and it was intimated that he could thus easily prosecute his plan of studying the Roman jurisprudence at the celebrated school of Roman law of Berytus in Phœnicia, not far distant from Cæsarea. Theodorus accepted the invitation; but this journey had a different result from what he had anticipated. At Cæsarea he became acquainted with Origen: the latter soon observed the talents of the young man, and sought to direct them to a higher end than that which he himself had then in view. Attracted, in spite of himself, by this great teacher, he forgot Rome, Berytus, and the study of law. To awaken in him the activity of his own mind, a free, unprejudiced spirit of inquiry, was, as Theodore himself describes it in his farewell discourse, the principal endeavour of Origen. After having made him search for the scattered rays of truth in the systems of the Greek philosophy, he showed him all that revelation furnishes of a higher order. In this way he led him to the study of the sacred scriptures, and expounded to him their meaning.

Theodore says of Origen's exposition of scripture, "It is my firm belief that he was able to discourse as he did only by communion with the divine Spirit; for to be a prophet and to understand prophets requires the same power. And no man can understand the prophets on whom the Spirit himself, from whom the prophecies came, has not bestowed the power of understanding his own language. This man had received from God that greatest of gifts, *the call to be to men an interpreter of the words of God*; to understand God's word as God speaks it, and to announce it to men as man can understand it."\*

After he had spent *eight years* with Origen at Cæsarea (where probably he also received baptism and adopted the name of *Gregorius*) he returned to his native land. With deep sorrow he took leave of the teacher to whom his whole soul was bound by the strongest affection. He compared the tie that united them with the bond of friendship between David and Jonathan. To Origen, and to the Providence which, without his own knowledge or will, had conducted him to such a friend, he testified his gratitude in the parting address, wherein he describes the providential events of his own life, and Origen's method of instruction and training.†

In tearing himself with pain from the society of his beloved teacher, and from those sacred studies which had so long been his exclusive occupation, to engage with sorrowful heart in employment of an entirely different kind, to which in his native city he was to devote himself, he exclaims, "But why grieve at this? We have, verily, a Saviour for all, even for those that are half dead and fallen among thieves—one who cares for all, is the Physician of all, the watchful Keeper of all men. We have *also* within us *that seed which by thy*

\* Panegyric. in Orig. c. 15.

† This discourse we have followed as the source chiefly to be relied on for the history of the early life and education of Gregory. The narratives of Gregory of Nyssa, in his biography of this Gregory, openly contradict the autobiography of the latter; and, as Gregory of Nyssa set out with rhetorical flourishes what he had taken from incredible or inaccurate stories, it were a fruitless labour to undertake to reconcile the two contradictory accounts. The Panegyric of Gregory may be found in the fourth vol. of the edition of Origen's works by de la Rue, and in the third vol. of the *Bibliotheca Patrum* of Galland.

*means* (Origen) *we have been made conscious of bearing within us*; and the seed which we *have received from thee*, those glorious doctrines. Having these seeds, we part with tears indeed, for we are leaving thee, but yet taking these seeds with us. Perhaps the heavenly Keeper will accompany us and deliver us; but perhaps we shall return to thee, and from the seed bring with us also the fruits and the sheaves; and if none are ripe (for how could that be?), yet they may be such as will thrive even amidst the thorns of civil employments." And then, addressing himself directly to Origen, he proceeds: "But do thou, beloved head, stand up and dismiss us with thy prayer. As by thy holy doctrines thou hast all the long time we have been with thee guided us\* to salvation, so now, when we are to leave thee, guide us to salvation by thy prayers. Give us over and commend us, or rather give us back, to that God who conducted us to thee. Thanks to Him for what He has hitherto done for us; but do thou implore Him also to guide us in the future, to inspire our minds with His precepts, to imbue us with the fear of God, and to make this our most wholesome discipline. For we shall not be able, far away from thee, to obey Him with *the freedom* with which we could obey him so long as we were with thee. Pray of Him, as a consolation for our separation from thee, to send with us a good angel who may guide us. But pray of Him also to bring us once more back to thee; for the simple assurance of this would be our greatest consolation."

After his removal Origen still retained an affectionate remembrance of Gregory. There is still extant a letter which he wrote to him, full of paternal love.† In this he assures him that his distinguished talents fitted him for the station either of an able teacher of the Roman law, or of an eminent instructor of one of the famous philosophical schools; but it was his wish that Gregory would make Christianity his single aim, and employ all his talents to promote this one great

\* He speaks here in the plural, probably because he has in mind also his brother Athenodorus, who had come in company with him to Origen, and afterwards became bishop of a church in Pontus. Vid. Euseb. l. IV. c. 30.

† Philocal. c. 13.



object. Following out his own principles as to the relation of the sciences, and particularly of philosophy, to Christianity, he goes on to advise Gregory to make himself master of everything in the general circle of the sciences and in philosophy which he could apply to any use in behalf of Christianity. By a variety of beautiful allegorical expositions of the narratives of the Old Testament, he endeavours to set clearly before him the duty of making everything subservient to the divine calling, and of sanctifying every other interest by referring it to this; instead of forgetting, as was frequently done, the divine calling itself in the crowd of foreign matters, or profaning it by allowing it to become mixed up and confounded with them. He then addresses him as follows: "Study, then, my son, before all things else, the sacred Scriptures; but let it be to thee an earnest study; for it needs a very earnest study of the Scriptures to keep us from expressing anything or judging anything too rashly respecting their sacred contents. And if thou studiest the Holy Scriptures with a believing temper of mind, well pleasing to God,\* then, wherever anything in them seems shut up from thee, knock, and it shall be opened to thee by the porter of whom Jesus speaks in St. John x. 3, *To him the porter openeth*. Search, with unwavering faith in God, after the sense of the sacred word, which is hidden from the great mass of readers. Let it not suffice thee, however, merely to knock and to seek; for prayer also is especially necessary to the understanding of divine things; for in exhorting us thereto the Saviour has said not only Knock, and it shall be opened unto you, and Seek, and ye shall find; but also Ask, and it shall be given you."

Gregory answered the hopes of his great teacher. In his native city, of which he became bishop, there were at first but *seventeen* Christians. Through his instrumentality the majority of its inhabitants were converted, and Christianity became

\* The Greek word *πρόληψις* hardly admits of being well rendered in the present case. Neither "prejudice" nor "prejudgment" would answer here. "Presupposition" would come nearer to the sense. Origen means to say that the reader of the scriptures should be *fully persuaded* beforehand that the sacred word is pervaded throughout with a divine spirit, and not allow himself to be embarrassed at particular passages where the divine meaning does not immediately appear.

widely diffused in Pontus. It is to be lamented that we have no account of the labours of this remarkable man more accurate and more worthy of credit than the legendary account of his life, set forth with so much of rhetorical ornament, which Gregory of Nyssa wrote a century afterwards. Perhaps, in following out those principles of the Alexandrian school which permitted and inculcated the practice of descending to the weakness of the multitude and carrying on a progressive course of religious education, he was in the habit of yielding too much from a wish to increase the number of his heathen converts; perhaps he conceived that, if they were but once introduced into the Christian church, the spirit of the gospel, and the continued labours of their teacher, would gradually lead them onward to a more enlightened Christianity. Having observed that many of the common people were attached to the religion of their fathers from a love of the ancient sports connected with paganism, he determined to provide the new converts with a substitute for these. After the Decian persecution, under which numbers in this country had died as martyrs, he instituted a general festival in honour of the martyrs, and permitted the rude multitude to celebrate it with banquets similar to those which accompanied the pagan funerals (*Parentalia*) and other heathen festivals. He imagined that, in this way, one main obstacle to the conversion of the heathen would be removed, and, if they once became members of the Christian church, they would, by degrees, when their minds had once become enlightened and spiritualized by Christianity, bid farewell, of their own accord, to those sensual pleasures.\* But he did not seem to consider what an intermingling of pagan and Christian notions and customs might result from this loose accommodation,—an issue which was afterwards too fully realized,—nor how difficult it would be for Christianity to penetrate directly into the life of men, when, from the very first, it had become adulterated by such an alloy.†

\* *Vita Gregor.* c. 27.

† The canonical letter which we have from this Gregory shows perhaps that, in the conversion of large bodies of the people, there may have been much which was merely outward and in appearance; for it relates to a class of persons who took advantage of the confusion occasioned by the devastation committed by the Goths in the country around Pontus to make the public misfortunes a source of profit to themselves,

We have from Gregory a simple and clearly written *Paraphrase of Ecclesiastes*. A confession of faith on the doctrine of the Trinity, which he is affirmed to have written by special revelation, was appealed to in the fourth century in opposition to the Arians. In attestation of its authenticity it was said that it still remained in his own hand-writing, having been preserved in the church of Neocæsarea. But although probably the first part of this confession, in which the peculiar doctrines of Origen may be distinctly recognised, is genuine, yet the second part is manifestly a later addition, inasmuch as it contains distinctions wholly unknown to the school of Origen, and which first arose out of the controversy with the Arians in the fourth century.

Among the violent opponents of the school of Origen we have already mentioned, in another place, *Methodius*,—first, bishop of Olympus in Lycia, afterwards of Tyre,—a martyr in the persecution of Diocletian. He does not however seem to have always stood in the same relation to this school. Eusebius of Cæsarea, in his continuation of Pamphilus's *Apolo-*gy for Origen, affirms that Methodius contradicted his own earlier remarks, which had been in praise of Origen.\* The ecclesiastical historian Socrates asserts, on the other hand,† that Methodius had first declared himself against Origen, and afterwards, in his dialogue called *ξένων*, retracted his censures, and expressed his admiration of the man. There must be some truth lying at the bottom of both statements. Eusebius and Socrates derived their impressions from what Methodius had himself declared in his own writings. But it seems not improbable that these two authors determined the chronological order of these writings, not by any historical data, but each according to his own private conjectures; and in matters of this kind the ancients were very far from being accurate. Methodius, in his *Symposium*, which we shall presently notice, does not appear to be by any means a stickler for

and even to rob their own countrymen. This letter furnishes, at the same time, evidence of Gregory's wakeful zeal for the morals of his people.

\* Apud Hieronym. lib. I. adv. Rufin. Hieronym. opp. ed. Martianay, T. IV. fol. 359: Quomodo ausus est Methodius nunc contra Origenem scribere, qui hæc et hæc de Origenis loquutus est dogmatibus?

† Lib. IV. c. 13.

the letter of the church doctrine. On the contrary, the work betrays a leaning to Theosophy, a fondness for the allegorical mode of interpretation. It contains much, therefore, which indicates a mental direction generally similar to that of Origen; indeed, expressions occur which at least favour the doctrine of the soul's præexistence.\* But it also contains much which is directly at variance with the doctrines of Origen;—for instance, a decided leaning to Chiliasm.† It may therefore safely be conjectured that Methodius, who was no systematic thinker, was in the first place attracted by many of the views and writings of Origen, which flattered his favourite opinions and pleased his taste; which only prepared him, however, to be the more strongly repelled by whatever in the same system went counter to his own intellectual bias and his own dogmatic principles.

The most important and authentic of the writings which remain of this Methodius is his *Banquet of the Ten Virgins*, in eleven conversations, containing a eulogy, oftentimes exaggerated, of the unmarried life.

The treatise on free-will (περὶ αὐτεξουσίου) which we have under the name of Methodius seems to belong to the Christian church-teacher Maximus, who lived in the reign of Septimius Severus,‡ rather than to Methodius.§ It is an attack on the Gnostic Dualism.

One who zealously stood up for Origen against those that accused him of being a heretic was the presbyter Pamphilus, of Cæsarea in Palestine, a man distinguished for his zeal in the cause of piety and science. He founded at Cæsarea an ecclesiastical library, which contributed in no small degree to the furtherance of scientific studies even in the fourth century. Every friend of science, and in particular every one who was disposed to engage in a thorough study of the Bible, found in this Pamphilus every encouragement and support. He exerted himself to multiply,|| to disseminate, and to correct the

\* Orat. II. Theophil. s. 5.

† Orat. IX. s. 5.

‡ Euseb. lib. V. c. 27. Hieronym. de vir. illustr. c. 47. This Maximus can hardly be identical with the bishop of Jerusalem of the same name. Euseb. l. V. c. 12.

§ See, on this point, my genetic development of the Gnostic system p. 206.

|| Vid. Montfaucon catalog. Mss. biblioth. Coislinian. f. 261.



copies of the Bible. Many of these copies he distributed as presents; sometimes to women whom he saw to be diligent in reading the scriptures.\* He founded a *theological school*, in which the study of the sacred writings was made a special object of attention.† From this school probably proceeded the learned Eusebius, who owed everything to Pamphilus, and looked up to him as his paternal friend. Pamphilus communicated to his scholars his own reverence for Origen as the promoter of Christian science, and exerted himself to counteract the narrow views that were propounded by those who branded Origen as a heretic. As the ignorant zeal of these people, Pamphilus says, went so far as to pass immediate sentence of condemnation on every one who in any degree occupied himself with the writings of Origen, Pamphilus, while in prison under the Dioclesian persecution, in the year 309,§ wrote, conjointly with his disciple Eusebius, a work in Origen's defence,|| and addressed it to the confessors who had been con-

\* Eusebius says of him, in the account of his life, Hieronym. adv. Rufin. lib. I. f. 358, 359, vol. IV., Quis studiosorum amicus non fuit Pamphili? Si quos videbat ad victum necessariis indigere, præbebat large, quæ poterat. Scripturas quoque sanctas non ad legendum tantum, sed et ad habendum tribuebat promptissime. Nec solum viris, sed et feminis, quas vidisset lectioni deditas. Unde et multos codices præparabat, ut, quum necessitas poposcisset, volentibus largiretur.

† Euseb. lib. VII. c. 32: συνιστήσατο διατριβήν.

‡ Euseb. de martyrib. Palestinæ, c. 4.

§ One illustration of the influence which Pamphilus exercised over those who lived near him is furnished by the history of his slave Porphyrius, a young man of eighteen years, whom he had educated with a father's love, and in promoting whose religious and intellectual culture he had spared no pains. To this young man he had imparted a glowing love for the Redeemer. When Porphyry heard the sentence of death pronounced on his beloved master, he requested that, after the execution of the sentence, he might be allowed the privilege of paying him the last tribute of affection by committing his body to the grave. This request at once excited the anger of the fanatical præfect. And, as he steadfastly confessed that he was a Christian, and refused to offer sacrifice, he was subjected to the most cruel torture, and finally, after having been dreadfully lacerated, was conducted to the stake. All this he bore with the utmost constancy; only exclaiming once, when the fire reached him,—"Jesus, Son of God, help me." Euseb. de martyrib. Palæst. c. 11, f. 388.

|| The charge of the passionate Jerome, that Rufinus had falsely ascribed such a work to Pamphilus, deserves no credit.

demned to the mines. After the martyrdom of Pamphilus, Eusebius added to the five books of the unfinished work a supplementary sixth book. Of this apology we still possess the first book, in the arbitrary version of Rufinus, with the addition of a few fragments of the Greek.\*

The example of Pamphilus shows us how the comprehensive mind of Origen, which grasped and united together so many different pursuits, gave birth not only to a spirit of doctrinal speculation, but also to the thorough study of the Bible and the careful investigation of the text of the scriptures, however irreconcilable with his allegorizing licentiousness this may appear. Another instance of the same kind probably is that of the Egyptian bishop Hesychius, who prepared a new and emended revision of the text of the Alexandrian version, which became the current one in Egypt.† He likewise suffered martyrdom under the Dioclesian persecution, in the year 310 or 311.‡ Finally : it must also perhaps be ascribed in some measure to the influence of Origen that a new and peculiar school of theology sprang up at Antioch, which first arrived at its full development in the course of the fourth century. In this school the science of scriptural hermeneutics and exegesis received a healthy direction between the extremes of the grossly literal and the arbitrary allegorical methods of interpretation. Learned presbyters belonging to the church of Antioch, who took a special interest in the study of biblical interpretation, may be regarded as the progenitors of this school ; particularly Dorotheus and Lucian, of whom the latter died as a martyr during the Dioclesian persecution, in the beginning of the year 312.§

\* The loss of the Life of Pamphilus, by Eusebius, is much to be regretted.

† Hieronym. adv. Rufin. lib. II. f. 425.

‡ Euseb. hist. eccles. lib. VIII. c. 13, f. 308.

§ Lucian prepared a new revision of the corrected text of the Alexandrian revision, and probably also of the New Testament. The codices written after this revision were called *λουκιανῆα*. Hieronym. de vir. illustr. c. 77, adv. Rufin. lib. II. f. 425, vol. IV. What we are to judge of the earlier relation in which Lucian stood to Paul of Samosata is a point which cannot be determined with any certainty from the account which has been left by Alexander bishop of Alexandria, since that account is liable to the suspicion of being coloured by a polemical interest. Theodore. hist. eccles. lib. I. c. 4.

Thus the historical development of doctrine in this period terminates with the conflict of opposite tendencies, which were to act as counterpoises to each other, in order that Christianity might not be maimed and crippled by the partial views of men, but might be preserved in its integrity as that which is destined to overcome and reconcile all human antagonisms. And as this process of development and purification is transmitted from one generation to another, so also the conclusion of this first great stage of its history contains in it the foretokens and presages of all the succeeding periods, which, through their ever renewing struggles and victories, are to prepare the way for the last great struggle and the final victory which shall put an end to all strife.

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## CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF ROMAN EMPERORS.

A.D.

- Augustus, B.C. 30.  
 14 Tiberius.  
 38 Caligula.  
 41 Tib. Claudius.  
 54 Nero.  
 68 Galba, Otho, Vitellius.  
 70 Vespasian.  
 79 Titus.  
 81 Domitian.  
 96 Nerva.  
 98 Trajan.  
 117 Hadrian.  
 138 Antoninus Pius.  
 161 Marcus Antoninus.  
 180 Commodus.  
 193 Pertinax.  
 193 Julianus.  
 193 L. Septimius Severus.  
 211 Caracalla.  
 Opil. Macrinus.  
 218 Heliogabalus.  
 222 Alexander Severus.  
 235 C. Julius Maximinus.  
 238 Gordianus.  
 243 Philippus.  
 249 C. Messius Decius.  
 251 Trebonianus Gallus.  
 253 P. Licinius Valerianus and Gallienus.  
 261 Gallienus (Macrianus, Valens, Calpurnius Piso, Aureolus) and Odenathus.  
 268 M. Aurelius Claudius.  
 270 L. Domitius Aurelianus.  
 275 M. Claudius Tacitus.

A.D.

- 276 M. Annianus Florianus.  
 276 M. Aurelius Probus.  
 282 Carus (Carinus and Numerianus).  
 284 Diocletian and Maximianus.  
 305 Constantius (Galerius).  
 306 Constantine (Galerius, Severus, Licinius or Maximinus, Constantius, Constantius, Constans, Dalmatius, Annibalianus from 335).  
 337 Constantius (Constantinus, Constans, Magnentius).  
 361 Julianus.  
 363 Flav. Jovianus.  
 364 Flav. Valentinianus, Valens (Procopius), Gratianus, and Valentinianus the Younger.  
 378. Theodosius (Gratianus till 383, Valentinianus the Younger till 392, Magnus Clemens Maximus, Arcadius from 383).  
 395 Honorius.  
 424 Joannes.  
 425 Valentinianus.  
 455 Maximus.  
 455 Avitus.  
 457 Majorianus.  
 461 Libius Severus.  
 467 Procopius Anthemius.  
 473 Glycerius.  
 474 Nepos.  
 475 Romulus Augustulus.

\* END OF VOL. II.















